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Summary 
 
This thesis sets out to examine changes to the policymaking structure and practice of the 
Labour Party during the 1994-1997 period, and to link these changes to the adoption of new 
policies. The leadership of new Labour has used its enhanced autonomy to move closer to the 
Conservative Party on a number of key education and training policies. The thesis uses 
manifesto and documentary analysis to illustrate policy movement, and interview evidence 
with policy actors past and present to trace the changing relationship between the party and 
the policy community. The thesis concludes that new Labour can best be understood as a 
synthesis of three elements; changing policymaking practices since the 1980s; the intellectual 
acceptance of globalisation, flexibility and market forces, which can be dated from the 1987-
1989 policy review; and moral authoritarianism, introduced since the accession of Tony Blair 
to the leadership and the appointment of David Blunkett as shadow education spokesperson 
in 1994. The thesis identifies two main currents of thought within the Left‟s educational 
discourse, egalitarianism and meritocracy, and concludes that new Labour has succeeded in 
presenting its new policies within the boundaries set by such a broad ideology.  
In educational terms, the new Labour Government has continued the centralisation of 
power within the Department for Education and Employment. Other key themes for new 
Labour include an enthusiasm for employer imperatives in education, institutional diversity in 
state education and centrally determined pedagogy. In post-compulsory and higher education, 
the costs and benefits will henceforth be the responsibility of the individual, not the state or 
employers. The thesis suggests that new Labour is characterised by cultural change rather 
than structural reform, because its adoption of Conservative positions in education and 
training has limited the opportunities for radicalism.  
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Chapter One  
Introduction 
 
This thesis sets out to answer two questions about the policymaking practices of both the Labour 
Party and the education and training polity. Firstly, why is education so high on the political 
agenda of all parties in the mature democracies, and Britain in particular? and secondly, what is 
the relationship between the Labour Party and an educational consensus? This initial chapter 
hopes to set the context for the rest of the thesis by explaining the linkages between education and 
the labour market and the parallel rise of education as a salient issue among the electorate as 
measured by opinion polling organisations. The chapter then goes on to explain why this high 
issues salience to some extent confounds the usual assumptions of policy network theory. The 
study argues for an educational exceptionalism. 
 The relationship between the Labour Party and educational consensus is treated historically 
in the first instance, while later chapters detail the policymaking practice of new Labour from 
1994 to the present. The thesis contends that changes to the policymaking structure of the Labour 
Party since 1994 make it easier for the party leadership to make reactive and populist policy 
changes wherever such opportunities exist, or to stay within the consensus where no populist 
opportunities existed. In order to establish the existence of consensus on key issues, this chapter 
breaks the concept down into three areas: inter-party consensus; intra-party consensus; and what 
can be termed a wider educational consensus.  
With regard to inter-party consensus, we can measure this quantitatively by examining 
General Election manifesto pledges for the period 1964 to 1997. This is set out below. The later 
case study chapters engage in a qualitative assessment of the relationship between Government 
legislation and Opposition responses. With regard to intra-party consensus, which is crucial to any 
party that seriously wants to fight an election without internal rancour and open debate, this is 
traced again throughout the case study chapters. This thesis argues that Labour Party ideology 
includes two major educational themes which usually have to be reconciled in policymaking and 
presentation- meritocracy and egalitarianism. The often subtle merging of these major themes is an 
underlying theme of this thesis which only emerges from a careful study of party documents and 
public statements which go further than manifesto statements. With regard to an „educational 
consensus‟, this is taken to mean the positions that key pressure group actors take in relation to 
educational issues. Often there develops a consensus among practitioners and academic 
researchers, and again the later case study chapters attempt to trace new Labour‟s relationship with 
such policy actors. Establishing this relationship between new Labour and the consensus allows us 
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to draw conclusions about new Labour‟s radicalism or caution in relation to the policy community. 
Examination and analysis of  consensus as expressed in party manifestos will follow later in the 
chapter. For now it is important to establish exactly why education is political. 
 
  
6 
 
 
 
A changing labour market 
 
This thesis suggests that new Labour are reactive to changes in demand for labour in the 
economy. The nature of such changes can be seen in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Employment change, 1978-98 (thousands) 
Year Ag. & 
Fishi
ng 
Energ
y & 
Wate
r 
Manu-
facturin
g 
Constr
-uction 
Total 
services 
Transport 
Storage & 
Communi
-cation 
Public 
admin, 
education
, health 
1978 407 713 6773 1254 13878 1474 4968 
1979 400 719 6677 1281 14125 1493 4991 
1980 393 705 6065 1222 13992 1459 4980 
1981 381 673 5617 1098 13798 1399 4952 
1982 387 640 5262 1085 13714 1359 4962 
1983 372 604 5070 1080 14033 1342 5039 
1984 365 576 5018 1074 14322 1336 5077 
1985 358 534 4965 1041 14516 1315 5173 
1986 348 485 4815 1031 14707 1287 5316 
1987 343 462 4832 1074 15237 1304 5508 
1988 332 438 4862 1096 15763 1340 5563 
1989 322 415 4816 1133 16153 1384 5593 
1990 311 392 4572 1117 16319 1395 5656 
1991 312 358 4185 1003 16145 1366 5702 
1992 313 324 3923 912 16049 1323 5721 
1993 310 282 3899 860 16307 1305 5748 
1994 279 247 3977 858 16510 1301 5756 
1995 277 238 4126 893 17038 1313 5762 
1996 328 225 4147 897 17358 1335 5809 
1997 328 218 4156 1067 17801 1354 5757 
1998 293 217 4064 1117 18189 1418 5803 
Source: www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase 
 
As we can see there are large falls in the numbers employed in agriculture and fishing, energy 
and water supply and manufacturing. The construction industry has fluctuated. The big 
growth areas are in services and public administration, education and health. Looking more 
closely at the figures, the flexibility of the new labour market can be demonstrated by the 
changing role of women and the numbers of self-employed. The Labour Force Surveys for 
1990 and 1991 shows rises in the numbers of women employed (Table 2): 
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Table 2: Labour Force Survey, Spring 1984- Spring 1991 
Category 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
All married 
women in 
employment 
(thousands) 
6433 6060 6755 6961 7250 7460 7728 7798 
Full-time % 45 45 45 46 47 48 49 50 
Part-time % 55 55 55 54 53 52 49 50 
Unmarried 
(thousands) 
3197 2997 3140 3159 3228 3549 3425 3236 
Full-time % 77 76 75 75 74 74 73 71 
Part-time % 23 24 25 25 26 26 27 29 
 
Here we can see the growth in women‟s employment and also the rising proportion of women 
who work full-time.  
 Self-employment is another indicator of a changing labour market as former large 
employers down-size and out-source services to previous employees, and new technologies 
provide new opportunities for small business start-ups: 
 
Table 3: Proportion who are self-employed, Spring 1984- Spring 1991 
Category 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Ag & Fishing 48 47 48 49 51 51 52 53 
Energy & Water 1 1 - - - - 3 2 
Non-fuel Mining 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 
Engineering 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
Manufacturing 6 6 6 8 8 9 8 10 
Construction 30 32 33 35 38 41 40 40 
Distribution 17 17 17 17 17 16 16 15 
Transport and  
Communications 
9 8 8 11 10 11 11 10 
Banking, finance 
& insurance 
12 13 13 14 13 14 15 15 
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Other services 6 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 
Source: Labour Force Survey 1991 
 
 
Why education is politically important 
 
Education is politically important on the most basic level because it affects everyone. This thesis 
demonstrates that education has become progressively more important both for the economy and 
for individuals. Changes in the economy dictate that individuals acquire new skills, that of new 
ways of delivering education and training are introduced, and that new standards and credentials 
are provided by the system. Individuals recognise the need to acquaint themselves with these new 
standards and credentials. Existing qualifications such as A levels and single honours degrees 
maintain their status and social value as education has become more socially and economically 
important, but new qualifications emerge 
Education is also politically important because the education service is the third largest area 
of public spending in Britain. In the financial year 1999-2000, education cost the exchequer £41 
billion out of a total spend of £349 billion; only social security and defence exceed this proportion 
of the budget
1
. Given this, it is only appropriate that public expenditure is accountable, in the 
sense that it is used efficiently and leads to useful outcomes; again this is as important to 
individuals as it is to the government, employers or taxpayers. 
 A further economic instigator of change is globalisation. Given the reduced capabilities of 
nation states to alter the national economy in relation to other states in an open trading 
environment, there are few other levers of economic power other than those which increase the 
value of human capital. Concerns about human capital and national competitiveness were voiced 
by new Labour both before and after the 1997 election, and formed the corpus of much 
Conservative policy during Labour‟s opposition years.  
The need for a growing economy would alone be enough to lift education policy up the 
political agenda in recent years. However, there have also been concerns regarding the 
effectiveness of education policy in social terms. Concern about this aspect of education was first 
raised by Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan in a speech at Ruskin College in October 1976. 
As we can see from Table 4, in percentage terms, concern about education and schools has 
steadily risen overall. The responses fluctuated between five and 18 during the period 1974 to 
                                                          
1
 The Budget: Spending and Revenue, 1999/2000, HM Treasury, March 1999. 
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1985 on the MORI scale of the „most important issues facing Britain today‟. From 1986 to 1996, 
concern varied between 11 and 32 percent and during 1991 and 1992, six months of each year 
registered concern in the twenties. Education and schools become even more politically salient 
(following a lull after the 1992 General Election) from 1993 onwards: the lowest register of 
concern in 1993 was 16%, in 1994 18%, in 1995 22%, in 1996 27% and in 1997 31%
2
 (Table4).      
 
 
The peak response illustrated by the table is 43% in April 1997. This continued after the May 1977 
election, and in 1998 education and schools had risen to third position in the scale of „most 
important issues‟ while concern about the education system stood at 33% eighteen months after 
new Labour came into office
3
. 
Education rises as a politically salient issue in line with both the timing of elections and of 
major legislation. Thus, MORI respondents registering concern about the education system almost 
doubled in percentage terms (from nine to 17) in the two opinion polls prior to the May 1979 
General Election, suggesting that the Conservatives attacks on the comprehensive system (or 
Labour‟s management of it) hit home with potential electors4. On a longer time frame, Gallup‟s 
slightly different „most urgent issue facing Britain today‟ index also found concern about 
education doubling between 1975 and 1976, and remaining at a high until after the 1979 election
5
.
  
 The 1983 General Election seems to have had little impact on such figures, but 1987 again 
produced a doubling of concern about education (from 11% to 24%) in the first six months of the 
                                                          
2
 MORI Polls (1998) Political Attitudes in Great Britain 20-23 November 1998 
3
 MORI poll  Political Attitudes in Great Britain for The Times, 26/11/98. 
4
 MORI (1998) 
5
 GPI Monthly Reports 1975 to 1979 
 
Table 4: Concern about education, 1974-1998, Mori Polls (1999) 
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year to coincide with the election. The approach to the 1992 General Election also precipitated a 
surge, not only in the peak of concern, but also the long sustainability of responses above 20% 
over a nine month period September 1991 to July 1992.  
The conclusion is clear; in response to and in the use of public opinion data (as de facto 
market signalling) parties make education one of the bases of their appeal to the electorate. The 
Conservatives clearly attacked the incumbent Government‟s record in 1979, but education had a 
lower salience in 1983, certainly as far as the Opposition Labour Party were concerned. Elections 
in 1987 and 1992 continued the earlier pattern, with either the Government using educational 
aspirations to denigrate the opposition, or the Labour Party raising education as an example of 
governmental failure. This alone, however, would fail to explain the rising overall concern of 
respondents with the education service. Response figures in the major polls generally fell away 
after elections, but the inexorable rise in the long-run trend after 1986 suggests another cause. 
Here the timing of major legislation and the ability of the governing party to raise political 
awareness about the need for reform is also evident. 
 The two highest MORI responses of 1980 maintained the growth pattern of 1978/79, and 
coincide with the introduction of the Education Act, 1980. This obliged local authorities to make 
information available to parents about examination results. The presence of such a major piece of 
legislation would be expected to raise awareness of education and schools, and in fact 1980 figures 
were in general higher than 1983, an election year. In 1987 there was a surge corresponding to the 
election and to the White Paper which pre-figured the Education Reform Act of 1988, and 
thereafter the post-election falling off was absent from MORI‟s responses. More specific polling 
on the issues the Conservatives raised in the White Paper suggested broad support for one of the 
main planks of the legislation, a National Curriculum, and also suggested encouragement for the 
continuation of grammar schools; this is discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. After 1992, 
key educational legislation provided the opportunity for schools to opt out of LEA control and 
become Grant Maintained, with direct management of both statutory and additional (transitional) 
funding. The MORI index rose correspondingly in 1993 as the reforms were introduced. Chapter 
Three of this thesis demonstrates the power of the media in spreading (or reflecting) parental 
concern about state education, while Chapter Six explores the increasing propensity of Left-
inclined newspapers such as the Guardian and Independent to highlight the failures of 
comprehensive education in the latter period. Although post-compulsory education and training, 
further education and (except on tuition fees) higher education were less of an immediate concern 
of  the electorate, the combination of social, economic and political imperatives in an era of labour 
flexibility and open markets clearly helped raised the profile of education as a political issue. New 
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Labour‟s adoption of much of the rhetoric of labour flexibility, modernisation, renewal and zero 
tolerance of low standards in the pre-election period added to this trend. The importance new 
Labour attached to education was best summarised by Tony Blair in a speech, perhaps 
symbolically at Ruskin College, in 1996: “I will ensure that when strategic decisions need to be 
taken, it is not just the Education Secretary speaking for education”. 
 
 
Educational exceptionalism 
 
In terms of methodology, this thesis uses policy network theory to establish the existence of a 
community and any consensus position it might hold. This is done to chart new Labour‟s position 
in relation to the consensus. However this thesis does not adopt a policy network theory 
framework. There are two main reasons for this; firstly, the electoral salience discussed in the 
previous section makes much education policy public property; secondly, much of the focus of the 
thesis is policymaking in opposition, and it is difficult to locate the opposition party in traditional 
policy network theory. In this survey of new Labour in opposition, the main question is the 
relationship between party ideology and electoral strategy. Therefore this thesis uses interview 
evidence with many representatives of pressure groups and other institutions which make up the 
policy community, with particular emphasis on the changing role of party actors. 
In relation to policy network theory, the first problem is that education policy is not 
developed in as closed a policy community as many of the usual examples cited
6
. Instead, 
education policy debates are carried out almost continually in the public domain because 
educational outcomes potentially affect both the life-chances of virtually all citizens, and the future 
economic performance of the nation. In education the policy community has to operate more in a 
semi-public arena than in other policy areas. For example, all that the state and the public demand 
of the health service is cheap, quick and efficient medical practice; it is not expected to have much 
impact on Britain‟s relative economic performance and detailed questions about medical practice 
are usually carried out away from the public glare. The high issue salience of education adds a new 
dimension to the activities of the policy actors discussed here, where the media and public opinion 
shape the actions taken by many actors, not least the parties themselves. This set of additional 
factors means that politicians and opinion-formers are quick to seize on education as a political 
weapon or as providing a symbolic vision for a reinvigorated Britain. There is certainly less of a 
                                                          
6
 Martin Smith‟s examples in the British context include agriculture, health, business and public 
policy, and consumer policy, Smith,MJ (1993) Pressure, Power and Policy: State Autonomy and 
Policy Networks in Britain and United States, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London.  
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tendency to leave educational problems to the experts than in other fields; almost every public body 
has an interest, everyone has experienced education and most think they could order it better. 
 The second problem with policy network theory in relationship to this thesis is that Labour 
was in opposition for most of the period under study. The standard typology of a policy community 
sees the community proper (centred around the state) at one end of a continuum and an issue 
network at the other. The issue network is usually populated by groups which are either temporarily 
interested groups, or those interested only in a part of the concerns of the core policy community. It 
could be argued that Labour, starting from political oblivion (circa 1983) moved from the 
peripheral issue network to the core policy community as its proximity to power increased. 
Although the party‟s education spokespersons throughout the 1980s (Frank Dobson, Neil Kinnock, 
Giles Radice and Jack Straw) always contributed to debates, and at elections Labour presented a 
full programme of education policies, the resource dependency variable was absent because other 
policy actors would receive little in return from Labour. The party concentrated on opposing 
Conservative changes, and as we shall see, interacted with members of the policy community 
proper only for campaigning purposes. In so far as a policy community presupposes consensus as a 
price of entry (moving from the periphery to the core of the policy network
7
), Labour was not 
continuously a member in any real sense.  
A further problem with policy network theory is that it claims that policy cannot emerge 
without state backing. In fact this thesis aims to show that the state has to respond to changes, such 
as demand for labour or the surges in inflation after the events of 1973 over which it has very little 
control. It is often assumed that the state follows and reflects new thinking among policy elites. 
However, as we shall see, the alleged declining standards in education, thought to be causing 
economic downturn, were not generally taken seriously until anti-state rhetoric from New Right 
thinkers persuaded successive governments that there was a need to recognise this linkage in 
policy change
8
. The openness of education as a policy domain forces us to reconceptualise. If 
policy network theories do not answer all the questions here, then other theories of how ideas 
(comprehensivisation, the economy-education link, parental choice) evolve into party manifesto 
pledges  have to be considered. The following section looks at the manifesto statements in more 
detail. 
                                                          
7
 Ibid, p.62, Smith also cites Jordan,AG & Richardson,JJ (1987) Government and Pressure Groups in 
Britain, Clarendon, Oxford who talk about the „rules of the game‟ core players have to abide by. 
These include accepting the Government has the final say, not making unreasonable public demands, 
and developing policy in secret - the opposite to what opposition groups do when far from power. 
8
 The most obvious example is the Labour Party Prime Minister accepting this thesis at his Ruskin 
College speech in October 1976. The state initially tried to deny any failings of the comprehensive 
system, and then gradually adopted the New Right critique as state policy. Ideas and the fact of an 
opposition Conservative Party impacted more on state policy than state autonomy in itself. 
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Inter-party consensus in party election manifestos 1964-1997 
 
This section looks at the evidence for inter-party consensus across a series of important 
educational and training issues as expressed in General Election Manifesto statements over the 
period 1964-1997. The intention is to establish movement by new Labour towards Conservative 
positions, which then form the basis for a consensus on key issues. However, this analysis also 
demonstrates that the Conservatives moved considerably on certain issues, whilst in Opposition in 
the 1960s and 1970s, and that there have been several periods of policy consensus throughout the 
period. Some important subject areas have been omitted from the analysis, such as the parties‟ 
position on public schools, direct grant schools and the Assisted Places scheme, where there was 
never a consensus. However the full series is reproduced in the appendix. Before we look in more 
detail at the findings which can be gleaned from such an exercise it is necessary to introduce 
several caveats relating to manifesto statement analysis. 
The first caveat in relation to this thesis is that elections are not generally fought and won 
on education alone. Manifesto statements represent what the parties believe to be politically salient 
or relevant to the electorate, and the language of the statements reflect this. Quite often, major 
educational themes are not covered at all in manifesto statements; for instance there is very little 
on the nature of pedagogy or the details of the curriculum, which are of underlying importance to 
the recurring themes of selection, access and standards. This is either because parties did not wish 
to highlight areas of controversy (or indeed, consensus) or because they wished to keep the 
promises and pledges of the manifesto simple and easily digestible for the public. Both these 
tendencies are understandable, and this thesis is not restricted to such policy pledges. Far more 
policy detail is issued between elections, in Opposition policy documents, in White and Green 
Papers, and in the statements and speeches of key politicians, and these form the bulk of the 
evidence for this thesis.  
 
A second problem with manifestos is that the statements are often too general and sweeping to 
identify the real trajectory of policy development. Omissions also present a problem, especially in 
the earlier manifestos covered by this survey. For example, the paucity of educational themes in 
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Labour‟s February 1974 document cannot be taken to mean that the party stopped caring about 
education, (it was a short document produced at short notice) and nor does the absence of specific 
standards-raising pledges by Labour until 1987 provide evidence that Labour did not care about 
higher standards. Standards would be raised, for all pupils, when comprehensivisation was 
complete. 
Manifesto statements require another health warning: they are contextualised by changing 
circumstances of the time. There are two separate aspects to the time context. A party in 
government for a long time will emphasise changes and improvements since it came to power, and 
will often de-emphasise what it considers non-issues which it has already solved. The 
Conservatives stopped being concerned about class sizes and teacher supply after 1966, and in 
1983 merely informed the electorate that “the country is now spending more per child than ever 
before”. The same effect is observed with opposition parties. While the main opposition party may 
develop new ideas whilst out of office, manifesto statements tend to be critically reactive to the 
Government‟s activities rather than offering a coherent alternative system.  In neither case do 
manifesto statements give the reader a representation of the full debates. 
The second aspect of the time context is illustrated by the two elections of 1974. At the February 
election, Labour produced a short document with the smallest education section of all the 
manifestos surveyed here. That election (and manifesto) was primarily concerned with economic 
policy, trade union power and energy supplies, and was called at relatively short notice. 
Throughout 1974 both parties couched their education pledges in reference to the prevailing 
economic circumstances: in October 1974, Labour acknowledged that “economic constraints are 
bound to influence [the] timing” of its plans. However, the Conservative Opposition in October 
1974 produced one of that party‟s fullest and most detailed education manifestos in the survey, 
highlighting standards of education and parental choice and attacking Labour‟s “ruthless 
imposition” of comprehensive reorganisation. This may reflect the beginnings of a rethink at 
Conservative Central Office in response to the February defeat (the ascendancy of the new right?), 
or equally that in times of rapid economic change it is legitimate to question the validity of public 
spending, especially on a (perhaps failing) policy; again, the manifestos provide only a partial 
view of developing policy imperatives. 
Given the above caveats, is it realistic to expect to find much in the way of meaningful evidence 
about policy consensus? There are some factors which should encourage consensus: both major 
parties are usually seeking to go beyond their core voters and gain the approval of the same 
section of the electorate, the neither strongly Labour or Conservative identifiers. Hence the cross-
15 
 
party consensus about the need to increase the supply of teachers to meet demand in the 1960s, or 
the requirement for government intervention in training especially during periods of persistently 
high unemployment. Another motive force for consensus might be the apparent success of a 
policy, which the Opposition wishes to endorse and build on if invited to form the next 
Government. Of the issues discussed in this section two such examples stand out; the 
Conservative‟s introduction of a national curriculum (which both parties highlighted for the first 
time in 1987) and local management of schools (LMS), introduced in the Conservative‟s 1987 
manifesto and responded to by Labour in 1992. Bearing in mind these caveats and motivating 
factors, let us examine the policy issues in more detail to identify areas of consensus. 
 
 
 
Inter-party consensus: issues in compulsory education 
 
Class size and teacher supply. 
As we can see, in 1964 there was a consensus shared by the parties on class sizes and teacher 
supply, but the Conservatives steadily move away from support for smaller class sizes over time. 
This is an example of movement by one party which leads to the breakdown of a consensus. 
Although only Labour pledged to cut class sizes in 1964, the Conservatives in Government had 
already planned teacher expansion. The 1966 manifestos also demonstrated consensus about the 
need for more teachers in primary schools, although already we can see a difference in emphasis 
with the Conservatives concerned more about manpower and encouraging more married women 
into the profession, while Labour are promoting the value of education and teaching. 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1964 Labour will cut down our 
overcrowded classes in both 
primary and secondary 
schools: the aim is to reduce 
all classes to 30 at the earliest 
possible moment. 
The training colleges will be 
producing by 1970 three times as 
many new teachers as in 1958, and 
the larger numbers going on to 
higher education will mean more 
teachers later on. 
1966 Our first priority is to reduce 
the size of classes. We shall 
intensify our efforts to 
increase the recruitment of 
teachers, and improve their 
status in society 
Get more teachers especially for the 
primary schools by expanding the 
Colleges of Education, enabling 
part-time teachers to qualify for 
pension, and giving more 
encouragement to married women 
who want to return to teaching. 
16 
 
 
Labour continued to make class size pledges in 1970 (though not in either of the 1974 manifestos), 
and again in 1979. The Conservatives did not mention either class sizes or teacher supply between 
1966 and 1979, which cannot be taken as evidence that they actually desired larger class sizes. The 
manifestos for 1983 show a resumption in the dialogue, with the Government clearly defending its 
record: 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1983 We will restore funds to local 
education authorities to 
reduce class sizes 
This country is now spending more 
per child in school than ever before, 
even after allowing for price rises. 
As a result, the average number of 
children per teacher is the lowest 
ever 
 
The 1987 manifestos show the beginnings of a divergence, with Labour continuing with its series 
of promises and the Conservatives hinting at relaxing the classroom‟s capacities to encourage 
more freedom for parents to opt for good schools: 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1987 We will make provision for 
smaller classes and ensure 
that children have up-to-date 
books, equipment and 
buildings without having to 
depend on fund-raising for 
those essentials.  
Schools will be required to enrol 
children up to the school's physical 
capacity instead of artificially 
restricting pupil numbers, as can 
happen today 
 
This Conservative statement echoes the intentions of the 1988 Education Reform Act, which is 
explored in more detail in Chapter Three. Despite the apparent ideological imperative to allow 
pupils the freedom to move to any school that their parents might desire for them, the 
Conservative Government of 1997 had to bow to the demands of teacher supply problems in 
specific areas, although it is a weak commitment compared to new Labour‟s specific and costed 
proposals: 
1997 We will reduce class sizes for five, 
six and seven year-olds to 30 or 
under, by phasing out the assisted 
places scheme, the cost of which is 
set to rise to 180 million pounds per 
year.   
 
We will.. encourage more 
teachers to enter the 
profession. 
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The issue of class sizes, especially for younger children, is one where there has been sufficient 
movement by one party to break down the consensus which existed. As we shall see in Chapter 
Six of this thesis, the consensus among policy actors on class sizes was almost universal by the 
middle 1990s, encompassing all the teacher unions, most practitioners and even the allegedly 
Conservative-orientated Office for Standards in Education (OFSTED). Only the Conservative 
Party and the Department for Education and Employment (DfEE) stood outside this consensus. 
However, the Labour Party had also moved on this issue, as pledges after 1992 are concentrated 
only on class sizes in primary schools, whereas earlier promises referred either to all age groups or 
were not specific. The comparatively strong agreement on teacher supply in 1964 and 1966 shows 
evidence for a temporary consensus based on the changing basis of demand, while the later 
divergence is evidence for the re-emergence of a divide based on (undiscussed) pedagogic 
disputes. 
 
Nursery provision for 3 and 4 year olds, prioritisation for early years 
 
This is another issue characterised by the Conservatives moving away from a 1960s consensus 
position. In fact the Conservatives were first to register the importance of early years education, 
with Labour quickly entering the dialogue. (Empty boxes denote a manifesto with no mention of 
the subject at hand): 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1964   
1966  Give improvements to primary 
school accommodation priority 
over projects for building new 
comprehensive schools 
1970 In the next five years, we shall 
put more resources, both 
teachers and building, into the 
primary schools and expand 
nursery schools provision both 
in, and outside, the educational 
priority areas. 
We also recognise the need for 
expansion of nursery education. 
This is especially important in areas 
of social handicap, such as the 
poorer parts of our large cities, 
where it is so vital to give children 
a better start. 
1974a Expand the education service 
by the introduction of a 
national scheme of Nursery 
Schools, including day care 
facilities 
We shall gradually extend free 
nursery schooling throughout the 
country so that within ten years it 
should be available for all three- 
and four-year-old children whose 
parents wish them to have it. 
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Note that the Conservative emphasis on primary education in the 1966 manifesto is coupled with a 
side-swipe at the comprehensive secondary school re-organisation programme favoured by Labour 
after 1964, and the 1970 manifesto echoes the Labour Government‟s actions to prioritise deprived 
areas. As with class sizes however, the Conservative manifestos between February 1974 and 1987 
ignored the subject matter completely, only to re-enter the debate with a defence of its record in 
Government: 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1987 We will make nursery 
education available for all 
three- and four-year-olds 
whose parents want this 
opportunity 
Eighty per cent of all three- and 
four-year-olds in this country attend 
nursery classes, reception classes or 
playgroups. Formal nursery 
education is not necessarily the 
most appropriate experience for 
children. Diversity of provision is 
desirable. LEA‟s should look to 
support the voluntary sector 
alongside their own provision 
 
The key to the change in Conservative thinking lies in the suggestion of a role for the voluntary 
sector, as competition for LEA primary schools. There is also an acknowledgement of 
contemporary research findings which suggested that formal education is not always appropriate at 
such an early age. Labour, by contrast, inserted commitments to expand nursery opportunities in 
every manifesto from 1970 to 1997, although the repetition of the message reads almost 
perfunctorily by 1992. The introduction of Nursery Vouchers by the Conservatives in 1996 
rejuvenated the dialogue in 1997, however: 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1992 We will offer nursery 
education to three and four 
year olds 
We will continue to encourage the 
creation of nursery places 
1997 Nursery vouchers have been 
proven not to work. They are 
costly and do not generate 
more quality nursery places. 
We will use the money saved 
by scrapping nursery vouchers 
to guarantee places for four 
year-olds. We will invite 
selected local authorities to 
pilot early excellence centres 
combining education and care 
for the under-fives. We will set 
targets for universal provision 
for three year-olds whose 
[O]nly we are committed to giving 
the parent of every four year old 
child a voucher so they can choose 
the pre-school education they want 
for their child. 
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parents want it. 
 
As we shall see in Chapter Six new Labour were reluctant to come out strongly against nursery 
vouchers throughout the period when they were being discussed (1995-1996). However, new 
Labour produced a new theme, that of combining all early years provision which allowed it to 
remain the party most concerned about early years education. The importance of repeated 
commitments on issues such as class size, teacher supply and offering nursery education is that 
they provide a clear brand image of what the party stands for.  
 
 
Comprehensive reorganisation, parental choice and opting out 
 
This issue is characterised by a changing inter-party consensus, with a large degree of movement 
exhibited by both parties who at different time sought to redefine comprehensive education after 
the Conservatives accepted its presence in 1974. Comprehensive schooling is probably the most 
complex of the issues discussed here. As Chapter Three demonstrates, the wider consensus about 
the need to reform and reorganise secondary education for the benefit of the many included senior 
Conservative figures in the 1950s and 1960s, and as some of the manifesto statements relate this 
consensus enjoyed the support of several Conservative-run local authorities. However, in terms of 
election manifestos the Conservatives had to tread a cautious path on comprehensive schools. The 
party‟s earliest objection was the threatened imposition of a socialist plan against the wishes of 
parents and professionals alike: 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1964 Labour will get rid of the 
segregation of children into 
separate schools caused by 
11-plus Selection: secondary 
education will be reorganised 
on comprehensive lines. 
Within the new system, 
grammar school education 
will be extended: in future no 
child will he denied the 
opportunity of benefiting 
from it through arbitrary 
selection at the age of 11 
Of the many different forms of 
secondary school organisation 
which now exist, none has 
established itself as exclusively 
right. The Socialist plan to impose 
the comprehensive principle, 
regardless of the wishes of parents, 
teachers and authorities, is 
therefore foolishly doctrinaire. 
Their leader may protest that 
grammar schools will be abolished ' 
over his dead body", but abolition 
would be the inevitable and 
disastrous consequence of the 
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policy to which they are committed 
1966 [W]e shall press ahead with 
our plans to abolish the 11-
plus – that barrier to 
educational opportunity - and 
re-organise secondary 
education on comprehensive 
lines. We have appointed the 
Public Schools Commission, 
to recommend the best ways 
of integrating the Public 
Schools into the State sector 
Give parents as much choice as 
possible by having diversity in the 
pattern of education.  
 
 
From the 1970 manifesto Labour was understandably preoccupied with the success of the 
reorganisation programme and the liberation of children from the 11+ examination. The 
Conservatives continued to equivocate about comprehensive schooling in 1970 and only in 
October 1974 began the process of identifying comprehensivisation with the party. This in effect 
meant entering the comprehensive consensus for the first time: 
 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1970 Comprehensive 
reorganisation has been 
vigorously pursued. In the 
past six years 129 of the 163 
English and Welsh local 
education authorities have 
agreed plans for reorganising 
their secondary schools. 
This progress must not be 
checked; it must go forward. 
We shall legislate to require 
the minority of Tory 
education authorities 
who have so far resisted 
change to abandon eleven 
plus selection. 
In secondary education, a number 
of different patterns have developed 
over the years, including many 
types of comprehensive school. We 
will maintain the existing rights of 
local education authorities to decide 
what is best for their area.  
Many of the most imaginative new 
schemes abolishing the eleven-plus 
have been introduced by 
Conservative councils. 
We therefore believe that Labour's 
attempt to insist on compulsory 
reorganisation on rigid lines is 
contrary to local democracy and 
contrary to the best interests of the 
children.   
1974a ..finally ending the 11+... We believe it to be educationally 
unwise to impose a universal 
system of comprehensive education 
on the entire country. Local 
education authorities should allow 
genuine scope for parental choice, 
and we shall continue to use our 
powers to give as much choice as 
possible 
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1974b As in all our plans, economic 
restraints are bound to 
influence timing. But the next 
Labour Government will:  
End the II plus and other 
forms of selection for 
secondary education. 
We are in no way against 
comprehensive schools: what we 
oppose is the ruthless imposition of 
these schools, regardless of local 
needs and in defiance of parents' 
wishes. Typical of this approach is 
Labour's circular, which hits the 
building programmes of local 
authorities which have not gone 
comprehensive. The next 
Conservative government will 
withdraw this 
 
Although we can speak of the Conservatives as part of an inter-party consensus from 1974, it is 
clear that there was thereafter tension within the consensus. Comprehensivisation was firmly 
established, apparently popular and was in effect the policy paradigm within which any further 
improvements to the education system would be discussed. Tension was created by a combination 
of factors. From the left, Labour was considering legislation to fully implement 
comprehensivisation, while from the right the Conservatives sought to maintain choice at the level 
of the local authority.  
 
The Conservatives introduced a new critique of comprehensivisation in the 1979 manifesto. Once 
again we see the Conservative Party explaining its position at some length, in comparison to 
Labour‟s simple message: 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1979 The Labour Party believes in 
equality of opportunity. 
Universal comprehensive 
education, which is central to 
our policy, must be completed in 
the 1980s. 
The Labour Party is still obsessed 
with the structure of the schools 
system, paying too little regard to 
the quality of education.  
Extending parents' rights and 
responsibilities, including their 
right of choice, will also help raise 
standards by giving them greater 
influence over education. Our 
Parents' Charter will place a clear 
duty on government and local 
authorities to take account of 
parents' wishes when allocating 
children to schools, with a local 
appeals system for those 
dissatisfied. Schools will be 
required to publish prospectuses 
giving details of their examination 
and other results. 
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This is the pivotal manifesto for this issue. For the first time the Conservatives connected 
comprehensive education with low standards of attainment, and predicted higher standards to 
emerge through parental choice. As we have seen from the MORI and Gallup data, concern about 
the education system began to rise from around 1976, and the 1979 Conservative manifesto 
reflects this, although remaining part of the consensus with a radical reformist message which 
included obliging local authorities to provide information to parents. Labour continued to stress 
equality and fairness, but in Opposition in the 1980s had less to say about the structure of 
education: 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1983 We will: 
Repeal the Education Act 
1979 and prohibit all forms of 
academic selection, such as 
the eleven plus, as a condition 
of admission to secondary 
schools.  
 Require local education 
authorities to maintain a 
broad, balanced and 
comprehensive curriculum, 
providing genuinely equal 
opportunities for boys and 
girls, and for the ethnic 
minorities to meet the needs 
of our multi-cultural society.  
 
For a long time now, parents have 
been worried about standards and 
discipline in many of our schools. 
This Conservative Government has 
responded to that worry with the 
Parents' Charter and the 1980 
Education Act. For the first time:  
Local authorities were obliged to 
take account of parents' choice of 
school for their children; schools 
were obliged to publish 
prospectuses, giving details of their 
examination results; parents were 
given the right to be represented on 
school governing bodies. 
1987 Labour will invest in 
education so that the abilities 
of all children and adults 
from all home back grounds 
and in every part of our 
country are discovered and 
nourished.  
At the same time as we 
improve the quality of 
publicly provided education, 
we shall end the 11 plus 
everywhere. 
These steps will compel schools to 
respond to the views of parents. But 
there must also be variety of 
educational provision so that 
parents can better compare one 
school with another.  
We will therefore support the co-
existence of a variety of schools – 
comprehensive, grammar, 
secondary modern, voluntary 
controlled and aided. 
If, in a particular school, parents 
and governing bodies wish to 
become independent of the LEA, 
they will be given the choice to do 
so. Those schools which opt out of 
LEA control will receive a full 
grant direct from the Department of 
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Education and Science 
 
As we can see from the manifesto statements, the Conservatives became increasingly concerned 
with the performance of schools and the transmission of accurate information to parents, so as to 
optimise choice. This was to be further stimulated by allowing schools to opt-out of local authority 
control, first mentioned in 1987. The 1992 Conservative manifesto also introduced a new theme, 
pupils with different aptitudes who needed differential education. Meanwhile Labour were 
responding to the reality of schools which had opted-out: 
 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1992 Opted-out schools will be 
freed from central 
government control and 
brought together with City 
Technology Colleges into the 
mainstream of the local 
school system 
We believe all parents have the 
right to choice in education – not 
only those who can afford school 
fees. Young people differ in their 
interests and aptitudes, and we need 
a range of schools to offer them the 
best opportunities 
 
If the consensus became stretched rather than broken by the changes heralded by the manifestos of 
1987 and 1992, it had certainly changed in character. The Conservatives had slowly adopted 
comprehensive schooling, yet worked to undermine the concept consistently from entering office 
in 1979. The system was still recognisably a state comprehensive system into the 1990s, as far as 
Labour manifestos were concerned. In 1992 the party‟s greatest concern was to bring opted-out 
schools back into local authority control, which is not the only necessary precondition for a fully 
egalitarian education system.  
By the time of the 1997 General Election new Labour had partially adapted to the 
Conservative‟s position, even to the extent of repeating a phrase from the 1979 Conservative 
manifesto: “The Labour Party is still obsessed with the structure of the school system, paying too 
little regard to the quality of education”. In new Labour‟s 1997 version, it was the Tories‟ 
obsession with structures which prevented real choice for parents, while new Labour held out the 
prospect of even more diversity. The Conservative accent on special abilities and aptitudes was 
echoed to some extent by new Labour, although the Conservatives alone offered “a grammar 
school in every town”. 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1997 We reject the Tories' obsession 
with school structures: all 
parents should be offered real 
choice through good quality 
Since 1979 we have created a rich 
diversity of schools, to serve the 
varied tastes of children and give 
parents choice within that diversity, 
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schools, each with its own 
strengths and individual ethos. 
There should be no return to 
the 11-plus. 
We must modernise 
comprehensive schools. 
Children are not all of the same 
ability, nor do they learn at the 
same speed. That means 
'setting' children in classes to 
maximise progress, for the 
benefit of high-fliers and 
slower learners alike. The 
focus must be on levelling up, 
not levelling down.  
because we believe that parents 
know what is best for their 
children. 
[A] grammar school in every town 
where parents want that choice. 
Schools are stronger and more 
effective where head-teachers and 
governors can shape their own 
agenda. Sometimes that means 
developing a specialism in some 
subjects. Sometimes it means 
selecting children by their 
aptitudes... special abilities should 
be recognised and encouraged. 
  
Both the major parties had moved some distance on comprehensive education, from a consensus 
position that believed comprehensive education was the fairest system to one which sought to 
diversify comprehensive schools. For new Labour the system would still remain comprehensive; 
the key concept here is modernisation in response to changed circumstances. The 1997 Labour 
Party manifesto echoes the concerns of senior Labour figures in the 1960s by portraying reform as 
“levelling-up, not levelling down”- the 1964 manifesto portrayed comprehensivisation as 
“grammar school education... extended”. As we shall see in Chapters Three and Six of this thesis 
the desire for fully egalitarian education was not universal within Labour‟s own „broad church‟.  
 
Local Management of Schools and Grant Maintained schools 
Another aspect of the debate on comprehensive reform relates to changes introduced by the 
Conservatives during the 1980s. Here, as we might expect from an Opposition party, there is 
movement by Labour towards the Conservative position. Local management of schools (LMS) 
was first floated by the Conservatives in the 1987 manifesto. Once again we can see the necessary 
time lag as Labour responded in 1992 by promising LMS for all schools- an appropriately 
egalitarian response. In 1992 the Conservatives concentrated on another new scheme to diversify 
comprehensive schooling, introducing the theme of Grant Maintained schools and City 
Technology Colleges. Although selection of pupils by aptitude and extra funding were central to 
the controversy that ensued over GM and CTC institutions, these formed no part of the manifesto 
presentation which concentrated on the new freedom such institutions would enjoy: 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1987  Within five years governing bodies 
and head teachers of all secondary 
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schools and many primary schools 
will be given control over their own 
budgets.  
They know best the needs of their 
school. With this independence 
they will manage their resources 
and decide their priorities, covering 
the cost of books, equipment, 
maintenance and staff; we will 
allow state schools to opt-out of 
LEA control 
1992 We will reform the 
Conservatives' scheme for the 
local management of schools 
All schools will be free to 
manage their day-to-day 
budgets, with local education 
authorities given a new 
strategic role 
We have further increased diversity 
by: Giving schools control over 
their own budgets and encouraging 
new types of school.  
Allowing schools to become 
independent of local councils, by 
applying for Grant-Maintained 
status if the parents involved so 
wish. By mid-1992, over 200 GM 
schools will be up and running.  
Creating a number of highly 
popular City Technology Colleges 
Existing schools which opt for GM 
status will be able to emulate City 
Technology Colleges and attract 
private technology sponsorship. 
  
New Labour‟s response in 1997 was to accept the reality of Grant Maintained schools (although 
they were to be renamed) but promise fairness in funding. As in previous manifestos new Labour 
was concerned to retain a role for local education authorities, while a major theme of this part of 
the manifesto was emphasising choice and down-playing fears of changes to admissions policy. 
Once again the issue of selection was ignored by new Labour, but the Conservatives (perhaps 
responding to new Labour‟s acquiescence on GM schools) promised to extend the scope for 
selectivity and specialisation. Interestingly, the Conservatives in 1997 also reacted to Labour‟s 
1992 pledge to offer LMS to all schools. Though not a radical policy change, it is indicative of 
new Labour sharing the agenda with the Conservatives by 1997, rather than the Government  
setting an agenda for Labour to follow, as had been the case with manifestos between 1979 and 
1992.   
Year Labour Conservatives 
1997 Schools that are now grant 
maintained will prosper with 
Labour's proposals, as will 
every school.  
We will encourage more schools to 
become grant-maintained... we will 
give all grant-maintained schools 
greater freedom to expand and to 
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Tory claims that Labour will 
close these schools are false. 
The system of funding will 
not discriminate unfairly 
either between schools or 
between pupils. LEAs will be 
represented on governing 
bodies, but will not control 
them. We support guidelines 
for open and fair admissions, 
along the lines of those 
introduced in 1993; but we 
will also provide a right of 
appeal to an independent 
panel in disputed cases. 
select their pupils. 
Local authority schools are 
benefiting from our policy of local 
management of schools. 
We will extend the benefits of 
greater self-governance to all LEA 
schools. 
 
 In consensus terms, LMS and GM schools are part of the comprehensive modernisation 
process that both parties were keen to be associated with by 1997. Although there has been a high 
degree of movement by both parties on comprehensive secondary education structures, some 
aspects of the original comprehensive settlement remained. For instance, the Conservatives were 
not keen to talk openly about selection in election manifestos (although they were in the wider 
educational discourse), remembering that it was the perceived unfairness of selection by 11+ that 
formed the basis of the argument for comprehensive reform. Even while the Conservative Party 
sought to undermine the system the party was unwilling to become associated with re-creating a 
deliberately tiered education system, preferring the language of offering choice. For Labour the 
emphasis was on adapting to changed conditions and making the proposals work more fairly (for 
instance by allowing every school to manage its own finances) and retaining a core role for LEAs. 
By eliminating funding unfairness new Labour could still claim to be egalitarian in intent. 
Movement within consensus over a long period of time does not happen in a policy vacuum, and 
both parties moved on comprehensive education because they shared some of the same concerns 
about outcomes. The clearest message that emerges from a reading of the 1997 Labour manifesto 
is that structures should not be set in stone or defended if they failed to optimise standards, the 
central concern of the next set of issues. 
 
Raising standards and teacher quality 
This set of issues is characterised by movement towards the Conservative‟s position by Labour. 
On the issue of standards of education, the Conservatives in Opposition and in Government were 
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consistent in their critique of the education system, particular teachers. Apart from one general 
statement in 1966, Labour chose not to highlight school standards until 1983: 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1964   
1966 Our educational aims.. are the 
highest possible standard of 
education for all children 
Judge proposals for reorganisation 
on their educational merits. 
1970  Concern about teacher training is 
widespread. We wish the teaching 
profession to have a career 
structure which will attract recruits 
of high quality into the profession, 
and retain them.  
1974a  Because of our concern over 
reading standards we have set up an 
enquiry... to report on all aspects of 
the teaching of English. 
Higher standards of education can 
only be achieved through more and 
better trained teachers. We wish to 
move the debate away from the 
kind of school which children 
attend and concentrate on the kind 
of education they receive 
1974b  Many parents are deeply worried 
about the quality of education 
which their children receive- in 
particular about standards of 
learning, conduct and discipline. 
We must take speedy action to raise 
the standards of teaching and 
education. This will involve 
considerable strengthening of the 
system of school inspection. 
National standards of reading, 
writing and arithmetic will be set 
1979  We shall promote higher standards 
of achievement in basic skills. In 
teacher training there must be more 
emphasis on practical skills and on 
maintaining discipline 
 
As we can see, the Conservative attacks at first concentrated on poor teaching and teacher training. 
The October 1974 manifesto introduces a new theme to the discourse, highlighting for the first 
time parental concerns of an individual nature about the comprehensive system. This has to be 
seen alongside the party‟s developing critique of comprehensive education in the last section.  
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In the area of standards the emphasis was to be on the publication of school inspector‟s 
reports. Labour‟s statement in 1983 was presented in the context of “fully comprehensive 
education” with the pledge to raise standards for all. Labour responded to the new Conservative 
standards agenda in 1987 with the promise of a standards council, even while the Conservatives 
had moved on to the question of why some schools performed better than others with the same 
resources: 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1983 We shall encourage a higher 
standard of achievement among 
all pupils in the variety of 
academic and other activities 
which are essential parts of fully 
comprehensive education 
Until now, HM Inspector‟s reports 
have remained secret. Now we are 
publishing them.. We are not 
satisfied with the selection or the 
training of our teachers. We shall 
encourage schools to keep proper 
records of their pupils progress... 
and carry out externally graded 
tests 
1987 [W]e shall work with local 
education authorities to secure 
a... School Standards Council, 
and a new profile of 
achievement recording 
individual progress through 
school for all pupils. 
[M]oney alone is not enough. 
Increased resources have not 
produced uniformly higher 
standards. Parents and employers 
are rightly concerned that enough 
children can master the basic skills 
 
By 1992 Labour had begun to take a serious interest in raising the standards of educational 
outcomes, setting targets and promising to introduce the expensive Reading Recovery programme. 
However, standards would improve as the result of a combination of traditional Labour 
preferences; smaller classes, more teachers and more equipment: 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1992 By investing in better 
teaching, smaller classes and 
modern books and equipment 
we will raise education 
standards. To make sure 
children are reading by the 
age of seven, we will create a 
National Reading Standards 
programme, with a national 
Reading Recovery 
Programme to help those in 
difficulty. 
[W]ithin five years, we want 
four out of five 16 to 18 year 
olds to be able to achieve at 
Regular and straightforward tests 
will be in place for all 7,11 and 14 
year olds by 1994. 
As the first step in the reform of 
teacher training, postgraduate 
students will spend much more 
time in the classroom, learning their 
skills under the practised eye of 
senior teachers 
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least five GCSEs at grades A, 
B, or C, or their equivalent. 
 
The 1992 manifestos show Labour again making more of the new opportunity to develop policy 
for improving standards by issuing a longer statement, while the Conservatives relied on the 
simpler messages of regular and straightforward tests and teachers taught in the classroom, rather 
than in the colleges of education. 
 This trend towards longer, more detailed statements from Labour was continued in 1997, 
with promises to radically intervene where schools were failing, and new responsibilities for LEAs 
to manage improvement. Baseline testing for new school entrants was highlighted and for the first 
time. Labour also promised to reform teacher training. The Conservative statement reads as a 
watered down version of the Labour one, even though most of the imperatives of the Labour 
statement mirrored Conservative concerns; for example, the „fresh start‟ policy of Labour was 
based on the experience of the closure of Hackney Downs school in 1995 by an Education 
Association appointed by Conservative Secretary of State Gillian Shephard and headed by Labour 
adviser Michael Barber (itself evidence of inter-party consensus). The Labour commitments to 
reform LEAs and teacher training are tougher than the equivalent statements from the 
Conservatives, who continued to put faith in the standards-raising power of parental demand: 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1997 Standards, more than 
structures, are the key to 
success. Labour will never 
put dogma before children's 
education.  
Every school has the capacity 
to succeed. All Local 
Education Authorities (LEAs) 
must demonstrate that every 
school is improving. For 
those failing schools unable 
to improve, ministers will 
order a 'fresh start' to close 
the school and start afresh on 
the same site. 
Every school needs baseline 
assessment of pupils when 
they enter the school, and a 
year-on-year target for 
improvement. 
Schools are critically 
dependent on the quality of 
all staff. The majority of 
Our decision to test children and 
publish the results has allowed 
standards to be measured and 
exposed. 
[W]e will require every school to 
plan how to improve its 
performance and to set targets. 
Parent power is a vital force for 
higher standards. 
Sometimes schools are failing 
because the LEA which runs them 
is failing... [these LEAs] will be 
required to set out plans to raise 
standards. 
We will establish a more rigorous 
and effective system of appraising 
teachers. 
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teachers are skilful and 
dedicated, but some fall short. 
We will improve teacher 
training, and ensure that all 
teachers have an induction 
year when they first qualify, 
to ensure their suitability for 
teaching. 
 
Once again here we can see the opposition party using more space in the manifesto to explain its 
new position. As with the Conservatives‟ slow response to the reality of comprehensivisation in 
the 1970s, the reactive party has furthest to move and has to take care to couch its new positions 
within existing party ideology. Therefore the size of statements is an indicator of new thinking and 
policy movement. 
 
National Curriculum 
The National Curriculum was introduced by the Conservative Government in the 1988 Education 
Reform Act. From the start there existed a consensus about the need for a national curriculum, but 
while there has been no movement, there is clearly a tension within the consensus with the parties 
having different aims for the curriculum. Labour made it clear before the passing of the Act that 
the party had thought of a national curriculum first, so in manifesto terms there was no time lag. 
Therefore this issue has a high degree of consensus, with Labour able to stay on the sidelines 
criticising the implementation while not countering the principle, in much the same way as the 
Conservative Opposition reacted to comprehensivisation in the 1960s. There is some tension in the 
1997 manifestos, with Labour pledging to vocationalise the curriculum for non-academically 
minded children, while the Conservatives concentrated on basic skills and high standards: 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1987 [W]e shall work with local 
education authorities to 
secure a flexible but clear 
core curriculum agreed at 
national level... 
[W]e will establish a National Core 
Curriculum... between the ages of 5 
to 16 to study a basic range of 
subjects- including maths, English 
and science. We will consult widely 
among those concerned in 
establishing the curriculum 
1992 Labour will modernise the 
national curriculum and apply 
it in all schools. From the age 
of fourteen, pupils will study 
five essential subjects: 
English, mathematics, 
For the first time in our history, we 
will soon have a National 
Curriculum which will require the 
main school subjects to be covered 
thoroughly 
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science, a modern language 
and technology. 
1997 We must recognise the three 
'r's for what they are the 
building blocks of all learning 
that must be taught better. 
..creating new opportunities 
for children, after the age of 
14, to enhance their studies 
by acquiring knowledge and 
experience within industry 
and commerce.  
We are revising and simplifying the 
National Curriculum in primary 
schools to emphasise high 
standards in the basic skills. 
We will.. introduce a new test for 
14 year old children that covers the 
whole National Curriculum.. 
 
Overall, on compulsory education issues relating to structures and standards there is some 
evidence for a consensus in the 1960s with divergence during the 1970s. The Conservative 
government enjoyed the opportunity to move the framework of comprehensive education between 
1979 and 1992, drawing Labour closer to its own agenda. What the 1997 manifestos illustrate on 
most of the issues so far discussed is Labour making more robust and detailed promises to reform 
the system. Labour have slowly adapted to the Conservative‟s position on testing and inspection 
for standards, backed up by rigorous teacher training and providing opportunities for schools to 
innovate; in effect, new Labour adapted to the new consensus and then appeared more serious 
about policy implementation. The Conservatives, by contrast, seemed to run out of steam after 
1992, with many of the 1997 manifesto pledges shorter and more perfunctory than the Labour 
counterparts; again the parallel for this is provided by Labour statements on comprehensive 
schooling and the abolition of the 11+ which grew shorter and more perfunctory during the 1960s 
and 1970s as the Conservatives increased the tone of its the critique of the system with longer 
explanatory statements. 
 In concluding this examination of compulsory schooling policies, we have seen the demise 
of some areas of consensus and the formation of other areas of consensus. Most of the movement 
by the Conservatives, whether within consensus or movement which took the party beyond the 
consensus, occurred in the earlier manifestos when that party was in opposition (1964-70, 1974-
79). On teacher supply, class sizes and nursery provision Labour has been consistent throughout 
the series. However, there are a group of issues on which Labour has moved quite considerably 
closer to Conservative ground, again coinciding with a long period of opposition. It is fair to say 
that in 1997 there was general consensus on grant maintained (or Foundation) schools (including 
their partially-selective character), local management of schools and the need for higher standards 
backed up by rigorous teacher appraisal and ongoing tests of performance. On comprehensive 
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education, both parties have moved considerably in their efforts to reconceptualise the state 
secondary school. Despite evidence of tension within the consensus, the comprehensive system 
has developed in such a way as to change the nature of the education system, without it being 
publicly denounced or revoked by either party.  
It is clear that the Government sets the agenda and the Opposition responds to this either 
critically or by absorbing popular policy, but it should not be forgotten that on several issues the 
acceptance of a new consensus position by the opposition can be put down to economic 
constraints (ie radical reform might be expensive) or because no other alternative policy seems 
viable. A summary of the evidence or consensus and tension or movement within consensus can 
be seen in Table 5. 
       Table 5: Consensus in compulsory education. 
Issue Early 
consensus? 
(1960s) 
Late 
consensus? 
(1990s) 
Tension? Movement by? 
Class size Yes No No Conservatives 
Nursery 
places 
Yes No No Conservatives 
Comprehen
sive 
schooling 
No Yes Yes Conservatives 
and Labour 
LMS & GM 
status 
No Yes No Labour 
Standards 
and 
teaching 
quality 
No  Yes No Labour 
National 
Curriculum 
Yes Yes Yes Neither 
 
 
Post-compulsory education and training issues 
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Further education provision and A level reform 
In this set of issues the parties began the period sharing the desire for expansion, but once again 
there is divergence after February 1974 when the Conservatives highlighted the economic 
circumstances: 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1964  More and more who have the 
ability to benefit will stay on to 17 
and 18 and go forward to higher 
education 
1966   
1970 We have never believed that 
education and educational 
opportunity should stop at the 
school leaving age; nor that 
further education should be 
confined to full time students 
in colleges and universities. 
 
1974a [A] big expansion of 
educational facilities for 16-
18 year olds.. 
The expansion of further.... 
education will be less rapid than 
planned because of the reduced 
demand for places and the 
prevailing economic circumstances, 
but numbers will continue to 
increase 
1974b   
 
In 1979 Labour was content to rest on its record, claiming to have increased FE places by 
25,000, while the Conservatives made no pledges relating to the sector.  The General Election 
of 1983 produced the beginnings of a new approach by the Labour Opposition. Plans to 
reform the A-level system and widen access in consecutive manifestos went unanswered by 
the Conservative Government: 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1987 We will spread the provision 
of a comprehensive tertiary 
system of post-school 
education. 
There will be maintenance 
allowances for 16- to 18- year 
olds whose family 
circumstances would 
otherwise impeded their 
further education. 
 
1992 [W]e will establish a five-
subject A level and bring it 
We will defend the well-respected 
A-levels examination, which 
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together with technical 
qualifications into our new 
Advanced Certificate.  
Labour would destroy. We are 
giving further education colleges 
and sixth form colleges in England 
and Wales autonomy, free from 
council control. We also value our 
school sixth forms and will ensure 
they retain their place in the new 
system 
 
The 1992 Conservative manifesto reacted to attacks on the A-level system but did not respond to 
Labour‟s 1987 message about widening access. For the Conservatives, the favoured option was 
the freeing of FE institutions from local government control to so that they might better respond to 
demand. There is also a key commitment to maintaining Sixth Form colleges which had come 
under pressure in the wider educational discourse for costing more per full-time student than the 
FE colleges. 
 Interestingly the 1997 Labour manifesto did not threaten Sixth Forms but continued with 
the theme of broadening A-levels. However, to counter accusations that Labour would dilute the 
„gold standard‟ the manifesto contained key references to standards and the teaching of key skills 
within a revised syllabus. The Conservatives‟ position was one of defending tradition against 
attack: 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1997 In schools and colleges, we 
support broader A-levels and 
upgraded vocational 
qualifications, underpinned 
by rigorous standards and key 
skills. 
We will continue to uphold the gold 
standards of A-levels and ensure 
that the great classics of our 
literature are studied at A-level 
 
On FE provision there was a comparatively weak consensus during the 1964-74 period when 
expansion was seen as both possible and a „good thing‟. However the Labour concentration on 
access and syllabus reform demonstrated a breaking away from consensus until 1992. Therefore 
we can conclude that there existed a broad consensus about expansion (when economically 
feasible), and whilst Labour introduced tension with its reformist language, the 1997 positions 
were closer together. 
 
Training provision and funding 
Training provision is one area where there has been almost continuous consensus about the 
personal and national requirement for more and better training. However, the two main parties 
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diverged to some extent in terms of why training is important. While both manifestos of 1964 
stress the individual‟s right to training, by 1974 the Conservatives‟ language stresses the changing 
basis of demand for labour: 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1964 Most young people, and 
particularly girls, are still 
denied either adequate 
training at work or release for 
further education and 
technical colleges. [We will 
implement] 
The right to first-rate 
industrial training with day 
and block release for the 
young worker; 
The right to retraining for 
adult workers. 
Steps will be taken to increase the 
number of industrial workers under 
18 who are released during the day 
to attend technical and other 
courses 
 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1974a ...redundant workers must 
have an automatic right to 
retraining; redundancy should 
then lead not to 
unemployment, but to 
retraining and job changing 
For the nation as a whole we have 
introduced the Training 
Opportunities Scheme... We have 
nearly trebled the numbers being 
trained and retrained under 
government auspices. Our 
Employment and Training Act has 
provided industry with help in 
increasing its own training, related 
to actual labour needs, through the 
newly established Manpower 
Services Commission. 
1974b Redundant workers must 
have a automatic right to 
retraining, with redundancy 
leading not to unemployment, 
but to retraining and job 
changing. 
One possibility, which we will want 
to examine closely, is to allow 
children of fifteen the opportunity 
of taking up an apprenticeship or 
training as a first step towards 
taking a job 
 
In response the demands for a new type of labour force, the Conservative‟s October 1974 
introduces the new idea of vocationalising compulsory education in the later years. Labour 
continued to be preoccupied with rights throughout out its long period of opposition, and 
slowly introduced national requirements while softening the language somewhat by replacing 
„right‟ with „entitlement‟ in 1992: 
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Year Labour Conservatives 
1987 British industry now carries 
out less than half the training 
of our competitors. Labour 
will therefore establish a 
national training programme 
to bring about a major 
advance in the spread and 
standard of skills. 
 
1992 Learning must become a 
lifetime opportunity, with 
new chances to update skills 
at work. Sixteen year olds not 
in full time education will be 
entitled to a new traineeship 
lasting for up to two years, 
with an option of another two 
years. Every young person in 
employment will be 
guaranteed the right to Learn 
While You Earn 
We will... continue to develop new 
high-quality National Vocational 
Qualifications, and introduce a new 
post-16 diploma which recognises 
achievement in both vocational and 
academic courses. 
Now we are offering young people 
aged 16 and 17 vouchers they can 
use to buy approved courses of 
education or training, and which 
will put the power of choice in their 
hands 
 
In Labour‟s 1997 manifesto the emphasis is on the funding of training, with „primary 
responsibility‟ residing with companies. For the individual, the entitlement of 1992 had been 
further redefined with individuals being given the power to invest in their own training, through 
specific schemes such as Individual Learning Accounts and the University for Industry. For the 
unemployed there was to be a programme (the New Deal) offering four routes to employment, 
education or training. The shift in emphasis towards the individual providing his or her own 
training is exemplified by the concluding sentence: 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1997 Employers have the primary 
responsibility for training 
their workforces in job-
related skills. But individuals 
should be given the power to 
invest in training. We will 
invest public money for 
training in Individual 
Learning Accounts which 
individuals... can then use to 
gain the skills they want. 
We will give 250,000 under-
25s opportunities for work, 
education and training. Four 
options will be on offer....  
Rights and responsibilities 
We will give students between 14 
and 21 a learning credit which will 
enable them to choose suitable 
education or training leading to 
recognised qualifications up to A-
levels or their equivalents. 
We will also introduce National 
Traineeships and encourage 
employers to offer more Modern 
Apprenticeships.. 
We will continue to support the 
network of Training and Enterprise 
Councils. 
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must go hand in hand, 
without a fifth option of life 
on full benefit. 
  
Once again Labour‟s statement is more detailed and concise than the Conservative‟s version. 
Despite the tonal differences, this provides evidence for a quite remarkable change in Labour‟s 
position over time. From 1964 the existing inter-party consensus exhibited tension on a rights-
national need axis, but from 1992 and then especially in 1997 new Labour moved into 
Conservative territory and sounded more evangelical about the possibilities. This is similar to the 
movements on comprehensive education and on standards that we observed in the previous 
section. Consensus exists, but its basis has changed over time. 
 
Human capital and value-for-money 
Several of the manifesto statements examined in the last section refer obliquely to human capital. 
This is taken to mean concerns with the correct use of manpower in the national interest, including 
the planning of industrial output. The Conservative statement of 1964 highlights the sometimes 
competing expectations from education. Clearly the changing basis of demand for labour is central 
to the ongoing consensus exhibited in the statements: 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1964 Labour believes the national 
plan will require a faster rate 
of change in industry. To 
meet the human needs that 
will arise it is essential to 
combine with our education 
reforms a revolution in 
training 
Education is the most rapidly 
developing feature of our social 
outlay. This reflects our view of 
education as at once a right of the 
child, a need of society, and a 
condition of economic efficiency. 
1966 The universities are being 
assisted to make a growing 
contribution in science, 
technology and social studies 
 
1970 This increased [educational] 
expenditure reflects our 
belief.. that it will make a 
contribution the welfare, 
quality and happiness of our 
society. 
We are in transition to a new 
era where higher education 
could become available to  
wider section of the 
Modern industry imposes new and 
heavy burdens on all levels of 
management. Good management is 
essential not only for efficiency and 
the proper use of capital resources, 
but also for the creation of good 
industrial relations 
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community. This expansion 
will require very careful 
planning. 
 
In 1987 Labour specifically linked the changing basis of demand for labour to education funding 
and provision, while the Conservative‟s highlighted international competition: 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1987 For modern, wealth-creating 
industry we need a well 
trained workforce.  
Education for life through a 
well funded adult education 
service will help to provide 
the means by which rapid 
economic and social change 
can be embraced 
[W]e must meet the nation‟s 
demand for highly qualified 
manpower to compete in 
international markets 
 
Human capital concerns emerge in terms of training and further and higher education, and in 1992 
Labour evoked the qualifications that our children receive. For Labour the 1997 manifesto 
statement most clearly puts the case: 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1992 Good education is the 
best investment in 
Britain‟s future. We 
want every child to get 
qualifications that count 
Last year we launched the new 
Employment Action programme, 
which will help more than 61,000 
people in a full year 
1997 Education... is not just 
good for the individual. 
It is an economic 
necessity for the nation. 
We will compete 
successfully on the basis 
of quality or not at all. 
And quality comes from 
developing the potential 
of all our people. It is the 
people who are our 
greatest natural asset. 
We will ensure they can 
fulfil their potential. 
Britain‟s prosperity depends on the 
quality of [children‟s] education. 
Competitive markets demand high 
skills. If Britain is to win, we need 
to encourage learning and give 
people the opportunity to go where 
their interests and inquiring minds 
take them. 
 
The emphasis on national requirements by Labour manifestos can be seen to balance the training 
emphasis on rights we saw in the previous section; therefore Labour acknowledge the 
Conservative‟s point that education and training serve more than one purpose. Human capital is 
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perhaps easier to identify as a consensus issue largely because it is not a specific policy but a 
narrative framework or paradigm within which assumptions are made. It is consequently difficult 
to identify much in the way of tension or movement in these statements, although once again 
Labour used the more rhetorical language and produced the longest statements as it emerged from 
Opposition. Table 6 summarises post-compulsory positions: 
 
     Table 6: Consensus in post-compulsory education and training 
Issue Early 
Consensus? 
(1960s) 
Late 
Consensus? 
(1990s) 
Tension? Movement 
by? 
 
FE provision 
and A level 
reform 
Yes 
Yes Yes Labour 
Training 
provision and 
funding 
Yes Yes No Labour 
Human-
capital 
Yes Yes No Neither 
 
 
 
Higher Education 
 
Higher Education expansion 
Once again, at the beginning of our period of analysis two-party consensus prevailed around the 
need for higher education expansion. The early manifestos of both parties include specific 
promises of expansion. There is some overlap with statements about further education in these 
manifestos which reflects the generalised nature of many manifesto statements and perhaps the 
lower political salience attached to further and higher education. Once again, also, the 1974 
manifestos of both parties either omitted pledges or made reference to the economic conditions, 
after which there is a difference of emphasis with Labour stressing widening access: 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1979 Labour will substantially 
increase the opportunities for 
We are aware of the special 
problems associated with the need 
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people from working-class 
backgrounds.. to enter higher 
education. 
to increase the number of high-
quality entrants to the engineering 
professions. 
1983 Our policy for education after 
18 is expansion with change. 
We will reverse the Tory cuts 
and restore the right of all 
qualified young people 
seeking higher education to 
secure places. We will also 
substantially expand 
opportunities for adults in 
both further and higher 
education. 
More of our young people are now 
entering full-time degree courses 
than under the last Labour 
government . 
  
While the Conservative Government was content to stress its record in office in 1983, it felt the 
need to promise expansion in 1987 as Labour highlighted increasing opportunity, especially for 
adults. For Labour the 1992 and 1997 manifestos contained quite different themes. Firstly, Labour 
made specific pledges to create more places for young people; in fact the number Labour pledged 
(one in three young people) was actually being met already according to the Conservatives. But by 
1997 Labour was only concerned to demonstrate that expansion was not possible with the current 
funding arrangements. A realisation that this was the case may be evidenced by the Conservative‟s 
equally short statement on maintaining „world class research‟. 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1997 The improvement and 
expansion needed cannot be 
funded out of general 
taxation. 
We have world class research in 
British universities which we will 
continue to support. 
 
Labour‟s emphasis on widening access, which challenged the inter-party consensus, was not 
highlighted at all after 1987- although a fuller understanding of higher education policy is 
provided by an examination of the party‟s treatment of funding issues in the following section. 
Higher Education funding and student loans 
The funding of universities and maintenance for students are separate issues which are not always 
sufficiently differentiated in the statements. In common with the sometimes vague language, these 
statements can be interpreted as evidence of a weak consensus which has changed over time. On 
the funding of universities, Labour had no comment to make until 1987. The Conservatives had 
stressed the need to improve finances in October 1974 and quality in higher education by 1979, 
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and had begun to review student grants (with a view to raising them) in Government between 1970 
and 1974. In 1983 the party introduced value-for-money concerns, perhaps justifying the higher 
education cuts of 1981-1982: 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1979  Much of our higher education in 
Britain has a world-wide reputation 
for its quality. We shall seek to 
ensure that this excellence is 
maintained. 
1983  The very large sums of public 
money now going to higher 
education must be spent in the most 
effective way. 
  
In the 1987 manifesto Labour entered the debate by stressing the need to maintain standards, but at 
the same election the Conservatives began to address student finance for the first time since 
February 1974, floating the idea of student loans: 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1987 We will also invest in 
research in higher education, 
in order to provide the 
facilities and opportunities 
necessary to sustain standards 
of excellence. 
As part of aim to widen access to 
higher education we have begun a 
review of student support... 
No final conclusions have been 
reached, but we believe that top-up 
loans to supplement grants are one 
way, among others, of bringing in 
new finance to help students and 
relieve pressure on their parents. 
 
Labour responded after the usual time-lag of one election manifesto, criticising the loans system as 
unfair and unlikely to help widen access. However, by 1997 new Labour had come around to the 
idea that students would have to repay some of the state‟s contribution to their maintenance; here 
the accent is on the inefficiency of the Conservatives‟ scheme, not its inequity: 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1992 The student loan scheme 
deters many bright youngsters 
from poor families. We will 
replace it with a fairer system 
of student grants and targeted 
help for housing and vacation 
hardship. 
We will continue to provide 
generous support for students and 
to expand our student loans 
commitment. The new system will 
steadily reduce the proportion of 
student‟s living costs that their 
parents are expected to meet. 
1997 The costs of student 
maintenance should be repaid 
by graduates on an income-
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related basis, from the career 
success to which higher 
education has contributed. 
The current system is badly 
administered and payback 
periods are too short. We will 
provide efficient 
administration, with fairness 
ensured by longer payback 
periods where required. 
 
In this example of a changing but usually weak consensus there is a development away from the 
overall costs of higher education into a concern for the quality of education offered as expansion 
continued during the period in question. As with comprehensive education, the Conservatives first 
worried about the costs of expansion, and then raised standards as an issue. Despite the repeated 
concern in Labour statements on FE and human capital about access, specific pledges for 
widening access to higher education appear only in the defensive context of opposing student 
loans. The paucity of statements about the financial problems faced by the HE sector demonstrates 
that both parties ignored the issue until the student loans system offered a partial solution. The 
other solution to HE funding, tuition fees, which were controversially introduced by new Labour 
in July 1997, went unmentioned in either of the 1997 manifestos. Given these omissions, it is 
possible to see higher education funding and student loans as another example of Labour adapting 
to Conservative Government initiatives. These positions are summarised below: 
       Table 7: Consensus in higher education 
Issue Early 
consensus? 
(1960s) 
Late 
consensus? 
(1990s) 
Tension? Movement 
by? 
HE expansion Yes Yes Yes Labour 
HE funding and 
student finance 
No Yes No Labour 
 
 Overall then, we see a degree of inter-party consensus on some educational policy issues as 
outlined in the party manifestos. What these statements show (and the remainder of the thesis 
bears out) is that consensus can shift over time, either in response to changes in economic 
circumstances (which impact on demand for labour and social demand for education) or in 
response to Governments with a secure period of at least two terms in office and with the 
inclination to develop and implement long-term changes to the education system. The greatest 
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movement occurs among opposition parties, as we might expect given the need for the Opposition 
to increase its share of the vote and to react to new legislation.  
Chapter Two will examine the construction of new Labour in more detail, to flesh out the 
changes observed in manifesto statements. The remainder of the thesis is structured thematically 
and chronologically. Chapters Three, Four and Five look at the historical development of Labour‟s 
policies on, compulsory, post compulsory and higher education up to the natural break point of 
1994 and the advent of new Labour. The next three chapters, Six, Seven and Eight examine 
contemporary policy development and look in detail at how new Labour‟s leadership autonomy 
was used either to adhere to the consensus, or, where populist solutions were available, alter 
policies so as to maximise electoral support. 
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Chapter Two 
 
The construction of new Labour  
 
This thesis discusses new Labour‟s appeal to a wider support base than was traditionally available 
to the Labour Party. This has necessitated a definition of voters which the party then targeted. The 
thesis suggests that new Labour targeted the aspirational middle class with certain education 
policies, particularly in the use of market signals which helped separate the aspirant from the 
traditionally less aspirant and less educated working class
9
. Since the election, the Labour 
Government and its intellectual supporters have continued the theme of appealing to the 
aspirational parents, particularly with its emphasis on parental involvement in education. 
Launching „Family Learning Day‟ in September 1998, Junior Minister Charles Clarke announced 
that:  
In the past education was seen as the responsibility of schools and teachers. There is a much 
greater realisation now that everyone has a part to play- with parents increasingly working 
in partnership with schools and colleges
10
. 
     
Other parents without the time or the education to navigate school admissions procedures, however, 
are able to take less of an involvement. A recent study showed that: 
...a significant proportion of parents do not, therefore, appear to have the necessary 
information or knowledge to be able effectively to exercise their power in relation to 
choosing schools
11
. 
 
Clearly, no major party could afford not to be seen to be concerned with education; not only is it 
more pervasive (in terms of numbers involved in the delivery or receipt of the service) than almost 
any other policy area, but public education is one of the largest elements of government 
expenditure. In addition, even those not directly involved with education would appreciate the 
social and economic importance of the skills level of the workforce. Education, then, is one of the 
                                                          
9
 Many writers have commented on the difference in motivation for education among social class 
groups, for example see Anne West, Hazel Pennell & Philip Noden, Secondary schools: Who's doing 
the choosing- parents or schools? Centre for Educational Research, LSE to the British Educational 
Research Conference, York, 1997. 
10
 New Materials for parents to help them improve children's learning- Clarke DfEE press release 
419/98, 10/9/98. 
   
11
 see West,A Pennel,H & Noden,P (1997) p.10  
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key issues in British politics, not least because, in addition to the general reasons set out above, all 
major parties  think that they have a potential to maximise their share of the vote through changes 
(or proposed changes) to the existing system. 
The context: Conservatives in power 
 
Prior to the 1997 General Election, the Conservative Government believed they had a vote-winning 
strategy for education with their emphasis on testing, standards and selection in schools. Appealing 
to the self-interests of individual parents, Conservative reforms introduced since the Education 
Reform Act of 1988 (ERA) have opened the door for real consumer choice for parents; basic 
testing of knowledge attainment by pupils has provided a „price list‟ league table of schools which 
operate a uniform national curriculum, while increased selectivity allowed by schools since the 
introduction of Local Management of Schools (LMS) and the directly funded Grant-Maintained 
schools mean that some institutions can now openly advertise their results, not only to the local 
community, but to the wider pool of aspirational parents who value a good start for their children
12
. 
The corollary of this, that some schools are failing to provide similar results from a similar intake, 
allowed the Conservative government to castigate the professionalism of some teachers, and, by 
extension, the whole profession, the teaching unions and the famed „progressive teaching methods‟ 
of the 1960s
13
. 
 Whilst in many policy areas the Labour opposition could attack the government for failing over 
eighteen years to improve life in Britain (economic growth and unemployment, for example), in 
areas of public policy like education and the National Health Service, the Conservatives could 
claim that marketisation and choice had only recently been introduced to these services. This 
allowed the party to criticise its Labour opponents in two ways; firstly as „permanent 
revolutionaries‟ who would not allow the new reforms time to bed down and demonstrate an 
improved service; and as ideological „luddites‟ who want to destroy what is new merely because it 
impinges on the collective interests of the „producer‟ unions who delayed the implementation of 
these necessary reforms for so long. 
 From the opposite perspective, the Labour Party traditionally benefited from voter salience on 
educational issues (evidence) as much as it has benefited from association with the National Health 
                                                          
12
 Aspirational parents in the sense used by West,A Pennell,H & Noden,P op cit, p10, Anne 
Schneider & Helen Ingram, Social construction of target populations: implications for politics and 
policy American Political Science Review, Vol.87, No2, June 1993 and Sally Tomlinson, Education 
dilemmas in a post welfare society, Renewal, Vol.6, No.3 Summer 1998, pp.28-35. 
13
 For example, child-centred, small group teaching methods (collectively known as „Plowdenism‟) as 
opposed to whole class rote learning. 
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Service
14
. It was Labour legislation in the 1960s which allowed for the huge expansion of higher 
and further education opportunities, and often Labour local authorities which pioneered the 
introduction of comprehensive community education throughout the country over the following 
two decades. Like health and social services, education is seen as safer in the hands of Labour than 
the Conservatives. Labour wanted to capitalise on this voter salience but also emphasise the 
economic importance of education: “The absolute number one priority for domestic policy is 
education and skills. We will win by brains or not at all. We will compete on enterprise and talent 
or we will fail”15. 
 For Labour, attacking Britain‟s record in producing a skilled workforce could make education 
policy the centrepiece of its national modernisation strategy. In the 1997 General Election 
campaign, both party leaderships stressed the role of education in the steady improvement of the 
nation. In fact for the Conservatives, the introduction of the post-1988 reforms and the introduction 
of quasi-markets
16
 in the post-compulsory sector meant that for the first time since the introduction 
of comprehensive schooling they were able to fight the election on what the party saw as a positive 
agenda. As this thesis will demonstrate, the Labour Party also believed in the electoral popularity of 
many of the Conservative‟s changes, and went on to couch its opposition in terms of efficiency and 
performance rather than by challenging the philosophical underpinning of the Government‟s 
education reforms since 1979.  
 Many of the issues here touched upon will be examined in more detail as this study aims to look 
particularly at how the Labour Party has put together its portfolio of education policies. The outline 
of this initial chapter will be to introduce the two main approaches that will be utilised in this study, 
especially as it relates to social democratic parties in Opposition. This first approach involves 
surveying the existing literature on  theories of power within the Labour Party and social 
democratic parties in general. The second approach will survey the recent changes to the party‟s 
constitution and policymaking practices, and how these changes might be explained by theories of 
modernisation and the creation of „new‟ Labour17.  
                                                          
14
 In the 1992 General Election campaign Robin Cook, then health spokesman, told a US observer 
that Labour did not have to develop any policies as it already had an approval rating of 72% without a 
policy. As reported in Dickson,N Lansley,S & Maltby,P Tory medicine quietens the NHS & The 
broadcast of nightmares, New Statesman, 6/9/96 pp.28-9. 
15
 Tony Blair speaking to a CBI Conference as reported by Elliot,L Business warns Blair on fees, the 
Guardian, 12/11/97. 
16
 Defined as the „private management of public money‟ by Evans,B (1992) pp.127-131, echoing 
Heclo,H & Wildavsky,A (1981) The Private Government of Public Money, MacMillan, London. 
17
 For the purposes of clarity, this thesis treats all Labour Party policymaking prior to the accession of 
Tony Blair to the leadership in 1994 as emanating from Labour and all such policymaking after Blair 
as the output of new Labour. Therefore, the historical chapters refer to Labour and the contemporary 
(1994-98) chapters refer to new Labour, except in historical references.    
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Approaches 
The main focus for discussion about the Labour Party since the accession of Tony Blair to the 
leadership has been about the concept of „new‟ Labour. This has been taken to mean something 
beyond the previous „modernisation‟ process which is said to have begun under the leadership of 
Neil Kinnock (1983-92) and continued under John Smith (1992-94). If not qualitatively different to 
his predecessors, Blair has, at the least, accelerated the process of change within his party, with an 
emphasis on both reinterpreting core values and altering the institutional structures of the decision-
making process. Education and training represents the ideal case study as far as new Labour is 
concerned; as noted above, it is central to Blair‟s renewal and modernist rhetoric (of both party and 
nation) in terms of values, and also central to the „supply-side socialism‟ which forms the party‟s 
main economic policy initiative.  
 Both of these aims of Tony Blair presented challenges to the support and loyalty of many who 
would consider themselves „old‟ Labour, and the leadership‟s control of the public statements of 
senior party figures during the last years of opposition showed the validity of  Lewis Minkin‟s 
model. His study of the relationship between the Party and trade union actors highlights the 
electoral cycle and the enormous pressure for all elements of the party to „all sing from the same 
songsheet‟ in the face of a hostile media in a pre-election period18.  
The advent of the new Labour phenomenon has led to a reappraisal of the Labour Party‟s Policy 
Review period, which began after the 1987 defeat. Many commentators at the time portrayed 
policy movement in relation to social democratic modernisation, a return to normal politics after 
the excesses of the Bennite period of the early 1980s, or as an inevitable process of neo-
liberalisation in the face of apparently popular Thatcherite policies
19
. Beyond the Policy Review, 
however, this thesis will concentrate on new constitutional arrangements set in train by Neil 
Kinnock and his successor John Smith, which could be seen to have taken Labour policy a stage 
further in bypassing the usual party affiliates. Therefore, this thesis also has to consider the 
possibility of new Labour as literally a new party.  
The main questions this research hopes to answer, and other issues it would hope to contribute 
to the discussion about, will be covered more fully in the concluding paragraphs of this chapter. 
The next stage, then, will be to introduce and discuss some of the major theoretical expositions of 
power which can be applied to the Labour Party. 
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Theories of power in the Labour Party 
 
Robert Michels‟ Political Parties, published in 1915 to reflect on the first forty years of the 
German Social Democratic Party, forms the theoretical basis for future analyses of power in Left 
parties. Michels outlines some universal problems associated with organisation in the world of 
mass politics, believing that only mass democratic parties could hope to represent the interests of 
the labouring classes: 
Organisation, based as it is upon the principle of least effort, that is to say, upon the greatest 
possible economy of energy, is the weapon of the weak in their struggle with the strong.
20
 
 
Only through collectivising individual strengths in a democratic socialist organisation could the 
weakest members of a society realise their potential. Other democratic forms are less inherently 
collectivist. These include direct referenda or plebiscitary democracy. For Michels this is flawed 
because the party membership could be open to suggestion by the ruling group or party who are in 
a position to set the questions. The ruling group have access to more information than the mass of 
the people, and the information tools (press, professional presentational skills) to direct the message 
in such a way as to reinforce their own prejudices. Thus, the holders of power maintain control. 
  This concentration of power is replicated within the party, as the hierarchy develops a separate 
interest from the mass membership. The party membership has formed around a particular set of 
basic principles, involving a mixture of defending their existing position and improving their 
current labour market and social situation. Beyond this basic core position, a schism emerges 
between the people who organise and act ex officio for the party‟s ends, and those who are content 
to be members with less direct involvement. So the very mechanism which legitimates the 
organisation (strength through unity) acts to strengthen the leadership, because every incremental 
gain in membership and the party‟s interests makes the activities of the party more complex. This 
complexity reinforces the tendency to leave decision making in the organisation to highly 
specialised sub-committees. Even the growth of membership alone, through extra contributions to 
the treasury, accentuates the trend which invests more power in the leadership. Thus, for Michels, 
hierarchy is purely technical outcome of proper and normal party behaviour.
21
 By setting the 
agenda for their memberships and controlling the access to media outlets, modern party leaderships 
can amply demonstrate the dangers of external referenda.  
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Another alternative form to mass party democracy is representative democracy, inspired by 
writings of Rousseau, Robespierre and Proudhon in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This 
also raises problems for Michels because permanent representation (as witnessed in the early 
decades of the SPD) can amount to dominion over the subject or citizen, in which the views of the 
represented are only listened to during an election campaign. The presence of this potential 
difficulty demonstrates the parallel between democracy as a whole and individual party democracy. 
Neither are what they claim they are to be, for: “Social democracy is not democracy, but a party 
fighting to attain to democracy. In other words, democracy is the end, not the means”22. 
Indeed, the means are aristocratic, reflecting the new tendencies of the leadership, who share 
with the membership the belief that they are the most mature and capable of all the members. They 
then no longer form a representation of the party but a group of individuals conscious of their own 
value to the whole, an aristocracy of the party.
23
 For Michels, then, political organisation is the 
realisation of power, and power is always conservative in the parliamentary situation because the 
basic aim of any party adhering to such rules is to maximise the party vote, which necessitates the 
recruitment of new members. For a democratic socialist party, this means going beyond its original 
and unique interests in an attempt to appeal to the interests of others; this is the motive force for 
such parties moving to the centre of the political spectrum and the sense of betrayal which then 
develops among some of the membership
24
.    
Every increase in the party under the new broader appeal accentuates the need for centralised 
control of the party message; there is now a larger number of differences within the party for 
opposing parties to exploit. During periods of opposition discipline becomes the paramount virtue, 
within the framework of a rigid hierarchy which performs a dual function; to reinforce the 
discipline and to „shadow‟ the government it wishes to replace. The original aim of the socialist 
party was to overthrow state centralisation, and the method used was the establishment of an 
organisation to further those ends; but, as the party becomes a centralised whole, organisation has 
moved from being the means to becoming the end itself. 
  Angelo Panebianco‟s theory of power in political parties is based on a less deterministic view 
of organisations than Michels, for whom parties inevitably disenchant their members and are 
reconstituted by periodic coup. Panebianco stresses not the ties that are broken but the ties that bind 
a party together; where Michels explains continual usurpation, Panebianco describes continuity in a 
fluid political situation. Panebianco also accounts for rational choice theories developed since the 
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1950s which attempt to simplify the motivation of parties as vote-maximising organisations which 
carry no ideological or emotional baggage
25
. Between the extremes of the pessimistic Michels and 
the economism of the rational school (exemplified by Anthony Downs), Panebianco describes a 
more naturalistic system. 
  Taking his cue from the firm, he sees organisations as structures which react to the various 
demands of their stakeholders, and which attempt to reach a satisfactory balance between them. 
This means, in practice, that firms are not only maximisers of profit, but need to placate suppliers 
and their workforces; thus, the goals are varied not fixed
26
. With political parties there is a 
complication in that they have usually a set of declared goals, in the form of a written constitution, 
which Michels would characterise as a facade. Panebianco recognises this, but he does not stress 
the betrayal of a fixed code, more the movement of party factions around the epicentre of a broad 
belief system; this, for him, is all part of an internal debate around party direction rather than a 
„substitution of ends‟27. The key factor in understanding organisations like social democratic parties 
is the understanding of incentives and how they vary within such parties. Again, he accepts 
differing incentives separating the leaders and the rank and file members, realises how Michels‟ 
oligarchic tendencies might emerge, but the umbilical cord which connects the interests of leaders 
and the led is only stretched rather than broken by changes in the balance of forces.
28
  
  The shared, collective incentive of the party may be relatively small, based around the need to 
achieve government and ameliorate the sufferings of the working class, but there are two major 
motivational factors which keep the party together. Firstly, in an hierarchical organisation like a 
social democratic party aiming for parliamentary success, there is usually no alternative route to 
that end; however narrow the identity between the leaders and led, there is no substitution of 
identity. The second factor stresses Panebianco‟s recognition of a tendency to oligarchy, but 
questions the Downsian thesis that party leaders dominate through absolute control of homogenous 
memberships; in fact the primary object of leaders is to safeguard what control they have by 
listening to their members. Organisational stability is their aim and it is achieved through a 
compromise between this stability and other ends pursued by more radical members. This internal 
balance of power is termed the dominant coalition and its exact nature depends upon the 
environmental factors surrounding each individual party.
29
 The key point is that however driven 
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social democratic party leaderships are to the centre, they are still obliged to take into account the 
ideological imperatives of the party membership. Therefore, the leadership has to maintain the 
umbilical link to at least part of the party‟s historical support base. In the British example, the 
Labour Party has traditionally identified with a wider political base than some continental social 
democratic parties, given the first-past-the-post political system which offers no representation to 
minority parties. However far towards the centre Labour might drift, they would suffer less from 
political exit than comparable parties in multiple party (proportional representation) systems
30
. 
  Panebianco‟s theory is therefore natural in that it does not imply a universal model for social 
democratic parties, even less for organisations as a whole. It accounts for intra-party debate and 
occasional leadership challenges if the present dominant coalition have stretched the umbilical cord 
too far beyond the collective interests. This reinforces the idea of a party as a balance of forces and 
may help to account for the longevity of social democratic parties. It is also more naturalistic than 
the rational choice model which fails to account for minority or principled parties in multi-party 
systems, which could never expect to form a government and would never aim for the centre 
ground vote. 
  Which of these theories might account for the British Labour Party in the 1990s? Panebianco 
developed his idea of the dominant coalition by comparing the historical development of European 
social democratic parties in action. In the case of the Labour Party, the dominant coalition is 
uniquely dependent on an outside actor, the trade union movement, to which many early party MPs 
were more emotionally attached than to the socialist Labour Representative Committee. The 
balance of forces, then, was between the first party leader, Kier Hardie, and the union leaders, 
whose membership had the potential to damage party cohesion through the workings of the Annual 
Conference. If the party hierarchy could control the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) and the 
unions control their delegates, this reciprocal system could almost guarantee stability. The 
introduction of individual membership in the 1918 constitution weakened the overt connection to 
the unions enough to incorporate other socialist and reformist groups and ensure their loyalty. 
  However, with Labour and the Trade Union Congress (TUC) locked together in an institutional 
and financial relationship which constitutes a dominant coalition of apparent strength, the division 
of incentives which emerges when Labour is in government necessarily causes damage to the 
relationship, which is inherently weak for Panebianco because of its dual hierarchy. Trade union 
incentives, built upon their members shared experience of exploitation and incremental 
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improvement, can be at odds with a government forced into following economic orthodoxy; this is 
termed a “disturbance of the equillibria” by Panebianco, and leads to crisis.31 The outcome of the 
crisis is a change to the dominant coalition, perhaps with redefined goals, a discrediting of the old 
coalition and some institutional restructuring of the party. In the case of the Labour Party, these can 
all relate to a change in the party-trade union relationship. 
  In his disagreement with Michels, Panebianco would stress the continuity and relative success 
of social democratic parties throughout the twentieth-century, and challenge the idea of large 
schisms between leaders and led; it is his systemic fluidity, the constant refinement within the 
dominant coalition that also allows him to critique the rational actor position. In the abstract world 
of electoral modelling, the logical inference is that voting will peak at a central point between the 
positions of the major political parties in the system. This is based upon four main Downsian 
assumptions: that the only desire of political actors is the attainment of office; that all voters and 
parties are preference maximisers; that there is only room for two major parties in a system; and 
that the two parties will always move to the median voter position. The British and American cases, 
without the option of exit, are almost written to fit the theory
32
. 
 In Downsian parties, the main determinant is the use of ideology to shape the preferences of 
those who vote. The tension created by the need to adhere to the ideology while attaining office 
causes the two main political positions to close together. There are two motive factors at play: 
initially, the internal homogeneity of both parties (presupposing absolute power for the leaders) 
allows the parties to move freely, but this is counteracted by the institutionalised power of the 
governing party, which can change state policy; and as the opposition is identically motivated to 
attract those voters who would be accommodated by the new policy, they follow suit. As the 
governing party can henceforth accrue no advantage from changing policy, this should logically 
lead to the end of political movement and should result in the main parties settling at the centre of 
political agreement. What has been observed, however, by Ian Budge‟s division of policy 
manifesto pledges into a left-right composition, is that the „median voter‟ has failed to remain fixed 
in the middle ground
33
. Instead, public opinion shifts around often quite dramatically, despite 
relative immobility among the parties. 
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These findings would reassure Panebianco whose critique of the Downsian model is based on its 
oversimplification. It contains little on the specific role of parties as it is based upon a 
universalisation of the weak-party American system, ignoring all the institutional trade-offs which 
characterise European labour parties. Also, elections are treated as one-offs by Downs; there is 
little account taken of loyalty, party ethos, integrity or policy-identification which Sprague and 
Prezowski demonstrate as crucial to the long term success of parties
34
 The very uncertainty of the 
world and the problems that can emerge (the post-1973 oil price shock, the collapse of 
communism) are missing, along with the role of ideology which helps anchor voters to a particular 
theory of the world, and which attracts members to voluntary parties. The history of the Labour 
Party, as shall be demonstrated in this thesis, shows that one party can contain within its parameters 
more than one „ideological position‟, and that during the 1994-97 period there was more than one 
position of anchorage that new Labour could adopt without sacrificing its core vote.  
One of the major Labour theorists of the post-war era is Lewis Minkin, who is most concerned 
with the internal politics of the party, specifically the relationship between the leadership and the 
trade unions. His findings about the balance of forces between the main actors offer support to the 
Panebianco thesis although Minkin refutes some of the latter‟s ideas about the plurality of decision 
making. Key for Minkin is the ethos of the trade union wing of the Labour „movement‟ when the 
party is in government. In his study of Conference resolutions, he found that this ethos, which 
allowed for acquiescence during periods of governance, could be betrayed if the leadership had to 
apply economic orthodoxy to appease the financial markets. The unions, socialist societies and 
Constituency Labour Parties which make up the remainder of the Labour „Movement‟35, would see 
such action by a Labour Government as a betrayal of emotional, perhaps irrational familial 
commitments, and this would explain the undisciplined nature of previous periods of Labour rule. 
Like Eric Shaw
36
, Minkin questioned whether Labour could continue if the balance of forces within 
the party coalition was altered by external factors such as the state funding of parties or the 
introduction of proportional representation followed by a coalition with the Liberal Democratic 
Party. In common with rational choice theory, the key factor here is the relationship between 
internal, institutional actors and the constitutional powers available to British governments; they 
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have so far determined what Labour‟s ethos has become, and, logically, will determine what new 
Labour‟s ethos will become. 
 For Henry Drucker, loyalty is the key theme of Labour‟s ethos, and this has developed out of an 
opposition to the exploitation of the managers and bosses in the workplace; this has helped to 
construct a defensive „us against the world‟ mentality among the working class. The defensiveness 
is Janus-like, both an attempt to fight off further exploitation and protect that which the workers 
have already achieved; this suggests that the instigators of the Labour Party were non-revolutionary 
in nature
37
. They were not calling for an overthrow of capitalist society, but for radical reforms to 
the existing system. For Drucker, Labour in the 1930s and 1940s had developed a necessary „social 
glue‟ of nationalisation, a compromise political hook to attract the uncommitted voters, while 
addressing the internal dilemma of satisfying socialists and non-socialists seeking a better life in 
the existing society. This thesis will argue that Labour in the 1960s and 1970s also used 
comprehensive education as a form of social glue to hold together egalitarians and meritocratic 
liberals, in an almost unspoken (or at least rarely questioned) compromise position between 
fundamentally diverse positions. It then goes on to argue that new Labour have utilised the same 
approach, with the new dominant coalition using individual opportunity, widening access and the 
need for modernised education and training system as the unifying force which acts to obfuscate 
the intellectual divide while providing a rationale for reform.  
  The theories so far discussed can be characterised as explaining two broad methods of political 
change; firstly, the Michels, and later, rational choice position, which would suggest that the 
Labour Party in Britain today attempted to maximise its share of the vote through adopting centre-
ground policies. Secondly, the Panebianco challenge to this, perhaps borne out by Budge‟s 
findings, suggests that this might be mistaken, as the movement of public opinion is more prevalent 
and volatile than movement of political stances by the parties. This suggests that political education 
of the electorate, appealing to their hopes for a better future rather than a better managed present, 
might be more successful in the long run. Any new dominant coalition within Labour could attempt 
to attract more of the electorate through an appeal to a mixture of policy proposals and a 
restatement of core values. 
However, chasing the consensus (or median voter) position is not a guarantee of success 
because, as Richard Rose recognised, consensus is a moving target
 38
. This is partly because the 
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context keeps changing as well, leading to differences of priority, and changes to what we might 
term the „consensus‟ position on  a given issue. Several major policy issues in the ensuing chapters 
of this thesis are concerned with changing consensus positions. Opposition parties, if they seriously 
hope to attain executive power in two-party systems, have to respond to the new consensus, and in 
some cases can even advance the consensus before entering office
39
. 
 In a series of related projects, Budge and others have concentrated on the manifestos and 
„Queen‟s Speeches‟ of many electoral campaigns across the post-war era in an effort to explain the 
apparent failings of „representative democratic theory‟. This is taken to mean that parties represent 
the people, gaining a mandate from them at elections, which they then implement (as far as is 
possible given external constraints), and have their actions accepted or rejected at subsequent 
elections.
40
 One way to measure the usefulness of this proposition is to look at the implementation 
of the various manifesto or governmental programme pledges.
41
 
  In a volume co-edited with David Robertson and Derek Hearl, Ian Budge presented findings by 
Colin Rallings which concentrates on a comparison of the United Kingdom and Canada (both of 
which use the „Westminster model‟). In terms of pledges, Rallings found, like Rose, that in normal 
circumstances (where a Government is relatively secure in its position), between 80 and 100% of 
the declared programme was implemented.
42
  
  However, during periods of intense Governmental unpopularity, such as 1977-78 in Britain, the 
rate averaged only 63.7% (although this rose to 72.7% for governments of over two years duration 
between 1964 and 1979). The electoral verdict is then decided by a comparison between the 
promises of the party in its manifesto, and its subsequent performance over a possible five-year 
period
43
. The analysis of Rallings, then, is less dependent on the statements of the manifesto than in 
Rose‟s earlier studies; for a variety of reasons, manifestos should be treated as a useful guide to 
separate the parties, rather than a full explanation of what the government will do. 
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  This is taken a stage further by Budge who added extra dimensions to manifesto analysis. 
Firstly, salience (taken to mean the attraction between policies and particular groups of voters) can 
only be determined by plotting the manifestos over time; only then can conclusions about the 
mobility of parties across the spectrum be made. There is less free movement across the continuum 
than Downsian analysis would suggest, partly because parties are as likely to want to stress policy 
differences from other parties as they are to stress their similarities. This is partly to do with tactical 
positioning, but as Budge (echoing Panebianco) emphasises, office seeking is not the total goal for 
most politicians. Individual political actors are driven by the desire to pursue certain policy goals; 
they might judiciously de-emphasise some aspects of their policies in manifestos (ie. the costs) but 
on the whole there is little room for policy manoeuvring
44
. Like Panebianco and Minkin, Budge 
provides a causation for movement which is circumscribed by the basic historical position of the 
party, personified by the membership, ethos, institutions, constitution and (as the former would 
emphasise) the balance of forces within the coalition. 
  Thus Budge hopes to demonstrate that movement is tied to history through the policies that are 
on offer. Extreme volatility of electoral pledges should be most visible during times when the party 
is unelectable (Labour after 1931 and 1983), while least movement should be expected when a 
party wishes to demonstrate the near-consensus between it and its opponents (Conservatives in 
1951 and 1955, Labour in 1964). A further condition for partisan statements would be the chances 
of success; it is easier to make radical statements of intent if you are either totally confident or have 
no chance of winning power. If a close election result is expected parties should emphasise 
consent
45. This forms the basis for the „modified office seeking model‟ which was applied by 
Budge et al to case study elections from nineteen industrial democracies over the post-war period. 
  The major finding was that the left-right continuum was the most prevalent factor among the 
countries studied; however, this failed to lead to policy convergence at the centre-ground (as 
Downs would expect) and in fact there was no definite trend. Where the two main parties in the 
United Kingdom were at their closest, in the 1950s they were both trending to the left of centre 
while in the mid-1960s they were both moving rightwards. In the 1980s, Budge found, they began 
to move apart once more, with the peak of the departure occurring around 1982, after which the 
Labour Party began to move rightwards again to close the gap. The only occupation of identical 
ground occurred when the Liberal Party oscillated between the two polar positions; there was no 
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„leapfrogging‟ among the parties competing for power46. This allows for several conclusions to be 
drawn about party behaviour and motivations. 
  Firstly, though parties move, they do not move very much; the biggest movement noted in this 
international survey was by the Conservative Party in Britain. Social Democratic parties do tend to 
move towards the centre, but within a tighter framework or “temporal variance of programme” than 
avowedly centrist parties
47
. Secondly, parties are ideologically stable; they generally stay quite 
apart, which in turn suggests that they have particular policies to pursue which they are not willing 
to jettison in the manner that Downs had supposed. They are „policy pursuing‟ rather that „office 
seeking‟ in a situation where Downsian assumptions do not apply: there is a unidimensionality, but 
it is in the nature of a simplification of policy differences for the electorate; there is actual 
uncertainty about the whereabouts of the median voter, so parties pitch their appeal according to 
their ideologies; and the ideologies themselves lead to relatively fixed policy positions which they 
are reluctant to change. The conclusions that flow from these assumptions for Budge et al are that 
parties do not converge on the median voter position, but the party which nevertheless gains the 
endorsement of the median voter will have won enough to form a government or a coalition, which 
occurred in 80% of sample elections.
48
   
     While this is a useful introduction to theories of power and how parties ought to behave 
given the proclivities of the electorate, this thesis argues that new Labour failed to act in the 
manner expected by Budge‟s theory in several ways. Firstly, although surely confident of victory, if 
not of the margin, Tony Blair and the party leadership kept a firm grip on policy pronouncements 
and decided on a vague series of policy aims to fight the election on, rather than a bold series of 
specific policy changes as we should expect in such circumstances. The unique extra factors which 
applied in the case of the Labour Party are the breadth of its ideology and the peculiarities of the 
British electoral system. This ideological breadth (the space which contains moderate egalitarians 
and meritocrats) allowed new Labour to shift policies in the name of modernisation and changed 
circumstance, without exceeding party boundaries and provoking exit. Modernisation, the 
expression of changing circumstance, thus rationalises a changing ideology and makes 
straightforward right-left snap-shot comparisons difficult; this thesis argues that new Labour use 
modernisation as a smokescreen for certain policy changes, as well as rhetorically for the benefit of 
the electorate.  
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Secondly, new Labour defied Budgeian expectations by choosing to fight the election on 
broadly Conservative grounds, especially with regard to key policy areas such as education and 
training (more emphasis on standards, discipline, choice and a value for money), crime and 
disorder, asylum law, economic policy, public spending restraint, defence, and over the need for a 
referendum before adopting the Euro to replace the pound. New Labour seem to have tapped into 
the concerns of former Conservative voters, portraying themselves as a corruption-free and more 
efficient version of the same managerialist type of Government. How did the Labour Party manage 
this transformation, and does this offer evidence for a Downsian or Michelsian conclusion? The 
next approach this chapter will discuss will trace the relationship between party structure and 
policy outcomes.  
 
Institutional changes to the Labour Party  
As we have observed the Downsian model of party change is largely based on the American two-
party system. In Britain the parties are stronger in terms of their organisational structure than in the 
US model, so any changes to policy or policymaking practice have to be discussed in relationship 
to changes to the institutional structure. The contemporary structure of the party at any given time 
constitutes a constraining factor on policy change. The case that institutional changes to the Labour 
Party are connected to a rightward drift of policy rests on the assumption that Labour has developed 
from a socialist past to a liberal, even neo-conservative present. This would be manifested both in 
Michelsian terms, where the party‟s democratic organisation had been eroded by a centralising 
leadership, and also in terms of political ideology, where a case could be made that the party had 
previously stood for and introduced in government, definite socialist policies which it now finds 
itself unwilling to offer the electorate. In terms of constraints on action, the suggested movement of 
the party across the electoral spectrum should be made easier by the removal of or restructuring of 
party institutions. In order to ascertain the effects of such changes, this section will concentrate on 
the major developments within Labour‟s institutions over the recent past, incorporating the role of 
the National Executive Committee and Annual Conference, the Joint Policy Commissions and the 
National Policy Forum. 
 The National Executive Committee (NEC) is the supreme body of the Labour Party for the 
fifty-one weeks of the year that the Conference does not meet. The NEC officially has two basic 
functions within the structure of the Labour Party; policymaking and party management. The latest 
constitutional changes to the NEC suggest more of an administrative and campaigning role, so the 
balance has shifted towards a management function: 
59 
 
It is the core objective of the NEC to ensure that we enter the next election in an equally 
strong or stronger position. The crucial management of the party's staff and resources 
remains a core responsibility of the NEC
49
.  
 
 The 1918 constitution set up the NEC as a bulwark against the power of trade unionists 
within the party. During the policymaking period covered by this thesis (1994-1997) it was still the 
case that of the 29 members of the executive 18 effectively relied on trade union support for their 
seats at the table, even though only twelve were directly elected trade union representatives. Five 
more NEC members were chosen by the votes of constituency parties, while five women and the  
treasurer were elected by the whole conference,  of which trade union votes counted for 50% (on a 
downward trend from 70% after 1993 and 90% before then). The socialist societies elected one 
member, and also for a representative of the Young Socialists. As Denis Kavanagh notes, the 
unions were all pervasive within the party, whatever the niceties of the wording of the 
constitution.
50
 
 In total, thirteen places on the NEC were occupied by MPs. However, there was no 
representation for the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) built into the constitution, although that 
was corrected by the first elections after the Partnership in Power changes. Previously the majority 
of MPs elected tend to come from the shadow cabinet. This is because of the way the NEC 
elections are carried out, with candidate profiles circulated to the mass membership who often 
selected the most famous faces or names on the ballot
51
. Members of the Trades Union Congress 
General Council, which constitutes the General Secretaries of the largest unions, were barred from 
standing, and there were no representatives of Labour‟s 12,000 councillors52, the women‟s 
conference or ethnic minority sections during the most recent policymaking period. 
 The affiliated trade union‟s representatives tended to be placemen, in that they were on the 
NEC to represent the interests of the union concerned on the basis of the size of their memberships. 
It is a deliberately representative body, at least of the blue collar, male party that Labour once 
largely was, designed in the 1918 compromise to keep the oligarchic tendency of the PLP 
leadership or the trade union block in check. Unfortunately, while it could perform this negative 
task, the NEC did not become a positive source new policy ideas, and representatives who have sat 
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on its subcommittees tended to be valued for defending positions rather than advancing policy or 
widening the interests represented on that body
53
. Hence the many attempts to change the structure 
of the NEC in recent years, from a variety of political standpoints
54
.  Designed as a constraint, the 
NEC was intended to contain the balanced forces, but according to one internal critic:  
It has changed a lot over time, not so much in the constitution of the party, but in practice it 
is markedly different now. [In the early 1970s].... I worked for the NEC and there was a 
chasm between NEC on the one hand and the Parliamentary leadership on the other, it was 
quite ridiculous that there were people like me working specifically for the NEC......  you 
could find yourself in very real difficulty at times if you were appearing to help the shadow 
cabinet. 
55
 
 
 From a later period (1978, with Labour in government), Tony Benn‟s diaries recall the type 
of problems which could occur when the trade unionists on the NEC thought that the PLP 
leadership was ignoring their interests: 
Frank Allaun opened for the NEC announcing that it had unanimously agreed on monthly 
joint meetings between the cabinet and NEC. Jim [Callaghan].... commented dryly: „Why 
not meet in continuous session?‟ Jim said that he did not see the need for monthly meetings 
and he was not willing to let the NEC be either the co-government or the alternative 
government.
56
 
 
 This was, of course a turbulent period featuring many uninvited economic difficulties for 
the 1974-79 Labour Government, and as Lewis Minkin has pointed out, the closeness of the party-
union relationship always tends to vary in relation to Labour‟s ability to deliver labour friendly 
outcomes in office
57
. In contrast to these conflicting views about the sometimes abrasive nature of 
the NEC‟s relationship with the leadership, for some party critics the problem is that co-operation 
between these two bodies tend to squeeze out the other constituent elements of the party. In fact, 
during the long opposition phase an incestuous relationship was said to have developed so that the 
body had become moribund and frequently inquorate.
58
 Hence the moves to reform the main policy 
and decision making body of the Labour Party during the 1980s and 1990s. These can be expressed 
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by the examples of two models of democracy, one from an inclusive, bottom up perspective, the 
other from a party-managerialist perspective. Peter Hain‟s appeal to democratise the NEC mirrors 
the concerns of Michels by making a causal link between hierarchical policymaking structures and 
the amount of policy input at local, grassroots level. Citing Seyd and Whiteley‟s findings that 
Labour performed better at the 1992 General Election in seats where there was committed activist 
campaigning,
59
 Hain saw this as a testimonial for the party management role of the NEC. In the 
policymaking process, Hain also wants to extend the party reach to the grass roots, even beyond the 
party itself: 
Sympathetic outsiders could be invited to attend these policy meetings (for instance local 
GPs or school governors) to provide extra expertise and to involve the wider community in 
the party. There are plenty of people with skills and others who are opinion formers who 
like to be involved and consulted...
60
 
 
 In such a scenario, representations to the NEC would be far more informed and 
democratically valid than in the Conference resolutionary procedure where a statement was 
appended to the local meeting‟s agenda and then “dispatched to the National Executive where it is 
ritually noted and ignored”61. Hain went on to recommend that Labour policy be made with such a 
local focus as to make the appeal particularistic and conditional, while the NEC itself would be 
reformed in a purely representative manner, with quotas appended to the mass membership 
elections. This would clearly create a channel of communication between the grass roots and the 
leadership which would consolidate the kind of NEC constraint on Labour in government which 
would prevent the leadership from acting beyond the interests of the rank and file. 
 An alternative reform model for the NEC was put forward by the party‟s General Secretary 
Tom Sawyer, who also wanted to see the new, bigger local parties represented on the NEC so that 
Labour could represent the whole community, and a bar on (shadow) cabinet nominations for NEC 
elections so as to allow the PLP some official representation. However, Sawyer saw little future 
role for the NEC in the policymaking sphere, rather: 
I think we would have to see the NEC as the governing council of the party. I would expect 
there to be a heavy burden of responsibility for the administrative functions connected with 
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the party organisation. But it is clear that the lead responsibility for the policy and the 
message will come from elected leaders.
62
 
 
 In this scenario we have the same concentration on widening the constituency that Labour 
can hope to represent in the communities, but in contrast to the Hain model, the concern here is to 
avoid a situation where decision making power is devolved to the wider party. Many of Sawyer‟s 
recommendations were incorporated within the consultation document Labour into power: a 
framework for partnership which emerged then as Party in Power. Raising the spectre of Denis 
Healey having to return from Heathrow Airport to address and win over a hostile Labour Party 
conference, Sawyer wanted a Labour Government to benefit from the kind of swift manoeuvring 
the Conservatives were capable of because they lack such internal democratic constraints: “Labour 
does need a democratic structure, but one that allows ministers to respond quickly and 
effectively”63. The result of these reforms have produced a situation where a mass membership 
party is ostensibly more democratic in its inclusiveness and representation on the key executive 
body, and yet is less democratic in its executive function if actual policymaking is to be centred 
around (shadow) ministers and their advisers. This would clearly result in the removal of the NEC 
as a counterbalance to leadership autonomy. 
 A recurrent theme of the ongoing debate about Labour‟s constitution relates to the practice 
in government. Hain, for instance, did not believe that the Cabinet should have to reassemble at the 
NEC every month. Making the Michelsian point, he states that: 
A Labour government will require the support of extra-parliamentary movements (trade 
unions, community and single issue groups) and wider popular opinion if it is to overcome 
hostile forces [to act as a] valuable countervailing pressure against influence from the City 
and civil service.
64
 
 
 Hain and members of a relatively new pressure group within the party, Labour Reform, 
clearly view the wider public opinion to be closer to their own socialist values; like Michels they 
believe socialism (or true democracy) can only emanate from below, but from the perspective of 
Labour Party leaders, this dissolution of power even beyond the party membership would make 
coherent policymaking in opposition or executive decision making in government far more 
difficult. 
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 Paradoxically, while the party leadership were keen to keep policymaking power at the apex 
of the party, and representatives of the rank and file, like Trevor Fisher of Labour Reform and 
Vladimir Derer of the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy, wanted to see more extra-party 
involvement with the community, it is on the question of outside influence on policy that many of 
the „old‟ Labour left fear the democratic deficit65. With less direct NEC influence on the 
policymaking processes following Party into Power, the trade unionist contingent and the few 
backbenchers among parliamentary representatives feel further from power now than under the 
previous system, before the Policy Review of 1987-89 consolidated Neil Kinnock‟s introduction of 
policy commissions designed to connect policy and presentation. 
 In the classic, and now historical, version of the role of the NEC in policymaking the 
executive maintained permanent sub-committees for distinct policy areas, so as to feed the 
Conference with new policies as required. Policy was typically made over a nine-month cycle, with 
the sub-committee served by a chair who was the regular parliamentary spokesperson, a secretary 
from the research department, interested members of the NEC evenly balanced to avoid political 
partiality, with some extra MPs and academic advisers brought in as necessary. Papers were drafted 
and circulated to the unions and other affiliates, and then full drafts were presented to the relevant 
subject (for example, Home Policy) Subcommittee, after which they were redrafted for the perusal 
of the full NEC and then set out for Conference to vote on
66
. The salient feature was that political 
balance and broad representation of party institutions were incorporated within the committee. The 
democratic constraints on the NEC power base consisted of the ability of the wider Conference to 
change the membership of the executive over time by election, and the fact that Conference could 
put items on the agenda of the party by way of the public domain
67
.  
 The process effectively begun with an NEC resolution to change or review an existing 
policy, and the relevant subcommittee was charged to carry out the review under the aegis of the 
shadow cabinet spokesperson. Unfortunately these subcommittees, like many purely representative 
committees, were beset by interests which tended towards the status quo or paralysis at best. 
Following the 1983 election defeat, the Kinnock leadership and some modernising MPs (including 
many with democratic socialist credentials) and activists urged Labour to update its procedures and 
remake the connection between policymaking and presentation
68
. The full-scale policy review of 
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1987-1989 introduced into practice the idea of giving more power to the shadow cabinet in Policy 
Commissions which would meet monthly over a two-year period to establish a new set of policies 
for the 1992 election. Unfortunately they were considered unwieldy organisations, consisting  of up 
to forty members, mainly because they were broad commissions, for example, the social policy 
commission involved health, education and social services.  
 These were in fact virtually disowned by many of the key actors who had to work on them; 
they were seen as sclerotic as the old sub-committees but even more unwieldy. According to David 
Blunkett who sat on the Social Policy Commission as Health and then Education spokesman: 
In my view the commissions have not worked, including the commissions on economic 
policy, social policy, environment and foreign policy, I don‟t believe that they have 
functioned more than for the first six months or so and I think they need reviewing...
69
. 
 
 The institutional structure of policy development can be seen to have been informed by 
direct experience; not only did the previous NEC system work imperfectly in that it tended to be in 
reality “shadow cabinet plus London intelligentsia-led” according to Blunkett, but the policy 
commissions fared little better: 
My abiding memory is the constant meetings  where we met fortnightly, even weekly in the 
build-up to the policy document in 1989, Meet the Challenge, Make the Change, we spent 
endless hours in meetings and discussion, and when you looked at it in the end, distilled into 
the document, you wonder whether all that time was fruitless, and then when you lose an 
election on the back of it, it does sometimes lead to demoralisation, so the present structure 
has partly risen out of immediate past experience, people wasting their time...
70
. 
 
 The method used by front benchers in the most recent pre-election policymaking period, 
1992-97, began with policy need being established by a meeting of the Joint Policy Commission, 
which had the crucial role of co-ordinating policies. For example, Labour decided to develop new 
policy positions in reaction to Government changes to the National Curriculum, opted-out schools 
and on nursery education vouchers, and made it the task of  specialised, „mini-commissions‟ under 
the relevant front-bench spokesperson to develop such policies. They were typically unofficial, (in 
terms of not being purely representative of the party institutions) and free to take evidence from 
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where its members saw fit
71
. The main question of whether this represents a more or less 
democratic policymaking structure might seem to rest upon whether Labour looks beyond its own 
perimeters for advice more so than in the past, to such an extent that party institutional bodies are 
effectively bypassed. Much of the evidence in the later chapters of this thesis is designed to answer 
this question. 
 By the 1990s the NEC policymaking system had deteriorated (or evolved) into a situation 
where the shadow cabinet member had a large degree of autonomy, certainly with regard to the 
advisers he or she would seek out, and to what extent the affiliates were listened to or consulted 
during policy initiation and development. After the advent of Joint Policy Commissions and the 
National Policy Forum system (in 1992-93) there still existed a system where the shadow cabinet 
member dominated the policymaking agenda, but if anything it was now more open. As the GMB‟s 
political officer Phil Wyatt put it:  
.....the party constitution still says the NEC is the font of policy, and of course the policy 
document that go to conference do go on behalf of the NEC. The drafting comes from the 
shadow cabinet member, and they get to decide who sits on the mini-commissions thrashing 
out the policy and drafting the paper...
72
 
 
 Although the NEC retained its pre-emptive position as the Conference when it is not sitting, 
it is far from being the only channel of communication between major policy actors. Quite apart 
from the Policy Forum which we will discuss in the next section, the Joint Policy Commissions and 
the Economic Policy Commission provide opportunities for the major trade union leaders to come 
into contact with the parliamentary leadership and have policy input. 
 Due to its central constitutional and policymaking role, the NEC was a representative body 
of the whole party, and as such a real constraint on the ability of the PLP leadership to make policy 
contrary to the interests of the rank and file. During periods of difficulty in government, it often 
became an alternative power base for trade union or Constituency Labour Party (CLP) interests; 
however, during times of quiet opposition, the NEC has on occasion become moribund as trade 
unions and the leadership worked together to modernise the party, squeezing out, in the time 
honoured manner, those minority elements of the party structure who wanted more democratic 
control of the party. This, in essence, is Lewis Minkin‟s historical model of the de facto party 
                                                          
71
 In her Early Years Enquiry Team, Margaret Hodge, MP used a team of about 15 advisers and 
interested people, and she held a series of seminars of around 40 individuals who were invited to 
discuss certain aspects of the issue. These consisted of the various pressure groups and LEA 
representatives. Her reaction to suggestions that it was not representative of the party was that the 
policy had to work on the ground and had to appeal to the country not the membership. 
72
 interview with author, 29/10/96. 
66 
 
constitution, with centralised effectiveness most apparent when the trade unions acted in concert 
with the leadership to close the gap between the two halves of Panebianco‟s dual hierarchy. The 
NEC itself, deriving most of its power from the fact that trade unionists were represented on it, 
could only act as an effective counterbalance so long as trade union interests were separate from 
those of the PLP leadership. Once trade union interests were subsumed into the leadership‟s 
electoral strategy, based as it was on new ideas about flexible workforces and supply-side 
socialism, the trade unions had less direct influence (reflecting the changing basis of demand for 
unionised labour) within the party.  Chapters Four and Seven of this thesis explore this new 
relationship with regard to vocational education and training policies. 
In the 1994-97 period, what seems to have replaced the flawed NEC policymaking system, 
with its heavy reliance on the shadow cabinet and their intellectual influences, is another form of 
policymaking which also is heavily reliant on a few chosen leaders and an increasingly 
sophisticated lobbying system which gives equal opportunities to elements of the Labour 
movement and non-affiliated pressure groups to influence policy. The NEC has less constraining 
power than it had before, and this is consolidated with the latest institutional changes. 
 One developing factor has been that the leadership in shadow cabinet had access to far more 
independent research, financed by the state‟s „Short Money‟73, which made it easier for front-
benchers to develop their own policies from research funds, which were said to have equalled the 
official party‟s research capacity at Walworth Road by the time of the climax of Labour‟s 
preparations for government
74
. This, of course, gave the leadership a degree of financial 
independence from trade union influences. This widens the possible external influences which can 
impact on the policymaking commissions, allowing the leadership to be more responsive to the 
electorate‟s concerns. Hence, lobbying power, either internal or external in origin, became greater 
while the institutional input of the trade unions through Conference and the NEC has declined. In 
Michelsian terms, the NEC could break the oligarchic stranglehold by acting as an interpreter of 
affiliate concerns, thus flattening the hierarchy. However, at times the NEC has itself helped form 
the oligarchic structure, in the name of electability, even while its intention was to check the 
leadership. The reduction in trade union influence makes it easier for the leadership to develop 
policy unchallenged at the apex of a steeper hierarchy. 
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 One of the implications of a lobby system of policymaking is that it is not mere size, voting 
power or even party affiliation which can have effect. Euphemistically at least, the quality of the 
argument should determine its validity or influence, rather than the source of the argument. The 
Policy Forum system, which allows for more representation by the „minnows‟ of Labour‟s 
constitution, particularly the constituency parties (CLPs), might seem to offer more opportunity for 
minority party interests to off-set the external lobbyists and the trade unions, yet it has attracted 
criticism from those who see it as  a constraint on party democracy rather than a constraint on the 
leadership. Potentially, however, Forum could act in the manner the NEC was designed to, as a 
Michelsian brake although through a lobbying mechanism rather than a voting mechanism. This 
new institution will form the focus of the next section. 
 
National Policy Forum  
The Policy Forum concept of policymaking in the Labour Party can be seen to have been born out 
of the democratic failings of the original constitution. It is a feature of the ongoing constitutional 
debate within the party that no-one can legitimately refer back to a period when the old structure 
worked „perfectly‟. In fact the Policy Commissions and Policy Forum mechanisms set up during 
the Neil Kinnock and John Smith leadership‟s were established, at least in part, in response to 
democratisation calls from individual parliamentarians like Peter Hain, pressure groups like the 
(originally Bennite) Labour Co-ordinating Committee and some trade unionists, notably John 
Edmonds of the GMB and Bill Morriss of the Transport and General Workers union, the T&G
75
. 
 Official party documents
76
 concentrated on the democratic deficit implicit in the imperfect 
operation of the pre-existing system, and stressed that Labour were “responding to demand” 
because the policymaking process excluded large sections of the movement, and the policy 
outcomes were often “muddled, even self-contradictory, of unclear status and arguable authority”77. 
The main concerns were that women, ethnic minorities and the European Parliamentary Labour 
Party (EPLP) were among the groups that were ignored and reforms set out to address this. On the 
new Joint Policy Committee, (JPC) the emphasis was on setting clear parameters for new policy 
development, to oversee policy co-ordination. The JPC does not, as such, threaten the sovereignty 
of the NEC in the way that the National Policy Forum (NPF) seemed to do; for example JPC output 
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was presented to the NEC in draft form before the NPF, and the policies still have to ratified by the 
next Conference. 
 The problems which the NPF have caused among party members can be broadly 
categorised as concerned with either representation, constitutionality or secrecy, or some 
combination of these. Again, the Party in Power reforms after the 1997 Annual Conference were 
partly intended to deal with some of these concerns, particularly by anchoring the NPF within the 
constitution. In terms of representation, the initial NPF in May 1993 had a total of 81 elected 
members, of which 41 were women due to the minimum requirement for each category. The 
breakdown was: 
The structure of the provisional National Policy Forum (1994) 
                                                                            Number Of Reps                Minimum 
                                                                                                                         Women 
England regional CLPs                                            18                                        9 
Scotland CLPs                                                           2                                         1 
Affiliates                                                                    1 
Wales CLPs                                                               2                                         1 
Women‟s organisations                                            11                                       11 
Black and Asian                                                         4                                         2 
Youth and Students                                                    2                                         1 
PLP                                                                            6                                         2 
European PLP                                                            3                                         1 
Local councillors                                                        8                                         3 
Socialist societies & Co-ops                                      2                                         1 
The Co-operative Party                                              1                                         1 
Trade unions                                                              20                                        8          
Total           81                                      41 
Table reproduced from ‘Extending Party Democracy’, Labour Party, March 1994.                                                   
 
 At the latest comparable pre-election meeting in May 1996, with a membership of 87 the 
ratios were little changed, with one less trade unionist, the women‟s organisations representatives 
dispersed (but at 43 out of 87 women form the same ratio) and more PLP and European PLP (seven 
69 
 
and five rather than six and three) representatives
78
. The most striking feature is the lower 
proportion of trade unionists in comparison to the NEC and Conference weighting. In a move 
designed to allow broader party input into policymaking, Regional Policy Forums (RPF) were to be 
set up, although „pilot‟ RPFs were not fully endorsed or directed by the leadership until after new 
Labour came into office. Prior to the election, organisation and regularity of the forums were left to 
the individual regions, the issue received a „hands off‟ approach from the centre (some of the 
regions report a similar apathy among members
79
) which suggests that some elements within the 
central policymaking machinery would not welcome another level of policy input. 
 One criticism of the way the NPF works, from within the trade union element of the party, 
illustrates the changing nature of policymaking in the Labour Party. In the classic version of both 
NEC and AC policymaking, trade unions had the ultimate veto of using their electoral weight at the 
conclusion of any discussions. This opportunity to exercise a membership mandate in numerical 
terms is not open to party actors at Forum, where the emphasis has to be on winning the argument 
and ensuring the chair of each work-shop discussion group notes any recurrent amendments which 
might have won the assent of the assembled.  Phil Wyatt of the GMB was concerned at the fact that 
“the chair of the Forum, Robin Cook and the Director of Policy.. Matthew Taylor... seem to be very 
uncomfortable with votes being taken” although he answered his own concern to some extent by 
remembering that “the Policy Forum is supposed to be there as a sounding board after all, it is not 
there to make policy, it is there to contribute to the policymaking process”80. The new system 
highlighted the fact that the trade unions were used to wielding their powers within Labour Party 
structures by the weight of their collective vote, rather than by reasoned argument. The very act of 
widening the franchise and introducing qualitative discussions through policy fora threatened the 
trade union power base within the constitution, which in turn prompted questions about the 
constitutionality of the NPF. 
 Before the 1997 constitutional reforms, the NPF remained largely mysterious to the wider 
party because there were no journalists allowed into the proceedings, and many policy actors and 
even trade unionists did not consider it a serious body. There are two main reasons for this 
perspective; firstly, there are no „official‟ votes taken at the Forum meetings, and as we have 
observed, this lessens the direct influence of some who are used to getting their view across in that 
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manner; secondly, many policy actors and some trade unionists did not consider it a powerful body 
because of its lack of a media profile.  
 For Phil Wyatt, this was a signal that the unions misunderstood the new structure as a whole 
and failed to see how the elements are connected: “a number of people have criticised the Policy 
Forum and I think they have not woken up to the meaning of the Economic Policy Commission” 
(EPC) which drafts documents for the Policy Forum. In fact the Forum was treated by shadow 
cabinet members as another opportunity to gain some ratification for their position: 
it is very difficult for the Forum to reject material that has come down in  a draft document 
from the shadow cabinet people; the policy documents come ostensibly from the policy 
commissions but they originate with shadow cabinet members and of course they are 
building in support for them in anticipation of Forum meetings.
81
 
 
 Labour front-benchers could legitimately declare, after discussions at the NPF, that NEC 
should proceed with these (sometimes amended) documents for ratification at the next Conference; 
even while unconstitutional, the pre-election NPFs had the effect of consolidating new ideas and 
policy positions among party members. And as news of new policy developments usually leaked 
out to the press despite the much heralded „secrecy‟, such documents then had to be defended by 
the party in the public arena, bringing electoral considerations into account as the leadership issued 
a clampdown on internal dissent
82
. At this unofficial level, the forum meetings could be seen to 
equate with PC and mini-commission meetings in that the same actors and issues were involved, 
and to a certain extent what ensues at forums is a semi-public version of these horse-trading 
sessions
83
. For example, at the May 1996 meeting in Manchester the Manufacturing  and Science 
Federation (MSF) union‟s delegate came to the training and lifelong learning workgroups with pre-
drafted amendments to be added to the papers under discussion, and met with some success in 
terms of amendments to the wording of the final document.  
 Fears of the NPF becoming the real executive powerbase of the party were partially 
assuaged by the Party in Power document‟s interpretation of the constitutional arrangements: 
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Through regular elections and annual reports, the new National Policy Forum would be 
firmly rooted in the party and accountable to annual conference as the sovereign policy-
making body
84
. 
 
 The reforms also address some of the democratic deficits of Forum, as many 
representatives, including the Constituency Labour Parties‟ 54 members, would henceforth be 
elected by their own delegates at the annual conference for a fixed, two-year term designed to 
coincide with the two-year rolling programme of new policy development.  In fact, many of those 
groups hostile to the forum system were warmer to the regional  and local versions
85
. The idea of a 
semi-open talking shop, which could be mathematically inclusive if it incorporated a plurality of 
CLPs, would mean that the NPF could become what the NEC was designed to be, a body which 
represented the interests of all party members. The key question is to determine whether this was 
the intention, or was it designed it contribute to the centralisation of power in the aftermath of the 
1997 formal adoption of Forum into the Constitution? While the NEC as originally established 
could become a thorn in the government‟s side and a check on oligarchic power, this often failed to 
materialise, hence the calls for reform. The NPF seems to have been constituted with less direct 
control over the leadership, yet provides another lobbying opportunity for ideas to coalesce and be 
tested against government or shadow cabinet proposals in at least semi-public circumstances. 
However, the removal of the NEC policymaking power and the reduction of the block votes 
at Annual Conference acts to steepen the hierarchy and allows the leadership more room for 
electoral manoeuvre. The apparently more democratic NPF system does not act as a brake on the 
PLP leadership in the way that the NEC could. The new democratic model, as expressed by the pre-
election Road to the manifesto endorsement exercise demonstrated how institutions could be 
bypassed by a direct appeal to the membership- in effect a plebiscitary model of democracy which 
Michels warned against. Therefore it is the premise of this thesis that new Labour policymaking 
processes have become more reactive to public opinion concerns because of the electoral awareness 
of advisers close to the party leadership such as Peter Mandelson and Philip Gould. From the mid-
1980s onwards, policies were often changed specifically to meet the needs of a wider section of the 
electorate than Labour had traditionally appealed to; as ever, the context was created by the election 
defeats of 1979, 1983 and 1987. As Bryan Davies, frontbench spokesperson on further and higher 
education put it, different conditions applied in the 1990s than had applied when Labour last held 
office: 
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The problem for policymakers really was, what does the party want, and second, how do we 
square that with the nation. Now, it is, what is the nation willing to support, and then, will the 
party support this too....
86
. 
 
Such thinking was promulgated among modernisers during the 1980s. Wishing to create a 
policymaking environment where electoral considerations were to the fore, Bryan Gould expressed 
it thus: 
We all recognise that too often we have brought in groups of experts who tell us what we 
ought to be doing or saying. We then agree on that policy, and then we think, almost as an 
afterthought, of how it is to be sold to the electorate........ 
What we ought to be doing is looking at where policies ought to come from, where the 
demand is, what interests we ought to be serving. In that way we make sure that the policy 
includes its popular appeal from the outset.
87
 
 Peter Mandelson, serving on the Shadow Communications Agency during 1988, also 
stressed the need for more emphasis on the selecting policies designed to maximise Labour‟s share 
of the vote: 
I believe we have to take a view now of what we want to fight the next election on, and then 
work backwards in our policy from that. This will also include what we don‟t want to fight 
the next election on, but which we have to get right to avoid disqualification at the outset.
88
 
 
The adoption of most of this agenda reflects what is effectively a Michelsian capture of the 
party by electoral strategists who make Downsian assumptions about the electorate. Pat Seyd has 
argued that, by changing Labour‟s constitution, policies, internal structures and image within a few 
years, Blair and new Labour have made fundamental changes to the British political scene not seen 
since the Conservative Party adapted to social democracy in the 1950s
89
. This thesis suggests a 
longer gestation, with new Labour the result of a synthesis between three elements which have 
created a new party policymaking environment. Firstly, the nature of policymaking which began to 
change during Neil Kinnock‟s leadership period. As we shall see, the use of an ad hoc policy 
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subcommittee to break a policy deadlock in the Manpower Liaison Committee established a 
precedent for policymaking which allowed frontbench actors more freedom to override trade union 
imperatives. Thus it became easier to make an electoral case for policy change. 
 Secondly, the Policy Review embarked upon after the 1987 defeat helped to consolidate the 
acceptance of globalisation and the need for supply-side reform, both of which have important 
ramifications for education and training policy. Acknowledgement of changing economic 
conditions allowed the Labour Party to use the language of modernisation to be applied to policy 
changes which downplayed collective interests such as re-nationalisation and trade union rights in 
the workplace, while simultaneously highlighting new policies which appealed to individual 
aspirations. As a result of the Policy Review and further developments in economic policy since 
1994, individualisation, modernisation and the rhetoric of renewal formed the intellectual case for 
policy change. 
 Thirdly, the accession of Tony Blair with his natural liberal, meritocratic instincts and 
strong ethical repugnance towards the state and the dependency of welfare recipients added a new 
element to Labour politics. Blair found an unlikely ally in David Blunkett who came to meritocracy 
from another perspective, and like many Labour figures from the past such as RH Tawney, saw the 
role of Labour Party social policy as opening up as many opportunities for the betterment of the 
poorest elements of society as possible. Blair and Blunkett necessarily shared an abhorrence of low 
standards and outmoded structures, especially when they acted as cover for producer domination of 
public services. Both also expressed, in their different ways, visions of a more decent society where 
empowered individuals took advantage of new opportunities within an enhanced code of 
responsibilities. In this sense, then, Blair and Blunkett (among others) provided the moral case for 
policy change. 
 Structural change made it easier to make electorally driven policy; the acceptance, after the 
Policy Review, of new economic realities gave policy change an intellectual underpinning; the final 
element, the moral imperative, was provided only after 1994 with the leadership of Tony Blair and 
key front-bench actors and advisers. The construction of new Labour can therefore best be 
understood as a synthesis, and the following chapters trace the interaction between this new 
political phenomenon and the extant policy communities of the education and training arenas. 
 This new synthesis seems to describe a Michelsian oligarchy which should logically follow 
Downsian assumptions and come to rest at the centre of any policy distribution. Is this the case with 
new Labour‟s education and training policies? To some extent, yes, new Labour effectively gained 
the support of centre ground or floating voters at the 1997 election, although the direct electoral 
effect of the policies discussed in this thesis are incalculable. But as we have already seen, the 
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centre ground in politics is not fixed and the movements it describes are expressed in individual 
consensus positions taken by professional practitioners and academic theorists. Parties, meanwhile, 
are largely restrained in their own movement by the existence of  party ideologies. This thesis 
argues that parties (specifically new Labour) adapt to the developing consensus positions and then 
amend their identity by redefining their ideologies to take into account new factors. Hence, in the 
cases discussed in this thesis, new Labour use techniques such as the imperatives of renewal and 
modernisation, or introduce (or adopt) new ideas within the polity such as „lifelong learning‟ which 
can be attached to elements of the existing ideology, such as widening access to education. While 
lifelong learning can be used as an expression of one of Labour‟s long standing aims, in policy 
terms it follows an already established consensus and has in reality implied little in terms of 
educational reform. In the case study chapters that follow, new Labour use the breadth of its 
ideological heritage (and the peculiarities of the electoral system) to emphasise how policy changes 
represent a modernisation of, not a retraction from, social democratic aims. In Panebainco‟s terms, 
the new dominant coalition is still attached to the party. 
In the historical development of the Labour Party the dominant intellectual themes have been 
(or can be reduced to for the purposes of this thesis) broadly egalitarian and broadly meritocratic or 
liberal. Often, Labour Party policy has embraced both these aims simultaneously, and the conflict 
between these elements is not unique to the experience of new Labour. As Maurice Kogan has 
pointed out, we should not always assume conflict between ideas, and people often keep 
contradictory things in mind. The nature of policy implementation also means that intentions do not 
always translate into the expected outcomes; policymakers cannot pre-guess the cultural influences 
of policy once they have passed through the boundaried institutions of school, college or 
university
90
. What is new about new Labour, this thesis will argue, is that the steepened hierarchy 
of the party makes it easier for the party leadership to follow what it believes to be electoral 
popularity, or to enjoin the consensus between entrenched positions to a degree necessary to 
operationalise policy. Parties do not set the agenda through the application of their ideologies, 
rather, they follow events and intellectual trends, and then amend their ideologies to suit the new 
conditions.  
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Chapter Three 
The Labour Party and compulsory education 
 
This chapter looks at the two major themes in regard to compulsory education in Britain since the 
war, standards and selection. It suggests that Labour was traditionally more interested in the 
structure of education, with the comprehensive system imposed in an effort to eradicate selection 
and raise standards for all as a by-product of egalitarianism. However, the standard of state 
education became steadily more important politically, and by 1997 new Labour had come to 
believe that standards mattered more than the structure of the compulsory schooling system. To 
explain this change of emphasis, this chapter asserts that party policy change is most readily 
understood as an inter-party process of changing consensus among party leaderships and the 
intellectual influences they are subject to, rather than internally derived. Policy is driven more by 
events and the changing perceptions of key élite thinkers than by party resolutions and conference 
decisions. The implication of this is that, in the case of both major parties in  Britain, inter-party 
leadership consensus masks internal dualism over major issues
91
. 
Consensus is a key theme of this chapter because changing social attitudes towards 
comprehensive schooling is reflected by positions taken within each of the major parties. Standards 
in education have become only criterion by which the state education system is measured, with new 
Labour abandoning the overtly egalitarian aspects of comprehensivisation in favour of more 
diversity, henceforth believed to promote a higher level of exam passes. Standards, in the context 
of this thesis, constitute two major elements, the curriculum
92
 and the structure of the school 
system. After 1997, the new Labour curriculum emphasised basic skills and vocational education 
for schools at the wrong end of performance tables. At the other end of the performance spectrum 
schools are encouraged to become specialist schools which can select by aptitude and go beyond 
the normal boundaries of, or ignore parts of the current National Curriculum (NC)
93
. Specialist 
schools continue the theme of the Conservative‟s City Technology Colleges and Grant Maintained 
schools in assuming that higher standards are achievable through such a differentiated system, the 
assumption of the 1944 Butler Education Act which found some support among Labour leadership 
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figures up to the 1964 election. Therefore, any discussion of the curriculum in education is 
inevitably also concerned with the structure of schooling. 
 The Labour Party became associated with comprehensive schooling in the 1950s and 1960s, 
although such reorganisation had been party policy since 1939. However, key Labour figures 
expressed doubts about comprehensivisation during the 1950s, so for Hugh Gaitskell, Harold 
Wilson and Roy Jenkins, comprehensivisation had to be presented as „levelling up‟ to grammar 
schools standards rather than down to the secondary modern norm
94
. While at leadership level there 
were doubts within the Labour Party, its control of many Local Education Authorities (LEAs) 
during the 1950s meant that the ideological arguments could be fought out at local level where 
comprehensive experiments were undertaken
95
. Attempts at comprehensive reorganisation from as 
early as 1948 were often opposed by the teacher unions, especially if they involved the closure of 
grammar schools; both the National Association of Schoolmasters (NAS) and National Union of 
Teachers (NUT) were unwilling to endorse comprehensivisation at their 1954 conferences
96
. 
Taking an alternative view, the National Association of Labour Teachers (NALT) and the Socialist 
Education Association (SEA), a party affiliate, worked within the party machinery to promote 
comprehensive schools. It was noted that “Quite small numbers of teachers, as members of local 
Labour Parties, had on occasions a very considerable influence promoting the comprehensive 
school”97, and this included members of the unaffiliated NUT. 
 In addition to this teacher union pressure on Labour, interested groups of middle-class 
parents emerged after 1960 which campaigned for state comprehensive education and against the 
selective structure which omitted 80% of the age group. This activity included the formation of  the 
Association for the Advancement of State Education (AASE), whose journal, Where, educated 
parents about the issues and told them where they could apply pressure for comprehensive reform. 
Acting, like the teacher unions, at the local level, an AASE offshoot, the Campaign for the 
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Advancement of State Education (CASE) was established to lobby councillors and provide 
information through the various comprehensive journals. These included Forum for promoting 3-
19 comprehensive education, and the Comprehensive Schools Committee‟s Comprehensive 
Education, which fed the growing interest in educational issues among concerned middle-class 
parents who feared their children might be among the 80% of failures. This growing issue salience 
was reflected in the hiring of education correspondents by most of the popular newspapers
98
. 
 The effect of this pressure is evident in the establishment of what Maurice Kogan has 
termed “a new educational Establishment” by the late 1950s, consisting of (Conservative Education 
Minister) David Eccles‟ Information Division and writers such as Tyrrell Burgess, Anne Corbett 
and Brian MacArthur who began to have a serious effect on social attitudes: 
The journalists were part of a wider network that grew in the 1950s and 1960s. The impact of 
the sociologists- Floud, Halsey, Michael Young- and the economists led by John Vaizey, has 
already been mentioned... before Vaizey published The Costs of Education in 1955 hardly a 
single academic paid attention to education
99
. 
 
 Evidence that comprehensivisation as a policy option had widespread, even cross-party 
support despite the official hostility of the Conservatives, can be found in the discourse of Eccles 
and his successor, Edward Boyle as Education Secretaries. Eccles was the first minister to make the 
connection between economic efficiency and educational goods, when he noted that educational 
expenditure was a form of  economic investment. This notion was coupled with an active 
stimulation of demand for education as a consumer durable by both politicians; as Kogan notes, 
such demand “required no stronger ideology than individual self-interest”100. Boyle was, however, 
untypical of the Conservative viewpoint on comprehensive education, as his 1962  statement 
demonstrated: 
One of the most important aspects in the educational system is to try to compensate for the 
inequality of the home environment of children over the country, 
 
and in the Foreword to the Newsome Report of the following year Boyle made a statement that has 
been described as a milestone in Conservative thinking
101: “...the essential point is that all children 
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should have an equal opportunity of acquiring intelligence, and developing their talents and 
abilities to the full”102.  
 Underlying this structural change which produced a near universal consensus around 
comprehensivisation was a concern for standards. During the 1960s the Labour leadership could 
benefit from the ideological division between liberal meritocracy and egalitarianism discussed in 
Chapter Two of this thesis. Many liberals within the party could celebrate the non-compulsory 
nature of the Circular 10/65 and the continuation of high standards in grammars‟ as an example for 
the rest, while applauding comprehensivisation as a way to raise the minimum
103
. The egalitarians, 
meanwhile, could confidently await the success of comprehensives and the inevitable decline in the 
appeal of both independent and grammar systems.  
With the introduction of comprehensivisation, standards of education had a lower salience for 
a decade between the middle 1960s and the middle 1970s as the new system benefited from 
consensual support
104
. However, the onset of criticisms of the comprehensive system and the 
inapplicability of many school leavers to the needs of the economy reconnected structures and 
standards within mainstream opinion. During the 1970s, and particularly after the oil crisis 
demonstrated Britain‟s industrial weakness, cross-party calls for a more vocational education105 
came up against the reality of educational professionals‟ effective control of pedagogy and school 
examination and inspection systems. Beyond these responsibilities, LEAs operated a light-touch 
advisory function (to complement Her Majesty‟s Inspectorate, HMI), set the political framework 
through the curriculum and resourced the infrastructure with central government funds. Any 
changes to this situation therefore had to incorporate both central government direction of the 
structure and the curriculum, which would necessitate changing the role of the LEA and teacher 
training, so as to reform the pedagogy and content of lessons. 
 The imperative of higher standards became the political property of the Conservative 
Opposition during the 1970s because the party had not, at national or  even ideological level, 
become so closely associated with comprehensivisation as Labour, although as the manifesto 
analysis in Chapter One demonstrates, the Conservatives became steadily less hostile to 
comprehensivisation. This fragile settlement began attracting criticism from a series of Black 
Papers from 1969, only four years after the Circular 10/65 which declared the governments 
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objective to “end selection at eleven plus and to eliminate separation in secondary education”106.  
This „New Right‟ critique lambasted the educational establishment and politically-motivated LEA 
control of education on the grounds of the failure of egalitarian schooling. Failure could be 
measured in terms of supposedly easier examinations and the higher proportion of students 
achieving GCE „O‟ and „A‟ levels and also from anecdotal evidence from employers that education 
was failing to meet changing labour market needs
107
. Although James Callaghan, Labour Prime 
Minister in 1976, shared some of these concerns, noting that “there is no virtue in producing 
socially well-adjusted members of society who are unemployed because they do not have the 
skills”108, an Education Act which for the first time made comprehensive re-organisation 
compulsory was introduced in the same year. Criticism at this stage was focused more on child-
centred teaching methods than on the structures of state schooling, but the fragile consensus among 
individual parents about the nature of comprehensive schooling was premised on its success in 
raising the standards of their children‟s education.  
 According to Gallup polling data, in 1976 a doubling of concern about education occurred 
in terms of the „most urgent issues facing Britain today‟ index109. For the critics of the right, 
concerned with the curtailment of freedom of choice in the name of equality, with Labour 
controlled LEAs and with „trendy teaching‟ methods, the comprehensive school system was the 
common denominator that linked poor standards and structures. This became the starting  point for 
Margaret Thatcher‟s government after 1979, but for the Labour Opposition, attachment to the 
comprehensive system and local democracy meant that it faced a peculiar difficulty if it wanted to 
acknowledge that standards had to improve.  
 To appreciate the nature of the change in Labour‟s position and to trace the leadership‟s 
accommodation to a new consensus on how to raise standards by changing structures, this chapter 
will continue with a discussion of  what is meant by „standards‟. This will then be traced within the 
context of Conservative legislation throughout the 1979-97 period and the Labour Party reaction to 
the new conditions prior to the change of party leadership which brought David Blunkett to the 
position of Shadow Education Secretary in 1994.  
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Standards: the politicisation of outcomes 
Any definition of standards has to begin with the question; what is education for? Education can be 
seen as a process, a product, or indeed both. Philosophers of education who focus on education as a 
product, the end result of teaching and learning activities, look particularly at such factors as goals, 
aims, competence, effective teaching, and standards. Those who view education as a process are 
concerned primarily with the quality of the learner‟s experience, the nature of methodologies, and 
the relationships between teachers and pupils and among pupils. To some extent, conservative 
philosophers of education see education mainly as a product, while liberal theorists of education 
have tended to see it mainly as a process. Others argue that product and process are inseparable; 
insofar as this is analogous with the dichotomy of standards and structures (the product is 
measurable against some standard, the process is determined by structure), Labour have most 
commonly been associated with the idea that they are inseparable.  Through the pedagogic process, 
the curriculum and through egalitarian distributions of talented pupils and teachers, the Labour 
Party hoped comprehensivisation would raise standards for all. 
 In keeping with the intra-party divisions and confusion about outcomes and processes, 
social scientists have had to develop their own definitions of „standards‟. Some  common 
definitions are; standards as a benchmark, a norm of quality and efficiency expected; standards as a 
minimum or floor, below which pupil performance should not fall, and the point at which remedial 
action should begin; in a broader sense a standard can be interpreted as a vision or direction for a 
school system, to which government can strive or plan; equally, standards can be seen as a 
condition of excellence, in the way that „O‟ and „A‟ levels are seen as the standard expected of 
brighter pupils or students
 110
. 
Clearly, these different definitions of „standards‟ are themselves subject to changing 
interpretations. Specifically, there are problems for policymakers who want to see evidence of 
improvement over time because syllabus content changes over time to take into account changes of 
emphasis or scientific advance. Hence, subjects once exclusive to university degree courses are 
regularly tackled at the „A‟ level stage and this is replicated throughout the age ranges. Another 
difficulty is raised when researchers wish to measure acquired knowledge; should it be through 
curriculum breadth or depth?
111. If we use the language of „falling standards‟, does this mean that 
                                                          
110
 Cooper,BS & Shute, RW Standardisation or standards: school reform in the USA and England, in 
Tomlinson,H(ed) (1992) The Search for Standards, in association with The British Educational 
Management and Administration Society, Longman, Harlow, pp.49-50. 
111
 This is often the concern voiced by defenders of „A‟ levels in Britain; if the qualification is to be 
broadened to cover more subjects in the same time, must there not be a diminution of standards? See 
81 
 
fewer candidates are reaching a standard demanded; for example, that the number of new recruits 
who have the ability to recite times tables or complete spelling tests on employment is declining? 
Or does it mean that the standard now seen as acceptable to warrant a certificate is lower than it had 
been in the past, in terms of practices like poor punctuation going unpunished?
112
. For some, 
standards are a measure only of performance, while for others the concept of standards incorporates 
notions of moral and social behaviour
113
. In the absence of a broad working consensus about what 
standards mean, the political application of standards is coloured by the prevailing ideological 
atmosphere. 
 One constant theme of the standards debate has been the requirement of national economic 
efficiency. On these grounds educational failure has been blamed for economic failures for over 
one hundred and fifty years
114
. Educational failure, by some interpretations, is a displacement of 
responsibility, and any „standards‟ debate which concentrates on the positive or negative effect of 
schooling reinforces inequality by transferring blame onto individual pupils and students rather 
than the economic system
115
. However, it could be argued that the real meaning of standards is 
dependent on what policymakers wish to see in place of „failure‟. The Butler Education Act of 
1944 had encapsulated the consensus view of a tripartite division of ability to match that of the 
labour market, and educational standards were set to meet the requirements of industry.  Indeed: 
In the post war climate, the priority was to hurry as many young people as possible through 
schooling and into the waiting labour market. Far from regarding the 80% of young people, 
who in the late 1940s, never attempted any course that would lead to a school certificate.... 
as a problem, the then Labour government unashamedly set up secondary modern schools 
to cater for those students “whose future employment will not demand any measure of 
technical skill or knowledge” 116. 
 
 The settlement around the slogan of „free education for all‟ (which arrived with Butler in 
1944) had the inter-war support of ethical socialists like RH Tawney, who believed that „equality of 
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opportunity‟ meant the opportunity to get bright working class children into grammar schools to 
help build the meritocracy, and if this could only be done by taking a measure of pupils‟ standard 
of education and selecting them for advancement, then so be it. In contrast to this meritocratic 
position, the 1960s consensus around comprehensivisation was never as secure or long-lived. It 
could be argued that, although the pro-comprehensive interest groups such as AASE and CASE 
worked on Labour indirectly by implanting ideas in society, they had only a direct influence on the 
party so long as parents were united behind a scheme intended to raise standards for their own 
children. 
 This thesis asserts that internal Labour Party or Left debates reflected the changing basis of 
demand for labour as much as they reflected philosophical differences, and the standards of 
education required to meet this demand are the minimum requirement for a mainstream party 
seeking office. However, within this externally-induced framework of change, there are distinct 
party political differences. The external conditions are set by the changing basis of demand for 
labour and social expectations, but parties are able to choose how best to respond to them. 
 During the 1980s an added context for the standards debate was set by demographic decline 
and open competitive markets, to which states have to respond by the maximisation of human 
capital. This implies the maximisation of  potential, satisfying the Labour Party‟s ideological 
commitment to equality of opportunity. The other aspect of the decline in numbers of young 
people, however, is that school rolls will fall, and the Conservative governments of the 1980s 
discovered that the application of competition between schools would ensure the worst performing 
schools would be squeezed by lack of recruits
117
. This would, for the New Right, demonstrate the 
positive market effect on standards, in particular that selective, differentiated educational systems 
could eradicate failure and represent value for money, satisfying the demands for lower public 
spending in other aspects of Conservative rhetoric. 
 The measurement of school performance led to a new appreciation of the „school effect‟ as 
an educational variable. The „school effectiveness‟ movement had been introduced to the 
possibilities of outcome measurement by the work of the Department of Education and Science 
(DES) during the 1970s, and especially after the Ruskin College speech of the Prime Minister 
James Callaghan in October 1976. Calling for greater accountability, DES Circular 14/77 set out to 
monitor, for the first time, LEAs and their curriculum policies, and the DES began to utilise HMI 
reports to galvanise the so called „Great Debate‟. The Department‟s Primary Survey of 1978 and 
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Secondary Survey of 1979 found that HMI reports contained no measures of attainment or 
objective measures of performance, and indeed relied upon the individual Inspector‟s experience118. 
However, from the mid-1970s, HMI had begun to use statistically controlled sampling of schools to 
plan their inspections and added systematic data-collection methods to their normative reporting. 
The free dissemination of these reports among headteachers slowly began to nationalise best 
practice
 119
.  
 Thereafter, we can trace the development of the imperative for more school accountability, 
facilitated by the simultaneous development of data processing methodology. Centralisation grows 
with the ability to measure outcomes and thrives in times of perceived economic underperformance 
because of the pressure on public spending and the desire for value-for-money. The ideological 
aims of the governing party is of less importance than national requirements, although 
Conservative government after 1979 demonstrated that entrenched consensual ideas about 
education can be more easily marginalised if the government harnesses new techniques and adopts 
them within its ideological boundaries. In 1979 new techniques allowed for the measuring of 
school effectiveness and maximising value-for-money. In order to take advantage of the new 
conditions, the Conservatives would have to confront the „producer interest‟ of the educational 
establishment and its cherished curricular and pedagogic autonomy. 
 
Effectiveness measurement; the building of a new consensus  
Responding to the 1980 Education Act, which required LEAs to make information about 
examination results available to parents, John Marks, Caroline Cox and Maciej Pomian-Srzedwicki 
embarked on research into the 1981 CSE and GCE exams results taken by the whole cohort of 16 
year-olds
120
. The results were subsequently used to attack both comprehensive assumptions and the 
educational consensus which preserved such a system. The Marks and Cox study showed that 
social class characteristics had the strongest correlation with examination performance; specifically 
that social classes 4 and 5 produced the poorest results. However, they noted the large variation, to 
a factor of two, between LEAs with the same proportion of social class 4 and 5 pupils; for example: 
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....in Mathematics, the range extends from three LEAs where an average of 16% or 17% of 
pupils attain passes at GCE/CSE Grade 1, to four other LEAs where the pass rates run at 
34%, 32% and two at 31%
121
. 
 
 They then used correlation coefficients and multiple regression to assess other factors 
generally assumed to influence educational attainment. Selectivity correlated positively, in that 
LEAs with higher proportion of selection produced better exam results than comprehensive areas, 
and more controversially, in seventeen of the fifty-seven LEAs in the sample, secondary modern 
pupils attained more „O‟-level and CSE points than the average for their peers in all other types of 
schools combined
122
. More surprisingly, they found a negative correlation between expenditure per 
pupil and high examination results; lower examination results tend to occur in LEAs which spend 
more on pupils and have lower pupil-teacher ratios. As expected, the percentage of pupils with 
English as a second language correlated negatively, meaning this category of pupils tended to 
produce lower examination results
123
. The authors chose not to highlight the possibility that, in 
areas with higher remedial language spending, this was adding value to pupils‟ outcomes and in 
fact narrowing the negative effect of language difficulties. 
 Indeed, Marks and Cox made a similar value judgement in their overall conclusions, by 
claiming that the correlation which favoured selection was at least as strong as the class factor 
effect, and that (within the assumption there are natural differences between pupils) both grammar 
and secondary modern schools were “in their different ways, enabling their pupils to obtain good 
examination results”124. Therefore diversity, in the form of technical and other types of specialist 
schools, should be encouraged. Furthermore, they argued for more control of public expenditure on 
education as a way of measuring the accountability of both teachers and LEAs, and that the time 
was ripe for experimentation as demographic change (pupil numbers in secondary schools were set 
to fall from 4 million to 3 million between 1983 and 1990) allowed for some reorganisation and 
rationalisation
125
. This report has been influential on much subsequent legislation, including ideas 
adopted by the new Labour Government after 1997. Importantly for the future development of 
                                                          
121
 Marks,J, Cox,C & Pomian-Srzednicki,M (1983) Standards in English Schools, National Council 
for Educational Standards, Report No.1, p.13. 
122
 ibid, p.17 
123
 ibid, p.43 
124
 ibid, p.116 
125
 ibid, p.119. Expenditure on education as a proportion of GDP had actually peaked during 1975/6 
at 6.3%, and that when Marks and Cox were claiming, p.119, that expenditure was the highest it had 
ever been in 1983 (the time of publication) it had in fact fallen to 5.4% of GDP, source, DES 
Statistical Bulletin 4/89, March 1989, quoted in Simon,B (1991) Education and the Social Order, 
Lawrence & Wishart, London, p.599. 
85 
 
educational policy, the report specifically linked standards as a political issue with the idea that 
selective provision was the best method for achieving higher standards.  
However, the DES reacted defensively to this attack on the comprehensive system. From the 
point of view of Marks and Cox, the existence of a consensual position which incorporated the 
DES was evidence enough of a left-leaning educational establishment which sneered at and tried to 
ignore their findings. The DES statisticians put their official commentary on the Marks and Cox 
report (containing a destructive critique of their findings) to the Secretary of State, and this was 
leaked to the press before the authors had chance to refute two allegations, that they used an 
unrepresentative sample and had made insufficient allowance for social class; indeed Frank 
Dobson, Shadow Education Spokesman, produced a press release to the effect that  
... the education world is now rife with rumours that Sir Keith [Joseph‟s] official statisticians 
have..... „rubbished‟ the statistical methods used in the document casting doubt on their 
validity
126
. 
 
 However, within two months the authors were called into the DES and given apologies for 
certain misrepresentations to the press, and some retractions and corrections were published. This 
apology allowed Marks and Cox to publish their own highly politicised attack (The Insolence of 
Office) on the Department,  supported by leaking officials and biased journalism. The net result was 
two episodes of publicity for the original attacks on the comprehensive principle and the 
politicisation of standards in the comprehensive system, because attacking the consensus opened up 
the field for different policy responses. Despite the clear selective bias of the authors in Standards 
in English Schools, the idea that schooling could be more effective and that what the socialist 
sociologist Julienne Ford termed “a gigantic experiment with the life-chances of millions of 
children” must be open to some evaluation, was born127. 
 As well as ensuring that LEAs had to be more open about the effectiveness of their schools, 
other aspects of the Education Act of 1980 set the tone of the Conservative period of government. 
Realising that parental choice could only be enhanced by giving more information, such as 
examination results, and requiring governor‟s to report to parents, government  also insisted on the 
right of parents to challenge an LEA‟s decision on which schools their children attended. Once 
again, with a falling number of 11 year olds, and a fixed number of schools, demographic change 
would allow a market to emerge to rebalance supply and demand. School closures would 
henceforth be determined by the unpopularity of a school, rather than on the basis of the needs of 
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the community. It was the piecemeal, voluntarist development of comprehensive education in 
Britain after Circular 10/65 that helped to obscure the facts of this ideological attack on the 
comprehensive principle. As a result of this compromise between egalitarian and liberal or 
meritocratic Left concerns, many excoriated secondary schools were unfairly affected by nearby 
grammar schools or the growing phenomenon of middle class flight from working class areas, 
stripping schools of well supported and self-motivated pupils. Schools that were in no sense 
comprehensive could henceforth be portrayed as failures of the system as their pupils numbers 
went into decline.  
 Other parts of the 1980 legislation challenged the authority of the  Labour Party‟s LEA 
powerbase by beginning the process of removing the curriculum responsibilities from local 
democratic influence, and encouraging more self-management at the level of the individual 
school
128
. This in fact found some resonance on the left, especially among educational sociologists 
concerned with the inability of Education Priority Areas
129
 and comprehensivisation to eradicate 
inequality, particularly racial inequality. A study funded by the DES and the Policy Studies 
Institute carried out by David Smith, Sally Tomlinson and researchers at Lancaster University 
between 1981 and 1988
130
 incorporated new statistical techniques and came to conclusions which 
supported parts of the Marks and Cox analysis. When attempting to explain differences between 
schools with a similar socio-economic background and a similar multiracial distribution of 
students, Smith and Tomlinson found that pupil teacher ratios were an unreliable indicator
131
, 
something which confirmed the earlier findings of Michael Rutter, who concluded that any class 
size from 15 to 40 was compatible with good outcomes
132
. They also found that there were 
inconclusive correlations with resourcing and size of establishment which again echoed the results 
of the Marks and Cox research.  
 Among the major positive effects that Smith and Tomlinson identified were the 
„management ethos‟ of the school and its ability to maintain high levels of contact with parents133. 
Hence the „school effect‟ became the key variable, even over factors such as the ethnicity of the 
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child. The policy implication, therefore, was that with the statistical methodology now available to 
assess the entry or „baseline‟ level of each child and variants components analysis to measure the 
value added during the period in school, all schools could be thus analysed to determine whether 
they were effective. Continual testing would be required because effective parental choice relies on 
this kind of evidence of differentials. The concept of the „failing school‟ was an essential feature of 
market rhetoric and declining demand. 
 As Tomlinson noted later, the intention of her study was not to pillory less successful 
schools but to encourage best practice
134
. However, a political momentum had built up through the 
various critiques of the comprehensive system, which questioned high or disproportionate 
spending, smaller class sizes, and child-centred learning. This momentum threatened the role of 
LEAs by calling for more management control at the level of the school. By the time of the 
publication of The School Effect in 1989, the government was already planning legislation which 
would oblige local authorities to publish school examination results, and the language of testing 
and improving schools was blended with the language of market choice by politicians, including, 
by 1996 some influential advisers to the Labour opposition like Michael Barber
135
. In common with 
Marks and Cox, Smith and Tomlinson felt they had been abused by the DES, who had funded the 
research, but because this time the authors cautioned against using their findings as a „green light‟ 
for publishing raw test results, “within nine months it was being rubbished as sociological 
jargon”136. 
 This marriage of left-inclined research, aimed primarily at raising the educational standards 
of ethnic minority pupils in inner cities, with New Right rhetoric might appear paradoxical; 
however, the common factor was the desire for higher standards, always an element of the 
consensus around the comprehensive principle. As that consensus unravelled, research continued to 
be based around the dynamic of improved performance, whether in the name of social justice, 
national efficiency, the application of ideology or through a desire to cut public spending through 
maximising value-for-money. Again, this was of concern on the left as well as the right. The Inner 
London Education Authority (ILEA), throughout the 1980s portrayed as a hot bed of „loony left‟ 
trendy teaching methodology and a classic example of „producer capture‟137 had in fact been at the 
forefront of the efforts to raise standards in its schools. According to Tessa Blackstone, (later a 
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Labour education minister, Baroness Blackstone) the thinking behind many of ILEA‟s innovative 
policies was to be found in the morality of Fabianism (particularly the emphasis on efficiency), 
long part of the capital‟s educational culture from the time of the London County Council. This 
emphasis on efficiency had been augmented in the 1980s by sharply egalitarian, anti-racist and 
anti-sexist policies; again, raising standards, for the excluded, was the aim. The ILEA was 
pioneering in nursery provision for three and four year olds and in the recognition of socio-
economic factors which the „school effectiveness‟ movement built on138. However, the 
Conservatives aimed to move the agenda on and continue reform in the shape of an Education 
Reform Act based on parental choice and a nationally determined curriculum  if the Conservative‟s 
were re-elected in 1987.  
 The mid-1980s political climate in education was also characterised by funding concerns
139
. 
Teachers‟ unions, doubly concerned by what they interpreted as a deliberate rundown of the state 
education service and their own relative pay, had embarked on three years of intermittent industrial 
action between 1984 and 1987. The general feeling of a crumbling status quo and that „something 
must be done‟ played into the hands of government reformers. British Social Attitudes surveys 
found growing support for Conservative policies on education (in contrast to health) as the 1987 
election approached
140
.  Labour were perceived as supporting a status quo which was seen as 
failing children
141
. Detailed questioning by the BSA researchers found that people were most 
concerned with apparently falling resource budgets, despite DES figures which show virtually 
unchanged LEA spending
142
. The issue of class sizes in primary schools was rated the most 
important factor for improving schools. More significantly, attitudes to comprehensive schooling 
and the effects of private schools on the state service were beginning to change. In terms of the 
latter, the percentage accepting the existing proportion of independent schools as „about right‟ grew 
from 59% to 65% between 1985 and 1987. In terms of the former, the numbers had moved from 
evenly divided to 52% in favour of selection and only 41% in favour of comprehensives over the 
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same period. Among respondents who were themselves teachers, only 48% favoured a 
comprehensive system
143
. 
 On the issue of LEA‟s control over the curriculum, BSA respondents showed movement 
towards the idea that local democratic control should diminish; even among Liberal Democrat and 
Labour identifiers there were only tiny majorities in favour of a principle that had been observed 
since 1902
144
. Labour chose not to highlight educational standards in the 1987 campaign, and its 
attachment to universalism and the concerns of the teacher unions are clear in the manifesto, 
Britain will win with Labour, which contained the highest ratio of references to education of any 
manifesto since 1964
145
. In pursuit of their aims for a democratic education system the document 
pledged that: "Labour will invest in education so that the abilities of all children and adults from all 
home backgrounds and in every part of the country are discovered and nourished
146
. This was to be 
in partnership with both LEAs and teachers: 
We will see that teachers are recognised properly as well qualified professionals, in their 
system of rewards, in their procedures for negotiation of their employment conditions and 
in participation in the development of education. 
 
LEAs were expected to work with a Labour government to “secure a flexible but clear core 
curriculum agreed at national level...”147. All these actions, and more resources, were to act on 
standards of education, and it is clear that they suggested higher standards within the existing local 
authority comprehensive framework. As the polling suggests, the relative popularity of the 
Conservatives‟ promised reforms was beginning to polarise opinion along party lines, with Labour 
identifiers diverging from Conservative identifiers in their responses during the late 1980s
148
. 
Labour had stood on a platform to “prohibit all forms of academic selection, such as the eleven 
plus, as a condition of admission to secondary schools” in 1983149, and this continued at the 1989 
Annual Conference and in the 1992 manifesto
150
. Despite the flow of often Left-oriented critiques 
of the comprehensive system,  Labour was consistent in its defence of the existing structure. 
However, on standards there were elements of an emerging future inter-party consensus in 
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Labour‟s acceptance of the need for a national curriculum, while the principle of testing had been 
accepted with a recognition of the need for a “profile of achievement recording progress”151 and 
greater emphasis on home school contact, both elements of the Smith and Tomlinson analysis and 
prescription for improving standards. 
 Evidence of some level of recognition among the Labour leadership that the party had lost 
the initiative over education emerged during the 1980s. First Giles Radice had begun the process of 
distancing Labour from automatic support for the teacher unions. Then, following the 1987 defeat, 
came the appointment of Jack Straw as Shadow Education Secretary. Straw almost immediately 
changed the party‟s attitude to the Conservative‟s proposal for more testing for standards, although 
not without friction with the office of the leader, Neil Kinnock
 152
. This is illustrative of the 
autonomy shadow cabinet members had begun to enjoy following the 1987 defeat, when there was 
wide support for some kind of general policy review
153
. One of the problems was that Labour was 
seen as close to the key teacher union, the National Union of Teachers (NUT) and certain 
professors of education, indeed, “it was a conscious decision in 1987....[for the Labour Party] to 
distance itself from the teaching unions to get the establishment out of this cosy relationship” 
according to Straw‟s research assistant Richard Margrave.   
 It was in this context that the Conservative Government passed the 1988 Education Reform 
Act (ERA). Secretary of State Kenneth Baker‟s declared intention for the ERA was unambiguous. 
It represented, in his words, the “fundamental unifying purpose to lever up standards”154 through 
the application of parental choice and its effects on competition. For historians Carr and Hartnett, 
the ERA “represented the pinnacle of New Right thinking”,155 in that it legislated for local 
management of schools (LMS) which rewarded school attractiveness to pupils by funding, and 
parental freedom of choice between schools. The intention was to introduce quasi-independent state 
comprehensives with which ordinary comprehensives would have to compete; these special schools 
were to be Grant Maintained (like the old Direct Grant schools) and contain among their founding 
governors businessmen as well as parents. Among the discretionary powers awarded to GM 
schools were the freedom on how to spend the budget, and the freedom to appoint non-graduate 
teachers. The level of state funding for these schools was to be at the discretion of the Secretary of 
State rather than the LEA. A further key provision was for open enrolment, (as opposed to 
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enrolment by catchment area) which meant that middle class children would be allowed to travel 
and have access to better education outside of their own catchment area, exercising their parents‟ 
rights in a framework of market and consumer choice. 
 The ERA (1988), which contained elements which attracted consensus support and which 
reconnected standards with selection (the national curriculum, more information for parents, the 
concept of measurement for effectiveness), can be seen to have several internal contradictions of 
relevance to this thesis. These can be best be understood by separating out three key themes of the 
Act and the ongoing debate about compulsory state education.  
Firstly, those aspects of the legislation directly concerned with raising standards, such as the 
national curriculum, continual testing and the introduction of different types of state school. 
Differential schooling to meet differential pupil needs had been consolidated by the Butler 
Education Act 1944 (and the Norwood Report which preceded it). In the 1950s the system 
developed into a straight division between the needs of those thought fit for an academic secondary 
education and „white-collar‟ occupations, and those thought best fitted for a secondary education 
targeted more openly at the needs of the „blue-collar‟ labour market. As we have seen, by the late 
1950s this failed to meet the requirements of either the changing labour market or the increasing 
aspirations of the growing middle class, and secondary modern‟s and later some comprehensive 
schools tried to satisfy parental demand by offering cheaper versions of the grammar curriculum. In 
a similar differential vein, the ERA (1988) allowed for schools to opt out of LEA control and 
attract extra funding, to the extent that, while an average LEA school received £18,000 from the 
government‟s capital programme, in the first year of the opting out process, Grant Maintained 
schools were eligible for an average of £227,000, with a still significant allowance of £40,000 in 
the second year
156
. In addition, opted out schools, with the extra facilities and staffing they could 
afford, soon began to attract the most aspirational parents, thus again lowering the overall spread of 
abilities in the remaining state schools within an LEA.  
 Other aspects of the new funding regime worked against the general raising of standards. 
Average Salary Funding and Standards Spending Assessments both follow the principle that 
funding should follow pupil numbers, and staffing levels were determined on that basis
157
. Without 
any attention to the curriculum or other special needs of a particular school, these funding 
procedures prevented schools from buying in the special services or experienced (and thus more 
expensive) teachers who could have raised the standards of education for all. Even the apparent 
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virtue of autonomy under the Local Management of Schools (LMS) came up against contradictory 
resistance in the overall regime of local authority capping. 
 On the curriculum side, Standard Attainment Tests (SATs) were criticised for taking up too 
much time and preventing good teaching; the emphasis began to change from professionals 
delivering their knowledge within a loose curriculum to teachers concentrating on that narrow part 
of a fixed curriculum required to pass the test. Of course, the extra administrative work involved 
with SATs testing also reduced the time teachers could dedicate to imparting knowledge
158
. The 
overall impression was one of a government determined to raise educational standards for all, but 
settling for raising standards for the children of its natural supporters, with an intellectual 
underpinning argument (of a division of abilities to match the division of labour) which justified 
differential funding, helping to disguise the fact of a cheaper state education system. This is the 
basis for Denis Lawton‟s critique, that the centralisation of the ERA was as much aimed at value-
for-money as it was at a better scrutiny of curriculum and standards
159
. 
 In terms of choice, the new National Curriculum was ostensibly designed to „weed out‟ the 
worst performing schools and improve the remainder through the more intense nature of the market 
relationship between consumer (parent) and supplier. Some have pointed out the confusion of goals 
here, reflecting the Conservative‟s fundamental ideological divide over issues of local autonomy. 
One strong element within the party clearly saw the ERA as an opportunity to attack the notion and 
the fact of local government, and therefore centralisation was a good in itself. However, another 
strand of Conservative thinking valued the apparent redistribution of powers to the local school 
managers and governors
160
. The pattern of Conservative legislation, from the Assisted Places 
Scheme of 1981 (a subsidy to the independent sector), through the City Technology College‟s and 
Grant Maintained opted-out schools, was aimed at expanding choice rather than raising standards 
for all. Harry Tomlinson saw this as evidence that the use of meritocratic or egalitarian goals were 
merely rhetorical, for the benefit of consumers and voters, while the unchanging social class 
structures ensured that the forces acting against raising standards (for all) were reinforced by the 
ERA
161
.   
 The final aspect of the ERA‟s impact was its effect on the individualisation of state 
schooling in Britain. By opening up individual opportunities among a highly differentiated group of 
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pupils and their parents, the Act conveyed the message that the education which the state could 
provide for all children was inferior to what was available for some, in contradiction to the 
comprehensive principle of universalism. Individual aspirational and affluent parents maximise the 
effect of their children‟s education by moving them into popular and successful schools. They 
could thus be insured against poor education in the same way as  paying private health premiums 
insured them against resource shortages in the NHS or private pension schemes ensured that 
retirement would not mean living on the state minimum. All these naturally work against the idea 
of collective provision, but in education, which projects future opportunities for the recipient 
(rather than acts as a safety net against the worst effects of past failure) the assumption that some 
people‟s children could do better than others conceals the fact that, within the state sector of 
education, additional resources for one group of pupils means less for another group The hand-
picking of high ability children from within a neighbourhood could actually damage the 
educational opportunities of those left behind. Therefore, in terms of ability and resources, 
competition within state education can be seen as a zero-sum game. It is for these reasons that state 
education is peculiarly reliant on the collective view that all parents and children are „in the same 
boat‟; once the possibility of exit emerges, parents follow the natural urge to maximise their 
children‟s opportunities and the collective spirit evaporates162. The situation is compounded by the 
fact that there is very little demand for poorly educated people in the context of the contemporary 
labour market
163
. 
 The ERA (1988) was only one of a series of key legislative changes introduced by 
Conservative governments which were intended to introduce markets into social provision. 
Through the mechanism of choice, the government hoped to act on general standards and utilise the 
demographic trend to transfer resources between schools in accordance with market signals of 
success or failure. However, because of the confusion of goals among Conservative thinkers and 
policymakers, the clearer ideology of markets seems to have outweighed the intellectual confusion 
about the meaning of standards in the final analysis. The ERA is central to the concerns of this 
thesis for several reasons; firstly, it continued the trend towards the politicisation of standards; 
secondly, it introduced the concept of a market choice within the free state sector, which is 
incompatible with comprehensive schooling; thirdly, it continued and reflected the ongoing 
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downward pressure on public spending expectations; fourthly, and most importantly, the ERA set 
the parameters of the education debate at the 1992 General Election and beyond. 
As in the mid-80s, so in the approach to the 1992 General Election, the public was 
concerned about educational standards
164
. With much of the architecture of the ERA yet to be 
tested in practice, the Conservative‟s were still able to demonise Labour-controlled LEAs. One new 
factor was the emergence of critical reports about the comprehensive system of state schools in 
Left-inclined journals, such as the Independent and the Guardian which were engaged in 
competition for the middle-ground, anti-Conservative readership. This led the newspapers to 
distance themselves from the Plowdenist doctrines of the past. Indeed, Maurice Galton, (writing in 
1995) who had been a member of the National Curriculum Council during 1988-90, was able to 
note the development of a new political consensus around standards: 
What I did not forsee... was the new alliance between the „Right‟ and the new „middle-
class‟ Left (referred to by some as the „futon socialists‟). At various times, in recent years, 
both main political parties have called for the reintroduction of streaming at the top end of 
the junior school. ... The Guardian, which throughout the debate in the 1970s and 1980s 
adopted a balanced view, took a particularly hard line
165
. 
 
 Against this background, the Conservative Party fought the 1992 General Election with an 
education manifesto which offered choice through diversity, the major theme of the ERA, and on 
teacher training the twin assumptions were that standards were falling and teacher educators had 
too much autonomy, isolated as they were in the universities. The solution was for student teachers 
to spend far more time „in the classroom‟ learning the job from senior teachers166. Meanwhile,  the 
National Curriculum was to be introduced, complete with tests at age 7, 11 and 14 to ensure that 
control of the education service was to be further centralised.  
By contrast, as in 1987, Labour‟s 1992 manifesto commitments on education quite clearly 
avoided linking poor standards with educational structures. Labour had talked of standards rising as 
a consequence of comprehensivisation and had begun to accept the value of tests and league tables. 
However, because it traditionally defended educational autonomy, trade union rights and local 
democratic control, the party was still seen as close to the producer interest. This was reflected in 
the manifesto; as well as promising better pay and career structure for teachers, LEAs were to 
retain their influence: 
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All schools will be free to manage their day-to-day budgets, with local education authorities 
given a new strategic role. Opted-out schools will be freed from central government control 
and brought together with City Technology Colleges into the mainstream of the local school 
system
167
. 
 
Labour endorsed the idea of a national curriculum, and agreed that parents should have the right to 
complain if the education authority failed to delivery on pre-agreed goals in the form of a home-
school contract. There were pledges concerning class-sizes and nursery provision. On structure 
issues, Labour still promised an end to selection and the abolition of the Assisted Places Scheme. 
Typically for an Opposition manifesto, Its time to get Britain working again was mostly concerned 
with underinvestment, and generally failed to reflect the intellectual movement towards challenging 
the pedagogical autonomy of teachers and teacher educators. However, as we have seen, the media 
(especially the newspapers of the centre-left such as the Independent and the Guardian) had made 
it easier to link poor education in the inner cities (particularly London of course) with poor and 
„wrong-headed‟ teaching. This made it politically easier for Labour to change its emphasis later in 
the decade. In the early 1960s, education correspondents had played a key role in disseminating 
dissatisfaction with the existing practice and structures
168
, acting both to spread new thinking 
among the direct readership and make educational standards a „story‟ in itself. This in turn fed into 
the general acceptance of comprehensive reorganisation after 10/65. In a 1990s context, the alleged 
failure of the comprehensive system became a staple of the tabloids, television and radio 
programmes, in addition to featuring in the broadsheet newspapers.  
 
Labour Party policy process, 1987-1992 
To demonstrate its role in a new consensus at time of the 1992 General Election, Labour claimed to 
have developed many of the ideas associated with the Conservative Government themselves. At the 
time of the ERA, Jack Straw as shadow secretary of state claimed the national curriculum as 
Labour‟s idea169, and shadow education ministers had long since stopped Labour support for 
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striking teachers
170
. Labour also promised to extend the Conservative principle of Local 
Management of Schools by delegating budgets to all schools within an LEA. 
 Labour was cautious about new ideas from its own left wing. Sally Tomlinson became part 
of the advisory group selected by Jack Straw in 1989, working closely with Paul Corrigan, 
Labour‟s Education Officer. Tomlinson was a research associate of the IPPR from its inception, 
along with David Miliband. Other members of Straw‟s closed circle were Christopher Price, MP, 
Christopher Ball (of the Royal Society of the Arts), Professors Ted Wragg from the University of 
Exeter, and John  Elliot from the University of East Anglia
171
. Straw was succeeded in 1992 by 
Ann Taylor, and there was some continuity of advisers who contributed. These included Michael 
Barber, a researcher at the TUC and Bert Clough, also of the TUC. Despite the continuity of 
advisers, Taylor had a different approach to policymaking and came from a more „educationalist‟ 
background, indeed Richard Margrave believed that “The only time the [ongoing modernisation] 
agenda changed or was halted was when Ann Taylor came in and it began to slip back to a more 
„traditional‟ Labour view”. This might have been down as much to the new party leader after the 
1992 defeat: 
John Smith would have been a more traditional type, but I don't think they we‟re all that 
happy with the Taylor period of office. John Smith used to say to me, as he was a traditional 
Labour educationalist, as shadow chancellor, don't worry education will get the priority on 
the funding side, he was very traditional on that. But certainly it slipped back during Ann‟s 
period, I think maybe they took the eye off the ball, maybe John‟s office were not that 
concerned.... they had a big modernisation programme which was quite apart from anything 
education was throwing up
172
. 
 
Taylor‟s methodology did not require a closed cabal of advisors, like Straw, instead she used a 
collection of individual advisers who would invite colleagues and allies to subject-centred seminars 
to discuss policy. While Tomlinson was close to Taylor, Estelle Morris and Jeff Rooker, junior 
spokespersons, also began to utilise the same methodology, meeting as a front-bench team with 
their own advisers in train, either as contributors to debates or helping with speech-writing and 
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framing parliamentary questions. This is substantially the model that David Blunkett continued 
with after his appointment in 1994.  
Politically, Ann Taylor had a more traditional educationalist background than either Straw or 
Radice, and spoke out strongly against GM schools and league tables, both of which were to be 
scrapped. This was in response to the post-election 1992 White Paper, Choice and Diversity: A 
New Framework for Schools which established a quango to channel funding for the GM sector, the 
Funding Agency for Schools (FAS). The FAS was to share responsibility with LEAs where 10% of 
an authorities pupils were in GM schools
173
; if the level of 75% GM coverage were to be attained, 
all children in the authority would be directly under the control of the new Department for 
Education (DfE). Clearly, it is feasible that LEAs could be eradicated entirely if these plans were to 
be taken to their logical conclusion.  
  However, Labour‟s agenda altered after Tony Blair became leader when he let it be known 
that both GM schools and league tables might have a future under a Blair led government
174
. In 
fact, Taylor‟s document for the Annual Conference, Opening doors to a learning society, 
contradicted Blair‟s position, calling once again for the absorption of GM and CTC establishments 
within LEA jurisdiction; it also called for the abolition of several education NGOs, notably the 
Teacher Training Agency and the FAS
175
.  
 Given Blair‟s new emphasis it is unsurprising that Taylor was soon replaced by David Blunkett 
who believed that league tables could be useful in raising standards. Blunkett was then thrown into 
the row about Tony Blair‟s choice of a Grant Maintained school for his son, which formed the 
context for both the development of and reception of Diversity and Excellence by the party in 1995. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that Labour slowly adapted to the Conservative agenda whilst in 
Opposition on certain key issues during the 1979 to 1992 period, and that this process was 
accelerated by new Labour from the beginning. Accepting these new positions represents evidence 
that policy change comes about as a process of changing consensus among professional 
practitioners and educational researchers, which party leaderships then adopt and present as 
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emanating from within the parameters of party ideology. Pressure from within the Labour Party is 
less evident than external pressure from parental or consumer groups, pressure from practitioners 
and pressure from social and economic demand. This chapter has looked particularly at the 
developing emphasis on standards and the freeing of schools from LEA control during the 1980s 
and early 1990s. However, on the structure of the state education system Labour were unmoved 
prior to 1994. Chapter Six suggests that new Labour continued the process by reacting further to 
Conservative legislation and what it believed to be popular reforms; in effect accepting the 
inevitability of structural change.  
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Chapter Four  
 
Developments in vocational education and training 
 
The main intention of this chapter is to examine the major issues in post-compulsory education and 
training and the Labour Party‟s treatment of them prior to 1994. This chapter will discuss three 
major issues regarding VET
176
 provision in Great Britain: the funding of post-compulsory skills 
education; the development of the voluntarist tradition of  funding and provision; and the nature 
and quality of the qualifications themselves. All these issues are discussed in the context of the 
changing basis of demand for labour. In addition, this chapter considers the Labour Party‟s failure 
to challenge the development of a voluntarist tradition in Britain, and the preservation of an 
academic-vocational divide. In terms of  this thesis, the academic-vocational divide can be seen as 
analogous with the presence of egalitarian and libertarian Left ideas within the party‟s broad 
ideology. In Chapter Seven of this thesis I will concentrate the treatment of these issues in the new 
Labour era. In tracing Labour‟s historical response to the demands of VET, the pivotal electoral 
episode covered by this chapter will be 1964, after the Conservative Government  established 
Industrial Training Boards and the Labour Party took office pledged to make them work
177
. 
      The incoming Labour government in 1964 was unable to compel local education authorities, 
employers, educationalists or trade unionists to fully rationalise the non-degree post-compulsory 
sector. As in the compulsory sector Labour tried to establish its favoured concept and encourage 
other key actors to adopt this as the standard practice, in effect governing through consensus. 
Unfortunately, in the case of VET provision the changing nature of employment skills demanded 
by the economy made it far more difficult to provide either a comprehensive, uniform, or coherent 
system which enjoyed the backing of the whole policy community.  
      A consequence of the changing industrial demand for labour is intermittent mass youth 
unemployment, and this has to be taken into account when discussing policy options from the 
middle 1970s onwards. Unemployment, growing from the late 1960s, was often associated with the 
inability of British capitalism to change production methods quickly enough. Large employers 
would then shed excess labour, (and neglect to take on apprentices
178
) but still absorb the capital 
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required elsewhere in the economy to stimulate new industrial investment, which could then retrain 
and utilise the unemployed in more fruitful market conditions. As a result of growing youth 
unemployment some secondary education theorists began to question the nature and rigour of 
comprehensive education and its applicability to the employment market, as part of the „Great 
Debate‟ initiated by James Callaghan‟s Ruskin College speech179.  
Politically, the emphasis on human capital (the link between education and employment) was 
rooted in changing basis of industrial demand and the growing  inequality of income since the late 
1960s
180
. As we have seen in Chapter One, by the 1970s years an inter-party consensus had 
developed around the idea that VET policies were the most appropriate tools for closing the income 
gap. In response to this the Conservative Government introduced the Technical and Vocational 
Educational Initiative (TVEI) in 1983. This was designed to take education for some fourteen year 
olds out of the hands of educationalists and make schooling more relevant to the demands of 
employers. TVEI sets the context for the  Labour Opposition‟s treatment of VET issues during the 
Thatcher period, with the vocationalisation of the secondary curriculum developing as a key theme 
for Chapter Seven of this thesis. However, to fully understand the complexities of available policy 
options during the  1994-1997 opposition period necessitates an historical overview with a longer 
time scale. 
 
The history of VET provision in Britain 
There are two major themes in the provision of VET in Britain which this section highlights: firstly, 
the lack of prestige attached to vocational education; and secondly the preservation of an academic-
vocational divide fostered by the voluntarist approach governments have taken.  The problem of the 
lack of prestige attached to vocationalism (as opposed to more academic post-compulsory 
schooling) in fact goes back into the nineteenth century; the first published account of British 
workers falling behind in skills appeared from Lyon Playfair in 1852, in conjunction with the 
observation that too much emphasis was given to universities
181.  As a consequence of Britain‟s 
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early industrial start, the small nature of most enterprises (due to the reluctance of banks to invest 
in industry) and the lack of a system of vocational education, some historians believed that a 
voluntarist tradition of apprenticeships emerged which consolidated a cultural constraint against the 
European concept of vocational education and training.  
      Brendan Evans summarises the situation prior to the 1918 Fisher Education Act by utilising 
three explanatory theories, all of which had continuing resonance at the end of the century. Firstly, 
the belief in the laissez-faire tradition of political non-interference during the period of Great 
Britain‟s initial industrialisation had become embedded182. The liberal legacy of initial 
industrialisation meant that apprenticeships, which were industry specific, non-scientific and non-
academic in nature, kept provision of training balanced between trade unions and employers
183
. 
Secondly, British capital‟s reluctance to reinvest after the success of the first wave of 
industrialisation equates with the reluctance to invest in employee training. This is highlighted by 
contemporary human capital theorists who attach productivity gains to education and training 
outcomes; where these are not immediately apparent, training tends not to occur. The third 
explanatory theory is cultural, suggesting that Britain is infused with an anti-industrial spirit. This 
thesis is most usually connected with the writings of Correlli Barnet and Martin Wiener
184
. A 
similar line is taken separately by Goldthorpe and Gerschenkron. For Evans, Goldthorpe‟s 
understanding of the unique reactions of national capital to the economic crises of the 1970s made 
cultural explanations all the more valid in comparison to more general ideological conclusions
185
. 
      Gerschenkron‟s historical analysis stressed the relative stage of industrial development; 
while laissez-faire state industry relationships might have benefited the first industrial nation, the 
need for the state to intervene in the economy (and provide technical education) became steadily 
more prevalent for later capitalising nations
186
. Among later writers, Finegold and Soskice also 
make the connection between competitiveness and Britain‟s capitalist development by stressing 
how the lack of large surpluses and desire to engage in vocational education helped consolidate 
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Britain‟s „low skill equilibrium‟ for the future187.  The problems of Britain‟s lack of industrial 
training or technical college tradition were largely ignored into the twentieth century.  By then, the 
trade unions had become the jealous guardians of the apprenticeship system, and the parallel 
strength of the employer associations mitigated against any real prospect of state intervention.  
      The second major theme of VET development in Britain is the  piecemeal development of 
provision, characterised by voluntarism and the preservation of a  divide between academic and 
vocational education. In the years prior to the 1917 Fisher Education Act, the worlds of education 
and industrial training were virtually unrelated, mainly because of the pragmatism of the voluntarist 
system, and the simultaneous development of academic sixth-forms in the better Secondary 
Schools
188
.  HAL Fisher, President of the Board of Education during the First World War, 
attempted to develop plans for part-time further education for those who had only an elementary 
education to build upon. His efforts were thwarted by a combination of the employers, trade 
unionists and the lack of support from Labour Members of Parliament.  In response to industrial 
opposition to a 1917 report which tentatively recommended eight hours a week‟s education for 14-
18 year old boys
189
,  Labour educationalist RH Tawney wrote: 
To suggest that British industry is suspended over an abyss by the slender thread of juvenile 
labour, which eight hours continued education will snap, that after a century of scientific 
discovery and economic progress it is still upon the bent backs of children of fourteen that 
our industrial organisation and national prosperity, and that rare birth of time, the 
Federation of British Industries itself, repose- is not all this, after all, a little pitiful? 
 
       As Tawney pointed out, the underlying assumption here was of the inability of certain types 
of (working class) children who “like anthropoid apes, have fewer convolutions in their brains than 
the children of captains of industry” to be successfully educated190. This attitude towards the 
educability of different social class groups was underpinned by the Spens (1938) and Norwood 
(1943) reports, which reinforced hierarchical prejudices and helped ensure that vocational training 
remained outside the “liberal, secondary-university tradition”191. Such indifference meant that, 
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despite Fisher enshrining continuing education in his Education Act of 1918, the sharp economic 
downturn of the early 1920s was enough to derail these expansionary plans
192
. 
        Labour and trade unionists had an opportunity at this point to make the case for vocational 
education as part of the secondary curriculum. The party‟s Advisory Committee on Education 
(ACE) had already concluded that a liberal education should encompass all classes of children, 
during the 1920s
193
. Evidence of increasing demand for academic further education in secondary 
schools is suggested by the figures for secondary education, where total rolls grew from 336,836 in 
1921 to 470,000  in 1938, by which time one-in-twelve students were in post-compulsory 
studies
194
. Meanwhile, employers had, by the late 1930s, found that they needed to develop 
industrial training for young school leavers despite their vehement opposition to obligatory day 
release or funding. In fact, by 1939 the numbers being voluntarily released by employers during 
working hours, at 41,000, was the same as those attending the academic Sixth-Forms
195
. 
       During the Second World War, reformers attempted to legislate for a  statutory period of 
day release training to meet the post-war conditions. Herwald Ramsbotham (of the National 
Government‟s Board of Education) developed an idea for continuation schools providing for the 
day-release requirements of the employers, while also offering opportunities on evenings and 
weekends for general further educational improvement:  
It should have all the facilities necessary to enable all kinds of activities, recreational and 
cultural, including school societies and clubs to be developed in and around it outside the actual 
hours of instruction
196
. 
 
       These activities would give the schools some corporate identity of their own, on a par with 
academic establishments. However, his successor, RAB Butler, took this idea and developed it into 
a more ambitious system of County Colleges to provide overarching education and training for all 
15-18 year olds. The legal obligation of LEAs to set up such colleges was written into of the 1944 
Education Act in the following terms: “The statutory system of public education shall be organised 
in three progressive stages to be known as  primary education, secondary education and further 
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education”197. However, the Act only obliged LEAs to enforce part-time attendance by all when the 
Minister considered it „practicable to do so‟. Other post-war economic priorities, as in the 1920s, 
meant that it was never, in fact, „practical to do so‟. Once again, further education was seen as an 
adjunct to mainstream education (in the secondary-university sense) and failed to establish itself on 
equal terms
198
. This voluntarist situation had not improved by 1959, when the Crowther Report 
opened with the line: “This report is about the education of English boys and girls aged from 15 to 
18. Most of them are not being educated”199. 
        Day release remained voluntary, and Crowther in fact faced the same problems that Fisher 
had grappled with in 1917. The experience of two world wars and the increasing demands for a 
technically skilled workforce in the reconstruction years after 1945 had failed to end the practice of 
voluntary attendance. The Henniker-Heaton report on Day Release (established in the wake of the 
Crowther Report) recommended the removal of a separate stream for technical education which 
Butler had imposed. Instead the report hoped to incorporate vocationalism within the curricula of 
general post-15 education
200
. However, compulsion was again absent, and the report hoped to 
stimulate demand via the planned raising of the school leaving age to 16 (due in 1970/71) and the 
tripartite Industrial Training Boards (ITBs) already in the legislative plans of the Conservative 
Government between 1959-1964.
201
 
With all the attention centring on the provision of VET, less attention had been given to the 
nature of any such education received. In response to their experiences of the First World War, both 
Percy Nunn, a science and mathematics education specialist, and RH Tawney, came to see a 
separate system of narrow vocationalism as insufficient, especially if it involved trade unions and 
employers rather than educationalists in delivery. Nunn was particularly wedded to the idea of a 
liberal education for vocational trainees, having made the connection that „continuing education‟ 
should be part of secondary education, which should embrace crafts and science as well as art, 
literature and history
202
. Such a change in the provision and content of VET would involve a degree 
of central intervention which was not seen as appropriate by inter-war policymakers. However, after 
the second war the context began to change, producing conditions favourable for reform. 
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Firstly, by the early 1960s the growing awareness of Britain‟s declining share of world 
markets and the paucity of skilled labour obliged policymakers of both left and right to attempt to 
plan the delivery of industrial vocational training much more rigorously in an effort to make human 
capital more productive. This implied a compulsory levy system to deliver adequate funding for the 
first time. Secondly, this funding solution was linked to a narrow vocationalisation of provision by 
the newly established ITB‟s which combined the unions and employers, but not the state in the 
form of the DES. This has been widely criticised by educationalists as exacerbating the problems of 
poor qualifications. There was finally to be national planning of VET, but with little input from 
educators, and without a full coverage of industries. 
 The centralisation of VET after 1964 around the imperatives of industrial planning only 
partially followed the logic of the Crowther Report which recommended a tripartite body to 
oversee the rehabilitation of vocational education and the term „practical‟. Therefore the concept of 
a practical education had to be inspired with ideological initiative, as Gary McCulloch noted, to 
overcome the stigma attached. Echoing Tawney and Nunn, Crowther had called for “a practical 
education making progressively exacting intellectual demands”203 rather than the „new 
vocationalism‟ which emerged. Such was the apparent dislocation of schooling and employment 
that by the end of the 1960s it had become clear that narrow vocationalism had failed to anticipate 
or satisfy the changing basis of industrial demand. Meanwhile, on the funding side, state planning 
had been introduced after 1964 to tackle the voluntarism of the past. For Brendan Evans, this key 
period of the early 1960s was one where the normal British incremental change was superseded by 
a realisation that new solutions had to be offered if Britain was to stem its perceived economic 
decline. The Conservative Government‟s Command 1892 Industrial Training: Government 
Proposals (which became the 1963 Act) explicitly noted the correlation between economic growth 
and the level of industrial training, and this planning of human capital investment was endorsed by 
both sides of the political divide
204. Ray Gunter, Labour‟s shadow spokesperson for training, noted 
that the state, employers and trade unions had each accepted the „sea change‟ in ideas towards state 
intervention
205
. The new consensus on training did not prevent some disquiet about the Act‟s 
favoured method of funding, which was to spread the costs of training evenly across industries. For 
employers, the trade off for the compulsory levy was in the form of the greater level of control they 
would have over apprenticeships through the tripartite Board which would govern each industry, 
and also from the pooling of costs. The trade unions had to accede some control over the 
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apprenticeship system, but benefited from being part of the central control over manpower planning 
which would extend, with the National Plan of 1965, to the whole economy and thus apparently 
guarantee jobs
206
. 
Large firms were broadly satisfied in the view of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), 
especially in terms of the quality of education and training offered. For others, however, a flaw of 
the levy funding formula was that, by its very universality, it obliged small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) to contribute, although often the ITB‟s did not recognise the informal on-the-
job training typical of the sector and some small firms saw the levy as another tax on employers
207
. 
Although attendance at colleges was not mandatory, the intention of the ITBs to increase the levels 
of provision was fulfilled in terms of Department of Employment figures for 1964 to 1968 which 
record a 15% growth in the number of workers receiving training, and the growth of 
apprenticeships from 36% to 42% of the age group between 1964 and 1970
208
. 
        However, the downturn in numbers in training after this time reflected, once again, the 
changing nature of demand for skilled labour. Despite the CBI‟s view that the Industrial Training 
Act had helped to “transform the whole climate of opinion and concentrate far more attention on 
training”209, the incoming Conservative Government of 1970 wished to review the need for ITBs 
and the compulsory grant/levy system on the basis that the necessary cultural change had occurred 
and there was no longer a need to compel employers, who in any case needed flexibility to meet 
demand.  
Employers‟ desire for flexibility led to pressure being exerted on the Heath government 
during the review period, which led to the weakening of ITBs after the White Paper Training for 
the Future in 1972, and their absorption into the new Manpower Services Commission (MSC) 
which became a tripartite structure. The Government justified the demise of strong ITBs on the 
basis of their inability to deal with the problem of declining regionally based industries, or to 
adequately meet the more flexible needs of small businesses. Evans points out the ideological 
inconsistency of Heath‟s responses to the economic downturn, in that the White Paper ended the 
statutory levy/grant system while simultaneously establishing a more powerful planning agency in 
the MSC
210
. However, the CBI‟s response to the putative National Training Agency was equally 
ambivalent; they were happy that funding had become a government responsibility (and thus they 
                                                          
206
 though it should be noted that there was never universal coverage of industries in the British 
version of exhortative corporatism. 
207
 Evans,B (1992), p.8.  
208
 Woodhall,M (1974) Investment in industrial training, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 
Volume 12, March 1974, pp.79-81 
209
 Evans, p., citing The Confederation of British Industries (1972), Education and Training Bulletin, 
p.2  
210
 Evans (1992) pp.12-14. 
107 
 
signed up for the national agency in April 1972) but feared for the possible interventions of the new 
body.  
  Although the NTA was the product of a corporatist body, Senker has pointed out that with 
the establishment of the MSC in 1973 and the introduction of systematic exemptions to the 
levy/grant mechanism, employer imperatives were to the fore
211
. This is in part explained by the 
beginnings of a decline in the number of apprenticeships, which correspondingly reduced the 
leverage of the trade union representatives within the tripartite structure. According to Department 
of Employment figures, the total number of apprenticeships declined from 243,700 in 1966 to 
156,200 by 1978
212
, which Gospel interprets as evidence of increasingly competitive markets, rapid 
technological change and the preference among employers to develop „firm-specific‟ training 
schemes to avoid the poaching of skilled labour. Andy Green emphasises the limited nature of such 
„strategic labour planning‟ in another way, with too little emphasis put on education which 
exacerbated the academic-vocational divide once again and disillusioned educationalists
213
.  In 
1976 Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan devoted a major speech to the problem and called for 
a national debate which in essence shared some of the Black Paper doubts about the 
educationalists‟ control of the „secret garden‟ of the secondary curriculum214, and also signalled 
further government intervention in post-compulsory education and training. 
        Along with Green, Patrick Ainley connects state intervention and centralisation with the 
advent of mass youth unemployment. This came in the form of the Youth Training System (YTS) 
which was partly a response to management complaints about the „restrictive practices‟ typical of 
the apprenticeship system
215
. With a Conservative government after 1979, changing demand for 
labour was allied to growing “governmental antipathy towards traditional methods of skill 
formulation, which... helped to undermine the apprenticeship system”216.  
This was in the face of international comparisons which for the late 1970s suggested that the 
ratio of 16 year olds in Britain attending either technical vocational courses in college or vocational 
apprenticeships in the workplace was far below the level of European competitor nations, with 60% 
of the age group in Britain either at work or already unemployed. The five other European states 
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compared ranged from 12% to 22% of that age group no longer receiving any form of VET, while 
from 55% to 76% of them were still in the education and training system
217
. This was voluntarism 
in practice. 
        The MSC was to survive into the Conservative era, however, despite the existence of a 
government ideologically opposed to corporatism, partly because although Evans notes that it was 
“partly a TUC creation”, it adapted to the changing circumstances by developing training schemes 
and adopting the language and priorities of flexibility by developing the YTS under its New 
Training Initiative. In fact, although the YTS met with resistance from some trade unionists, those 
TUC representatives on the MSC believed they were preventing something less palatable emerging. 
This desire by the unions to “try and cling on to whatever avenues of power remained” allowed the 
Conservatives to “skilfully exploit the TUC‟s commitment to its own creation”218 until they finally 
withdrew from the Training Commission (MSC) in protest at the introduction of Employment 
Training in 1988
219
. 
        The gradual if steady diminution of trade union influence within training policy during the 
1970s and early 1980s also resulted in a resurgence of employer interests. They were no longer 
willing to fund training as directed by government unless employer imperatives were central to the 
curriculum. In the employers‟ interests new vocational qualifications were launched but 
unfortunately, few employers were directly involved in their development, or troubled to send their 
most senior executives to serve on the industry lead bodies. These problems resulted in a low 
uptake of the new qualifications and financial difficulties for the National Council for Vocational 
Qualifications (NCVQ) which was charged with marketing them
220
.  
        In parallel with the targeting of training funding at local employment needs was the 
individualisation of training provision implicit in competence-based qualifications, (such as 
National Vocational Qualifications, NVQs), being developed from the time of the TVEI. David 
Mathews, a promoter of an occupational standards approach, interpreted the development of 
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competencey as leading to a situation where skills are seen as commodities to be utilised by 
individuals, and only to be judged against performance of those skills
221
. For critics like Williams 
and Raggatt, this individualisation works against workplace collectivism in terms of  knowledge 
and identity
222
.  
After 1987 and the introduction of the Youth Training System (YTS), the MSC was 
abolished and in the words of the 1988 White Paper from the Employment Department, the 
intention was to “give leadership of the training system to employers, where it belongs”223. Hence 
the role of the Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs), which consolidate both voluntarism and 
vocationalism by controlling some of the funding which traditionally went via the Local Education 
Authorities (LEAs) to the Further Education sector. The new structure was designed to oversee the 
individualisation of qualifications, such as   the new NVQs. Individual students or trainees were to 
be provided with training credits, to be redeemed by colleges or private providers who would then 
receive outcome related funding (ORF) in instalments. This would allow for student/trainees to 
become true consumers of their own education; indeed the Government White Paper 
Competitiveness: Helping Business to Win of 1994
224
 wished to see this expanded to the whole of 
the tertiary sector
225
. 
        As Evans points out, the context for replacing the MSC with the TECs was the decline in 
unemployment after 1987; it was felt that the MSC and its union contingent was useful for labour 
force planning, but in the context of renewed growth, employers should have the main say in where 
training funds would be best spent. However, as private enterprise could not be trusted to fund 
training itself, the state would continue to bear the main burden. In effect, then, the state wished to 
establish a training quasi-market, regulated by employers to meet localised conditions, yet 
supported by a centralised bureaucracy to enable credit to follow the individual trainee who would 
attain nationally recognised qualifications
226
. 
       However, problems soon emerged with this voluntarist model. The first problem was the 
low value, or „currency‟, attached to the new National Vocational Qualifications, by employers and 
trainees, in comparison to traditional GCSE and A levels. As a result, by 1995, two thirds of Youth 
Trainees (YTs) were leaving training schemes without achieving even the basic NVQ levels I or II, 
and in fact, with only 37% of 18 year olds achieving either A level or NVQ level III compared to 
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55% in the equivalent German and French structures, this demand-led system had failed to close 
the training deficit
227
. The failings of the NVQ were recognised by the introduction of General 
National Vocational Qualifications (in pilot form from 1993), based not on workplace competence 
but on transferable academic skills
228
. This also, however, attracted criticism for falling between 
two stools; on the one hand, as a college based vocational A level it was seen as too narrow without 
its links with employment
229
, while for other critics, the narrow vocationalism of the GNVQ means 
it is merely a work accreditation certificate which does nothing for British competitiveness
230
. 
     Alongside the unpopularity of the NVQs, a second problem emerged because of the 
voluntarism of the TECs, which only had the power to persuade and exhort training. Without input 
from any other „social partners‟ (such as the state, local government and trade unions), the 
narrowness of the achievement measuring system of competence only met the requirements of 
employers in the short term. Neither the economic need for more trained workers to help Britain‟s 
competitiveness, nor the imperative of a better educated workforce had been satisfied by the 
introduction of TECs.  
     Confusion over the place of vocational qualifications, the voluntarism of the British 
experience and the role of education as a tool of international economic competitiveness have 
characterised the provision of VET in recent years. In fact, the same debates about VET provision 
which were stimulated by the First World War were still alive in the policymaking discourse 
between 1994 and 1997. There were many who would call, like Percy Nunn and RH Tawney in the 
inter-war era, for the removal of employer and trade union influences and for the return to 
educationalist imperatives. This view was most coherently exemplified in the 1990s by Josh 
Hillman, who pointed out that Britain suffered because of an imbalance between primary and 
secondary spending which institutionally disadvantaged the student body by failing to adequately 
fund the early years of compulsory schooling
231
. An important part of this critique was the 
emphasis on a vocational secondary education and the separation of students (and the curriculum) 
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into vocational or academic „tracks‟ at the early age of fourteen232. However, some defenders of an 
academic-vocational divide (usually in celebration of the primacy of the A level) also believed in a 
stronger role for educationalists, thereby continuing the meritocratic tradition of Tawney and 
Nunn
233
. 
        On the other hand, there were many who saw education purely in economic (human 
capital) terms, either for the benefit of the individual, the firm or society as a whole. These can then 
be subdivided into two camps, those who wanted the state to invest more investment on education 
and training, improving the academic standards of all school leavers so as to make them more 
easily retrainable by employers; and those  sceptical of the role of education and training as a tool 
of empowerment or economic competitiveness
234
. This latter group were conceptually closer to the 
initiators of an employer led training environment, such as Britain developed following the demise 
of the MSC, although they would question either the political emphasis given to the role of the 
state, or the actual validity of a role for the state. Once again, the underlying assumptions were that 
education and training policy had to be reactive to the changing basis of demand, and that the only 
response to such demands was flexibility among the workforce.  
        The concerns outlined above form the parameters of the contemporary debate surrounding 
VET policy, and the context within which Labour has tried to develop a distinctive and workable 
set of proposals. However, Labour‟s reaction to economic events and the particular situation of 
opposition (since 1979) have to be traced from the key moment of 1964, when, as we have seen 
above and in the manifesto analysis in Chapter One, Labour came into power committed to the new 
consensus of planning the manpower requirements of the nation in a relatively stable economic 
environment. 
 
Labour and training policy since 1964 
In government or in opposition, Labour has contributed to two major periods of inter-party 
consensus since 1964. The first was the planning imperative following the realisation that Britain 
was entering a period of relative decline of its share of world trade share, exemplified by the 
Crowther Report, the Robbins Report and the Industrial Training Bill of 1963, all of which were 
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based on human capital assumptions. The second period of consensus has developed since the 
middle 1980s, with the acceptance of employment flexibility as a response to open international 
markets. In response to this latter factor, moves to reform VET qualifications have been paramount. 
       Labour entered the 1964 General Election in broad agreement with the government‟s plans 
for industrial training. The party‟s training spokesman Ray Gunter pointed out that Labour were 
willing to use manpower planning in order to improve Britain‟s competitiveness through 
productivity gains. Indeed, with Labour‟s ideological commitment to the planning of the wider 
economy, the introduction of Industry Training Boards would have been more rational for Labour 
than the Conservatives. In line with the Croslandite moderniser‟s assertion that nationalisation was 
not the only road to socialism
235
, Labour accepted the requirements of changes in capitalist 
development, but found no reason to fear them: 
Labour believes that the national plan will require a faster rate of change in industry. To 
meet the human needs that will arise it is essential to combine with our education reforms a 
revolution in training
236
. 
 
Such was Labour‟s confidence in manpower and output planning that it felt able to promise a 
charter of rights for all workers including that of the right  to “first-rate industrial training with day 
and block release for the young worker”237. Clearly, although the authors of the manifesto realised 
the need for flexibility, the emphasis was on retraining for the new kinds of jobs that dynamic 
capitalism was producing. But where unionised jobs remained, the corporatist structure of the ITBs 
ensured that trade unions interests would be represented.  
        The new charter of rights emphasised the changing basis in demand for labour. They were 
largely rights for workers in new, less organised industries which did not have strong unionised 
work-forces. In the British corporatist context, trade union rights and access to training 
opportunities stemmed not from the legal rights of citizens but from the relative position of the 
trade unions in particular industries and firms, and a consensus among wider policymakers that 
employment training was good for society. In effect it amounted to a human capital argument as 
much as an argument based on the rights of individual employees.  
The 1966 manifesto confirmed that employment was central, with Keynesian demand 
management used for societal ends: 
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The level of economic activity in the community must be sufficient to provide jobs for all. 
Labour has always insisted that this can and will be ensured through intelligent management 
of the economy
238
. 
 
Labour acknowledged that the contemporary employment problem was not 1930s style 
unemployment but redundancy brought about because of new labour-saving methods in industry. 
Hence the accent was on retraining disemployed individuals, with a rigorous regional policy to 
attract industry to areas now in decline. The legislation which ensured compulsory day-release for 
employees wherever new training grants were to be considered was highlighted in this context. The 
emphasis for the late 1960s was to be an expansion of training places in response to the needs of 
the „new industries‟. By the time of the 1970 election campaign, Labour‟s discourse hinted at new 
economic conditions with the reassurance that workers should not be: "left stranded by 
technological change. We must help them to acquire the skills they need to man the new industries; 
offer them a wider choice of job opportunity
239
. 
 
       However, the lack of a coherent National Plan was evident in some other areas of the 
training manifesto, with Labour promising a new National Manpower Service to create new jobs 
and a Commission on Industry and Manpower. Now, with the training imperative and import 
resistance, Labour hoped to achieve a faster rate of economic expansion. Training had become an 
engine for growth as well as a right of employment by 1970. This was coupled in the manifesto 
with exhortations to large employers towards “managerial efficiency” and the hope that they would 
become “accountable to the community”240. 
        With less emphasis on nationalisation as a policy option, Labour found that exhortation was 
insufficient in times of economic downturn; as we have already seen, industrial apprenticeships 
peaked around 1970, and thereafter economic policy was aimed at promoting more growth to stay 
one step ahead of the changing demands of industry. To this end, Labour also started to develop 
policies aimed at making British firms more competitive, especially with regard to large 
monopolistic firms. The incoming Conservative government took this thinking a stage further by 
recommending a review of ITBs which ended Britain‟s brief experiment with compulsory VET 
provision. 
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        It is at this point that we can determine a degree of policy divergence between the parties. 
The Conservative Government‟s Industrial Relations Act of 1971, which tried to curb the trade 
unions, was introduced alongside a diminution of the union‟s role on the ITBs. Labour, who had 
attempted to curb trade union power (insofar as it was thought to cause inflation) with In Place of 
Strife in 1969, now supported a stronger role for trade unions as the party‟s Left-wing came to the 
fore in opposition.  
       The two manifestos of 1974 reflected the reassertion of workers rights, especially where 
made redundant, and a promised Employment Protection Bill would protect workers rights to 
unionise and to receive apprenticeship training. Two other key factors are relevant here; firstly, the 
Conservatives had weakened the ITBs through the introduction of the MSC. Labour now planned 
to make that tripartite body stronger in terms of its ability to plan manpower needs; specifically it 
was to develop and deliver on the pledge that “Redundant workers must have an automatic right to 
retraining”241, so as far as the party was concerned, corporatism still had a role. The second key 
factor in the October 1974 manifesto was the linkage of education and training (with compulsory 
day release) with its implication that those who left school early were being let down somehow by 
the education system; indeed, by highlighting this issue, Labour reintroduced vocationalism to the 
national debate
242
. 
            The rights agenda within Labour VET discourse reached its high-point during the 1979-
1983 period. This is related to the prevalence of high and long-term youth unemployment in the 
wake of the oil crisis. Hence, the main pledge of the Introduction to the 1979 manifesto: “A good 
job is a basic human right”243. Once again, the emphasis was on retraining to attract employment to 
regions deprived of their traditional industries, and of a National Enterprise Board to create jobs 
through public ownership. Labour envisaged introducing a universal scheme of education and 
training for all 16-19 year olds, but it was to be “if necessary backed by statute” in recognition of 
the government‟s lack of faith in persuading employers to volunteer themselves244. Labour had 
presided over an increase in Further Education numbers during the recession since 1974 and 
envisaged increasing enrolment in both traditional Higher Education and the Open University, 
clearly in response to the lack of demand for employment. 
        It is also during this period that vocationalism, manifested as a critique of the 
comprehensive system‟s applicability to the world of employment, began to point towards the 
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quality of training programmes on offer. The Conservatives in Government after 1979 answered 
calls for the vocationalisation of the secondary curriculum, which culminated in the Technical and 
Vocational Education Initiative (TVEI) in 1983. Labour in opposition reverted to defending the 
liberal education aspects of the comprehensive principle. The manifesto exhibited a degree of 
defensiveness, with calls for a return to corporatism in the MSC‟s role as manpower adviser and for 
a return to obligatory day-release training. The manifesto exhibited a confusion of aims, promoting 
liberal educational themes but with a strong role expected for the trade unions. Rights to training, 
education and to join a trade union were all emphasised in response to the Conservatives‟ laissez 
faire attitude to employment and intervention. The pledges merged compulsion with incentive. On 
the one hand, “Employers will be given a statutory duty to provide opportunities for their young 
employees to receive systematic education and training”, while the next line continued; “Premiums 
will be paid to them to recruit young people and provide them with such opportunities”245. This 
ambiguity of message was perhaps also evidenced by the pledge to “end the scourge of youth 
unemployment and prepare young people to take up the jobs we will create”246; this seemed to 
suggest that youth unemployment had begun to affect social behaviour adversely (echoing the 
Conservatives‟ belief that the young „don't want to work‟) yet the manifesto also signalled job 
creation, suggesting that unemployment was not the fault of the unemployed. On training 
allowances, Labour were hostile in principle, but offered a specific allowance and promoted trade 
union input which would have countered the flexibility of state funded training programmes. The 
unions could actively monitor such programmes, and have the opportunity to negotiate the level of 
the allowance on an annual basis
247
. 
        This amounts to a misunderstanding of  job flexibility and the role of the MSC. The 
ideological basis of the emasculation of ITBs and the establishment of the MSC was the 
circumvention of the policy community which had grown up around employment and training 
issues, specifically the local authorities and the trade unions; this had been confirmed by the 
passing of the unambiguous Employment and Training Act of 1982
248
. The MSC is best understood 
then as a quango, whose intention was to maintain control over policy development, to manage 
public money without public accountability and to entrench employer imperatives. 
        Labour‟s policy confusion with regard to the MSC reflects the continuing strength of trade 
union influence, both within Labour‟s policymaking process and within the wider economy. The 
sudden growth in youth unemployment meant that the MSC had extended its own role into the 
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realms of local government and the education system, with responsibility for the Youth 
Opportunities Programme and the Youth Training Scheme after 1983. As Minkin shows, a majority 
of the TUC leaders showed considerable attachment to the MSC, under which they had more 
influence over training policy than previously. The TUC could henceforth work with the 
Confederation of British Industries (CBI) to influence Government policy. In effect, trade unions 
had more potential power in the economy than their status as Labour Party affiliates would have 
presented them with in Opposition
249
. This caused friction within the party, with the trade unions 
defending corporatism and narrow vocationalism against party critics of both left and right. 
       After the 1983 defeat, moves were introduced to develop a new policy which would unite 
the factions of the party. However, following a June 1984 meeting of the party-TUC Liaison 
Committee, the lines were more severely drawn, with the Left on the NEC (who favoured 
boycotting the MSC) and the Right (wishing to absorb training into an Education and Training 
Ministry), uniting to counterbalance the uncritical review of the MSC the trade unionists had 
presented. An attempt was made to clear the impasse with an ad hoc meeting of the front bench, the 
Leader‟s Office, and the TUC, which broke the procedural guidelines of the Liaison Committee250. 
Although this meeting was inconclusive, the precedent of a smaller policymaking group on 
education, employment and training involving front benchers and advisers before involving the 
TUC established the model for future practice, as we have seen in Chapter Two. In addition, by 
1985 Labour‟s use of supply-side reformist ideas led training policy to become central to economic 
policy, as a response to market failure
251
. Intervention to secure more investment in training was 
portrayed by John Smith (trade and industry spokesperson) as a vital „engine for growth‟252. To 
avoid the free-rider problem (of employers who poached trained staff from competitors) a levy 
system was proposed. In 1986 John Prescott, employment spokesperson, succinctly outlined the 
dilemma and the solution: 
Industry has a responsibility to support training in line with agreed national priorities. And 
to help pay for it. Since companies refuse to provide sufficient resources voluntarily, some 
form of levy system will clearly be necessary
253
. 
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Although training was becoming central to Labour‟s economic policy, details were vague in 
advance of the 1987 election due to the sensitivities of some trade union leaders who wished to 
retain a corporatist role for the MSC
254. In the event, unions‟ concerns were assuaged partly by Neil 
Kinnock‟s reputation as an educationalist, and the emerging New Skills for Britain saw the MSC 
position safeguarded
255
. This document was complemented by Work to Win, a TUC-Labour Party 
liaison paper which proposed a national training fund, part-funded by employers and administered 
by the MSC. The hypothecated nature of the levy would ensure the necessary investment, but the 
erosion of full employment and a recognition of the weaknesses of the existing arrangements 
ensured that unemployment was central to the training section of the 1987 manifesto. 
 With the national imperative to reduce unemployment and close the international skills gap, 
Labour did not feel the need to highlight the employer levy (or any funding mechanisms) in the 
manifesto. This perhaps reflected the lack of issue salience among voters as much as a fear that the 
Conservatives and their business allies would seize upon the National Training Fund that had been 
clearly proposed in New Skills for Britain and Work to Win. Training and continuing education for 
adults appeared in the manifesto mostly in the context of unemployment. Apart from an Adult 
Skillplan for those in work Labour pledged to create a Foundation Programme for all 16-18 year 
olds, and a "Jobs, Enterprise and Training Programme [which] will expand existing programmes 
for unemployed people with a guarantee of a job or new skill for the long-term unemployed"
256
. 
 
 Following defeat in 1987, Labour launched a full-scale policy review which placed training 
issues in the hands of the People at Work group, headed by Eddie Hague of the trade unions and 
Michael Meacher of the Front Bench. Advised by David Soskice
257
, this group further emphasised 
that “the key to our economic success in the future is good education and training”258. The Policy 
Review document Meet the Challenge, Make the Change promised a National Training Fund and, 
for the first time, details of the levy system to make the fund a reality; henceforth 0.5% of 
employers payroll would be hypothecated for the new Skills UK agency to use to organise and 
monitor programmes
259
. 
 Following internal reports that the new policy would prove unpopular (particularly on the 
internal Business Taxation Committee), party leader Neil Kinnock replaced Michael Meacher with 
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Tony Blair, then employment spokesperson and seen as close to Kinnock, who would be an 
“engine for ideas” to help settle on an industrial relations policy and avoid further conflicts260. 
Taking advantage of the new policymaking conditions, which allowed front benchers much more 
leeway in developing new ideas, Blair soon discarded the idea that all firms would have to pay the 
Training Investment Contribution (levy). It was to be replaced with a scheme in which all 
employers would have to allocate a given percentage of their own turnover for training; only if they 
did not comply would they be taxed to fund the skills agency
261
. This was a step back from the 
universal compulsion of training investment implied in the earlier documents.  
Blair went further in 1991, highlighting the quality of training on offer; under this new 
scheme, good employers who trained to the standards required of the Conservatives‟ Investors in 
People award would be exempt from the levy
262. As well as rejecting universalism, Blair‟s 
Opportunity Britain document also embraced the idea of individual vocational education portfolios 
and Personal Development Plans, designed to be independent of employers, with requirements 
partially met from the skills fund. Training and Enterprise Councils, once earmarked for abolition 
or at least reconfiguration with a stronger role for trade unions, were to be reinforced, with 
assurances to business that unions would not be given joint control of organisations whose remit 
was to remain voluntarist rather than systematically interventionist when it came to employers‟ 
training efforts
263
. In general, as Wickham-Jones and King concluded, Labour discourse during the 
early 1990s was characterised by vague and non-committal language, of gradually introduced 
taxation changes only after  widespread consultations
264
. 
 With the approach of an election in 1992, Labour‟s manifesto once again concentrated on 
unemployment and opportunities for individuals to improve their employability: 
We will...  establish a work programme combining three days a week work for the 
unemployed- paid at the proper rate - with two days' training and job seeking. This will 
benefit the community and ensure that unemployed people are offered a range of 
employment and training opportunities. The programme which can be quickly and easily 
established will allow us to start bringing down unemployment immediately
265
. 
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And to highlight the individual opportunities Labour would henceforth offer the electorate:  
We will establish a new cash-limited Skills for the 90s fund with an initial budget of £300 
million, to upgrade the training of those in work. Investment will be targeted particularly at 
areas of skill shortages and will give people who are now unskilled the chance to acquire 
basic skills
266
. 
 
Playing on the ad hoc nature of much current Conservative provision, Labour was able to introduce 
its new funding mechanism in the name of economic rationality: 
Instead of the present series of piecemeal initiatives we will establish a coherent national 
training policy to meet the needs of industry and provide people with real equal 
opportunities at work. All employers, except for very small businesses, will be obliged to 
invest a minimum amount on training their workforce or make a contribution to the local or 
national training effort
267
. 
 
However, perhaps the key phrase of the manifesto in terms of the changes to Labour policy was 
“Training will be a real partnership between government and industry, not an excuse to shift all the 
burden onto employers”268. The shift towards individual training opportunities was a logical step 
for a party which understood the flexible requirements of employers. With in-work training mostly 
exhorted and unemployment portrayed as an opportunity to retrain, Labour could offer the 
electorate something better than „Tory schemes‟, while a more sophisticated reading of the policy 
documents behind the manifesto led some in the City to praise a new found pragmatism
269
. 
In the aftermath of still another defeat in 1992 and a change of leadership, Labour policy 
moved more strongly in favour of a tax to fund training which would apply to all firms, with one 
document Labour’s economic approach proposing a levy of up to 1.5% for non-training firms270. 
John Smith‟s Commission on Social Justice eventually recommended a rising tariff of up to 2% of 
payrolls
271
. However, these commitments were soon watered down after the death of Smith and his 
replacement by Blair in July 1994. In the first restatement of Labour policy since Blair‟s election, 
New Economic Future for Britain retreated from compulsion, given the changing basis of demand 
for labour which had resulted in over half of Britain‟s employees working for SMEs, many of 
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which had been exempted in the pre-1992 policy. Instead, the document concentrated on the 
opportunities inherent in Individual Learning Accounts and the need to ensure training was of 
adequate quality
272
.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has concentrated on the quality of post-compulsory education and training, employers‟ 
continuing reluctance to fund training, and the vocationalisation of compulsory education designed 
to counteract this lack of training in Britain. The constant background context for these 
developments is the changing basis of demand for labour in an ever more flexible employment 
market.  All these are recurring themes of Chapter Seven. This chapter shows the change in 
policymaking practice as trade union influence has declined in the economy, in response to such 
changes in demand for labour.  
Labour Party institutions have mirrored this marginalisation of unionist concerns with the 
new policymaking environment which emerged at the time of the Policy Review. However, as we 
have seen, even a Labour Party with institutional input from its trade union affiliates had to react to 
changes in demand, hence the inter-party friction discussed above. Following the Policy Review 
period Tony Blair clearly had an immediate impact on employment and training issues during 
1990-91, prefiguring his premiership with an emphasis on business-friendliness and the 
individual‟s responsibility to retrain. John Smith, who was more committed to Labour‟s trade union 
links, effectively steered policy back towards a compulsory levy, and employers‟ responsibility to 
train the workforce. Party ideology and the perception of electoral popularity were at this stage 
major constraints on Labour policymaking, even after allowing for the increased frontbench 
autonomy discussed earlier. After 1994, in the era of new Labour, the continuing decline of the 
trade unions in the economy and their waning influence within the party, it became easier for the 
party leadership to marginalise unionist concerns as the party prepared for Government.  
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Chapter Five 
 
Labour and the development of the British university system 
 
This chapter outlines the Labour Party‟s attitudes towards higher education. We shall see how the 
twin concerns of wider egalitarian access and libertarian autonomy are intertwined in Labour 
positions. Although these two elements of Labour‟s ideology are not necessarily incompatible, the 
evidence in this chapter and in Chapter Eight show that it is easier for the party to combine the two 
concepts in opposition than it has proved in government. Some historical context is required before 
the position of the Labour Party can be appreciated. 
 The development of higher education in Britain since the nineteenth century has been 
characterised by gradual state centralisation of the service and the increasing application of human 
capital concerns. The relationship between the autonomy of universities, and the ability of policy 
actors to redirect Britain‟s tertiary education and thus economic resources, has been the subject of a 
continual struggle for almost two hundred years. There were many attempts to make the 
universities more respondent to the needs of the professions and scientific research in the 19th 
century, but they met with resistance from the traditional and particular view of the university 
which had emerged in England. This emphasised the humanistic search for truth and the 
development of a disinterested culture; indeed Newman‟s Dublin lectures on the role of universities 
stressed that a university education should have no market value
273
. However, the increasing  
pressure for more British scientists and engineers, which was partially met by technical colleges, 
the Scottish universities and state universities in Germany and elsewhere, rendered the two pillars 
of the British educational establishment, Oxford and Cambridge, less and less relevant to national 
success in the context of rapid industrialisation
274
. In response to the specific lack of scientific and 
engineering research (as opposed to the teaching of engineers and scientists), many municipal 
„Redbrick‟ universities emerged in the latter half of the century, particularly after the Paris 
exhibition of 1867, which galvanised critical national interest in the nature of British education
275
.  
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 Thereafter, an academic-vocational divide began to emerge between institutions concerned 
with pure research and those that were concerned with meeting the requirements of industry. As the 
state took more interest in the university system, tension developed between the state and 
institutional autonomy. This resulted in a compromise between the universities and the state which 
was characterised by institutional variation and plurality as universities and colleges emerged to fill 
different demands at different times. Competing definitions of the role of universities also 
developed, reflecting the internal tensions
276
. However, concepts of the university began to 
converge after 1900, when the new colleges, later to become universities, began to offer traditional 
humanistic learning programmes, intended to broaden the mind and transmit a „professional‟ 
culture. At the same time the Oxbridge colleges used their extra resources and links to the political 
elite to establish themselves in scientific research. This is the process which came to be known as 
„academic drift‟.  
 The lack of direct state involvement in the university sector prior to the First World War 
was due largely to the success of the Redbrick universities, established usually after pressure from 
municipal authorities and initial funding by local entrepreneurial investment. Civic pride ensured 
that the institutions survived after the patronage of individual capitalists declined, thus preserving 
autonomy and the voluntarist tradition and remaining outside of the state‟s purview. However, 
Britain‟s wartime experience demonstrated the necessity of scientific, managerial and engineering 
skills at a level only the universities could provide. In addition, positivist sociology, represented by 
August Comte, and the idealism of TH Green, began to establish the concept of the social 
usefulness of higher education and the universities
277
. State involvement in the British university 
system had begun, albeit in an ambiguous, compromised form, and this set the higher education 
agenda for the remainder of the twentieth century. 
 After the war, the vocational and professional training of the universities  again came under 
attack from traditionalists, who feared for the quality of degrees. In 1932 the political scientist Sir 
Ernest Barker expressed worries about the democratisation of higher education, and the growing 
belief that universities could solve all social ills. If quality was threatened by the quantitative 
expansion, universities could lose the freedom to pursue knowledge in a disinterested way. For 
historian FS Lyons, this was the last rattle of the traditional guard; certainly, science, coupled with 
the success of wartime planning, had forever changed the concept of the university, and the 
argument was no longer about whether there should be vocational or professional education taught 
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in the universities, but on the correct balance of vocational and liberal learning in each 
institution
278
. This view was reinforced by the failings of the British economy, especially during the 
1930s, to either compete internationally or provide enough employment at home, and the 
experiences of the second world war. 
 A reformist view was expressed by Bruce Truscot in Redbrick university in 1943, in which 
he sketched out a future in which there would be a levelling out of resources between ancient and 
modern universities, a unification of standards at the point of admission, and the free movement of 
students between the various institutions which would all develop as centres of excellence in 
specific fields. He married the concepts of research- “a search after knowledge for is own intrinsic 
value”- and teaching, with the hope that “the discipline of conscientious teaching and application to 
learning cannot but make men better”279. While much of Truscot‟s thinking was firmly 
traditionalist and he failed to set it within the context of expansion, elements of credit transfer 
between institutions and specialisation were to reappear in the Robbins Report of the 1960s. At the 
time, however, the context of 1943 was set by the White Paper Educational Reconstruction which 
spoke of post-war expansion and argued that: "The aim of national policy must be to ensure that 
high ability is not handicapped by place of residence or lack of means of securing a university 
education"
280
. 
 
 Following the passage of the 1944 Education Act, governments became more committed to 
education as a tool of manpower planning, and the route towards a coherent system was signalled 
by a series of reports from Government enquiries. These included the Percy Report (from the 
Special Committee on Higher Technical Education) of 1945 and the Scientific manpower report 
(from the Barlow Committee). The latter report recommended the doubling of output among 
scientists, but not at the expense of humanities courses
281
. In response to further reports on the 
manpower requirements of education, medicine, agriculture and social studies, successive 
government‟s expand places from 50,000 in 1938-39 to 100,000 in 1958-9282. In 1951 the National 
Advisory Council on Education for Industry and Commerce reported to the Labour government in 
1951, called for what were eventually established after 1956 as Colleges of Advanced Technology 
(CATs)
283
. The rationale for expansion comprised three elements: increased student demand; the 
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need to improve technical and industrial training; and the growing recognition that much talent was 
being wasted
284
. 
Growth in the „national interest‟ found its fullest expression in the terms of reference of the 
University Grants Committee which were widened in 1947 to explicitly acknowledge that national 
needs should be a factor in the development of universities. However, the development of the 
state‟s interest in university education has to be seen in the context of the relatively high levels of 
autonomy common to British universities. The UGC was seen by some as a buffer between the 
universities and the state in the pre-war decades, but the general post-war consensus towards 
intervention was exemplified by the acceptance by the CVCP in 1946 that the efficiency of the 
economy had to be governments‟ primary aim for the education service. The general autonomy of 
universities was maintained until 1964 when the UGC was absorbed by the Department of 
Education in 1964. This absorption raised the possibility of conflict between accountability and 
academic freedom and marks the beginnings of the Left‟s ideological confusion about the social 
role of the university and the preservation of elite excellence. 
 
Labour’s interest in higher education, 1964-1994 
 
This section looks at developments in higher education carried out by Labour in office, 
specifically the expansion signalled by the Robbins Report (1963) and the establishment of the 
Open University, both of which illustrate the confusion of aims in the ideology resulting from the 
presence of egalitarians and libertarians within the Left
285
. Libertarian Left here encompasses 
Croslandite notions of meritocracy, while the egalitarian Left would see social and education 
policy as an opportunity to redress class imbalance through wider access and egalitarian funding 
formulae. With Labour so often out of office, the party leadership was able to conceal the 
differences, up to the point when, on entering Government, it has been obliged to make „hard 
choices‟.  
 This dualism was apparent by 1964. David Robertson contends that the trade off between 
excellence and the continuing free deliver of higher education allowed Labour thinkers to merge 
the two themes during the 1960s. Many within the Labour Party assumed that participation in 
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higher education could be driven automatically by success from below, because the grammar 
school stream promoted the kind of excellence required for university entrance, and believed that 
fair access to higher education was guaranteed if its provision was free. Some accepted of the 
rationing of higher education places, rather than their expansion as an entitlement for all
286
. Others 
believed that it was not necessary to challenge the content of higher education. Indeed academic 
and institutional autonomy found favour among Left libertarians, as did the belief that voluntarism 
was the appropriate response to calls for university reform. 
 The Labour Party‟s support for the Robbins Committee‟s report in 1963 was based on 
various factors. Firstly that Labour MPs and party members had benefited from grammar and 
university education, and were keen to see further expansion of opportunity as promised in the 
party‟s Taylor report to Annual Conference287. Although Robbins demonstrated the continued 
social imbalance of university intake since 1945, the liberal, meritocratic Left believed that the 
reform of secondary education would correct the social bias, and many did not challenge the belief 
that only a minority in society had the innate ability to take a university degree
288
. With the 
presence of A-levels as the university entry mechanism, the concept of open access was transferred 
away from the university sector and into wider educational discourse, which preferred selection at 
18 to selection at 11, and where the illusion of a meritocratic, democratic society with free higher 
education for the brightest seemed just and benefited from consensus support
289
.  
 The second factor was the need for a reliable supply of teachers, scientists and engineers, 
and this forms the context with which the Labour Party approached the 1964 General Election. 
Labour addressed higher education issues in two main ways. The first of these was the 
establishment of a higher education committee by Gaitskell in March 1962. This included Anthony 
Crosland, Tyrell Burgess and John Vaizey among Labour educationalists, and reported as the 
Taylor Report in time for the 1963 Annual Conference
290
. The report benefited from much of the 
written evidence which had been presented to the Robbins committee, and couched the language of 
expansion within manpower planning terms: "Economic expansion is only possible if university 
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and technological education expands rapidly and continuously to provide the necessary brainpower 
and skill"
291
. 
 
The Taylor Report also envisaged a unitary future for the expanded higher education sector, with 
the universities undifferentiated
292. The second element of Labour‟s approach became clear with 
the policy statement Labour and the Scientific Revolution produced for the Conference, which 
presented Labour‟s plans as modernisation in the form of a popular and democratic expansion of 
opportunity which would contribute to economic growth
293
. 
 In terms of human capital growth and planning, Labour‟s 1964 manifesto built on the 
themes of planning and modernisation, setting out what it believed to be national, and thus 
consensual truths about the possibilities of education in general: 
This is an age of unparalleled advance in human knowledge and of unrivalled opportunity 
for good or ill. In ever-widening areas of the world the scientific revolution is now making 
it physically possible for the first time in human history to provide the whole people with 
the high living standards, the economic security,  and the cultural values which in previous 
generations have been enjoyed by only a small wealthy minority
294
. 
 
Not only was education for the scientific national good, but for the material and cultural benefit of 
an ever widening section of the population. Labour‟s promise of “a programme of massive 
expansion in higher, further and university education” allowed them to be radical, yet firmly within 
the consensus of the times around the Robbins Report. 
 The consensus around the Robbins Report broadly consisted of a consolidation of the 
conclusions of the 1943 White Paper Educational Reconstruction, that social demand should 
govern supply, and that there should be an open-ended commitment to the principle of higher 
education paid for by the state. Set up with a brief to construct a framework for the future, the 
Robbins Committee established a set of aims for the universities. Robbins‟ first priority was for the 
instruction in necessary skills, but that was buttressed by the other, more liberal, major aims of the 
report; to produce, not just specialist but cultivated men and women; to further the advancement of 
the idea of learning as a good; and the transmission of culture. Ramifications of these aims included 
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equal reward for work of equal standards, the removal of all differentations between institutions 
which provided similar functions, mobility of students within higher education, and the 
maintenance of standards. 
 In effect, this meant that post-Robbins expansion was to be societal, in that it would meet 
the new national requirements for science and technology, but with the preservation of the 
traditional universities‟ liberal education role. To this end, Robbins proposed that the Colleges of 
Advanced Technology, the CATs, should be come Technological Universities, and that five Special 
Institutions for Scientific and Technological Education and Research should be established, along 
with recommendations that student numbers grow
295
. Robbins was responding to calls for 
expansion from two directions, the politically-desired science and technological imperative, and the 
twin social effects of „bulge‟ and „trend‟. The bulge was a manifestation of the increased birth rate 
during and after the war, which naturally raised demand for places; the trend effect was triggered 
by more students staying on longer at school (as provided for by the 1944 Act) and taking A-
levels
296
.  
 Perhaps the main feature of the expansionist consensus was the perceived need to make 
universities more accountable. Robbins‟ recommendation of a Council for National Academic 
Awards (CNAA) had been accepted by the Conservative Government
297
 and the funding of higher 
education came under the control of the Department for Education and Science at the same time. It 
is within this framework that the arguments surrounding Labour‟s introduction of the binary divide 
can be best understood. It created thirty polytechnics delivering CNAA accredited degrees, which 
were nevertheless confined to a hinterland between the further and higher education sectors, 
although officially they were part of the latter. It also allowed the traditional liberal universities to 
maintain autonomy over what they taught and how they carried out their duties
298
.  
This binary divide, confirmed and consolidated by Labour Secretary of State Anthony 
Crosland in a speech at Woolwich Polytechnic on the 27th April 1965, was specifically intended to 
control that part of higher education output which the Government thought necessary to meet its 
economic and industrial needs, and was introduced against the express wishes of the Robbins‟ and 
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Taylor reports
299
. Because it was also intended to maintain the autonomy of the traditional 
university sector, the binary policy was welcomed by many in the universities as a signal that they 
could continue „unreformed‟. However, this decision was fiercely condemned by many on the 
egalitarian Left, such as the communist education historian Brian Simon, who had hoped that the 
Robbins‟ recommendation of an expanding unitary system would become the basis for a broad 
democratic advance
300
, a hope apparently dashed if the polytechnics were to be in effect, the second 
division. 
 Labour faced difficulty on this issue because the new binary divide seemed to offend 
equality whilst retaining excellence. Indeed, Crosland later stated that he had been hurried into an 
announcement of a change of policy by his advisers at the Department of Education and Science 
(DES)
301
 who wished to strengthen the position of the department in relation to the universities by 
establishing a public sector of higher education
302
. However, at the time Crosland made a spirited 
case for a dual system of higher education, largely on the basis that the polytechnics would 
inevitably feel inferior to the universities even if they were within the same structure, “becoming a 
permanent poor relation”303. He also made the social democratic case, that a substantial part of 
higher education “should be under social control, and directly responsive to social needs”. 
International competitiveness was a further motor of policy. In this sense the Polytechnics were to 
have a regional role linked to industry‟s needs and the employment needs of the local population. 
With an understanding of the need to balance meritocracy with egalitarianism, Crosland concluded 
his Woolwich speech with an rhetorical flourish: “Let us now move away from our snobbish, caste-
ridden hierarchical obsession with university status”304.  
 In response to charges that the policy was inegalitarian, Crosland pointed out that selection 
at 11 was wrong in that it adversely affected the aspirations of most of an entire age group, while 
selection at 18 for university affected the relatively few who want such an education, and they 
require quite different types of courses and institutions rather than uniformity. Additionally, 
egalitarians should not have supposed that naming the polytechnics as universities would have 
resulted in the greater resources being available to reach equivalent standards
305
. Centralised 
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control and the need to reflect regional employment needs also implied a role for the Local 
Education Authorities, which fitted ideologically with the Left‟s belief in the possibilities of local 
government. Although local and central government control can be seen as contradictory, where 
assumptions are shared and accountability is the main concern of the controlling authority, local 
authority control can be seen as an effective centralising measure when contrasted to institutional 
autonomy. 
 Recalling his close observations of the Crosland period, former ministerial private 
secretary
306
 Maurice Kogan raised two further points about the binary policy which help explain 
Labour‟s acceptance of what had become a controversial division. Firstly, Kogan believed that “it 
was a moderately left-wing position to believe in polytechnics... because of the improved 
opportunities it gave in vocational education and parity of esteem”307. Then there was the “vague 
ideology about the usefulness of vocational education, as against the Ivory Towers mentality of the 
universities”308. These beliefs also connected the antipathy towards hierarchies common on the Left 
to issues of national competitiveness and wider opportunity for party audiences.  
 Crosland‟s higher education policy decisions, therefore, combined egalitarianism and 
efficiency to secure an inter-party consensus. Problems only emerged at the point of 
implementation. Thus, Crosland signed the Taylor Report calling for unitary expansion of higher 
education in opposition, but in Government  signed the order for the binary division. Kogan 
believed the decision to found thirty polytechnics “must have been created by the Department 
responding to local authority wishes”309. The majority of larger city councils were at that time 
Labour councils and LEAs, and this confusion, or dualism within Labour thinking, allied to the 
desire to centralise control over public expenditure on higher education (through the use of LEAs), 
allowed a Labour Secretary of State to overturn agreed party policy in the interests of a wider 
consensus. 
 In terms of widening participation and access through the creation of a new set of 
universities, Labour failed to act radically whilst in office. Richard Crossman‟s Cabinet diaries 
recorded his belief that when Michael Stewart became Secretary of State for Education in 1964, he 
“quietly accepted the departmental line [on the binary divide] because there was nothing in the 
Party policy about committing us to repeal it”310 and Crosland entered office after the binary policy 
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had been regarded by the Department as a fait accompli
311. Although Labour‟s position on forming 
the Government was clearly to create an undifferentiated university system, the wider consensus, 
from the Treasury to the Local Education Authorities, reflected the desire for accountable 
economic outcomes from an increasingly expensive higher education service This was a consensus 
which the Department would have represented but which it could not have sustained alone. 
However, the existence of this consensus allowed the Secretary of State to override party 
objections, even while drawing on elements of party support (such as Crosland‟s adviser Tyrell 
Burgess). Some Labour Party thinkers close to Crosland pointed out that the working classes had 
always favoured further education over university education, and the thirty vocational Polytechnics 
would provide the vehicle for expanding access to underrepresented social groups. As a socialist 
future needed more skilled workers as much as it needed equality, the downward catchment of the 
new sector would heal social wounds and improve economic performance with one stroke. Burgess 
had emphasised the skills deficit among the working classes in responding to changing capitalism 
in the United States, and believed that “this fate awaits the children of manual workers in this 
country unless we can radically alter the bias of our educational system”312.  
 In fact Crosland did not expect degree-level education to constitute a large part of the 
Polytechnic‟s workload, and thought that they were intended to fulfil quite other requirements to 
the universities. In 1972, he believed they had established themselves and were not “trying to beat 
them [the universities] at their own game. Rather they are playing a different game with a different 
set of rules”313. He was quite indifferent to calls to democratise further and higher education, 
rejecting both mandatory grants to sixteen to eighteen year old students and calls for selective 
discrimination for lower academic qualifications as the price of university entry, although there 
were clearly financial constraints in operation. 
 Creating the Polytechnics allowed Labour to fulfil expansionist expectations, but it also 
shows the extent to which the leadership had to take into account the dualism within party 
ideology. The creation of the Open University, the other major policy development of the Wilson 
Governments (1964-1970) also revealed the presence of egalitarian and meritocratic values in 
conflict. David Reisman notes that Crosland was actually indifferent to the promise of an Open 
University, which was incorporated in Labour‟s 1966 election manifesto. Michael Foot recalled 
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that “Left to Crosland the whole thing might have been kiboshed”314 even though the project had 
the support of Harold Wilson and Michael Young. In fact Wilson could not guarantee funding for 
this project in the circumstances of the financial crisis of 1966, and he asked his advisers to find 
private financial support
315
. The Open University was clearly aimed at a widening of access which 
should appeal to the egalitarian Left among the Labour Party membership. However, the Open 
University developed in such a way as to replicate the social composition of the traditional 
university sector rather than to widen access. Its success in increasing the numbers taking degrees 
should not mask the fact that its timing coincided with the expansionary intentions of the prevailing 
consensus, (in that it responded to middle class demand), that it was relatively cheap way to fund 
the Robbins expansion plans
316
 because students had to pay their own tuition fees in full. These 
aspects of the OU system were formed into a new Left egalitarian critique which developed during 
the 1970s and early 1980s. 
 The major significance of the establishment of the Open University in 1969 was that it 
influenced on the development of more traditional higher education after that time, both in terms of 
expansion to meet social demand and in the modularisation of course structure. Labour‟s 1966 
election manifesto had set out the intentions of the „University of the Air‟ to widen entry to give 
“everyone the opportunity of study for a full degree” while at the same time offering new ways of 
studying in higher education which did not have to end with the awarding of a full degree
317
. 
Initially established to increase numbers, the OU also aimed to widen opportunity by only 
accepting part-time students without the „normal‟ (then two A levels) qualifications, and was 
restricted to students over the age of twenty-one. Thus it was designed to fulfil a social egalitarian 
function of widening access to underrepresented mature students, but it also realised the social 
demand which even Robbins had failed to anticipate. The Open University immediately expanded 
places by 20,000, and this had trebled by the end of its first decade in 1980
318
.  
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 In terms of modular structure, the OU was pioneering in this regard precisely because the 
mode of learning had to be home-based and part-time
319
. This had  a number of effects on the way 
the Polytechnic system developed, targeting mature and part-time students in greater numbers 
throughout the 1980s, even while the OU itself managed to represent a separate strand within the 
system mainly because it did not pose a challenge to other degree-awarding institutions
320
. 
 Although the OU‟s pioneering methods were also utilised by the Polytechnics, neither 
sector made much impact on the social composition of entrants. Perhaps, then, Crosland‟s belief 
that it would be a drain on the finite education budget reflected the fact that the OU was never 
intended to democratise access or develop Britain‟s economic prospects321. By the middle 1970s, 
survey findings suggested that the new part-time students were building on qualifications already 
attained (often they were previously uncertificated teachers upgrading) and came from social 
groups which were already upwardly mobile in terms of occupation. Only 8% of OU students were 
working class in 1972/3 and indeed 90% of OU students were from social classes I & II. Even 
among part-time Polytechnic students the number was as high as 76%
322
. Part-time provision, the 
basis of the OU, seemed to be leading towards a cheaper, rather than more egalitarian system, 
without amending either the democratic or national manpower deficits. While the OU did not have 
a radical effect on the social class composition of higher education students, some contemporary 
critics acknowledge the OU as a radical measure even while recognising that it could be firmly 
located within the confines of the prevailing consensus around expansion
 323
. 
 The incoming Conservative Government after the 1970 General Election was also 
committed to expansion. The White Paper issued by Margaret Thatcher, the Secretary of State, in 
1972 envisaged 200,000 more students in higher education by 1981, taking the number of the 18 
year old cohort up to 22%, as opposed to 7% in 1961 and 15% in 1971
324
. As well as endorsing the 
consensus around expansion, Thatcher (or her departmental advisers) espoused liberal intentions 
for the universities: 
Opportunities for higher education are not... to be determined primarily by reference to 
broad estimates of the country‟s future needs for highly qualified people... The government 
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consider higher education valuable for its contribution to the personal development of those 
who pursue it
325
 
 
However, the 1972 White Paper Education: a Framework for Expansion, is widely recognised as 
the high-water mark of growth; even so, during the post-war period, from Butler, to Edward Boyle 
and Margaret Thatcher, the Conservatives could point to an expansionist record in office at least 
the equal of Labour
326
. After this time economic difficulties changed the funding environment and 
expansion was curtailed. 
 The Labour manifesto of 1970 had also contained promises of expansion and offered new 
opportunities to challenge the élite nature of university and the possibilities for wider access. 
Reflecting the economic circumstances the February 1974 manifesto made no mention of higher 
education, while the language of October 1974 had changed somewhat, with no promises of 
expansion in higher education, (although a fairer grants system was a declared aim) but more 
opportunities in further education and training. The preconditions, and perhaps the underlying 
assumptions, had begun to alter, however: “As in all our plans, economic restraints are bound to 
influence timing”327. The changing economic circumstances after 1972 led to the erosion of the old 
inter-party consensus which had ensured that higher education, as an undisputed good, was to be 
protected in all circumstances. For Kogan, this partially reflected latent 1960s grumblings within 
Labour‟s egalitarian Left about the unchanging elitism of the university sector, the associated 
problems of academic drift by the Polytechnics (aping the universities, against Crosland‟s 
expectations) and the perceived failure, once again, of further and higher education to respond to 
social and economic needs
328
. However, there were still arguments for a wider variety of student 
types realising higher education from within both major parties, which stressed higher education as 
an equaliser of opportunity, and as a tool of national economic policy which required accountability 
and responsiveness to changes. 
 Economic problems during the 1974-79 Labour Government increased the demands on 
higher and further education to respond to a national crisis. James Callaghan‟s call for a 
vocationalisation of the secondary curriculum at Ruskin College in 1976 resonated throughout the 
tertiary sector as he derided the notion of creating well adjusted citizens who were 
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unemployable
329
. Government policy reflected this and the tightening economic circumstances as 
we can see from this table: 
Table 12: DES projections for higher education numbers in 1981, 1970-1976 
Year DES declared targets 
1970 835,000 
1972 750,000 
1974 635,000 
1976 600,000 
Kogan,M & Kogan,D (1983), p.29. 
 The numbers attending higher education from the 18 year old cohort fell from 14.2% in 1972 to 
12.4% in 1978 despite steady rises in the numbers suitably qualified
330
. This was based on the 
Central Policy Review Staff‟s evidence that with a falling birth rate, the demand for higher 
education was bound to decline even if the proportion of 18 year olds entering the sector (age 
participation rate, APR) continued to rise
331
. Gordon Oakes, the Labour higher education minister 
in 1978, addressed the crisis of decline with the Brown Paper Higher Education into the 1990s, 
and, for the first time introduced rational planning for the sector based on consultation
332
. One 
solution for the universities was to expand access among women, mature students and the working 
classes to accommodate for the falling numbers of 18 year olds between 1983 and 1994, which 
would mean offering more places throughout the period, but without the damaging peaks and 
troughs
333
. 
 Labour faced up to the immediate challenge (and rising unemployment) by expanding 
places in further education by 25,000 before the 1979 General Election, and the language of the 
party manifesto reflected the Brown Paper with the need to widen access to adults and the working 
classes in further and higher education. However, the document mostly reflected past achievements 
and offered only “an extension of the present mandatory grant system” for full time university 
students. One of the major opportunities for access that Labour offered to prospective students 
relied on continuing the tradition of self-funded part-time education: "We want to see more workers 
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given time off work for study. To this end, the places at the Open University have increased from 
42,000 in 1974 to 80,000 in 1978"
334
. 
 
By the occasion of the next election, in 1983, the context had been changed to certain extent 
by the cuts in higher education expenditure signalled by the Conservative Government in 1981/2. 
The intellectual agenda had altered too, again in response to the economic circumstances, which 
signalled an end to the hope that democratisation of access would come though continuing sectoral 
growth. For Marxist Michael Rustin, this represented a “compromise with the coalition of interests 
committed to the post-Robbins system” which failed to take on middle-class pressure groups335. 
The egalitarian Left of the Labour Party, represented here by Rustin and Oliver Fulton, were now 
calling for the comprehensivisation of post-compulsory education, and this emerged in party 
thinking in the policy document of 1982 Education after Eighteen: Expansion with Change
336
. This 
for the first time talked of blurring the divide between further and higher education through the 
financial mechanism of a universal educational entitlement. Both Labour and Rustin remained 
within the consensus because of the emphasis both placed on maintaining standards during a period 
of expansion, hence Rustin‟s endorsement of the Open University‟s role337. 
 
Consensus on expansion in the 1980s and 1990s 
Broadening access became part of the wider consensus of the 1980s largely because of economic 
and demographic factors; economic need coincided with the current of thinking. While there were 
unambiguous calls for the higher education sector to be more responsive to the needs of the 
economy from the CBI and other organisations, the universities and polytechnics had to face the 
reality of falling numbers of 18 year olds by responding creatively and opening up opportunities for 
those previously denied. Once again the institutions would have to reform in the face of crisis and 
external pressure, and once again the challenge was met firmly within the boundaries of  a cross-
party consensus. 
 Some elements of this new consensus, combined a commitment to wider access with a 
heightened concern for better economic responsiveness, was exemplified in Labour‟s 1983 General 
Election manifesto. After rejecting Conservative talk of student loans and pledging Labour to 
improve and expand on the student grant system, Labour promised to: 
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Establish machinery to plan and co-ordinate all post-18 education together, and ensure that 
the bodies funding universities, and planning local authority further, higher and continuing 
education, are more accountable and representative
338
. 
 
To this end, Labour would “Require educational institutions to be more flexible in their admissions 
procedures and methods of study”339. However, the manifesto combines the beginnings of an 
egalitarian phase which challenged the liberal, meritocratic Left view of higher education, with 
some confusion about the desired outcomes. The headline promise of the document was to “reverse 
the Tory cuts” which might well have left the universities unreformed, while Labour also supported 
the liberal education assumptions of the OU by promising support for such part-time students.  
 Yet the remainder of the education pledges relate to expanding opportunity for the post-
school working classes through paid leave from work. There was no detail behind the proposed 
changes to university admission procedures, and the „workerist‟ tone of the manifesto suggests that, 
for the „Bennite‟ egalitarians in the  Labour Party, the workforce needed retraining rather than a 
university degree, even while the select few who received the latter should be protected from 
economies. As in other educational areas, the 1983 manifesto bears out the impression of one 
observer who expressed the view that “policy was made by adding up all the interest demands and 
putting them out as an A to Z manifesto” and that Labour‟s lack of coherence during the 1980s was 
down to a colonisation of the party by interest groups
340
. 
 Labour‟s policy dualism reflected the lack of a high profile higher education lobby group 
with a firm ideological agenda among the party‟s affiliates. Chapter Seven demonstrates that 
Labour‟s trade union affiliates delayed reform to training  policy, but no parallel force, reformist or 
defensive, existed in the area of higher education. 
 Instead, both parties displayed an openness to new ideas which balanced liberal education 
and vocational expansion in response to employment and social demand. Changing demographic 
factors noted by the 1978 Brown drew attention to the fact that there would be a decline in numbers 
of the 18 year old cohort from 1985, when 125,000 initially entered higher education, to a low of 
95,000 by 1995, and a rise again thereafter
341
. During the 1980s the Department of Education and 
Science (DES) realised it would need to fill the student gap in order to maintain the ratio of 
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graduates, and indeed to comply with the declared aims of increased participation, reiterated in the 
1987 White Paper
342
.  
Pressure for extra students from previously under-represented social groups was not confined 
to the political Left. Throughout the 1980s the Employment Department
343
 presented arguments 
relating to the needs of employers not being met by university output. Elite interests contested such 
reforms however, citing the quality of students and extra pressure on academic staff as their main 
concerns. The solution eventually settled on allowed for expansion at the less prestige institutions, 
leaving the elite universities free to maintain high entry standards, and this has tended to exacerbate 
the hierarchy of higher education experience. Much of the language of Employment Department 
(ED) reports and the debates around access reflected vocational requirements of employers and so 
did not directly challenge restricted access by the elite Oxbridge universities. Although the precise 
nature of labour market shortages was difficult to measure, the pressure on ministers and officials 
often came publicly from employers. Shortages were particularly worrying during periods of high 
unemployment and recession, and ED surveys tended to concentrate on the imbalance of graduates 
to employers in specific fields, such as engineering and science
344
. Such reports served not only to 
examine the often anecdotal evidence for a shortage of certain kinds of graduate, but also to serve 
the function of examining the effectiveness of higher education in meeting the economy‟s needs in 
terms of manpower
345
. In 1989 Jonathan Cope, Minister of State at the Department of Employment 
acknowledged this pressure from employers for graduates: 
Like every nation we face an urgent need to educate and train at high levels to meet our skill 
needs and to compete successfully in international markets....... This need is given added 
urgency by the sharp drop in the number of 18 year olds, over the next five years..... The 
Employment Department‟s Training Agency... ....is playing an active role in promoting wider 
access in higher education in order to meet national skill needs
346
. 
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The tone of the ED‟s report, Admissions to Higher Education by Oliver Fulton and Susan Ellwood, 
consolidated ED pressure on the DES to widen access to meet these requirements. Among the 
twenty-six recommendations of the report were suggestions to alter entry criteria, so that ability to 
complete a course should be the basis of entry (threatening the „Gold Standard of A levels), that 
rewards should accrue to institutions who successfully graduated „non-traditional‟ students, and 
that course structures should be adapted to fit the new type of higher education intake, for example 
Credit Accumulation and Transfer (CAT) and modular structures
347
. Many of these 
recommendations had appeared in Fulton‟s earlier work for the Labour Party, underlining the 
cross-party nature of what by the end of the 1980s had become the new consensus
348
. 
 The DES‟s own projections of demand after the 1982 decline in the „traditional student‟ 
cohort suggested the possibility that „Older Mature‟ students (those aged between 25 and 34) could 
follow the upward trend they had exhibited since 1970
349. The report‟s Projection Q specifically 
noted that older matures could fill the gap and maintain institutional capacity, indeed: “This would 
reflect present trends and would allow for more continuing education and retraining for the 
working population”350. However, rather than widening access as a route to further expansion, the 
projections anticipated a reduction in mature student intake after 1995 when the number of 18 year 
olds were again due to rise and to fulfil their share
351
. The universities and the DES were willing to 
take their students from a wider pool of applicants, but wishing to maintain the high A level entry 
criteria, they chose to temporarily open access to social groups exempted from the usual conditions. 
The fact that, as Fulton and Ellwood report, many of the universities did not fear a dilution of 
standards emanating from this manoeuvre is largely down to their expectations of reaping the same 
proportion of those students with the best A level results, while the colleges of education and the 
polytechnics would absorb the newer type of students
352
. 
 Clearly, expansion in one sector of the higher education world need not unduly disturb the 
elite universities and their application requirements. As long as the responsive public sector reacted 
to the new conditions and widened access, the universities could maintain their supply at the top of 
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the market. While this might have satisfied the technocrats and the meritocrats, it fell short of the 
demands of some of the egalitarian Left reformers who increasingly throughout the 1980s began to 
equate widening access with social justice. 
 Adding to the general pressure on higher education to react to the challenges the 
demographic pattern was academic pressure for reform. The Leverhulme study for the Society for 
Research into Higher Education, published in 1983, was one such body of evidence that proved to 
be influential in justifying expansion and widening access into the 1990s . This report incorporated 
the spectrum of political opinion from egalitarian Left reformers who were concerned with access 
and course structure, the technocrats one either side of the political divide, who were concerned 
with matching (as far as possible) public expenditure with national economic output, and the needs 
of employers often left dissatisfied by the over-specialised nature of traditional academic degrees. 
It seemed that a new consensus was emerging around the idea that the fall-off in the number of 18 
year olds in the population would “provide opportunities for the establishment of new patterns of 
courses within stable budgets”353. Diversity could be attempted without harming the excellence of 
the elite university structure. Thus, the over-specialisation of degrees, which Robbins had not 
wished to see develop, could be tackled, and replaced by “short basic courses linking more than 
one disciplinary perspective but of good academic quality” which “would be suited to the needs of 
many students and many employers in a system of mass higher education”354. Widening of access 
could develop alongside the vocationalisation of higher education, and, incidentally, institutional 
plurality of governance and funding rather than a unitary system, with a continuing role for local 
authorities in the direction of sub-degree work
355
. A new set of balances was envisaged by the 
Leverhulme study, between central and local, public and privately generated funding, and between 
institutional and professional autonomy, which would combine to produce “a more equitable 
approach to the funding of institutions”356.  
 Given this background, Labour‟s 1987 General Election manifesto hardly reflected the 
radicalism of the egalitarian Left, or of the Leverhulme participants, and also failed to anticipate the 
enormous expansion of places launched by Kenneth Baker in 1988. The manifesto concentrated on 
more funding for tertiary education and grants for these intermediate students. But alongside 
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pledges to expand opportunities to a wider social cohort (the actual trend since at least 1970) were 
genuflections towards maintaining standards and the excellence of British university research
357
. 
After the election, the Conservative‟s Education Reform Act (ERA) of 1988 opened up new 
possibilities for course and institutional flexibility by abolishing tenure for academic staff at the 
established universities
358
. Expansion was also relaunched with Baker‟s doubling of the APR from 
15% to 30% between 1988 and 1992, which  presented higher education with a new set of 
problems. A mass system would henceforth be funded (and increasingly underfunded) on the same 
basis as an elite system, which would inevitably increases social demands for accountability. The 
social cost (to the taxpayer) of higher education rose while the unit cost per student fell by as much 
as 40%, thus raising the spectre of unaffordability while at the same time creating real financial 
crises in some institutions
359. The Conservative‟s solution to this new set of conditions was to begin 
the process of transferring the costs from the collective to the individual by the introduction of 
student loans to cover maintenance. 
 Although this kind of individualisation and consumerisation of higher education was 
welcomed by some on the egalitarian Left (such as David Robertson and Eric Robinson) as well as 
the New Right, the Labour Party found it difficult to challenge the status quo of free university 
education for all who qualified, the primary Robbins‟ principle. Robertson‟s attacks from the 
market perspective suggested that government and universities were unsuitable institutions to 
determine the correct distribution of courses. Supply, he suggested, should reflect demand, not be 
rationed as a „middle-class benefit‟ and in the interests of academic autonomy360. Allied  to the 
technocratic, human capital arguments about manpower needs, this new egalitarian critique 
suggested access as social justice, and wished to hasten the deconstruction of wasteful inter-
departmental blockages in higher education. Labour market protection for the middle-classes could 
be swept away as the nation became more competitive and educational opportunity became 
available for all
361
. The benefits of flexibility and choice could be available to everyone in the new 
era of lifelong learning, except perhaps the flexible academics themselves. 
                                                          
357
 Labour Party Britain will win with Labour, The Labour Party, 1987, pp.27-31.  
358
 Robertson,D (1995) Universities and the public interest: Time to strike a new bargain?, Renewal, 
Volume 3 No.4, October 1995, p.45. 
359
 The 40% fall in funding per student in higher education is calculated over twenty years, 1977-97, 
The Dearing Report, DfEE and GDP deflator, cited by John Carvel, Oxbridge fights to retain the status 
quo, The Guardian, 12/11/97 . 
360
 ibid, and Robertson,D (1996) Paying for learning, New Economy, Volume 3 No.3 Autumn 1996, 
IPPR, London, pp.154-157, and Robinson,E (1997) Mass, continuing adult education: three questions 
for Dearing, Higher Education Review, Vol.29, No.2, Spring 1997, pp.7-16, passim. 
361
 ibid, see also Robertson,D (1994) Choosing to Change: Extending access, choice and mobility in 
higher education. The report of the HEQC CAT Development Project, Executive Statement and 
141 
 
 The consensus around a new terminology of flexibility, individual learning entitlements and 
institutional deconstruction, found expression in Labour‟s 1992 General Election manifesto, which 
stated that “Learning must become a lifetime opportunity”. Credit transfer was envisaged in the 16-
18 age group, adopting some of the Higginson Report‟s recommendations for reforming A levels, 
although the main „headline‟ higher education statements within the manifesto were a reversal of 
the Student Loan scheme, with a return to “a fairer system of grants”, and  assurances about 
standards. Once again, Labour appeared to be within the broad consensus on access without leading 
it at its radical „edge‟, clearly with electoral caution to the fore362. 
 During the 1987-1992 period, Jack Straw had been shadow education secretary, and his 
media-friendliness may have helped raise the profile of education, while at the same time limiting 
Labour‟s radicalism. The impact of raising the question of higher education expenditure was to 
remind the middle-classes of Keith Joseph‟s early 1980s threat to introduce tuition fees. For every 
benefit of raising political issues, there are downsides in the conservatism or indifference of the 
electorate. However, the human capital consensus ensured that education policies were to the fore 
by the end of the 1980s, almost regardless of party manoeuvring. The 1992 Labour manifesto 
contained a far higher proportion of educational themes (almost 10% of the text) than was usual, 
and was one of only three post-1964 manifestos which felt the need to present the party‟s education 
policies in the front half of the document (1970 and 1987 being the others). The rising salience of 
educational issues referred to earlier in this thesis continued in the 1997 manifesto, which had 
education as its opening chapter
363
.  
 With the simultaneous growth of a new inter-party consensus around access, and public 
accountability, and the emergence of tertiary education as a politically salient issue, Labour had to 
confront some of the ideological confusion and mythology it had previously left unexplored if it 
was to enter Government. Ambiguities useful in opposition can be seen as weakness in 
Government. Hard choices would have to be faced, for example on student finance which the 
Conservatives had raised. Thus, while Ann Taylor was shadow education spokesperson, her junior 
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spokesperson Jeff Rooker had to be sacked after considering „out loud‟ the possibility of student 
loans, then contrary to party policy. 
 By 1994 there was already a cross-party consensus on student financed HE at leadership 
level, but problematically for Labour, advice to the leadership suggested that opposition to loans 
among the electorally key middle class groups meant that the party should keep a low profile. Two 
confidential memoranda were produced for John Smith‟s Leader‟s Office early in 1994, the first of 
which accepted the principle that it was the grant system of funding which rationed access 
predominantly to the benefit of the middle-classes, and that the individual was the primary 
beneficiary of higher education. The second memoranda concluded that the solution was to attack 
the Conservatives‟ version of the student loans scheme, introduced in 1990, as it was based on 
“Thatcher‟s ideological assumptions”. Labour could present the policy better, the document 
continued, if it was portrayed as a more equitable and efficient mechanism to gather graduate 
contributions to their own education, while at the same time the policy preserved the principle that 
higher education “should be free at the point of access”364.  
In 1994 Labour was still unwilling to back student loans as policy in Opening doors to a 
learning society, despite many references to unified qualifications structures, coherent frameworks 
and “genuine parity of esteem between academic and vocational” areas of study365. Clearly 
electoral caution was to the fore, while the Government‟s operation of an unpopular scheme 
gradually introduced the idea into society. Labour did not have to take a fixed position in 1994, and 
preferred to wait until the strength of the argument (that thirty-five percent APR could not be 
funded in the same way as seven percent APR) began to wear down the resistance of parents and 
students.  
Conclusion 
 
Labour‟s confusion about higher education was based on the liberal-egalitarian division within the 
party, and that fact that Labour had few opportunities after 1970 to operationalise policy. The lack 
of a high profile lobby group within the party made it easier for Labour to stand for things in 
opposition and effectively do the opposite in Government when external pressures would have 
more impact.  In the 1960s and 1970s the Robbins expansion and the Open University were 
presented as measures which widened access, but in reality these policies reflected the internal 
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party dualism because they did not alter the social intake of higher education. As we have seen, 
both libertarians and egalitarians could celebrate the OU and many saw the binary divide 
represented by the new polytechnic sector as appropriate to the needs of the economy as well as 
opening up further opportunities for the educationally disadvantaged. After a long period of 
opposition, Labour in the 1990s was fortunate in that student loans and the eventual replacement of 
grants with loans had been part of the Conservative Government‟s agenda throughout the 1990s, 
had indeed become part of the wider consensus (insofar as ordinary members of the non-graduate 
public were not exercised against loans
366
), and indeed framed the only options for expansion, a 
traditional egalitarian Left concern. In 1996 the Government asked Sir Ron Dearing to review the 
whole question of the medium and long term financing of higher education, thus delaying any 
reforms until after the next election due to held by May 1 1997. Only after winning the election 
would Labour have to confront again its dualism and make political choices relating to access, 
funding and quality and standards. The period between 1994 and 1999 will be explored in detail in 
Chapter Eight. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Compulsory Education: actors, pressure and policy 
 
This chapter sets out to explain the development of new Labour policy in compulsory education. 
The two pre-election documents, Diversity and Excellence (1995) and Excellence for Everyone 
(1996) form the basis of the 1997 White Paper, Excellence in schools and subsequent legislation. 
This chapter makes clear that new Labour developed new educational polices largely in reaction to 
the changed context provided by the Conservative period of power. However, as well as expanding 
its share of the aspirant middle class vote (in Philip Gould‟s terms), new Labour was concerned to 
portray its policy development as part of the Labour tradition and thus not deter Labour‟s core 
voters. The manifesto analysis in Chapter One has provided an incomplete picture of the detailed 
changes that the new legislation implied, so this chapter analyses party policy statements and the 
interaction between the party and other interest groups in order to fully understand the motivation 
for policy change.   
Diversity and Excellence was produced for ratification at the 1995 Annual Conference and 
was intended to deal with two structural issues which were part of the Conservative legacy. The 
first issue was selection of a proportion of their pupils by Grant Maintained (GM) schools and City 
Technology Colleges (CTCs). Labour has been consistently opposed to selection in schools since 
the 1964 election, but the popularity and higher league table positions attained by such institutions 
made them popular with aspirational parents. The second issue was how to deal with the 
disproportionate funding and freedom from Local Education Authority control that GM, CTC and 
grammar schools enjoyed. New Labour believed that disproportionate funding could not be 
defended, but local management of schools by headteachers and boards of governors was popular, 
and so found itself threatening to take powers away from democratically elected local education 
authorities, many of which were Labour controlled. 
 Diversity and Excellence suggested that structures (specifically whether there was selection 
by ability in the system or not) and standards were separate, and that the parental choice aspects of 
the Education Reform Act (ERA) of 1988 and the 1992 Education Act could be continued without 
harming the educational opportunities of all pupils in the state sector. Excellence for Everyone 
(1996) was primarily concerned with improving the standards of educational output through 
improving teaching and learning, developing partnerships with school‟s surrounding communities, 
and setting targets for success. Following the election of the Labour Government in May 1997, the 
party initiated legislation designed to re-integrate the concepts of structure and standards, in the 
Standards and School Framework Bill and the Teaching and Higher Education Bill. The concerns 
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in Excellence for Everyone relating to teaching and teacher performance appeared in the latter Bill 
launched in the House of Lords in November 1997. The organisational aspects of raising standards, 
which changed the role of LEAs in relation to schools, from one of curriculum agenda setting and 
staffing to one of „standards watchdog‟ for central government were in the Framework Bill.               
Taken together this new policy environment suggests a coming together of the new Labour 
and Conservative educational thinking which is expressed in six consensual themes which underlie 
the specific changes discussed in this chapter. Firstly, new Labour positioned itself in relation to a 
consensus around the „school effect‟. This consensus was based on the belief that the school effect 
was greater than social or governmental action in determining performance, and we have already 
seen in Chapter Three how the development of this consensus threatened the earlier consensus 
around child-centred learning and comprehensive schooling.  
The second major theme is the rising salience of „standards‟ in education, which has been 
partially covered in earlier chapters. Chapter Three showed that first Left-inclined criticisms of 
teaching practice and educational autonomy in the Guardian and other centre-left journals 
developed during the winter of 1991-1992. Polling evidence analysed in Chapter One suggests that 
new Labour was correct to concentrate on standards as measures of salience demonstrate a 
consistent upward trend from 1986.  
A third theme is the centralisation of powers in the Secretary of State, also in the name of 
raising standards, which threatens the independence and function of LEAs and teacher training 
institutions. Labour was also compelled to address other Conservative policies, such as the local 
management of schools (LMS), and the autonomy from LEAs which GM schools enjoyed. In 
addition, the increasing application of targets, tests and published league tables all tended to reduce 
local and increase central control over education. 
 Fourthly, the new approach to standards by new Labour also raised the issue of the 
vocationalisation of secondary education, exemplified by the Education Action Zones policy. This 
raised fears that groups of pupils in poorly performing schools (or whole LEAs) could be diverted 
at the age of fourteen from the normal curriculum in the interest of local employment requirements 
and thus not be able to benefit from the full breadth of academic opportunities. 
Fifthly, admissions policy, crucial to the question of parental choice, institutional selectivity, 
specialisation and the continuation of Grammar schools, is a further area which the Labour Party 
found it had to address in an effort to attract (wider middle class) electoral support, and another 
area where Labour would have to confront local authority control. As a consequence, new Labour 
became committed to a more meritocratic and hierarchical distribution of educational institutions, 
with more encouragement of specialisation and experimentation.  
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A sixth and final new Labour theme is social inclusion and exclusion; this was connected to 
other strands of new Labour‟s wider social policy which was concerned with equalising 
opportunity. In education, this implied that statemented children (with special educational needs) 
would be included in mainstream schools unless other factors applied.  
 The following section outlines the interest groups, government departments and individual 
players who constitute the compulsory education policy community, and the Labour Party‟s 
institutional relationship to this community. It will then look into the policies in more detail and the 
legislation designed to implement them. Finally, the Chapter will examine the interactions between 
the party and the interest groups, and intra-party debates or influences where appropriate. 
 
The policy community 
 
Compulsory education is characterised by a large policy community, consisting of professional 
producer groups, such as the teaching unions, statutory quality and funding quangos, school 
governors, consumer groups such as parental organisations,  and governmental bodies, such as 
local authorities, the DfEE and the Treasury. There are also many peripheral or ephemeral groups 
around the fringes of education which can be described as the issue network. A major factor within 
the community is resource dependency, because governmental action depends on the compliance of 
and input from producer interests. 
Bodies and individuals within the policy community for the purposes of this Chapter are: 
The DfEE, The Treasury, the Prime Minister‟s Office, The House of Commons Education Select 
Committee, Funding Agency for Schools (FAS), the National Foundation for Education Research 
(NFER), the Teacher Training Agency (TTA), Basic Skills Agency (BSA), the National Union of 
Teachers (NUT), the National Association of Schoolmasters/ Union of Women Teachers 
(NAS/UWT), the Association of Teachers and Lecturers (ATL), the Professional Association of 
Teachers, (PAT) the National Association of Head Teachers (NAHT), the Secondary Heads 
Association (SHA), the National Governor‟s Council (NGC), the Editors of the Times Educational 
Supplement (TES), and Times Higher Education Supplement (THES), the Office for Standards in 
Education (OFSTED) the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA) (now absorbed 
into the Qualification and Curriculum Authority, QCA) and the Association of Metropolitan 
Authorities, AMA (now Local Government Association, LGA). 
Also among the standing body of interest groups the policy community we can place 
interest groups such as: the Campaign for the Advancement of State Education (CASE) the 
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National Confederation of Parent Teacher Associations (NCPTA) the Conservative Education 
Association, (CEA) the Socialist Education Association, (SEA) the Grant-Maintained Schools 
Foundation, (GMSF) the Advisory Centre for Education (ACE), the Pre-School Learning Alliance 
(PSLA),  University Council for the Education of Teachers (UCET), and the Campaign for Real 
Education, (CRE). This group has less influence but always contribute to the debates. In addition, 
there are a group of working academics and political advisers in the field. Among those influential 
with new Labour (and the outgoing Conservative government in some cases) have been: Michael 
Barber, David Reynolds, Tim Brighouse, Leisha Fullick, Andrew Adonis, David Miliband, Sig 
Prais, Alan Smithers, Howard Glennerster, Nick Tate, and journalistic commentators such as Peter 
Wilby, a former education correspondent and later editor of the New Statesman, Melanie Phillips, 
George Walden, MP and the philosopher John Gray.  
Finally, the issue network consists of groups not only interested in education, but who make 
occasional contributions to debates, includes: the Social Market Foundation (SMF), DEMOS, the 
Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) the Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA), the Fabian 
Society (FS) the CBI, the TUC. 
Policy networks theory offers little guide as the position of institutional Labour Party 
figures and organisations in the schemata of influence. It should be noted that internal party 
organisations, such as the SEA, are not central to the community, although as an affiliated 
organisation, the SEA does play a part in the politics of the Labour Party Annual Conference
367
. In 
terms of parliamentary representation during the opposition phase, from 1994 to 1997 Labour‟s 
education spokespeople were David Blunkett, Margaret Hodge and Estelle Morris, on nursery and 
primary issues, Peter Killfoyle, the education whip, and, to a lesser extent on compulsory education 
issues, Stephen Byers, who was spokesman for training. After May 1st 1997, Blunkett became 
Secretary of State, Byers became Minister of State for Standards, Morris became Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary for Standards, while Margaret Hodge continued to have influence through her 
leadership of the House of Commons Education and Employment Select Committee. These 
individuals constitute the state/party executive with whom the policy community interacts. With 
this in mind, the remainder of this chapter will look at the development of Labour policy over the 
1994-97 period in terms of documentary output. 
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From open doors to diversity 
The Labour Party‟s Opening doors to a learning society, produced by Ann Taylor and her team in 
1994, was a traditional Labour education policy document, and represented a reassertion of 
„educationalism‟ after the Jack Straw period368. The document was traditional in that it was 
concerned with access, quality, equity, continuity and accountability. It used the language of 
partnership between professional teachers and local and central government. The document also 
promised a “dramatic extension of nursery education” so that there would be places for all three 
and four-year-olds whose parents wanted nursery provision
369
. There was the usual concern with 
class sizes and improving outcomes that we have observed in manifestos since 1964. One new 
element was the setting of individual targets for achievement, such as that for 80% of young people 
to achieve the equivalent of GCSE A-C grades in core subjects, emphasising the pupil-centredness 
of traditional Left policy
370
. These targets were to be pre-agreed by the parents, children and the 
school, and would be aimed at reflecting each pupil's improvement within his or her potential
371
. .  
Opening doors also specifically pledged Labour to “replacing overburdensome and 
educationally flawed tests with assessment procedures...” which would preserve a larger role for 
teacher‟s professional and autonomous judgement. The tone of the remainder of the document was 
also strongly educationalist, attacking league tables and OFSTED, the recently established 
inspection service, which Labour feared was not independent enough of central government. In 
contrast to Conservative policies over the previous fifteen years, Labour saw the LEAs as having a 
major role to play in inspection, advice and the provision of services. By far the largest change in 
the LEAs role would be to take back GM schools and City Technology Colleges into the local 
democratic framework, and, crucially, to “ensure that the funding of every school is equitable”372.  
There would be no further use for the Funding Agency for Schools (FAS, used to direct 
central government money into the GM sector), nor for the Assisted Places Scheme (APS) which 
“subsidises the independent fee-paying sector at the expense of the public sector and denies 
equality of opportunity”373. The GM schools, Labour reported, were often referred to as having 
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„opted-out‟ of local authority shackles, whereas in fact these schools had opted-in to DfE control; 
the positive side of the equation, local management of schools by headteachers and Governors, 
would be maintained in principle and improved upon. Labour chose to present the debate thus: 
“The choice is clear: more Tory nationalisation or Labour‟s strategy for locally managed 
schools”374. The election of Tony Blair to the leadership after John Smith‟s death in 1994 changed 
the context of education policy in a number of ways. Smith did not envisage education becoming 
central to Labour‟s electoral appeal, except to the extent that the party would succeed with a 
traditional programme, pledging more resources and capitalising on the unpopularity of the 
selective aspects of Government policy. Tony Blair and David Blunkett had other concerns with the 
education system. 
Blunkett moved into his new opposition brief shortly before the controversy over the Blairs‟ 
choice of  a Grant Maintained school for their eldest son
375
. As he told the TES in September 1995, 
“In general I am left-wing and radical on economic policy but conservative on social matters”376. 
He was appointed because of his views on education rather than as Blair‟s uncritical spokesperson, 
and represented neither the liberal educationalist nor the teacher-unionist strands of educational 
thinking, especially when producer interests harm the educational opportunities of the working 
classes. Rather like Tawney, he saw the education service as the one chance for the poor to be 
helped out of their predicament; the how is less important. Despite their markedly different 
backgrounds, both socially and politically, Blunkett and Blair shared a desire to change the Labour 
Party‟s accepted educational positions. Central for new Labour was to be, not what ideology could 
provide a centre-left government, but what would provide improved school standards; this can be 
interpreted as a restatement of  equality of opportunity. 
Blair and Blunkett: a new agenda 
 
Personalities are important in opposition policymaking, in particular the relationship between 
leader and responsible shadow minister: Jack Straw had a more modernising agenda for education 
than Neil Kinnock, while Ann Taylor‟s approach caused less friction with John Smith who did not 
interfere with her work on education policy. As we have seen, Blair contradicted Taylor‟s anti-GM 
policy immediately on taking office as Leader of the Opposition. Despite the wording of Opening 
doors, he changed the language of education policy by his contributions to the debates on parental 
choice and selection, and soon replaced her with Blunkett, although the document stood as party 
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policy
377. Tony Blair did not share John Smith‟s assessment of the 1992 election defeat, belonging 
firmly to the modernising camp, for whom „one last heave‟ was not thought appropriate, and he 
placed a renewed emphasis on education and the labour market. In addition to an emphasis on 
individual improvement, in national, collective terms, Blair‟s view was that “education is the best 
economic policy there is for a modern economy”378, indeed he told a group of business leaders that: 
"The absolute number one priority for domestic policy is education and skills. We will win by 
brains or not at all. We will compete on enterprise and talent or we will fail"
379
.  
After coming to the leadership of the party, Blair also stated the need to modernise the 
comprehensive principle by making “a determined break from the monolithic comprehensives that 
symbolised Labour's past"
380
. The intention of Blunkett and his colleagues on the Education and 
Employment Policy Commission during 1994-1997 was clearly to tackle the tough decisions that 
he felt Taylor had ducked
381
. Shadow spokespeople clearly need the support of the party leader in 
order to deliver radical changes. In contrast to the John Smith-Ann Taylor relationship, that 
between Blair and Blunkett was one in which it was recognised by both parties that the party leader 
would set the agenda because of the higher importance education would have for new Labour
382
. 
To this end Blair had his own set of education advisers, including Michael Barber who was also 
influential with the Conservative Government and its attempts to improve standards in schools.  
The extent to which the educational agenda of new Labour developed during the first year 
of Blair‟s leadership could be seen from public statements on GM status and the taxation position 
of public schools in the intervening period
383
, which revealed that the new Labour leader viewed 
parental choice and institutional diversity as the way forward for comprehensive education. 
However, Opening doors to a learning society stood as official party policy until Diversity and 
Excellence was presented by David Blunkett in June 1995. The new document set out four 
principles to guide policy; schools were to be responsible for managing themselves; accountability 
must exist locally as well as nationally; funding must be fair and open; and admissions procedures 
must be fair, with no return to selection through the 11-plus. The main aim of the paper, the reform 
of school structures, was underpinned by a bold assertion: 
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The whole notion of LEA control of schools- on which the drive for GM status started- is a 
thing of the past. LEAs do not control schools. Schools do. LEAs provide the local 
democratic framework and need to become agencies and advocates for improving standards 
in all schools
384
. 
 
 All schools were to benefit from local management and an increase in the proportion of 
delegated spending, to a minimum 90% of the LEA formula. In the new configuration of secondary 
schools, Community status would replace LEA or county status schools, Aided would become the 
new name for Voluntary Aided and Voluntary Controlled (mostly denominational) schools, while 
Foundation status would replace GM status. The biggest changes were in the ending of the extra 
funding that schools could receive for opting out of LEA control, and the requirement for the new 
Foundation schools to be inspected by and reported on by LEAs (in addition to national OFSTED 
inspections); to that extent, GM (Foundation) schools would be returned to the LEA fold. On 
admissions, the other contentious issue of GM status, Diversity and Excellence portrayed GM 
schools as being able to set their own admissions policies, without recourse to the LEA: by 
contrast, in the Foundation sector, admission policy was to be based on parental preference and 
agreed in consultation with the LEA, which restricted such schools‟ ability to select a proportion of 
pupils
385
. On funding, the document granted Foundation schools the freedom to develop resources 
through trust funds and promised that: " Foundation schools will offer a new bridge between the 
powers available to secular and church schools. They will offer flexibility and devolution within 
the local management system"
386
.  
 On the more detailed issues surrounding parental preference and admissions procedures at 
oversubscribed schools, the document recognised that school effectively made choices anyway, 
based on sibling attendance, local prioritisation or attendance at a feeder school. However, given 
that “Labour has always encouraged schools to play to their strengths” and pledged to open more 
„technology schools‟, the document recognises that parental preference “will always take account 
of the specialism and expertise that exists in a school where a child has a particular aptitude”387. 
This would be seen, so long as equal opportunities are not infringed “as an acceptable part of an 
agreed admissions policy”388. This implicit message, which celebrated specialisation and accepted 
that such schools would have the right to select by aptitude, was reinforced by the hope that 
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Foundation schools “would have an opportunity to develop within the local education system the 
ethos which many GM schools feel they have developed.”389 
For some observers on the Left, this amounted to acquiescence to Conservative ideas about 
selection, in the guise of specialisation, and represented a change in the party‟s positions for 
electoral purposes. Caroline Benn and Clyde Chitty noted that: 
On both the Centre Right and the Modernising Left, the return of selection is justified as the 
only means of enlisting the support of large sections of the middle and professional classes 
for state-provided education
390
 . 
 
  Specialisation was developed by the Conservatives and had been launched by legislation in 
1992. It had clearly become a new Labour theme by 1995, and its influence had fed into Diversity 
and Excellence as Secretary of State John Patten suggested it should. As he told the New 
Statesman: 
...selection is not, and should not be, a great issue of the 1990s. The S-word for socialists to 
come to terms with is, rather, „Specialisation‟. The fact is that children excel at different 
things; it is foolish to ignore it, and some schools may wish specifically to cater for these 
differences. Specialisation, under-pinned by the National Curriculum, will be the answer for 
some- though not all- children, driven by aptitude and interest, as much as ability
391
 
 
New Labour adopted this agenda with its welcoming of „schools playing to their strengths‟, 
and also planned to allow the fifteen CTCs and the planned language and technology colleges to 
continue to select a proportion of their pupils, subject to a ballot of affected parents. However, the 
main purpose of Diversity and Excellence was to take the political sting out of the argument about 
structures and reinforce “fairness and equity of funding”. This allowed for the continuation of the 
Local Management of Schools (LMS) principle, which Labour admitted was popular and which 
had effectively depoliticised structures by removing the opt-out incentive for many schools
392
. 
 On grammar schools and their ability to select, Labour was able to sound disapproving but 
felt obliged to maintain the concept of parental choice: 
Our opposition to academic selection at eleven has always been clear. But while we have 
never supported grammar schools in their exclusion of children by examination, change can 
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only come about through local agreement. Such change in the character of a school could 
only follow a clear demonstration of support from the parents affected by such decisions
393
. 
 
Fair admissions policies were promised, but again with local appeals mechanisms and independent 
arbitration to ensure the primacy of parental choice, and the principle of local community 
determination involving partnerships between LEAs and parents, following “clear national 
guidelines [set] by the Labour Government for all schools”394. This allowed Labour to leave the 
issue of national admissions guidelines and how to ballot the relevant parent groups aside until well 
after the 1997 election
395
.  
However, former junior education minister Roy Hattersley raised the issue of this clear 
endorsement of two-tier schooling during the summer of 1995 and at the Annual Conference, 
becoming a hero of the egalitarian Left
396. This prompted Blunkett to make the response: “Watch 
my lips, no selection by exams or interview under Labour” from the platform, but Hattersley‟s 
accusation, that such a policy would maintain the status hierarchy of schools, would not easily 
disappear from the political agenda because it represented a radical change from the egalitarianism 
behind the original comprehensive reorganisation programme and later policy document and 
manifesto commitments.  
Despite the presentational emphasis on modernising comprehensive education, new Labour 
now openly stood for an education system which offered a hierarchy of institutions in eight 
categories: independent schools; grammar schools; City Technology Colleges; Foundation (GM) 
schools; specialist state schools (including Beacon Schools); Aided (church) schools; 
comprehensive schools; and secondary modern schools in areas where grammar schools persisted. 
Of these eight categories, seven would be state funded, while all but comprehensives and secondary 
moderns would select a proportion of their intake by ability, aptitude or religious persuasion
397
. As 
many have pointed out, selection by identifying an aptitudinal specialism within a pupil is fraught 
with definitional difficulty. The Oxford English Dictionary lists the first definition of ability as 
aptitude and the third definition of aptitude as ability
398
. Hattersley declared that "by building its 
policy around different classes of school, Labour is endorsing selection" and pointed out the 
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corollary, that "once a hierarchy of schools is established, those perceived as 'best' always receive 
more than their proper share of the national resources"
399
. 
More assiduously for the general thrust of specialisation and new Labour policy, Tony Blair 
chose to echo John Patten by making the link between the idea that all children do not learn in the 
same way with proposed radical changes to the way schools and teachers treat differing abilities. 
During a speech in June 1996, Blair told his audience: 
Not to take account of the obvious common sense that different children might move at 
different speeds and have differing abilities is to give idealism a bad name. The 
modernisation of the comprehensive principle requires that all pupils are encouraged to 
progress as far and as fast as they are able. Grouping children according to ability can be an 
important way of making that happen
400
.  
 
This allowed new Labour to link the structure of schools with poor educational standards, much 
more traditional Labour territory, and portray any objectors as „old Labour‟ supporters of the 
producer interest who were contributing to the harm of, not only school children, but the economic 
future of the nation.  
In the year following the publication of Diversity and Excellence, Peter Mandelson and 
Roger Liddle‟s, The Blair Revolution401, (which was endorsed by Blair on its publication) also 
suggested that more schools should introduce setting in some academic subjects, and that “where 
there are ideological presumptions in favour of mixed ability teaching, these should be abandoned 
in favour of what achieves the best results in schools”402. Despite the rhetorical use of mixed ability 
teaching as the problem and setting as the solution for comprehensive education, the assumption 
that the majority of state schools employed mixed ability teaching to any great extent had been 
disproven by Benn and Chitty‟s historical survey of comprehensive schools in operation, Thirty 
Year’s On 403.  
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 Having settled the issue of school structures and introduced progressive-sounding moves on 
specialisation, in Diversity and Excellence, new Labour next turned its attention to standards. By 
establishing that poor performance was linked to the failings of comprehensive education, (the 
autonomy of teachers and ideological direction from the LEAs), new Labour had gone some way to 
recognising the concerns of (usually urban) middle class critics of the state system. Sally 
Tomlinson demonstrated the power of such groups in helping Labour build a consensus for the 
abolition of the 11+ examination system in the 1960s and recognised that the aspiring middle class 
was again responding to Conservative legislation by exercising its rights
404
. Also echoing the 
Conservatives, new Labour‟s emphasis on poor teaching and ideological pedagogy allowed it to 
introduce the „school effect‟ caveat that money was not the dominant variable in the performance 
of the school. School improvement would henceforth come, not just from more money, but better 
spent money through a central interest in the delivery of education in the classroom. 
In terms of school structure, standards would best be raised by releasing better students 
from the shackles of their less-able peers, but within the single-school structure which was now 
seen as the main advance provided by the original comprehensive reorganisation
405
. In fact, 
egalitarian Left critiques of Labour‟s enthusiasm for setting were in some ways spiked by Benn and 
Chitty‟s research, which found no comparative advantage (independent of other factors) accruing 
from mixed ability teaching, in fact the “type of grouping policy used made no appreciable 
difference to a school‟s examination performance...”406.  The most egalitarian Left position, that 
there should be no setting within a school, had often been observed only in the breach, and new 
Labour‟s enthusiasm for setting had the advantage of sounding radical and progressive to 
prospective parents while offering no real threat to the practice in the majority of comprehensive 
schools
407
. 
 New Labour policy thus far can be characterised by an oversimplification of the arguments 
around standards and the „school effect‟. In an effort to sound modernising and critical of the 
existing structures, new Labour exaggerated, and then attacked the image of monolithic 
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comprehensives, allowing it to challenge both old Labour and the Conservatives. New Labour was 
positive in offering a degree of specialisation and continuing freedom for GM schools after the 
demise of that status. Meanwhile, it was negative about the dogmatism of the Conservative 
Government, which seemed likely to offer more selection as a proxy for market signalling, and the 
dogmatism of the old left who wanted a return to the (largely mythical) certainties of circular 
10/65
408
. The mechanism which allowed new Labour to achieve this new synthesis between the 
positive and the negative was the high-profile emphasis on standards in an ongoing media 
campaign by new Labour figures.  
Both the party‟s enemies, „old Labour‟ and the Conservatives, could be blamed for the 
failings of the past, while new Labour radicalism would emerge through offering choice for parents 
and freedom for school heads and governors. Specialisation was used to attract the aspirational 
middle class voters Blair had identified with, along with the emphasis on the failings of inner-city 
comprehensive schools. By his own actions (choosing the London Oratory, a GM school, for his 
eldest child) Blair had shown that dogmatic approval of the state system as it existed in 1995/96 
was irrelevant to the values of new Labour, sending the message that it was right to maximise one‟s 
own opportunity and choice. To reinforce this message, and to resist the tide of criticism from 
within the Party, new Labour had to play heavily on raising standards for all pupils, if necessary by 
redistributing wealth and opportunity to the worst performing areas of the country.  
 
 
Standards, standards and standards 
 
The work of Sally Tomlinson and David Smith, cited in Chapter Three, had been used by an earlier 
Conservative Government to challenge the Left assertion that extra resources alone could improve 
the education of the poorest performers in tests. In 1995 and 1996, another academic researcher, 
also from the „school effectiveness‟ movement, helped provide new Labour with a further 
justification for its  changing policies. As with other areas of new Labour‟s social policy 
(compulsory pensions, vocational training, higher education funding), improving standards were to 
benefit from international comparative policy studies. David Reynolds‟ Worlds Apart? report and 
the Third International Maths and Science Survey (TIMSS) supported the view of David Blunkett 
when he asserted that Britain was falling behind others in Europe and Asia in the foreword to 
                                                          
408
 Mythical in the sense that 10/65 left reorganisation up to LEAs. The Education Act of 1976 was 
the only legislation which sought to impose comprehensivisation.  
157 
 
Excellence for Everyone
409
. This concentration on other countries‟ educational systems and what 
Britain could learn from them, although not new, seemed a natural progression for a party that 
embraced globalised financial structures and free trade. If knowledge capital was to be the 
determinant of national competitiveness, then education had to become key to economic policy. 
 New Labour‟s next policy document was specifically designed to address falling standards. 
Again produced under the aegis of the Education and Employment Policy Commission (which 
included David Miliband from Tony Blair‟s office) Excellence for Everyone set out to offer 
educational opportunity for “the many, rather than the few... Quite simply, not enough schools 
perform like the best”410. Using comparative studies and national statistics, David Blunkett argued 
that the long tail of British underachievement was caused by low expectations of socially deprived 
pupils and that the solution, excellence for everyone, could come about through the spreading of 
existing best practice, which would involve more whole-class teaching in the core skills of 
numeracy and literacy. To facilitate this, new Labour emphasised the need for heads and teachers to 
be highly competent,  and offered a combination of pressure and support to the professionals. The 
tone of the document left no doubt that teachers were at least part of the problem, with new 
headteacher training programmes and “a National Register of teachers qualified to be heads to 
ensure greater consistency in standards”411. Teachers were offered a General Teaching Council to 
represent their profession, but in exchange Labour threatened to root out bad teaching and 
streamline dismissal procedures: 
It is neither in the interests of pupils or teachers themselves that the small number of 
teachers who at present drift through years in the profession, often suffering acute personal 
difficulties, should continue in the classroom
412
. 
 
 Alongside the pressure that this entailed, support was to come through an opportunity for 
experienced practitioners to become Advanced Skills Teachers rather than to leave the classroom in 
search of promotion or new challenges. A new Teachers‟ Centre was proposed, using new 
technology to allow teachers to add to their qualifications, and the adult-child ratio in classrooms 
was to be improved by the encouragement of more Classroom Assistants and Teaching Associates. 
The latter group were to be industrialists, technologists or researchers who could be „in residence‟ 
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at particular school during set hours for advice and expertise in subject teaching
413
. Information 
Technology was to be used more thoroughly and thoughtfully in the classroom, with the 
appropriate training for staff and Internet links supplied by the private sector. 
Labour also planned to alleviate classroom problems by guaranteeing enough funding to 
lower class sizes for all five, six and seven year old pupils to no more than thirty, to be paid for 
from the abolition of the APS. Here were combined two of Labour‟s longest standing education 
pledges; the APS had been opposed in every manifesto since its introduction in 1981, and lower 
class sizes were promised in almost every  manifesto since 1964
414
.  
Partnership was a further theme of the document. Home school contracts and associations 
were to be introduced to instil parental responsibility. This built on the findings of the House of 
Commons Education Select Committee which 
highlighted the importance of high parental expectations in improving achievement. High 
expectations from Asian parents in Britain, for example, have been cited as a contributory 
factor to better exam results in their community. Similarly the greater staying-on rates after 
16 in Germany have been put down to greater parental expectations.
415
 
 
 As part of their responsibility, parents would have to ensure that new homework guidelines 
were adhered to, and where this was not possible due to work commitments or a lack of space and 
quiet in the home, homework clubs were to be established after school. Further, new Labour 
expected schools to teach good parenting as part of the curriculum and through the examples set by 
adults working in schools. Governing bodies should work in tandem, forming families of schools, 
while the LEAs would set strategic Education Development Plans (EDPs) which detailed how they 
would raise standards in their area, subject to Secretary of State approval
416
. In this sense, the role 
of the LEA was to be further prescribed, as the centre, in the shape of the DfEE, would henceforth 
set “clear national targets, with action taken where targets are not being met locally”417. 
 In the section headed Setting targets for success, new Labour returned to the theme of 
linking educational improvement with renewal of the comprehensive system, which meant that: 
Labour will encourage schools and their pupils to play to their strengths. Schools have 
rightly rejected forms of streaming which have labelled some children as failures 
throughout their schooling, and some as successes, regardless of the strengths and 
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weaknesses they may have had in different subjects or disciplines. But some pupils progress 
much further in some subjects than in others, and can flourish in one area, whilst falling 
behind in others. .... A bright pupil must be allowed to work at a faster pace and high fliers 
given the extra help to succeed in a diverse and comprehensive system.
418
 
 
 And while setting by subject was recommended for individual schools, they were also 
exhorted to become specialist schools, developing into centres of excellence whose resources could 
be shared with other schools within the „family‟. New Labour hoped to achieve diversity within 
one campus and between schools, which would allow individual pupils to stretch themselves 
academically through the use of nearby-schools‟ specialisms- either as part of the school day on in 
the pupils‟ own time419.  
Tackling pupil underachievement would build on the emphasis on inclusion and 
responsibility, with a paragraph inserted in later drafts of Excellence for Everyone promising a new 
category of exclusion, as a half-way house between the extant fifteen days limit and permanent 
exclusion, with parents having to agree to a programme of education in the home. New Labour 
later reacted to Secretary of State Gillian Shephard‟s decision to set the new exclusion limit at 45 
days by declaring a limit of 60 days in any one year, the equivalent of one full term
420
. Following 
this period the Pupil Referral Units (another Conservative innovation) would have to develop plans 
to reintegrate pupils in the mainstream. In terms of institutional failure, new Labour did not want to 
go as far as the Government which had closed Hackney Downs school in March 1995
421
, instead 
believing that 
....a fresh start for the minority of failing schools will prove a much more decisive way of 
improving opportunity for pupils than more prolonged measures, once a range of school 
improvement measures have failed to make a difference. Pupils in a school that has reached 
rock bottom do not have the time that it can take for protracted measures to achieve results. 
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It is a positive alternative, therefore, to the government‟s „hit squad‟ or to the closure of a 
valued community resource. Our policy is aimed entirely at giving young people the kind of 
opportunity which others take for granted and which a failing school denies them
422
. 
 
 „Fresh Start‟, in this context, would involve formal closure in July, and a reopening in 
September of the same year under a “new name, new headteacher, new staff and a revised 
governing body” although existing „good‟ staff could be re-employed. Innovation, to prevent the 
schools going back into old habits, would be provided from the LEAs concerned.
423
  
  
 Over a two year period since Blair and Blunkett came into their respective offices, new 
Labour had quite radically altered many aspects of compulsory education policy. Diversity and 
Excellence had made it clear that changes to school status and admissions policies would result in 
less interference from LEAs and a broad choice of schools for parents, with league tables retained 
(albeit contextualised) as an additional market signal. Diversity would show parents where to send 
their children in search of excellence. Excellence for Everyone further modernised the 
comprehensive principle by institutionalising setting and streaming within schools, (to demonstrate 
that aspirational parents‟ children were not being hampered if they were bright enough) and by the 
encouragement of specialist schools.  
New Labour aimed to satisfy its core vote with the hope of better education standards for all 
by talking of policies „for the many not the few‟, by making specific pledges on the availability of 
nursery places for all, class sizes for the early years and by pledging some redistribution to the 
poorest performing areas of the country. Inclusion was another theme likely to satisfy more 
traditional Labour supporters. But such commitments were outnumbered by the policy innovations 
aimed at satisfying the middle class demand for higher standards. The two documents challenged 
the producer interests of teachers, heads and officials through the use of „pressure and support‟, 
which implicitly threatened poor teachers with removal; and target setting, coupled with Local 
Management of Schools (LMS), which would simultaneously remove political interference from 
the LEAs whilst making them responsible for the realisation of improved school performance. Also 
likely to appeal to new Labour supporters were appeals for parental responsibility, and the 
opportunities provided for remedial action via home-school contracts and homework clubs. New 
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Labour stood for greater centralisation of powers in the state, with the intention of improving 
Britain‟s knowledge capital base and thus economic performance; it also offered further 
individualisation of the education process for the benefit of consumers. Institutional autonomy, in 
the shape of the teaching profession and the power of their unions, was threatened by the 
exhortations that professionals utilise „best practice‟ rather than their own experience, and this was 
underlined by the flood of international comparative research studies which prescribed whole class 
teaching methods
424
. 
 The Labour Party‟s manifesto for the 1997 General Election, New Labour: because Britain 
deserves better, highlighted education as the key policy area for a new Labour Government, with 
the education section opening the text for the first time. The focus was to be on levelling up, not 
levelling down; standards, not structures, were the key to success; and new Labour would not put 
dogma before children‟s education. Standards, though, were mainly the concern of poorer 
performing schools, not those that succeeded or benefited from some kind of selective intake: 
Our approach will be to intervene where there are problems, not where schools are 
succeeding. Labour will never force the abolition of good schools whether in the private or 
state sector. Any changes in the admissions policies of grammar schools will be decided by 
local parents
425
.    
 
The major focus for standards was to be in the early years, with the scrapping of nursery 
vouchers and the guarantee of nursery places for all parents of four year olds (with plans to extend 
this down to three). Primary schools, where the core of the curriculum, maths, English and science 
are introduced, would benefit from the extra funding for teachers released by the abolition of the 
APS, and would be expected to respond in kind by achieving targets in numeracy and literacy. The 
concept of education action zones (EAZs) was also launched in the manifesto, as vehicles for 
“recruiting the best teachers and head teachers to under-achieving schools”426 and by providing 
vocational education opportunities in industry after the age of 14. The manifesto explicitly denied 
that Labour would close GM schools although “the system of funding will not discriminate unfairly 
either between schools or between pupils”427. The manifesto highlighted the traditional Labour 
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polices of class sizes and nursery education for all, and spoke of maintaining the spirit of a 
„modernised‟ comprehensive principle by preserving inclusion in one campus. Teachers, by 
implication, were a problem that could be tackled, partly through judging them by pupils‟ test 
results and inspections, partly through a stronger role for parents on governing boards and partly 
through the introduction of “speedy, but fair, procedures to remove teachers who cannot do the 
job”428. Parental choice of school was also highlighted, with guidelines for open and fair 
admissions introduced which followed the spirit of the 1993 guidelines, although with more 
extensive appeals procedures
429
. The manifesto message was clearly and accurately aimed at both 
traditional Labour supporters and the new voters the party hoped to attract. Bearing in mind this 
appeal to a new, wider electorate, new Labour had adopted what it perceived to be popular among 
Conservative policies. LMS, partial selection, specialisation, grammar schools, parental choice and 
league tables were all accepted; to this new Labour had added elements drawn from party ideology 
in the form of targeted help at the poorest performing areas (universalism-plus), action on class 
sizes, the abolition of the assisted places scheme and commitments towards inclusive education. 
The next section of this chapter will trace new Labour‟s key educational themes identified so far in 
relation to the policy interest groups within the community. 
 
 
Manifesto to legislation 
As we have seen the key issues new Labour concentrated on during the pre-election period were: 
(1) smaller class sizes, to be funded out of the abolition of the APS; (2) the expansion of free 
nursery provision; (3) greater choice on admissions for parents; (4) the eight category hierarchy of 
schools; (5) the introduction of a General Teaching Council; (6) reforms to teacher training; (7) the 
changing LEA role as standards enforcers; and  (8) the emerging EAZ policy. Issues (1) and (2) 
were long term Labour Party imperatives; (3), and (4) represented market signals for aspirational 
middle class parents; (5) and (6) eroded professional teacher autonomy; while (7) and (8) removed 
political meddling by LEAs and centralised services in the DfEE. To what extent did these key 
issues accord with the interests of other policy actors? Firstly, let us look at how new Labour dealt 
with long standing Labour Party pledges.  
 
Class sizes and nursery provision 
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Class sizes had long been a contested point among educationalists, especially since Michael 
Rutter‟s assertion in 1979 that good education was compatible with class sizes of any number 
between 15 and 40
430
. However, many teacher unions and educational research organisations 
argued that class size was crucial to improving school performance. The growing consensus around 
the class size question among pressure groups emerged alongside the constraints imposed on public 
sector spending and caps on local authority discretionary spending which typified the Conservative 
period of office.  
A long campaign by interested parties and policy community actors was joined by the Labour 
Party in Opposition, in accordance with successive manifesto commitments. Among these policy 
actors were Peter Blatchford and Peter Mortimore (of the Institute of Education at the University of 
London) who produced a paper for the National Commission on Education in 1993. This stimulated 
the joint commissioning of a report by  the Campaign for State Education, (CASE), ATL, NAHT, 
NASUWT,  and the Professional Association of Teachers (PAT)
431
, and carried out by Exeter 
University. NAHT also presented its own evidence, asking why OFSTED, which possessed the 
largest database of performance and resources statistics, would allow no other researchers to access 
its findings
432. Adding to the institutional pressure, new Labour‟ pre-manifesto endorsement 
document, The road to the manifesto, highlighted research by the NFER which confirmed that the 
additional teachers could be afforded from the money saved by the proposed abolition of the APS 
subsidy to independent schools. This was reported to be in opposition to OFSTED findings which 
suggested that the policy was ill-costed, one of many political interventions which made the 
„independent‟ OFSTED unpopular in educational circles433.  
All this research emphasised that there was a consensus on the effect of large class sizes 
(specifically over thirty) on learning. The Exeter study also noted that local management of schools 
(LMS) was failing to halt a growing trend towards larger classes as it involved schools competing 
for pupils, and that parents were becoming increasingly concerned. International evidence, in the 
form of the Stay to Achieve Results (STAR) project in Tennessee was also regularly highlighted in 
the education press, and seemed to show long term positive effects from an early years 
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advantage
434. In the case of class sizes, only the Prime Minister‟s Office, the DfEE and successive 
Conservative Secretaries of State among the policy community did not accept that children‟s 
education could be damaged by being taught in classes of over thirty. By highlighting other factors, 
such as poor teaching skills, and the success of some schools with large classes and poor socio-
economic characteristics of their intake, the Conservative Government  held out against prioritising 
spending in such a way.  There was no mention of class sizes in the Conservative‟s manifesto, so 
this represented a breakdown of consensus on this issue as we noted in the manifesto analysis in 
Chapter One. Certainly, new Labour believed that it were responding to public disquiet on class 
sizes
435
, and had anyway targeted reductions at 5, 6 and 7 year olds, where even OFSTED had 
agreed, in 1995, that “small class sizes are of benefit in the early years of primary education”436. 
Rather than offering a radical solution, (class sizes of thirty for all age groups, for example) new 
Labour was merely integrating the majority of evidence with a long-term pledge.  
New Labour in Government also used spare capacity in schools to justify threatening 
closures on the basis that poorly attended schools were clearly not achieving high enough standards 
to attract pupils (or their parents)
437
. Another element of the class size question was the „whole-
class teaching versus small group teaching‟ debate, in which new Labour came down on the side of 
more whole class teaching as best being able to deliver the required improvement in standards
438
. 
This was traditional Conservative territory, used to deflect the class size debate, because whole 
class teaching is not as number-sensitive as small group teaching.  
The abolition of APS was another long-term party pledge that new Labour was able to 
satisfy, although it felt obliged to make reassuring noises to independent schools, notably on their 
ability to retain charitable status. School Standards Minister Stephen Byers offered financial 
incentives to independent schools to become partners and beacons of excellence for nearby state 
schools
439
. The most serious debate among educationalists was around the issue of whether the new 
government would raise enough money from the abolition to fund the extra teachers required to 
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lower class sizes
440
. The problem of ensuring that class sizes did not rise above 30 without 
producing classes with an uneconomically low number of children, also remained to be solved, and 
some educationalist and economic commentators noted that even this apparently egalitarian policy 
would actually benefit former Conservative voters
441
. This was because it was predominantly 
Conservative controlled LEAs (which predictably achieved better results) that that had allowed 
class sizes to rise in response to LMS and parental demand, while many inner city Labour 
controlled LEAs (which contained many of the worst performing schools) had already introduced 
such a limit. Schools which had deliberately opted for classes just above thirty and spent the wages-
equivalent £4,000 on books would henceforth be rewarded, which would represent both poor value 
for money and a waste of resources
442
. 
New Labour routinely used focus groups and private polling to test the policies it was 
developing, after drafting, but certainly before such policies appeared in the manifesto
443
. Even if 
this effect had been noted by focus groups analysts and welcomed as a subliminal message to 
former Conservative voters (who were apparently satisfied with the education their under-eights 
were receiving in places such as Bromley, Solihul and Dorset), new Labour found its greatest 
difficulty was in squaring parental choice with the prescription that no school should have classes 
with over thirty children
444
. After the election the White Paper Excellence in schools provoked a 
hostile reactions from some policy actors who had supported the drive to lower class sizes, because 
of what they saw as an unnecessary emphasis on parental choice by the new Government
445
. 
Among these Graham Lane of the Local Government Association (LGA) warned the new Labour 
Government that “it has to change the law on admissions and appeals- that means reducing parental 
choice. If it is not going to face that, it is not going to deliver the [class size] targets”446. The 
response from Ministers was that choice was not to be inhibited by the class size 
recommendations
447
. The LGA commissioned accountants Coopers and Lybrand to offer solutions 
to this problem, and the only option compatible with parental choice and not overspending involved 
effectively trading off class sizes with a degree of mixed age classes. This would mean that the 
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class sizes in the whole school could be recalibrated by shuffling pupils around at the margins of 
age groups, which might lead to inappropriate teaching pressures and, ironically, offend the 
principle of parental choice
448. The DfEE‟s School Admissions Interim Guidance- Consultative 
Draft of June 1998 simply declared that popular schools would receive extra funding for teachers 
and buildings
449
, and there would be elaborate appeals procedures. We shall return to this area 
when looking at school admissions policy as a determinant of parental choice and institutional 
diversity. 
The other long-standing policy pledge new Labour was able to meet on entering 
Government concerned free nursery provision for all parents of four-year-olds (in the first instance) 
who wanted it. This was in line with the 1992 Manifesto commitment to offer places for three and 
four-year-olds “by the end of the decade”450. However, in 1997 there were two complicating 
factors. First, the Conservative‟s Nursery Voucher Scheme and, second, new Labour‟s ambivalence 
towards providing universal nursery provision in the public sector. As far as vouchers were 
concerned, new Labour promised to honour the value of those already distributed but no new ones 
would be issued
451
. 
The document Early Excellence benefited from much group support at its launch in 
November 1996. Pressure groups such as the Pre-Learning School Alliance, (PSLA), National 
Childminding Association, Health Visitors Association, NUT
452
 and AMA (later the LGA) were 
enthusiastic about the plans to merge child-care with nursery education through an Early Years 
Unit. However, the Campaign for State Education (CASE) did not agree with some of the basic 
precepts of the document, preferring the incorporation of all nursery provision within the LEA 
purview.  
 Despite the generally warm welcome for the Early Excellence, the development of the 
paper illustrates some tension within new Labour. Margaret Hodge had originally established a 
mini-commission of advisers on early years issues known as the Early Years Enquiry Team, 
                                                          
448
 ibid. 
449
 DfEE School Admissions Interim Guidance- Consultative Draft, DfEE Publications Centre June 
1998, p.6 merely says that money will have to be found, presumably from a combination of other 
schools (as funding is based on numbers), the APS and Standards Fund money. 
450
 Labour Party (1992) Its time to get Britain working again, The Labour Party, London, April 1992, 
p.33. 
451
 Labour Party (1996) Early excellence; a head start for every child, The Labour Party, London. At 
a speech to the PSLA David Blunkett said that Labour‟s alternative was inclusion, meshing childcare 
and nursery education, and bringing voluntary and private sectors in with parents and LEA's. He also 
promised to return the money to LEA's as soon as  practicable. Margaret Lochrie of the PSLA 
expected Labour to be able to have a new system in place by September 1998, see Blackburne,L 
Labour threat to nursery vouchers, TES 22/11/96. 
452
 Although Neil Robinson of the NUT was concerned about the language of pupil/adult ratios 
instead of pupil/teacher ratios, interview with author, London, 20/8/96.  
167 
 
although she acknowledged that the Leader‟s Office and David Blunkett acting in liaison would 
have the final say. This enquiry team represented a mini-commission in the sense that we have 
observed in other case studies in this thesis (notably on training policy, Chapter Seven). Hodge was 
under no obligation to include party affiliates or pressure groups in the consultations, which 
generally involved around 15 advisers and seminars with up to 40 contributors
453
. The series of 
seminars ran for nine months from the beginning of 1994 according to participants
454
. However, 
David Blunkett replaced Hodge with Estelle Morris during the autumn of 1996 apparently because 
the long-delayed document was not appropriate and was too polemical
455
. Blunkett actually pointed 
out that Hodge had not been part of the team, while Morris had been used as a shadow 
spokesperson before. The messy replacement of Hodge with Morris was believed by some pressure 
groups as significant. Margaret Tulloch of CASE noted that whenever she approached Blunkett for 
information on the early years document she was “passed to another member of the team, never 
Hodge”456, and that Hodge appeared to be working alone after the series of seminars had finished. 
For CASE the continuing delays suggested that new Labour was unsure about which position to 
take. Such was the distrust about new Labour‟s reactiveness to media influences, at one point 
during the pre-election period CASE came to expect a pro-nursery voucher document from new 
Labour because it had adopted much of the anti-single mother rhetoric then prevalent in the media. 
Margaret Tulloch believed that: "......they think public opinion is shifting against women going out 
to work and they don't want to be seen to say something which makes it easier for women to go out 
to work.".
457
 
 
 CASE also believed that the LEAs could have pushed harder for the immediate abolition of 
the Nursery Voucher Scheme. Graham Lane of the local authorities association AMA (LGA), a 
consistent supporter of the party leadership, responded by saying that he could not, during 1996, 
say why LEAs were not coming out against vouchers
458
.  Mansfield interpreted this as a lack of 
courage at the centre of new Labour policymaking from the beginning of the scheme: 
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...if Labour Party policy had been much clearer they should have been adamant...  when the 
government came out with it in the summer of 1995 and said we are against it, Blunkett and 
Hodge could have stuck to their guns throughout from summer 1995 through the Bill 
process.
459
  
 
 Such ambiguity was also noted by Peter Wilby, who related the issue to the wider one of 
new Labour telling aspirational parents what they wanted to hear. He points out that new Labour 
strategy was to say: 
„we won't go any further than this, nursery vouchers  have not yet started so we can stop 
them‟, but if they had been up and running and middle class parents were happy with them, 
Labour would not reverse them
460
. 
 
New Labour‟s developing policy had in fact concentrated initially on treating all pre-school 
provision including childcare equally, with the emphasis on increasing the educational content of 
all early-years provision. A 1994 policy statement noted the valuable role which such diverse 
institutions as nursery education, reception classes, day nurseries and childminders could perform, 
encompassing the statutory, voluntary and private agencies at work. Rather than call for all such 
provision to be incorporated within LEAs, the document suggested that: 
All local authorities should designate a lead department to co-ordinate childcare provision 
between the different providers and agencies: public, private, and voluntary
461
. 
 
 Already, new Labour‟s attitude towards local authority control of services was clouding the 
nursery education picture. The party did highlight the successes of its LEAs around the country, 
and produced a further document in 1995 which ridiculed the Conservative‟s attempts to encourage 
provision for all four year olds. Anticipating the introduction of nursery vouchers (NVS), new 
Labour concentrated on splits between right-wingers in the Conservative Party and the Secretary of 
State Gillian Shephard, who was quoted as saying “I must say I am very conscious of the unwieldy 
nature of vouchers. You don‟t want the machinery to overshadow the policy” and as late as April 
1995 she stated that vouchers “are not the favoured option”462. 
However, Tony Blair failed to distance new Labour from the vouchers debate when he 
stated that “Vouchers are a mechanism, not an answer”, (perhaps remembering that vouchers have 
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a distinct history on the left
463
), and chose the same speech in June 1995 to highlight what could be 
learnt from best practice: 
I believe we can learn from the huge range of local initiatives that are taking place, the 
central lesson being that education and care should be brought together to ensure a quality 
offer for children while also meeting the needs of parents
464
. 
 
Once again, new Labour declared that the aims, in this case of better quality and parental freedom 
to work, were sacrosanct, while the means were merely technical and non-ideological- vouchers, a 
mere mechanism, would not be ruled out  a priori. This tone continued with the launch of Early 
Excellence: A head start for every child in November 1996. This document concentrated on the 
value of early years education (with international evidence) and the lack of nursery provision in 
Conservative-controlled LEAs, despite Secretary of State Margaret Thatcher‟s 1972 pledge to 
provide free places for all three and four year olds. The Nursery Voucher Scheme was criticised, 
but new Labour stopped conspicuously short of pledging to abolish the scheme, instead promising 
new partnerships between providers and the exhortation of fathers and grandparents to take on 
traditional supportive roles. New Labour highlighted meeting the needs of working families 
(through „wraparound‟ services) and the benefits of diverse provision465. Meanwhile new Labour 
made political capital from the voucher system currently being piloted, with David Blunkett 
taunting the Government at the Labour Party‟s 1996 Annual Conference in Blackpool: 
Who could dream up a dafter scheme than nursery vouchers? Millions of pieces of paper 
circulating round the country. Money taken from high providing local authorities where 
places exist and circulated through a voucher which no-one can redeem if the places are not 
available. 
 
And here, Blunkett came close to proposing abolition when he stated that “Early excellence is the 
way forward, rejecting the voucher scheme and putting children before gimmickry”466. New 
Labour had arrived at their formulation of policy for the 1997 manifesto, but once again it had 
travelled a tortuous route. Having failed to openly attack the NVS during its parliamentary passage, 
(perhaps due to electoral caution, as CASE believed), new Labour calculated that, with an 
introduction date of April 1997 for the national scheme, it would be safe to promise instant 
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abolition in the manifesto in the knowledge, (as Wilby pointed out) that it had not had time to 
become popular with the middle class.  
 Talking about the forthcoming Early Excellence David Blunkett seemed to want to distance 
himself from an open attack on nursery vouchers as late as August 1996: 
Yes, we will talk about the vouchers, but I will produce a draft circular to local authorities 
on the voucher scheme and its aftermath so the whole of our policy document doesn‟t get 
tied into dealing with the Tories, and is a perspective of the future and an alternative. The 
idea of a shadow circular, which is not usually done, is a way of dealing with the practical 
problem of the vouchers themselves
467
.  
 
 Such a circular would have the effect of letting LEAs know the parameters of what they 
could embark on if they had to reorganise nursery education- like the DES circular 10/65, it would 
avoid the political pain of openly abolishing one practice and enforcing another. In the summer of 
1996, new Labour launched the Road to the Manifesto document, designed to garner support 
among the membership and publicity for new policies; again, the language on vouchers was weak: 
“we do not favour vouchers” although “our aim is to guarantee nursery education for all three- and 
four-year-olds”468. However, a stronger line – “we will scrap the nursery voucher scheme”- 
appeared in the membership magazine New Labour, new life for Britain, also in summer 1996
469
, 
and this was the formulation that appeared in the General Election manifesto. This might suggest 
that the electoral strategists around the Leaders‟ Office were closer to final policy than the 
education team centred on Blunkett, who himself admitted that “if I was dealing with an area where 
Tony and I disagreed,.... in those circumstances, the leader wins”470.  Sometime between summer 
1996 and the spring of 1997 new Labour decided to go strongly with a policy of abolition. Until 
that time, the party had appeared cautious. The political calculation of a serious opposition party, 
offering an alternative point of view, creates its own constraints on policy. Certainly, by the spring 
of 1997 new Labour decided to dispense with the deliberately vague position it had taken 
previously. The final eradication of vouchers came with the publication and passing of the School 
Standards and Frameworks Bill launched in December 1997. 
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Parental choice and the hierarchy of schools 
 
The previous section set out to deal with the apparently simple transition of long held Labour 
policies into new Labour Government action. Although the issues were not controversial with the 
public, in that no group argued against lower class sizes or in favour of nursery vouchers, (bar the 
Pre-School Learning Alliance) new Labour still found it had to present its policies in such a way as 
to reassure potential voters that the party was not reactionary. The problem for new Labour in the 
second category of issues, which continued with Conservative trends towards parental choice and a 
hierarchy of  educational experiences, was to prevent attacks from its own Left flank. We have 
already seen how new Labour managed to obfuscate  the question of school structures with its 
emphasis on raising standards, but many institutional actors within the policy community wished to 
influence the direction of party policy.  
Among the groups involved with this issue, there is a clear division between, one the one 
hand teacher and headteacher institutions; and on the other hand, Labour Party institutions and 
some of the party‟s favoured academics. The teaching unions NAS/UWT, ATL, NUT, PAT and the 
headteachers organisations NAHT and SHA all argued against new Labour‟s new Foundation 
status and the general principle of parental choice as encouraged by party documents, even, in some 
cases, when the interest of union members clashed with the stance of the organisation.  
On the other side, the SEA (like the LGA, headed at this time by Graham Lane), the Labour 
Party Policy Directorate, the SMF‟s Stephen Pollard and David Reynolds, an academic chosen by 
new Labour to lead both the pre-and post-election Numeracy Task Forces, all suggested that 
Blunkett‟s position on selection and specialisation were correct. Others, including Peter Wilby and 
Sally Tomlinson, saw the electoral logic of new Labour‟s position in the light of the 
individualisation of social policy provision.  
Following the 1997 election the NUT, in its response to the Government‟s White Paper 
Excellence in schools, noted that new Labour had perhaps miscalculated the unpopularity of the 
Conservatives‟ policy of „opting out‟, and had itself helped prevent further selection by GM 
schools by refusing to allow swift passage of the Education Act (1997) prior to the election. The 
kind of “instant solution to a political problem” which Diversity and Excellence represented in 
1995 was no longer relevant. Indeed “the Government appears to insist on proceeding with a 
structure which is wholly out of tune with its wish to remove debates about structure from the 
agenda”471. The teachers union urged the Government to revert to only two types of school, 
community and aided, and noted that the manifesto had made no references to a change in school 
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status
472
. The NUT were clearly concerned with employment issues in the main, and the clause 
which would allow Foundation schools‟ governors to become the employers of teachers had also 
recategorised voluntary controlled schools as Foundation, so that such schools “will automatically 
assume employer status whether they like it or not”473. 
 On admissions, the NUT wished the LEAs to maintain the right to vary admissions criteria 
to meet the needs of the local community and circumstances, and called for equity in the allocation 
of school places. This would involve the modification of the Greenwich Judgement
474
, which 
upheld the right of parents from outside an LEA not to be discriminated against by automatic 
preference for those living within LEA boundaries
475
. The NUT also warned that specialisation by 
schools often led to admission on a selective basis; it preferred schools to admit openly and then 
develop able pupils through the schools‟ specialism as they demonstrated an aptitude for that 
specialism. This would avoid the problem of schools attracting aspirational parents in a 
marketplace. 
The NUT position was typical among teacher organisations. Exemplifying the consensus 
among the unions on this issue, even the Association of Teachers and Lecturers (formerly the 
grammar schools teachers‟ union), voted against selection at their 1996 Annual Conference476. 
NASUWT, traditionally a more membership-concerned union, and like the NUT affiliated to the 
TUC, were also disappointed with new Labour‟s developing policy: Eamonn O‟Kane, Deputy 
General Secretary of the union believed: 
....they could have taken a stand on principle over GM schools, it was ground that was 
defensible and principled, and it would have struck a cord in public consciousness that it 
wasn‟t right that schools could drift off and become financed by the state but in effect run 
like quangos. They are at the end of the day public institutions, why should one group of 
parents in one particular town get to decide the form of that school for the next X number of 
years. They could have arrived logically at a defensible position, but they have lost that 
particular battle
477
. 
 
 While he did not expect new Labour to come to electoral harm over the issue, O‟Kane 
believed that the party had broken or watered down the comprehensive system which had emerged 
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in the 1960s, but this was not necessarily the result of ideological conversion among individual 
party actors: 
I think that was simply the rationalisation of what was going to happen anyway, there was a 
growing feeling in the upper echelons of the Labour Party that much of what the 
Conservatives were asking for, they (new Labour) agreed with... if Tony Blair had children 
ten years older it would have been someone else, this fits with his ideology of the power of 
the individual, it was symbolic as much as anything else. Jack Straw would be at one with 
this, and he sends his kids to comprehensive schools in Camberwell, he would agree with 
this policy of choice for the parents, it was definitely on the agenda anyway
478
.   
 
The change in Labour policy could in fact be traced back to the end of Ann Talyor‟s period as 
Front Bench spokesperson: NASUWT and the Labour Party had combined in campaigning against 
the introduction of GM schools and on the funding imbalances between primary and secondary 
schools at the time of the 1993 Education Act. Despite this example of resource dependency 
between the teacher union and the party, O‟Kane noted that hereafter relations between the party 
and the union began to decline with new Labour‟s wish to distance itself from producer interests. 
 The headteacher unions, NAHT and SHA, traditionally had a more ambiguous relationship 
with the Labour Party. In common with all organisations that exist to serve the interests of their 
members (and who are in direct competition for members) they have to balance philosophy with 
pragmatism. Rowie Shaw of NAHT explained that: 
We are not easy bedfellows with GM schools nor with the City Technologies Trust, 
because, as with the other teacher unions there is a slight tension between what as an 
association we think is philosophically correct to provide an educational service, balanced 
against protecting the interests of our members, because we are not going to turn away GM 
heads and CT College principles, so we tend to keep a low profile on all of that
479
.  
 
 The NAHT balanced those concerns in the same way  as SHA, whose position was that 
heads of GM schools could not be assumed to be philosophical adherents of the status hierarchy 
that was created, rather, they had adopted GM status because “they saw it  as the best thing for their 
school at the time”480.  Shaw, apparently employed for her Labour Party connections481, and as 
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former headteacher in two inner-city comprehensives, felt that new Labour policy had let schools 
down: 
...both my governing bodies, which were Labour dominated, voted against going GM 
because they thought it was Labour Party policy for schools not to opt out, and have 
therefore prejudiced themselves financially, because the GM schools do a whole lot 
better.... 
482
 
 
GM schools also benefited from the unfair allocation of technology and art specialist status. The 
new Labour policy of continuing with a hierarchy of schools also met with disapproval from Shaw 
and the NAHT‟s official position: 
Middle class members of the Labour party should not be seen to be giving their children 
advantages that other people, people on the estates that I have worked with all my working 
life can‟t do, and I think it stinks. Our official words for it is „arrant hypocrisy‟483. 
 
 The NAHT and SHA also mentioned the London orientation of much of  new Labour‟s 
policy influence. Shaw believed that new Labour‟s acquiescence to GM status, in the face of the 
decisions by Harriet Harman, Tony Blair and Michael Barber to send their children to such schools, 
had directly led to the Conservative Government‟s 1996 White Paper which envisaged a „grammar 
school in every town‟; in fact, she believed that “these three people in the whole of London have 
caused this policy”484. 
 At the SHA, John Sutton realised that a combination of the Blair and Harman decisions and 
the belief that there were votes to be won in a number of key constituencies were behind new 
Labour‟s decision, but was unsure how deliberate it all was: 
It is hard to believe they would be so naive.... The problem though is the London bias of so 
much of what goes on in education policy. London is simply a special case, and 
unfortunately too much legislation is made on the back of London to the detriment of the 
rest of the country
485
. 
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On selection, the SHA demonstrated a further aspect of the teacher unions‟ ability to 
balance the needs of their members with a political stance: 
....some of our members have strong philosophical commitments; many for example feel 
passionately that we need to have comprehensive education, not all. We have all types of 
schools represented, we have a large swathe of GM schools and independents, some get 
steamed up that is one thing, but we also have a strong pragmatic spirit and awareness of 
political positions. 
 
This leads SHA to take a position that shifts the emphasis slightly: 
....we don't say all selection in education is bad because that would upset some members, so 
what we said, we are against the extension of the principle of selective education. [And on 
grammar status] we say, if a whole community votes for selection in all of their schools, 
they can have it, it is democratic; but if one school wants to go selective, that is not 
democratic because it is having a knock-on effect on the other schools in the rest of the 
community. Virtually any of our members will sign up to that, that is the way we do it
486
.  
Despite the ability of actors to remain flexible in response to diverse memberships and a 
fluid policy environment, as players in the policy community the teacher unions were clearly 
marginalised on these issues in the policymaking process. As with the Early Years Enquiry Team, 
such organisations were not consulted by right before Diversity and Excellence, although they were 
free to send documents of their own to the party and use lobbying opportunities such as 
conferences and the media. On the other side of the debate the SEA initially expressed reservations 
about the decisions of the Harmans and Blairs, and said so publicly, but Chief Executive Graham 
Lane drew a distinction: “if the party decided to do something fundamentally wrong, like bring 
back grammar schools, ....we would have a public row”. Highlighting the pragmatic nature of 
policy, and the nature of consensus in education, Lane noted in 1996  that: 
in the 1960s the reason why Labour did not get much benefit from education was that 
comprehensives were not a party issue, some Conservative councils introduced 
comprehensive schools, and now Dimitri Coryton (of the CEA) is furious about 
Conservative emphasis on grammar schools because most pupils won't get in and their 
parents know that. Coryton has told Major to his face that he will lose the party votes with 
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this policy, and put it in print in Education magazine which he edits. There are lots of 
Conservative MPs who are pro-comprehensives, the CEA is headed by Mark Carlisle, an ex 
Secretary of State, it [comprehensivisation] was all about raising standards for everyone and 
selection was not delivering
487
 . 
 
 New Labour‟s position relative to the educational consensus around standards was also 
highlighted by Liz Allen, Education Policy Officer of the Labour Party, speaking in 1996. Again 
the consensual desire to raise standards was portrayed pragmatically: 
..we all feel very strongly that we are here to think about the interests of and the uses of the 
education system, and the providers have a role, but we are not led by them. The bottom 
line is that what we are doing in the interests of the users
488
.   
 
 This implies that, if raising standards for the users is the end, selective or specialist means 
to that end would be compatible with Labour Party principles as well as aspirational parents. Allen 
reiterated the fact that Labour had always contained people who believed in selectivity: “the 
balance hasn‟t changed at all, the climate at the moment with the Tories needing to make an 
aggressive lead on selection makes it easier for people to talk about selection”489. The key thing for 
the party leadership “is as much to lead and encourage development thinking among the party 
membership as it is outside”. Allen believed that: “the Party membership needs to move on in its 
thinking, it doesn‟t if all we do is reflect party membership, all it will do is just fossilise”490. 
Instead, new Labour should concentrate on the dogma of the Conservative‟s plans, particularly the 
selection and extra incentives which GM schools enjoyed. 
 This sense of a dual focus in new Labour policy was personified by David Blunkett. He 
believed that new Labour needed to simultaneously retain the enthusiasm of its supporters and 
attract new ones. Recalling 1995, when he had to sell Diversity and Excellence to a sceptical party, 
Blunkett highlighted the problem of language: 
You have got to be very careful. It is more a question of not expressing the language in a 
way that is not designed to appeal to the activist, but is designed to appeal to people outside 
politics, and that is sometimes misunderstood by activists who want to hear the language 
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they grew up with, they want to hear the buzz words or trigger words which make them feel 
secure
491
.   
 
....on Diversity & Excellence and Excellence for Everyone we have actually gone round  the 
country listening to people and asked them what they wanted, and they may not have 
always got what they wanted in terms of language, but they certainly got the reflection of 
what they want, so they say, “we want you to be much more positive against selection” and 
I point to them the words  that appear, and they say “but they don‟t appear often enough” or 
“they don‟t appear at the front”...492. 
             
           Therefore new Labour believed it had put enough safeguards in place to appeal to the core 
vote and the potentially Labour-voting aspirational middle class. Further support for new Labour‟s 
changing policies on parental choice and the creation of a hierarchy of schools was supplied by 
David Reynolds, professor of education at Newcastle University. Linking the need for in-school 
streaming, setting and differentation with social change, Reynolds reiterated the claim of Tony 
Blair: 
[That] the comprehensive school is too monolithic to meet the conditions of the 1990s in 
terms of parental wishes, and the increased range of student achievement. The common or 
comprehensive school first emerged in Scandinavia where historically you have a very 
restricted range of achievement and a highly homogenous population... [on reading 
achievement] we have a bigger range now than twenty years ago.... the evidence about 
parents is that they are probably more varied in what they want out of school for their 
children... the Tories opened out choice and you cannot take away this power to celebrate 
diversity
493
.    
 
            Here are merged the political and the academic arguments for new Labour‟s emphasis on 
choice and diversity. Reynolds believed that new Labour should resist both streaming in schools 
and selection by ability, and put its faith in greater standards delivered through value added league 
tables
494
. New Labour could fairly argue, Reynolds thought, that such tables would put all schools 
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on an equal footing “in ways that potentially vast numbers of resources given to them wouldn‟t”495. 
This amounted to an alternative „social democratic‟, new Labour way of raising standards for all, 
and one which would avoid endorsing selection
496
. 
           However, from the right, Stephen Pollard of the Social Market Foundation (though formerly 
of the Fabian Society) doubted the honesty of new Labour advisers and thus new Labour itself. In 
his reading of Diversity and Excellence during the pre-election period, he detected a: 
..great split in Labour policy between perception and reality; the overwhelming perception 
is that they are moving towards selection, but.... people confuse that fact that Labour is 
moving towards a more traditionalist approach to teaching methods with their approach 
towards the structure of the schools themselves
497
. 
 
            New Labour‟s endorsement and encouragement of setting within schools, and specialisation 
between schools, with the retention of Foundation, CTC and Grammar status, clearly meant that 
potential voters would note the hierarchy of opportunity. However, for Pollard, new Labour were 
only adopting the „selection‟ agenda for political reasons, “they buy into it only in terms of rhetoric 
but not reality”498. For Pollard, a supporter of selection, the real differences between GM and 
Foundation schools were in the latter‟s structural attachment to LEAs, through funding. New 
Labour‟s dishonesty about specialisation was evident, because “as soon as you try to pin them 
down, what does this specialisation mean without selecting who goes there, the whole thing 
unravels”499. This, of course, was also the egalitarian Left critique. 
             It is worth reiterating at this point just what new Labour were proposing on admissions and 
school structures. The DfEE produced  a draft consultation paper School Admissions: interim 
guidance in June 1998. This contained several key principles, the most important ones for the 
present purpose being that arrangements should “meet parents‟ preferences for the schools of their 
choice to the maximum amount possible” and that local admissions authorities should consult and 
co-ordinate their arrangements, including over the “rapid reintegration wherever sensible of 
children who have been excluded from other schools”500. On the first point, admissions criteria for 
oversubscribed schools reinforced the Greenwich Judgement (of 1989), stating that “It should not 
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be assumed that admissions policy should simply reinforce the local social mix”501. This had been 
countered to a degree by the Rotherham Judgement of 1997, which stated that it was not unlawful 
for LEAs to operate catchment areas in the event of oversubscription- however, the judgement also 
drew attention to admissions authorities‟ need to encourage parents to express a preference, as there 
is no legal requirement for parents to express a preference for a specific school. The draft 
consultation warns that “authorities will need to be cautious about making guarantees to parents of 
places in the local catchment school if these parents do not express a preference for the school”, 
and continues: 
Admission authorities may not automatically give priority to allocating parents a place at 
the school in whose catchment area they reside where those parents had not positively 
expressed a preference for that school.  
 
After those that have expressed a preference for an oversubscribed school: 
...parents living outside the catchment area who express a preference for that school must 
come next, ahead of those within the catchment area who have expressed no preference
502
.  
 
By expecting parents to volunteer a preference, the draft guidelines could in effect „weed out‟ 
parents who either do not bother to exercise this choice, or are unaware of the ramifications of  not 
expressing a preference. As we have already seen, middle class parents are known to pay more 
serious and sophisticated attention to local catchment guidelines than some of the disaffected poor, 
who traditionally value education less
503
. The draft guidelines, in this respect, make it easier for a 
well performing school to change the nature of its intake over time as aspirational parents respond 
to such market signals. 
 From the point of view of schools compliance with parental preference, the unchanged 
nature of partial selection in the new Foundation and Aided status schools becomes clearer: 
Under the new schools framework, GM schools will choose a new category from 
September 1999. In the meantime [they have a duty] to comply with parental preference. 
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That is, an application must be accepted unless admissions would be incompatible with any 
arrangements for selecting pupils by reference to ability or aptitude
504
. 
 
As if that was not a clear enough signal of exclusivity, the warning that partially selective schools 
must admit up to their approved admission number was reinforced by comparison to Grammar 
schools: “Only schools which are wholly selective by high academic ability or aptitude can keep 
places empty if they do not receive sufficient applicants of the required standard”505. The clause on 
former GM schools could be interpreted as meaning that even if numbers applying do not meet the 
partially selective requirement, such schools would be free to fill their selective quota with pupils 
with slightly lower entry requirements, before they would have to consider taking from the general 
population. The same could also apply to school with a specialist status.  
 On the second point, the reintegration of challenging pupils, the document notes that: 
Some schools with spare capacity may find that they are required to admit an undue 
proportion of pupils whose behaviour can be challenging. Other schools may find that they 
are unable to take a share of such pupils as they are oversubscribed
506
. 
 
Although it is “highly desirable” that LEAs and schools should find ways of balancing things 
better, the market signal is clear; that undersubscribed schools are at one end of the standards (and 
behaviour) continuum, and oversubscribed schools are at the other. The School Standards and 
Framework Act (1998) disallows parental choice for parents whose offspring have been 
permanently excluded from two or more schools, which again allows oversubscribed schools to be 
reactive to demand from aspirational parents
507
. The problem of children with behavioural 
difficulties and Special Educational Needs accumulating in „sink schools‟, could only be 
exacerbated by these changes. Parents and governors of successful schools are likely to resist any 
changes to LEA policy which forces them to admit more problem pupils, especially given that the 
interim guidelines highlights other market signals: “it is clear that the annual school performance 
tables help inform parents over admissions decisions”508. There are also potential caveats built into 
the requirements for potentially disruptive pupils, which state that “Admission authorities may 
legitimately refuse to admit a child where to do so would prejudice the provision of efficient 
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education or the efficient use of resources”509. The undefined phrase „efficient education‟ is used 
throughout the document, and could be construed differently according to the educational 
achievement norms of particular schools: it is easy to imagine the clause being cited by a high 
achieving school against a poorly performing pupil who needed disproportionate (non-efficient) 
help, and simultaneously used by an undersubscribed school to defend its educational record by 
reference to the lower quality of its intake. 
 The interim guidelines do manage to clarify some of the questions surrounding class sizes. 
While the LGA‟s Coopers & Lybrand report suggested mixed-age teaching as the only cost-neutral 
way of meeting the commitments to class sizes and parental preference, the document makes it 
clear that “some extra teachers and capital will need to be focused on schools for which there is 
strong parental demand and where a good standard of education is offered” which squares the circle 
as “more parents should have their preferences met in primary or rural schools, with the added 
benefit of lower class sizes”510. New Labour makes it clear that parental choice and class sizes can 
be satisfied simultaneously, but it implies a redistribution of funds (which are tied to the pupil) 
from undersubscribed schools to oversubscribed ones. While the previous Government were 
content to let crude market signals, such as league tables and open catchment policies, guide the 
aspirational parents, new Labour openly committed themselves to a purer market model with 
money following the child to the best schools. 
 Another crucial aspect of the interim guidelines are the rules on selective admissions. As far 
as Grammar schools are concerned, the selective procedures operated by such schools were to 
continue, although the School Standards and Framework Bill would mean that, from September 
1999, it would be up to a ballot of local parents to decide whether to remain wholly selective. For 
those schools which partially select, the situation would be less clear: "The Government has 
withdrawn previous guidance which suggested that admission authorities might introduce up to 
15% partial selection without publishing statutory proposals"
511
. 
 
This says nothing about how a new Labour Secretary of State might look upon published proposals, 
merely that schools could not go ahead without publishing; however, there were clauses which 
allowed for the adjudicator to “be empowered to end partial selection when the practice is referred 
to him by local admission authorities or by parents”512. Specialist schools would be empowered to 
select by aptitude up to 10% of the relevant school age group in a regulated range of subjects. 
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Again the adjudicator would have to ensure that schools comply with the Government position that 
“aptitude should not be used as a replacement for, or as a cover for, selection by academic 
ability”513. This recalls Lord Hattersley‟s contribution to a House of Lords debate, quizzing 
Government Minister Baroness Blackstone:  
Can my noble friend give us a definition of aptitude which is different from the definition of 
ability? She knows, because she is the great expert on these matters, that in practice 
whichever test is imposed produces virtually the same result
514
. 
  
 This new Labour would dismiss as missing the point; what mattered was a quantifiable 
improvement in educational outcomes, not semantics about the means to an end. Further, as 
Michael Barber, a key adviser to Tony Blair later brought in to head the Standards and 
Effectiveness Unit at the DfEE believed, the new Government should take advantage of the 
extension of central power the department had accumulated since the ERA of 1988 and establish 
priorities within education policy. Writing during the pre-election period, he recommended that: “A 
potential government should set out its chief priorities before an election and treat them afterwards 
as a non-negotiable core of policy”515. Barber came to this conclusion after speaking to former 
Conservative Secretary of State Kenneth Baker about the introduction of the National Curriculum 
in the face of almost universal educationalist hostility: “we had a mandate”, he simply replied, 
referring to the pre-election published proposals to do just that. Elections are not won or lost on 
education, but unread manifesto pledges can carry more weight than academic opinion. On the 
other hand, selected academic opinion, in this case Barber and Reynolds, would carry more weight 
than other interested parties, individual or corporate. Here, the combination of electoral need and 
selected academic research allowed new Labour to significantly change party policy in the name of 
raising standards.   
The next series of issues of concern to educators which exercised educators in the pre-
election period were reforms to teaching practice and the role of  a General Teaching Council. They 
are political questions in education because they impinged on professional autonomy and increase 
the powers of the Secretary of State. Reiterating the main theme of this Chapter, the battle for 
improved standards was the central justification for policy change.    
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Teachers’ regulation and control 
 
The promise to introduce a General Teaching Council for teachers was again a long-standing one 
from the Labour Party but new Labour‟s GTC emerged within the context of a pre-existing Teacher 
Training Agency.  A GTC had been seen by some as an opportunity to build a professional, rather 
than trade union, organisation which could represent teaching in the same way as the British 
Medical Association represented doctors and the Law Society represented lawyers. The president 
of the SHA, Bruce Douglas, argued that the GTC should be independent of both the Government 
and the teacher unions to further its ability to fulfil such a function
516
. According to others, a GTC 
should stand for promoting higher professionalism, safeguarding the public interest through a 
registration system for teachers, helping professional teachers to change and developing a shared 
purpose of confidence and trust in the future
517
.  
In fact, a GTC had been on the political agenda since the 1860s, with pressure culminating 
in the inclusion of a register of teachers in the 1899 Education Act. A voluntary Teachers 
Registration Council, (later the Royal Society of Teachers) was established but was wound up in 
1949. After attempts to establish such a council in Scotland in the 1960s, the DES in 1970 launched 
another campaign, replicated by the House of Commons Select Committee for Education, Arts and 
Science in 1990. This helped consolidate another voluntarist commitment which had been arranged 
by the teacher unions, and including NATFHE, in the form of a private company dedicated to the 
establishment of a GTC in law
518
. The Labour Party had promised a GTC since the 1992 
manifesto
519
 and new Labour, influenced by Michael Barber, realised it was an opportunity to unite 
all the disparate elements of the teacher unions into one coherent teaching force able to take on the 
task of raising standards. But the danger was clear if the teacher unions prevaricated and engaged in 
turf-wars: “the chance has been missed on three previous occasions this century and if it is missed 
again it may never come again”520. 
 To fulfil Barber‟s electoral criteria (discussed in relation to Baker above), the GTC would 
have to specific and well defined, pre-announced in the manifesto and then a working group should 
be given “no more than 18 months to report”. Barber was sceptical about the teaching unions 
(having worked for the NUT) and wanted the GTC to be tied into the standards agenda as quickly 
as possible: 
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Though the teacher unions currently [1996] have a tentative agreement in favour of a GTC, 
there is no guarantee that it would hold once a specific GTC with a defined constitution and 
job description was put forward. ... Furthermore, trade union history, not just in education, 
teaches convincingly that the power of the unions to prevent change is infinitely greater 
than it is to drive it
521
. 
 
 Some on the unions‟ side would have like the GTC to supersede the Teacher Training 
Agency, but Estelle Morris, junior minister for standards, made it clear soon after the election that 
co-existence was the Government‟s preferred option522. This declaration of intent was during the 
consultation period for the introduction of a GTC, signalled by the White Paper Excellence in 
Schools. Stephen Byers, writing in the foreword to the consultation, set the context: 
Our aim is to set up a professional body which will encourage all teachers to play their part 
in the challenging programme of reform mapped out in Excellence in Schools. The GTC 
must represent the highest professional standards and speak out where standards are not 
what they should be. We are not interested in a talking shop for teachers or a body to defend 
the way things are. An effective GTC must be an engine for change and a powerful driving 
force behind our new deal for teachers
523
. 
 
 Having outlined what the GTC was to be, new Labour set out to build a consensus among 
groups through inclusion and by narrowing the consultative opportunities. For example, after a 
paragraph which outlined the GTC‟s role in raising standards, respondents were asked to share their 
views on “how the GTC might assist in the Government‟s drive to raise standards”, not whether 
standards raising should be the main aim of the organisation
524
. Another suggestion was that the 
GTC could impact on standards  through working in partnership with the TTA to change teacher 
training and in-service training. The idea of a General Teaching Council as a discursive council 
representing all aspects of education policy had been reduced to another motor for improving 
standards. The GTC would act to drive up standards in the profession by playing a key role in 
disciplinary procedures, even being expected to hasten the dismissal of poorly performing 
teachers
525
. David Blunkett had raised this possibility in a speech to the NASUWT at Easter 1996, 
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again as part of the concerted public campaign to put education standards at the top of the political 
agenda
 526
. 
          The biggest area of controversy in the GTC proposals concerned its membership. Many of 
the teacher unions wanted to send their own nominees onto the Council, while new Labour made it 
clear that it would favour regional ballots for the heads and teachers who were to attend
527
. This 
would reduce the chances of organisational factionalism by appealing directly to teachers and thus 
bypassing activists.  
Clearly, new Labour shared the Conservative‟s resistance to a single lobby group which 
could present an alternative education agenda, but even in the pre-election months there were 
attempts to place proposals for a GTC on the Conservatives‟ 1997 Act, so consensual had the idea 
become
528
. By December 1997, however, with the GTC launched in the Teaching and Higher 
Education Bill, it became clear that the centralising agenda of new Labour had outweighed any 
fears from a centralisation of the teaching profession. A TES editorial, Control of buyers and 
sellers, predicted that the GTC would be a government appointed board for regulation, not a free 
standing professional body like the British Medical Association
529
, and this seemed to be confirmed 
in April 1998 when Stephen Byers announced the construction of the Council, even while the 
House of Lords was introducing an amendment to the Bill which would have toughened the 
independent status of the GTC
530
 . The Council was to consist of 55 members, 20 elected by 
teachers, 9 appointed by unions, 13 appointed by representative bodies, and 13 appointed by the 
secretary of state. The nine appointees from the teacher unions  would have to be current classroom 
teachers “or have recent classroom experience” in an effort to depoliticise the Council531. Rather 
than a grand council of all the teaching interests, the GTC was to be rich with classroom 
knowledge, and, as Michael Barber had proposed, it would act as the profession‟s self-policing 
agency. This fitted closely with the long developing standards agenda which had attacked the 
quality of teaching.  
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The role of the GTC in standards raising further consolidated the ideas of the „school 
effectiveness‟ movement. David Reynolds, one of the school effect academics close to new Labour, 
recognised the influence of the movement: 
... part of the appeal is that we talk about the school independent of what type of school it is, 
and what we say is that good schools make a difference, wherever in the structure they are 
found... the within-system variation is probably greater than the between-system variation.... 
yes we fit, well it is not just that we fit new Labour‟s ideology, its just that‟s where the 
evidence is.  ...what we were saying was politically in tune with the climate of the times
532
.  
 
       In an age when so little seemed to be economically „do-able‟ and school structures mattered 
less than how children were taught, concentration on the nature of teaching could be seen as 
inevitable. The emphasis on poor teaching was multifaceted, containing three distinct elements. 
Firstly, blaming poor teachers shifts the emphasis away from Government, thereby displacing 
responsibility. Chris Woodhead, head of OFSTED, had publicly cited „15,000 poor teachers‟ 
(which in reality was 15,000 hours of bad teaching in the year and implied around 2-3%  bad 
teachers) and this had been repeated by Blair. Woodhead had been continually criticised within the 
profession for not being independent enough of the Conservative Government, but new Labour 
soon made it clear that it would resist moves to sack him. For some, Woodhead had identified 
himself too closely with selection after writing for Politiea and taking the New Right position in 
debates
533
.  In a TV interview with David Frost prior to the election, Blair was asked directly if he 
would sack Woodhead: unprepared, Blair blustered defensively about Woodhead‟s contract. It was 
widely believed among educationalists that Woodhead‟s press officer had planted the question to 
bounce the Labour leader into a decision he could have avoided
534. Woodhead‟s continuing role 
was not calculated to foster confidence in the future professionalisation of the teaching service; he 
had consistently and publicly made clear that school autonomy and teacher professionalism were 
barriers to improving performance
535
.  
         The second element was the implications for school funding implicit in the school 
effectiveness movement. Henceforth new Labour neglected the older Left arguments about poor 
standards being caused by the systematic underfunding of primary education relative to the 
secondary and tertiary sectors, preferring to highlight the „school effect‟. Robin Alexander, a 
                                                          
532
 David Reynolds of the Numeracy Task Force, interview with author, Newcastle, 17/3/98.  
533
 Including one hosted and recorded by UCET, as reported by Ian Kane, interview with author, 
Manchester 17/3/97.   
534
 Ian Kane of UCET and Robin Alexander, formerly with Woodhead as two of the „three wise men‟ 
both held this view, interviews with author.  
535
 Woodhead,C A memo to David?, New Statesman, 18/4/97. 
187 
 
professor of education and adviser to the DES on teacher training since 1983, also highlighted the 
Treasury context of much policymaking in the early 1990s, with reforms always in the context of 
no extra money
536
.  This of course was another continuation of  Conservative practice, leading 
Alexander to reflect the view of many of his fellow professors of education, that new Labour stood 
for “not only... policy convergence, there is also process convergence, the same steamrolling view 
of the policy process”537.  
          Cost neutrality, displacement through blaming teachers and the difficulties of altering 
parental behaviour all pointed new Labour towards efforts to improve the practice of teaching, the 
third major element of the attack on low standards. This was the role written for the Teacher 
Training Agency in 1994
538
.  The TTA was to improve the teaching of trainee teachers, which had 
traditionally been the preserve of the universities and the professors of education, and to raise the 
status of teaching as a profession. Gillian Shephard, as Secretary of State from 1994, had continued 
the establishment of the agency with the aim of developing a national curriculum for teacher 
education. Again, consensus had developed around this idea in an effort to raise standards in 
schools, however Robin Alexander recalled that teacher training reform had been on the agenda 
since 1984 (when he served on the Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education, CATE). 
Indeed, the regulations had been subsequently tightened up in 1989, 1992 and 1993. He therefore 
felt that Blunkett, when in Opposition, could have pointed out the failures of the reform process so 
far and questioned the need to carry on in the same vein
539
.  Blunkett, however, chose not to 
challenge the government on the reform of TT; it fitted naturally with the general pressure new 
Labour applied to teachers, and equally to the universities and colleges of education which 
exercised a degree of professional autonomy which, as we have seen with Woodhead, was widely 
construed as part of the problem. For a representative of the University Council for the Education 
of Teachers (UCET), such as Ian Kane, it was clear that central government was planning to wrest 
control away from the universities. The Dearing Review into Higher Education had established a 
TT study group during 1996-97, the constitution of which made the intention clear. It was to be 
chaired by Sir Stewart Sutherland, a former chief inspector of schools: 
[who was] known throughout the system as being the sponsor of Anthea Millet to get the 
TTA job, as guardian angel; then, lo and behold he has two assessors, one of whom is 
David Hargreaves of Cambridge who regularly does proselytising lectures for the TTA and 
leads the assault from within the universities, the other is Lawrence Montague..of the 
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School Centred Initial Teacher Training (SCITT) [movement]. You couldn‟t pick two 
people who would form a more formidable assault on the universities‟ role in TT540. 
 
            Without the independence of university teacher training, Kane feared, the Secretary of State 
could interfere directly in the curriculum of a part of higher education. He also feared that the 
Dearing initiative would lead to TT becoming the preserve of Further Education, and that new 
Labour would probably go along with this agenda, given the savings that would accrue from this 
and the moves towards more school based training. Colin Picthall MP, who was not a front-bench 
shadow spokesperson, was asked to produce Labour‟s pre-election TT paper. During his 
consultation Picthall, a former teacher and teacher trainer, had approached UCET and meetings 
were held with NATFHE, AUT, the teacher unions, Bryan Davies (further and higher education 
spokesperson) and Blunkett, during which UCET tried to move the agenda away from standards 
and onto teacher supply
541
. New Labour declined the advice and the TT paper was delayed until the 
eve of the election. 
             Once again, policy on teacher training had been subordinated to the much wider policy aim 
of raising standards as new Labour came closer to the realisation of power. After the election, new 
Labour continued to stress the TTA role in standards raising (against the expectations of both 
Alexander and Kane) and also charged the body with making teaching attractive to new recruits. If 
the decision to continue with, and even highlight, the TTA‟s role damaged university autonomy542, 
in the public sphere the debate moved on to how to attract the best teachers without adding to the 
total teacher salary bill. The other major concern was the standard of TT intake. In September 1997 
the TTA introduced a five year plan to improve intake, wanting to see at least three applicants for 
every initial teacher training place by 2002, and declaring that in Bachelor of Education (B.Ed) 
courses, 80% of intake should come from the top 20% of A level cohort grades. It also 
recommended that that PGCE students would have to hold upper-second class degrees at least; 
meanwhile the TTA pledged to raise the profile of the profession by 2002. SCITT was encouraged 
to get more candidates into the profession
543. Some of the Government‟s efforts in this respect 
relate to the introduction of Education Action Zones, the subject of the next section, and the 
appearance of the new advanced skills teachers (ASTs) which EAZ‟s experimental remit would 
allow.  
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          The difficulties of teacher recruitment in certain subject and geographic areas would clearly 
have to be tackled if the TTA was to meet its declared targets. New Labour‟s initial response was to 
issue league tables of ITT providing institutions, which would complement OFSTED‟s inspection 
service. In November 1997, Estelle Morris announced that: 
Potential trainee teachers should also have information to help them make an informed 
choice, I have therefore decided that performance tables of ITT providers should be 
published so that meaningful comparisons can be made.  This will be in a spirit of openness 
and will act as a spur to raise standards
544
.  
 
UCET responded with fears that this might actually deter recruitment among mature 
returners, who would usually only have the option of their local college, rather than have the 
opportunity to choose the best course for their future employment prospects. They also feared that 
the next move would be to marginalise B.Ed courses by withdrawing funding from universities 
which offered the four year specialist teaching degree which produced most primary teachers
545
. 
This was partially confirmed when it became clear that tuition fees would only be waived for 
PGCE courses but not the B.Ed
546
. So how would new Labour manage to attract a better standard 
of trainee teachers, especially against the background of serious shortages in specific subject areas, 
such as science, maths and modern languages? 
 The new Labour answer came through the application of performance-related pay. The 
majority of teachers, though, would not attract pay rises because of the impact on inflation. In a 
scheme announced in July 1998, David Blunkett proposed to tackle the supply problem in two 
ways. To reward teachers who were excellent, but had no opportunities to gain promotion other 
than into non-teaching roles (and even these are not generally available in smaller primary schools) 
the Secretary of State suggested that performance-related pay could benefit up to half of all 
teachers, thereby avoiding the problems of divisiveness and elitism of Advanced Skills Teachers 
and other similar schemes. Then, to attract new teachers into the profession, Blunkett said that pay 
reform would be backed up by recruitment of classroom assistants and investment in technology 
and buildings to create a profession attractive to graduates:  
This is not a scheme to reward just those teachers in schools that have good results. It is 
about giving an opportunity for high-performing teachers to be well paid - even if they work 
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in a disadvantaged area where everything about them is falling apart, or in a middle-class 
school that is coasting
547
. 
 
Therefore, new applicants could be attracted financially to a profession often bedevilled by images 
of underperforming schools and problem children. The message was that if teachers were good 
enough, they could expect greater reward. On this issue, new Labour had managed to win over the 
class-teacher unions (who had always been hostile to AST status and its Conservative predecessors) 
by sheer financial inclusion
548
, and the headteacher unions by conferring on their members the 
power to reward good work. The performance-related-pay announcement came after the 1997-98 
Comprehensive Spending Review, which had allowed the DfEE to establish a £1 billion service 
development fund
549
. Overall the CSR heralded a slight improvement in overall education spending 
for the remaining years of the Parliament
550
. 
Clearly, an important element of new Labour‟s reform programme relied on the support of 
the profession, (as Barber had shown) and the development which allowed for greater financial 
rewards tied to performance had the dual benefit of potentially applying to a critical mass (50%) of 
all teachers, and leading to efficiency gains. In fact, new Labour planned to adopt the PrP principle 
across the public sector, as Chancellor Gordon Brown told the TUC
551
.  Such radical change might 
have offended the spirit of collectivism, but as the teacher unions were quick to realise, enough 
individual members would be attracted to the idea, and their representative duty was henceforth to 
safeguard the assessment process by joining the consultations rather than displaying petulant 
oppositionism. At one level, at least, new Labour had managed to achieve its preference for a weak 
GTC and a strong TTA by offering financial rewards to the main teacher union actors. 
Taken together, the GTC and the reforms to Teacher Training were ostensibly about 
improving the profession, giving teachers a voice and providing them with opportunities for 
advancement and reward. However, these policies have to be seen in the context of a general 
climate of „teacher bashing‟ which emphasised the real nature of policy change. Standards control 
had been concentrated within the DfEE and its satellite agencies, OFSTED and the TTA. Once 
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again „standards‟ set the overriding policy context, and in this case even public spending 
constraints were to be superseded if the rhetoric of „half of all teachers get a raise‟ were to be 
fulfilled. The supremacy of raising standards is also a central concern of the final areas of 
compulsory policymaking to be analysed in this chapter, the changing nature of the role of LEAs 
and the introduction of EAZs. 
  
EAZs and the changing role of the LEA 
Changing the role of local education authorities and the establishment of education action zones are 
two areas of policy where Michael Barber proved to be influential. Much of his agenda aimed to 
build on Conservative policies since 1979 and particularly since the ERA of 1988. LMS and the 
establishment of the GM and CTC sectors had steadily reduced the LEA function to the extent that 
by 1996 Barber could hypothesise that “the next government will face the choice of either taking 
education out of local authority hands altogether or unlocking their creativity”552. Preferring the 
latter course, where LEAs promoted innovation, Barber realised that many would not fill this 
function and therefore OFSTED and the Audit Commission should inspect them regularly, with the 
attendant threat from government: 
The minister.... should make clear that any new lease of life for LEAs is conditional on their 
demonstrating their success in promoting improvement. Continuous improvement, in other 
words, is more important than the continued existence of LEAs
553
. 
 
 Barber‟s general philosophy for educational improvement constantly emphasises 
experimentation and change in the classroom and by educational authorities. Along with his 
recommendation that a new government should ruthlessly prioritise, set targets and commission 
task-forces (for example, on numeracy and literacy), he favoured the faster sackings of teachers and 
parent and pupil representation on assessment boards
554
. However, he was not as pessimistic about 
standards as some of his contemporaries, nor did he advocate selection of pupils by schools on 
either political or philosophical grounds
555. Barber‟s main purpose in the development of new 
Labour policy was to embrace best practice and spread the word that education could be improved. 
This fitted naturally with the new Labour emphasis on „what works, works‟, which became 
                                                          
552
 Barber,M (1997) How to do the Impossible: A guide for politicians with a passion for education, 
Institute for Education, University of London, p.30. 
553
 ibid, p.31. 
554
 Barber,M (1996) The Learning Game: Arguments for an Education Revolution, Gollancz, London, 
passim. 
555
 On standards of new teachers, see Barber,M Curriculum wars, TES 27/9/96, while in The long 
shadow of the IQ empire, TES 13/9/96 he argued forcefully against fixed intelligence. 
192 
 
pervasive across social policy. It has been noted that Barber was unusual among professors of 
education because his influence was not due to research findings or the development of 
pedagogical methods. Peter Wilby recognised Barber‟s value to new Labour, and his place in the 
roll-call of advisers: 
My impression is that there are a few advisers who are influential... Barber has the great 
advantage from their point of view that he manages to sound tough on standards while also 
sounding forward looking. He is a very political person, most academics don‟t rate him as 
an academic, he also has the advantage of his NUT background so he understands how to 
get the teachers onside, the Labour Party still finds it important to keep them onside
556
. 
 
 Nor was Barber‟s advice restricted to new Labour circles; he had been appointed to the first 
Education Association set up by the Secretary of State under powers conferred by the 1993 
Education Act. This association was given the task of deciding whether Hackney Downs school 
(which fell within the control of Barber as Chief Education Officer of Hackney LEA) would have 
to close down in response to poor results and a declining intake. He was already associated with the 
idea of partnerships to run education authorities, and was selected for the EA to help Gillian 
Shephard close Hackney Downs
557
. The EA concept was to involve a partnership of local authority 
and business figures who would take over a „failing school‟ or a group who were failing or in 
„special measures‟558. This would bypass the LEA and school governors, and report to the 
Secretary of State. It is clear that Barber was a key figure in the development of the idea that local 
authority control of education was not a necessary prerequisite of state education. New Labour‟s 
and, in particular Tony Blair‟s, endorsement of Barber‟s ideas, suggests that the party was moving 
into political ground that was fertile with radical new thinking and at the same time distanced new 
Labour from the „loony left council‟ image of „old Labour‟. The most significant aspect of the 
Barber‟s involvement in the Hackney EA, however, was the similarly between the EA and the 
emerging new Labour policy of education action zones.  
 While the Hackney Downs closure saga continued, official Labour policy was more 
restrained. Excellence for Everyone merely spoke of a „Fresh Start‟ for schools. However, the 
political raising of the „standards‟ stakes had continued to the extent that Education Action Zones 
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made their first documentary appearance in the 1997 manifesto. Already, by the end of 1996 some 
of the constituent elements, such as spending disproportionately in poorer areas and local 
partnerships, had been well highlighted by Barber, drawing on the ideas of another key Blair 
adviser, Geoff Mulgan of Demos
559
.  
 From the local government perspective, Graham Lane of the LGA and the SEA was (pace 
Barber) also more impressed by the possibilities from changing education than defending existing 
practices. Lane and the local education officers who met with him in 1995 to discuss Diversity and 
Excellence had declined to take an oppositionist stance about GM/Foundation status
560
. Again 
echoing new Labour policy, Lane believed that: 
What we should be doing is holding schools to account: why are your exam results not good 
enough?; why can‟t your kids read?; and that is a much more difficult thing to do, and much 
more interesting. That is our role, and it is interesting, because that is where we want to be 
and [what] has developed in the last few years. The government [in 1996] is now supporting 
us, they are now saying the role of the LEA is to raise standards... I think LEAs are in a 
much more powerful position than they have ever been, and they are using it...
561
. 
 
 The SEA was content to balance the return of GM and CTC schools into the LEA fold and 
the new „standards enforcer‟ role against the autonomy steadily lost through LMS562. While some 
in local government may have hoped new Labour would devolve power once again,  in reality, 
what was proposed did not involve any further reduction in influence
563
. Allowed to tender still for 
services, LEAs would also be responsible for admissions procedures, central administration, 
transport, special educational needs, the provision of musical education, and of course standards 
and effectiveness
564
. In this latter function they were to develop their own Education Development 
Plans (EDPs). For new Labour, further devolved budgets meant accepting that the right of 
democratically elected authorities to prioritise certain aspects of education would have to be lost. 
Prioritisation in this context means the autonomy for LEAs to decide on whether to favour primary 
over secondary schools, on how much of an emphasis to place on multiculturalism, special needs 
statements, whether to introduce class size limits or leave policy up to heads. These are all political 
decisions, taken at a local level. In the new regime, accountability for education officers would 
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henceforth come through educational failure rather than electoral unpopularity (which has little 
effect in one-party dominated councils). This in turn would make LEAs even more vulnerable, 
however, for if their role was merely as standards enforcers they would replicate the work of 
voluntary school governors and EAZ boards (Action Forums); for some critics on the political 
right, without real autonomy LEAs would merely be agents for central government, and they had 
no legitimacy in such a role
565
. 
 Stephen Pollard of the SMF was not convinced by new Labour‟s talk of not abolishing GM 
status were largely concerned with this political interference in the true local management of 
schools; funding that came via LEAs would not constitute freedom from his perspective
566
. In 
contrast, the new EAZs were not only to have real local autonomy, but they would benefit from the 
input of local business entrepreneurs who understood the market and the concept of failure.   
 EAZs were officially launched by the White Paper Excellence in schools in July 1997. The 
emphasis was on targeted support at the areas of the country which most needed such support. New 
Labour would continue to offer a universal and free education system, with targeted additional 
help. However, EAZs also implied a radical shake-up of the educational system: potentially the end 
of a national curriculum, through the narrowing or vocationalisation of curricula in zones; changes 
to the structure of the school day and year, requiring a renegotiation of the teachers‟ contracts; the 
introduction of Advance Skills Teachers on a higher salary; and „superheads‟ responsible for all the 
schools in a zone, and paid accordingly. Only in January 1998 did David Blunkett reveal that EAZs 
were also to bring in private sector money, services and expertise to the running of local education 
services
567. At the same time, Barber, now head of the DfEE‟s Standards and Effectiveness Unit (a 
role he literally wrote for himself) suggested private finance might play a part in a speech to the 
local government-dominated North of England Education Conference: 
Education Action Zones offer the opportunity for a radical reappraisal of education within a 
variety of geographical locations. Today we are inviting a range of organisations such as 
businesses, local education authorities, Training and Enterprise Councils, and 
schools/further education colleges to participate in EAZs. .... Innovation will be a clear 
component of each EAZ's strategy to address local problems and to focus on teaching and 
learning.  This is a great opportunity for the business world to  play a direct and central role 
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in the management and leadership of EAZs. EAZs are an exciting move forward in 
education and may well form a blueprint for  education in the next millennium
568
. 
 
 In the event few of the first batch of EAZ bids involved creative use of private money, and 
fewer still featured private companies actually offering investment. The early signal that this was 
likely to happen was when the Government announced that the original financial arrangements, of 
£500,000 per zone, half each from the public and private sectors, became £750,000 with £500,000 
from the state. Later, when the bids were announced, it became clear that the £250,000 private 
input could be „in kind‟; many on the Right, such as Pollard, took the poor quality of private bids as 
evidence of LEAs clinging to power and  withholding information from potential bidders
569
.   
 Others, like Frances Beckett in the New Statesman noted that private finance had been 
evoked before, in 1986 with the City Technology Colleges, when, after announcing that the private 
sector would put in £8-10 million, Kenneth Baker than had to lower this to £2 million plus control 
of the buildings and employment contracts
570. In this interpretation, new Labour‟s invocation of the 
primacy of business is part of a long term and failed attempt to deny that the state is the best 
provider of education. The evidence suggested that the private sector was unwilling or unable to  
make a profit out of compulsory education, but it suited new Labour to promise of freedom from 
restriction as an example of its willingness to be radical, innovative and experimental. On an 
ideological level, it was yet another clear signal that new Labour was a best agnostic about local 
authority control. The EAZ agenda was all about depoliticising the role of local authorities and 
centralising control in the DfEE and No.10 Downing Street. It was also about raising standards; to 
this end, local democracy was but another failed means, this time because it was associated with 
the monolithic comprehensives of old. This was reflected internationally in the intellectual trend 
towards policies favourable to individualism. In 1998, even the French Education Minister was 
moved to declare that “equality is achieved neither through egalitarianism nor sad uniformity, but 
through diversity”571.  
 Graham Lane reacted to the announcement of EAZs with voluntary and business input by 
raising fears that it would mean the end of local democracy
572
. Once again, it seemed, Lane, often a 
key figure in supporting new Labour innovation, was unaware of the policy process itself. Some 
ambivalence towards the plight of LEAs was also expressed by interest groups and educationalsist. 
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Contemplating LMS, Rowie Shaw of the NAHT was pragmatic: "....if greater delegation means 
that more money comes into schools to reduce the stress... we support that, but we do not have a 
policy of taking schools out of LEA control"
573
. 
 
 For Maurice Kogan, LEAs in the 1990s had little influence, and because they were 
financially unable to give schools the level of support they had wanted (due to funding redirected 
through OFSTED and LMS) schools no longer mourned their further decline
574
. New Labour had 
managed to continue the process of long decline in local authority control of education which had 
begun with the publication of test results after the 1980 Education Act. Government needs central 
control of the education system in order to better respond to the changing basis in demand for 
labour; local government, as we shall see in relation to further education colleges in the next 
chapter, can be seen as a barrier to rapid change. Sally Tomlinson made the connection between 
raising standards and the national economy as she believed new Labour interpreted it : 
education is just as important and as material as economic capital; and is in fact economic 
capital. Knowledge and information is capital to earn material wealth. I suppose the Labour 
Party actually understands that better than the Conservatives
575
. 
Conclusion 
In developing compulsory education policy, new Labour, in both Opposition and Government has 
clearly been influenced by Conservative reforms which are evidenced by the six themes outlined at 
the start of this chapter. Taken together, these themes form a consensus about education 
policymaking which exceeds the temporary and fragile consensus about comprehensive education 
which formed in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Firstly, the school effect. Adherence to the Conservative legacy was evident in the emphasis 
on the „school effect‟ consensus which downplayed the effect of resources in schools and placed 
the onus on schools, teachers and educational researchers to identify, spread and utilise best 
practice.  
Secondly, new Labour added to the politicisation of standards, which remained a salient 
theme with the electorate well after the 1997 election. The new aspect for new Labour is that 
standards would henceforth be raised by concentrating on how teachers taught and how the school 
was organised, in contrast the Labour‟s traditional emphasis on resources and equality of treatment 
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for all pupils. „Raising standards‟ was also used thematically and even symbolically, in an effort to 
disguise selection. Selection was also used to send market signals to the aspirant middle class of 
where they might use state education without undue harm to their children.  
Thirdly, centralisation, which was manifested in several ways. One aspect implied further 
autonomy for schools through LMS but at the same time a continuation of centralisation, especially 
through the prescription of pedagogy in the name of the numeracy and literacy task forces. Another 
aspect of centralisation has been the establishment of targets of achievement for schools, along with 
the assumption that advice and specific funding from the Ministry would help repair the damage 
done locally by 'inept' teachers, heads and local authorities. Building up the public mood of 
national renewal, new Labour promised to „modernise the comprehensive principle‟ which implied 
a changing role for LEAs, as part of a new emphasis on the users of education rather than the 
producers. New Labour in Government would henceforth to use its central control to regulate the 
relationship between consumer and producer. There has been less professional input than in the 
past as many of the producer actors reported process convergence to go with policy convergence, 
as consultation was narrowed, shortened and generally ignored. Another aspect of centralisation is 
the political one; on certain issues, the strategists around the party leadership had decisive effect on 
education policy, in fact, key advisers, such as Barber, had more direct influence on Blair than on 
Blunkett, who then responded to Blair‟s agenda, rather than setting the agenda as previous Labour 
shadow secretaries and Secretary of State‟s have done.  
Fourthly, vocationalisation. Within the context of a meritocratic society, vocationalising 
post-14 education represented both a desire to equalise opportunity and meet the changing demands 
of the future labour market. As we have seen, a key theme in the centralisation of education policy 
has been the distancing of new Labour from the „producer interests‟, as teacher associations and 
professors of education were styled, which theoretically makes it easier for business and 
employment interests to have some say in the establishment of Education Action Zones.  
Fifthly, changes to admissions policy and its effects on selection and specialisation. 
Continuing the trend since 1980, many of new Labour‟s policy changes were aimed at developing a 
series of market signals for aspirational parents. The consolidation of the hierarchy of schools 
outlined earlier in this chapter has been furthered by post-election developments, not least the 
announcement of a huge expansion of the specialist and Beacon status schools early in 1999, along 
with recommendations that schools should use setting to “meet individual needs aptitudes and 
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abilities”576 and also offer gifted pupils (the top five to ten percent in tests) the opportunity of 
master classes and “world class tests” to stretch them577.  
The sixth and last theme relates to inclusion and exclusion. The expansion of the Beacon 
School and specialist school sectors after the election were partially aimed at individualising the 
setting of education for each pupil. However, these announcements were made alongside proposals 
to target help at the poorest performing schools and underachieving pupils in the six largest inner-
city conurbations around the country. This represented a degree of redistribution and inclusion, 
although at the expense of further highlighting educational failure and departing from the 
comprehensive principle of universal provision. Another aspect of inclusion is the emphasis on 
educating statemented pupils in mainstream schools wherever possible; however, partly in 
contradiction to this is new Labour‟s  pledges to make it easier for schools to permanently exclude 
disruptive pupils.  
Politically new Labour portrayed many of the changes within the corpus of Labour Party 
ideology, for example, on class sizes, nursery provision, the abolition of the APS, and improving 
standards through best practice and „what works, works‟. It is clear that the general thrust of new 
Labour policy, though it may have moved towards convergence in some matters, remained within 
the Labour Party‟s traditional political space by offering some redistribution and amelioration to 
the poorest performing pupils, and that much of the additional aid would be triggered by socio-
economic indicators. Therefore new Labour were able to change the perceptions of what the 
Labour Party stood for educationally in the public consciousness. In terms of internal party 
institutions, we have seen how, even without the changes implied by the National Policy Forum, 
the party leadership was easily able to garner support from such bodies as the SEA and override the 
concerns of those who wanted more overtly egalitarian outcomes. Through the use of standards as a 
„catch-all‟ concept for education policy, new Labour managed to send two clear messages to the 
electorate: the old ways had failed; and the new party were not beholden by producers to maintain 
the status quo. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
Post-compulsory education and training: actors, pressure and policy 
 
This chapter is concerned with the development of new Labour‟s policies towards vocational 
education and training (VET) and post-compulsory education. The three main issues discussed here 
are post-compulsory qualifications, training policy and lifelong learning. The relevant documents 
issued by new Labour were Aiming Higher, which examined new proposals for the post-
compulsory qualification structure, and Learn as You Earn, which was concerned with the 
provision, funding and quality of qualifications offered to employees in the workplace. In addition, 
post-compulsory and VET issues were covered in Lifelong Learning, the higher education 
document. Analysis of these documents and evidence from policy actors will form the bulk of this 
chapter, which traces new Labour policy into Government. 
In keeping with the way such post-compulsory issues have been traditionally treated, this 
chapter sets out to examine the different policy environments and interest group clusters in three 
distinct, but inevitably overlapping areas. The first section will look at the issue of post-compulsory 
qualifications; the second section is concerned with the development of new Labour‟s training 
policies; the final section is concerned with lifelong learning which, for new Labour, acts as a 
thematic and symbolic vision which promises personal fulfilment and economic modernisation. 
Each section will commence with a breakdown of the main policy actors who have impacted, or 
tried to impact, on developing policy, and much of the evidence relates to actors‟ changing 
perceptions of policymaking. 
 
New Labour and the development of post-compulsory qualifications 
The context for reform of the post-compulsory (or indeed post-14) qualification structure can be 
traced back to Callaghan‟s Ruskin College speech and the Conservatives‟ efforts at making British 
education more relevant to employment. As we have seen in Chapter Four of this thesis, one of the 
main historical problems policymakers have had to deal with is the academic-vocational divide, the 
perception that following any other route than A levels at sixteen is a signal of failure. Many 
attempts have been made to modularise the qualification structure so as to make units of 
educational attainment transferable, whilst at the same time satisfying the needs of employers, who 
remain attached to a high level of entry-skills and task-related training. The Conservatives‟ most 
serious attempt to reform the qualification structure was Sir Ron Dearing‟s Review of 
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Qualifications for 16-19 Year Olds, published in 1996
578. New Labour‟s response to this was 
Aiming Higher, which centred the party firmly within a developing consensus around the need for 
reform, but without harming standards. 
  
The policy community 
Many organisations are interested in post-compulsory qualifications; the CBI, the Institute of 
Directors (IOD), the TEC National Council, the National Council for Vocational Qualifications 
(NCVQ, which became the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, QCA), the Further Education 
Funding Council (FEFC), the National Association for Educational Research (NFER), the Further 
Education Development Agency (FEDA), the Joint Council of National Vocational Awarding 
Bodies (JCNVAB), the National Institute for Adult Continuing Education (NIACE), the Local 
Government Association (LGA), and the Teaching & Learning Technology Support Network 
(TLTSN). In addition are the teaching unions, the National Union of Teachers (NUT), the National 
Association of Head Teachers (NAHT), the Secondary Heads Association (SHA), the Headmasters 
Conference (HMC), and the National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education 
(NATFHE).  
Individuals who provided advice with the intention of affecting new Labour policies include 
Ken Spours and Michael Young, Helena Kennedy, Bob Fryer, Terry Hyland, Josh Hillman and 
business members of the Commission on Public Policy and British Business (CPPBB) such as Lord 
Hollick, George Bain, Christopher Harding and David Sainsbury. Other academics whose work 
contributed to the debate during the 1994-99 period include Alan Smithers, Alison Wolf, Gilbert 
Jessup, Sig Prais, David Soskice, Johann Schmitt, Will Hutton and John Kay, JR Shackleton, Andy 
Green and David Jaffe of the National Commission on Education (NCE), and the members of the 
Beaumont Review of vocational qualifications. Many of the individual actors represented think 
tanks, such as the Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA), the Institute for Public Policy Research 
(IPPR),  and the Social Market Foundation (SMF). 
 
Issues, policy and practice 
The political divide this chapter is concerned with is between meritocrats who value excellence and 
egalitarians who value wider opportunities through a greater appreciation of vocational skills. This 
divide can be witnessed between the parties and also within the Labour tradition. Four main issues 
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discussed in this chapter also illustrate the divide; human capital; excellence and standards; value 
for money; and centralisation versus professional autonomy.  
 The context for new Labour policy development was largely set during the 1980s with the 
development of modularised and unitised vocational awards, in response to the changing basis of 
demand for labour, and employers‟ unwillingness to fund what they saw as inappropriate training. 
By 1989 there was a broad consensus around the idea that, as the CBI noted: "There is a need for a 
quantum leap in the education and training of young people to meet both their aspirations and the 
needs of the economy in an increasingly competitive world"
579
. This was echoed by the Trade 
Unions Congress: "Britain is facing a skills challenge greater than any since the industrial 
revolution... By the year 2000 we will either be a superskills economy or a low-skill, low pay 
society"
580
. 
 
In the same year, Labour Party leader Neil Kinnock declared: 
 
Education and training (are) now the „commanding heights‟ of every modern economy... 
now and for all time in the future, human skills and human talents will be the major 
determinants of success or failure- not just for individuals but for a whole society in its 
social, cultural and commercial life...
581
 
 
 The modularisation and unitised philosophy of the new vocational qualifications offered a 
potential solution for those seeking to reform the qualification structure to meet these demands. The 
concept was consolidated with the introduction of  National Vocational Qualifications (NVQs) 
after 1986. These are based on measuring the competence of workers against a set of criteria for the 
task laid down in national guidelines set by Industry Lead Bodies. The criteria include 
demonstrating an understanding of the underpinning knowledge behind the activity, and observed 
performance of these tasks under a range of conditions so that competence can be accurately 
judged. The NVQ formula appealed to potential reformers of the qualification structure because 
individual units of competence could be used either as lateral credits towards alternative NVQs, or 
vertically to build towards higher NVQ levels. This principle was expanded after 1992 with the 
introduction of General NVQs (GNVQs) as „applied A levels‟ which are composed of taught units; 
moreover, the separate pathways of vocational and academic qualifications could be bridged to 
some extent by the inclusion of „common learning outcomes‟ in both GNVQ and A level 
                                                          
579
 CBI, cited in Jessup,G (1991) Outcomes: NVQs and the Emerging Model of Education and 
Training, The Falmer Press, London, p.7. 
580
 ibid, p.7 
581
 ibid, p.7 
202 
 
syllabuses. These common outcomes were often expressed as the „core skills‟ which the CBI had 
called for the introduction of in all post-14 education since 1989
582
. 
 In academic circles, the need for greater national competitiveness and the changing basis of 
demand for labour which the globalised economy had heralded also produced calls for reform. 
Against a background of an educational system geared to employment patterns now long gone, 
many thought that old curriculum and teaching styles also had to be renewed
583
. Richardson, 
Spours, Woolhouse and Young‟s Learning for the Future study, begun in 1993, was based on the 
premise that the status quo worked against efforts to maximise those with the knowledge, skills, 
enterprise and ability to learn. The education system, they believed, separates knowledge from its 
application, accepts too readily the position of universities as the only generators of knowledge, 
equates learning with time-limited teaching, and accepts the barriers represented by the artificial 
division between academic and vocational learning and the assumption that more breadth always 
means less depth of understanding
584
.  
To address these shortcomings, a fully redesigned system of post-compulsory education 
would have to support and encourage high levels of participation and attainment, and establish 
coherent and flexible frameworks to address funding, quality, assessment and accreditation. It 
should also connect knowledge with practical skill, and reflect the knowledge that comes out of 
workplace experience. In terms of the individual, the redesigned system should also develop 
learners‟ skills of connectivity, collaboration and risk-taking, and promote individual motivation 
and capacity to learn throughout life
585
. Indeed, to ensure parity of esteem and equity among 
learners, nothing short of an overarching qualification to encompass all post-compulsory 
qualifications would suffice
586
. 
 Similar recommendations had been made by David Raffe of the National Commission on 
Education (NCE) in 1992
587
, and indeed the producers of  the 1990 Institute for Public Policy 
Research (IPPR) report A British Baccalauréat
588
. This then forms the intellectual context for the 
Dearing Review and for Labour‟s response to it. The party document Opening doors to a learning 
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society, issued under John Smith‟s leadership in 1994, adopted much of the reformist agenda, 
pledging to develop “genuine parity of esteem between the academic and the vocational”589 and 
also responding to the “universal call to replace the present over-specialised A level”590. This in 
turn built upon the 1992 General Election manifesto which suggested an Advanced Certificate to 
incorporate both widened A levels and technical qualifications and even held out the prospect of 
transferable credits
591
. 
 The establishment of the Dearing Review therefore took place within a context of a 
consensus for reform which transcended left and right and took in  a variety of organisations. It also 
built on the experience of a decade of vocational qualifications and a new sense of urgency about 
the quality of education and training other than A levels. In response to human capital concerns, 
and also in the interests of providing opportunities for individual recipients of education and 
training, the Conservatives presided over a radical phase in the development of post-compulsory 
qualification structures which had the effect of raising the profile of vocational education. This also 
had the effect of raising the alarm amongst defenders of the supremacy of A levels as a „gold 
standard‟. During the review period, new Labour sought to carve out a position for itself, and 
released Aiming Higher earlier than planned so as not to seem reactive to Dearing
592
. 
 
The Dearing Review 
In one sense the Dearing Review can be seen as the culmination of the reformist drive towards 
broadening opportunities through vocational education. Any further movement would have 
unbalanced the consensus. Although there were many academic advisers and practitioners 
throughout the 1980s who helped develop the unitised structure of vocational qualifications and 
helped spread the modularisation of A levels, by 1994-6 the reaction from the pro-A levels lobby 
had created an atmosphere in which it became difficult for Dearing to suggest a merging of the 
qualification pathways. In fact, an overarching diploma on the baccalaureate model was 
contemplated by the Committee, before objections from right-wingers and some head-teachers 
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reduced it to only one of three suggested options
593. The right were also pleased by the review‟s 
calls for tougher standards in arts A levels, stricter external assessment of GNVQs and the 
introduction of more „core‟ „key‟ or „general‟ skills (numeracy, literacy and communication) which 
all qualifications should have embedded within them.  
Above all, Dearing consolidated the three „tracks‟, the academic, the applied educational and 
the vocational, which co-existed in post-compulsory education
594
. Although these were brought 
closer together by some of the recommendations of the review, the underlying assumptions were 
that they would remain unmerged. The reaction among defenders of the A level on the Review 
committee found broad support within the policy community. Part of the problem was that, since 
the 1980s, A levels were perceived to have become easier, and any attempts to merge A levels with 
applied GNVQs would only weaken them further. There is certainly some justification for the 
perception that A levels have changed since their introduction in 1951, when they were taken by 
only three percent of under 18 year olds, with a one-third built in failure threshold
595
. By the 1990s 
a substantial proportion of the age group entered, and nine-tenths passed. This is because in 1982 
the overt marking policy which created the 30 percent failure rate was ended. Further, say the 
detractors, during the 1980s a wider variety of „less academic‟ subjects came on offer; even more 
seriously, and in response to the reformist calls we have already noted, course modularisation and 
time relaxations had apparently made it easier to pass, as had the growth of assessed coursework 
and the opportunity to re-sit final exams. 
Although it is clearly very difficult to judge changes over time (mainly because syllabuses 
change), what matters for some is the perception that A levels had become easier. Dearing, 
however, responded to the Institute of Directors (which mostly represents small and medium sized 
business, SMEs) by ensuring that all A level syllabuses were to be raised to the standard of the 
toughest. The worst problems of modularisation, especially with regard to re-sitting examinations 
and coursework accounting for over 70% of the total marks, were tackled. An important argument 
for the defenders of educational excellence was provided by National Foundation for Educational 
Research (NFER) evidence for Dearing suggested that many of those which dropped out of A level 
courses (amounting to 80,000 a year) were unable to cope with the demands. Six out of ten failures 
had received “poor examination results during the course” according to the NFER596. This 
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suggested that either GCSE students were receiving poor careers advice or that they had simply 
chosen the wrong course for their abilities.  
Given this apparent misapplication of resources, the NFER‟s call for better initial career 
guidance and better tracking of drop-outs, along with the modularisation and a breaking down of A 
level and GNVQ units so that they are comparable (and thus transferable) at the lower level, could 
be contemplated without any fear that A levels would be disturbed at the top of the hierarchy. A 
Gatsby Foundation study, again for Dearing, specifically looked into the transferable possibilities 
between the two strands, but found themselves hidebound by the remit to “keep A levels pure”597. 
For Alan Smithers, usually a critic of vocational qualifications, there was little to fear from any 
apparent weakening of A level standards because, despite their evolution, they still represent 
„coinage‟, evidence of a filtering-out process that employers, admissions tutors and parents want 
from the qualification system
598
.  
The preservation or consolidation of more than one educational track by Dearing became the 
key political legacy of the review. The three recommended options, to be decided by “the 
market”599 were effectively; retention of the status quo; a National Certificate to record attainment 
towards training targets; and a National Diploma rewarding a set number of passes, in the manner 
of the baccalaureate. Perhaps with one eye on the forthcoming General Election, Dearing refused to 
name his own preference, although the National Diploma was regarded by commentators as putting 
in place the platform for genuine overarching reform should an incoming Labour government wish 
to use it
600
. The floating of plans for an overarching National Diploma was enough to raise the 
alarm among conservative critics such as Melanie Phillips who claimed it would merely blur the 
divide and devalue the A level
601
. Highlighting educational standards reinforced the belief that A 
levels needed to be defended against alternative qualifications. 
 
Aiming Higher 
The Dearing recommendations were echoed to some extent by the Aiming Higher policy document 
which had been issued a week earlier to reinforce the impression that new Labour was not 
following, but leading events
602
. This thesis contends that new Labour has its own agenda for post-
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compulsory education and training, based on standards and the vocationalisation of compulsory 
education. This is implicit in both pre-election and post-election policy pronouncements. 
Aiming Higher was written by members of the Education and Employment Policy 
Commission and the unofficial mini-commission which actually made the key decisions This 
smaller group included Stephen Byers, MP, David Miliband of the Leaders‟ Office, Simon Wilson 
(a research assistant funded from David Blunkett‟s allowance, and seconded to help Byers on 
training policy), Michael Meacher MP, (who had held an employment brief) Conor Ryan 
(Blunkett‟s longstanding Personal Assistant and adviser), and Bryan Davies, MP (Further and 
Higher Education spokesperson) and his researcher Nick Pearce. After the election the personnel 
changed somewhat, and the relevant team was Secretary of State David Blunkett, Andrew Smith, 
Minister of State for Employment and Disability Rights and Welfare to Work, Alan Howarth, 
Parliamentary Under Secretary for Employment and the Jobseekers Allowance, Kim Howells, 
Parliamentary Under Secretary for Lifelong Learning, Investors in People, education and training 
targets, and Baroness Blackstone, Education and Employment in the Lords, Further and Lifelong 
Learning. 
Aiming Higher began by acknowledging the existence of a triple-track system, of A levels for 
academic work, GNVQs for applied education, and NVQs for the work-based learning pathway, 
and in this sense Aiming Higher echoed the Dearing Review. However, new Labour‟s 
concentration on vocationalisation of the National Curriculum in areas where it had apparently 
failed less academic pupils before Key Stage 4 (the age of 14) implies a meritocratic rather than 
egalitarian distribution of opportunities, and this is reinforced by the emphasis on standards.   
Among the key aims new Labour identified in the paper were:  
to provide education and training of the highest standards... to meet the demands of all 
individuals... and in the long term 80% of 21 year olds (should) receive advanced level (level 
3) qualifications
603
. 
 
Other declared aims were “to establish continuity with pre-16 studies” and ensure that “all students 
attain a high level of basic and core skills”604. To these latter ends, it was proposed that Training 
and Enterprise Councils (once threatened with reform or abolition by Labour) should establish 
bridging courses which would allow young people from the age of 14 to take NVQs in FE colleges 
whilst remaining the responsibility of the schools. These proposals, on standards and the 
vocationalisation of 14-16 education, and on ensuring core skills and meeting individual demand 
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illustrate the convoluted nature of new Labour‟s position; like Dearing himself, influences on new 
Labour suggested that vocational education was the most appropriate for disinterested pupils, many 
of whom, as the document points out are “young males in areas of socio-economic 
disadvantage”605. This of course implies not so much a meritocratic division of educational 
opportunity as one dictated by the requirements of local employers and the socio-economic history 
of the area. 
 However, new Labour also held out the prospect of an evolutionary development of a single 
qualifications framework aimed at raising participation as well as standards. This involved breaking 
down A level achievement at the lower level, equivalent to NVQ level 3, with an advanced level 
which would lead to the award of an Advanced Diploma at the equivalent NVQ level 4. To 
facilitate this Aiming Higher pledged to modularise all learning programmes, with ongoing 
attainment recorded in a National Record of Achievement which would equate to the expectations 
of the National Education and Training Targets
606
. To this end, there should be an alignment of A 
levels and GNVQs where they covered the same subject area, and the overall regulation of the 
framework would be carried out by a National Qualifications Council (later the Qualifications and 
Curriculum Authority, QCA) which would ensure the integral role of employer interests. The 
problematic area of core skills was to be covered by a Core Skills Unit which would investigate 
ways to overcome the lack of a skills tradition in A levels
607
. Raising participation and 
appropriateness could best be facilitated, for new Labour, by a convergence of interest between 
employers and higher education institutions with regard to 16-19 qualifications. So, for example, 
while employers demanded more than mere occupational competence skills from new employees, 
requiring breadth, universities could also help the situation by “more labour market sensitive initial 
undergraduate provision”608. 
 Aiming Higher followed the 1992 manifesto by highlighting the Higginson Report of 1988 
which suggested broadening A levels to five subjects, and noted that, with British students 
spending twelve hours less studying than French or German counterparts, there would be plenty of 
time to accommodate breadth
609
. In terms of the vocational equivalents, the new Labour document 
proposed to raise the standards of GNVQs until they were suitable to become Applied Advanced 
Level qualifications
610
. However, the main recommendations relating to NVQs echo the problems 
of vocational training ever since the advent of high youth unemployment in the late 1970s 
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(discussed in Chapter Four) by linking vocational qualifications with  workplace training as a right 
for 16 to 17 year olds. It is difficult to trace the educational continuity between baccalaureate-style 
five subject A levels as a university entry mechanism, and NVQs which are essentially the only 
labour market credential for those low-skilled or poor enough to have to go into employment at 16, 
especially as this part of new Labour‟s plans runs into the New Deal requirements for “young 
people who have left the formal education system”611. This is clearly in contrast to vision of 
qualification unification such as Spours and Young, who argued that: 
...to limit a large proportion of young people to the current forms of vocational education 
from the age of 16 (or even 14) is to exclude them from access to the kinds of skills and 
knowledge they are going to need to be effective citizens and workers..
612
. 
 
 Overall Aiming Higher certainly moved in the direction of radical reformers such as Spours 
and Young, although it fell short of proposing to submerge all qualifications, including the key 
market signal of A levels, under one all-encompassing qualification with different roots to 
attainment. They noted that Aiming Higher represented only a modest reform agenda, but 
recognised that new Labour have made a unified system an aspiration
613
.  
Developments in government  
After the 1997 election new Labour initially set in train a consultation exercise, in the form of 
DfEE paper Qualifying for Success, aiming to build on  the manifesto commitments to broaden A 
levels and upgrade vocational qualifications by underpinning them with rigorous standards and 
Dearing‟s new term, „Key Skills‟. Some have criticised the demise of „core skills‟, which implies 
skills which would have an underlying role in all aspects of an overarching qualification 
structure
614
. Key skills are seen to imply something inherently vocational and necessary to gain 
employment. For instance, Dearing envisaged key skills of communication, numeracy, literacy and 
information technology to be part of the Advanced Diploma, in the sense that they are required 
skills for employment, although they were not to be made compulsory in NVQs (where their 
introduction would be prohibitively expensive) and were to be introduced only carefully in A levels 
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so as not to “distort the integrity of individual subjects”615. This suggests key skills are specifically 
targeted at GNVQs, not the whole qualifications system
616. Therefore, different notions of „key 
skills‟ made the unification of qualifications  more difficult  
As a result of the DfEE‟s consultation, which included submissions from many of the policy 
community identified earlier, the Quality and Curriculum Authority and Baroness Blackstone 
announced changes to the A level and GNVQ curriculum in April 1998. The main 
recommendations were for the A level to be broken down into three-unit Advanced Subsidiary 
(AS) qualifications as the first half of full A levels- this would then match the new six unit (as 
oppose to twelve unit full) GNVQ. Measures were highlighted for combining GNVQ units with 
other vocational qualifications “whilst retaining the distinctiveness of the GNVQ”617, which would 
damage any chances of merging NVQs with GNVQs. The Minister also went on to invite the QCA 
to examine further the possible development of an overarching qualification,  replicating the aim of 
the Dearing Review
618
. While it is clear that there were progressive measures incorporated in the 
new qualifications structure, the main impression was of the government failing to implement 
radical strategies, and by asking for a further review, delaying reform.  
 There are two main reasons for the relatively weak positions taken by new Labour in 
Government, one educational and one political. Firstly, reforms to the A level had begun to meet 
resistance in the shape of concerns about maintaining standards. In educational terms, the 
Qualifying for Success programme had come up against the same problems faced by the Dearing 
review; how to balance the interests of those who wanted to maintain excellence and the clarity of 
A levels as a market signal to parents, potential students and university admissions tutors, with the 
interests of those who sought a more open, egalitarian system which values the abilities of all. 
Although the ground had shifted considerably during the course of the Conservative years in power 
(which witnessed the introduction of modular, „easier‟ A levels, assessed coursework and less 
emphasis on final exams), the reform process had by 1994 reached the stage where the primacy of 
A levels would have to be challenged. As Alison Wolf has noted, once a critical mass of students 
have chosen the academic route (university education), the only successful market signals are 
academic ones and vocational qualifications are doomed to low public esteem
619
. 
This situation emerged in Britain especially (although the growth of mass higher education 
is a global phenomenon) because of the increased politicisation of standards across the party 
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spectrum. As we shall see in Chapter Eight, the meritocratic, liberal elite lobby in the university 
system used the image of excellence in UK universities to resist most attempts at restructuring the 
sector. In the post-compulsory sector, the „gold standard‟ of A levels is used in the same manner, 
representing the last word in any „standards‟ debate and the ultimate market signal to potential 
consumers. The insistence of tight public expenditure controls also mitigates against the 
experimental offering of broader opportunities to all; the filtering effect of the A level effectively 
reinforces the notion that it should be restricted, with valuable resources more realistically targeted 
at vocational or applied post-compulsory education for most school leavers. The celebration of 
excellence necessarily limits the possibilities of egalitarian reform. 
 Secondly, changes to the way the Labour Party made policy as it moved from Opposition 
into Government meant that new Labour relied more on Shadow Cabinet members and their 
selected advisers than on party institutional sources, and this made it easier for the leadership to 
react to external interest groups‟ concerns. In some policy sectors, party groups such as the trade 
unions acted as a powerful lobby for their own agendas. In the low-salience post-compulsory 
education sector, however, there was little evidence of a sectional interest which could successfully 
carry the fight over A levels. In keeping with the broader consensus identified earlier, it was 
implicitly accepted on the left that meritocracy and egalitarianism could be merged under the broad 
umbrella position of maintaining excellence and widening opportunity at the same time.  
One strategy for maintaining such an unspoken compromise position is to keep Opposition 
policy statements vague. As Ken Spours, closely involved with the party process since 1991, 
realised, even Aiming Higher had to bridge the gap between being merely a set of principles and 
becoming a strategy for government. To overcome the inevitable reaction from defenders of A 
levels and those wary of revolution, the post-election Spours and Young plan to Ministers would 
come in two phases of reform, an improvement preparatory stage, followed by an introduction of 
greater reforms in the second term of Government. As we might expect the policymaking 
environment changed after the May 1997 election.  
In the immediate post-election period Spours and Young were invited to outline their plans 
for an Advanced Diploma to Ministers and senior Civil Servants. Spours noted that the party 
structure no longer played any part in the debate: “there is no relationship with the party now, the 
party has gone, it is now the government and the think tanks and the academics”620. This was not 
only a reflection of the transition between opposition and government, however, but the result of 
changes in policymaking practice during the 1990s. Working with David Miliband (Leader‟s Office 
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education adviser in the pre-election period and co-author of A British Baccalaureate) Spours 
found that policy was developed more by talking to party figures rather than specialist educational 
advisers before 1990. After the 1992 election defeat, things were relatively quiet until the Dearing 
review galvanised leadership thinking once again. During 1995 new Labour followed the 
Conservative Government in merging the education and employment portfolios, after which the 
party policy group discussing post-compulsory issues (in effect, a smaller version of the official 
Policy Commission) contained new faces and views. The new interest among front-benchers was 
fed by Spours and Young‟s findings from the Learning for the Future project which offered 
“potential solutions.... with a staged approach”621. 
 It is worth reiterating that the latest stages in the reform process, Dearing and the Spours 
and Young agenda, were not in any way stimulated from within the Labour Party‟s institutional 
structures. The influence of new ideas which new Labour would absorb were external, as they had 
been in 1992 when the manifesto reflected some of the “big bang strategy” of the baccalaureate 
plans; with Aiming Higher, the party was going out for expertise and advisers were chosen from a 
network of  personal contacts: “In a sense the relationship wasn‟t forged by the political party 
having certain needs, it was actually being able to relate to people...”  This contrasts to the situation 
before 1990 when Spours felt that “[t]hey depended on people who have their own political 
projects and don‟t know enough, and who can‟t write good documents” and this was exacerbated 
by the “heavy hand of the unions as well. The people who were appointed [to policy commissions] 
were movers and shakers in that respect”. The situation began to change during the 1990s with the 
appointment of  new types of research staff, and this trend was accelerated by the arrival of Blair 
and Blunkett: "..there was a period when they relied less on the internal apparatchiks and more on 
the outsiders, and the outsiders established a relationship of trust by virtue of what they gave"
622
. 
 
This account of the policymaking practice of new Labour gains some support from other evidence 
in this thesis, and from other players in the post-compulsory field who saw it as problematic. John 
Sutton of the Secondary Heads Association (SHA) noted that it was often difficult to get hold of 
Labour front-benchers because of a hypersensitivity about being seen as influenced by pressure 
groups, particularly teaching unions. Instead, Sutton believed, new Labour relied “on the handful of 
gurus whom they identify and trust to lead them on policymaking”. Even before coming into office, 
he believed that “they [new Labour]  haven‟t got a policymaking apparatus of their own... which 
makes it difficult for people like ourselves to identify at any one moment who the key players 
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are”623. The National Association of Headteachers reported two things common to interest groups 
which contributed to this thesis; the perception of closer direct links between key advisers and 
Tony Blair than David Blunkett (who was officially head of the relevant Policy Commission) and 
the perception that there was no formal machinery of interaction between interest groups and the 
party, despite the fact that the organisations were free to contribute to and produce documents for 
the Education and Employment Policy Commission. The two headteacher organisations believed 
that they had less influence on policy than in the past because of new Labour‟s desire to distance 
itself from teaching or producer interests, and also because of the personal nature of developing 
policy which effectively meant that very few people within the organisation could be aware of the 
latest position
624
.  
 This created the impression among other policy actors that, in the absence of any party 
input new Labour were not grounded in principle. In the opinion of  Alison Wolf “they [new 
Labour] don‟t actually have an analysis from which they derive things”, therefore “once in office 
they will just be buffeted by what happens next”625. Therefore, on such specific issues as the 
employer imperative domination of vocational qualifications “they are not challenging it, not 
because they have any deep emotional commitment to it, but because there is nothing on the 
surface that they want to go against”. Without a grounded position of principle, Wolf expected new 
Labour not to challenge the tripartism of Dearing, which centralised power in the DfEE, because 
“governments don‟t give away power...”626.  
 This section has outlined a policy agenda dominated by standards and the economic 
imperative of value for money, best facilitated by more centralised control of education spending. 
Hence, the increasing trend towards recommending vocational qualifications, sometimes in the 
workplace, for students who have yet to have the opportunity to take academic qualifications at 16. 
This might be seen as appropriate in human capital terms; after all, in a meritocracy it is more 
important to have everybody in the employment roles appropriate to their individual abilities, rather 
than to expensively allow everyone to explore their artistic and academic potential through the A 
level syllabus. New Labour‟s policy development offered little encouragement to radical reformers. 
At the base, the emphasis on standards and key employment skills worked against reform, as did 
the continuing emphasis on excellence at the top where the A level remained unchallenged. Overall 
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the Dearing process and the support of key advisers such as Spours and Young helped shift the 
agenda towards an overarching qualifications structure, but this has been limited by new Labour‟s 
attachment to standards (leaving them open to the forces of reaction) and to the demands of 
employers, both on retention of A levels and on different skills requirements
627
. This section has 
looked in some detail at a policy area which had low political salience, in that it raised no specific 
problems in the minds of the electorate. It is also a policy area in which there seemed to be little 
input from elements of the party whose opinions might reflect an internal left-right divide. By 
contrast, the next section looks at an area of policy with a large inbuilt institutional interest in the 
form of the trade union affiliates. 
 
Vocational Education and Training: the Policy Community 
The main players in the training policy community differ from those in other case studies which 
make up this thesis. Trade unions, many affiliated to the Labour Party directly, and all affiliated to 
the Trades Union Congress (TUC), had direct input into Labour Party policy on training policy; 
therefore, internal party concerns have a higher profile here. Other major non-party policy actors 
include many of those educational groups  and individual academic commentators  referred to at 
the beginning of this chapter. As we have seen in Chapter Four, training policy has always been a 
subject of controversy between educationalists and those whose concerns are related to 
employment needs, so as well as trade unionists the policy community  contains employer 
organisations such as the CBI and the IOD. 
The funding of workplace training 
 
This part of the chapter will examine the detailed policymaking which allowed new Labour to 
continue the changes to the funding and provision of vocational education and training (VET) 
which were explored in Chapter Four. It is clear that Tony Blair, with Opposition responsibility for 
training policy between 1989 and 1991, saw workplace training and education as both a key motor 
of economic policy and an expression of an individual‟s right to retrain. This was reiterated after 
Blair became leader of the Labour Party and appointed David Blunkett to his shadow education 
post. New Labour‟s concept of individualised human capital maximisation implied planning and an 
active labour market strategy, as opposed to the market-led solutions of the Conservatives or the 
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perceived obstructionism presented by trade unions in rigid corporatist bodies. An active labour 
market strategy implies a flexible workforce, while planning takes the form of constructing the 
correct qualifications and training structure to provide that flexibility. Despite the emphasis on new 
solutions to meet new conditions, the guiding principles and defining problems of VET remained 
largely the same as in 1964: coverage of provision, funding and quality remained the key issues.  
 New Labour consolidated its training plans with the publication of Learn as You Earn in 
May 1996. This was largely developed by the team which produced Aiming Higher meeting in 
closed sessions of the mini-commission. The main actors were Stephen Byers, MP, and his research 
assistant Simon Wilson, Michael Meacher who represented the employment brief, and David 
Miliband of the Leader‟s Office. As with the Liason Committee paper New Skills for Britain in 
1984, (see Chapter Four) Learn as You Earn was developed prior to any official intervention by 
trade union affiliates, which only came when the paper was presented to the Joint Policy 
Commission and Economic Policy Commission during March and April of 1996. Prior to this, 
Blunkett had engaged in many personal discussions with Shadow Chancellor Gordon Brown about 
the costs of the proposed new funding regime for training. The title of the document changed 
several times during the drafting stage, perhaps reflecting the influence of the Leaders‟ Office, 
although David Blunkett suggested the first change from Training and Learning for Work to The 
Skills Revolution. The document was also endorsed by the party‟s National Policy Forum in May 
1996 and was officially accepted as party policy by the 1996 Annual Conference. 
The document controversially ended the uncertainty which had surrounded the training levy 
policy since Blair‟s time as Employment Spokesperson by emphasising the individual 
responsibility that workers could exercise through the proposed 'learn as you earn' smartcard. This 
placed the onus for training on individuals, and by removing from employers the obligation to fund 
training, new Labour placed much faith in the voluntary contributions they could make with the 
help of tax incentives. Indeed, the document began by hoping that the surviving Industry Training 
Boards which had continued voluntarily after 1982 should remain in place
628
. The expectation was 
that good, large employers would continue to train their workforce as usual, while individual 
employees of smaller companies (SMEs) could take the £150 state funding (triggered by a £25 
contribution from the individual) wherever they liked to improve their employability. It was left to 
the firms themselves decide whether to add to this training. Although the £150 million budget for 
these Individual Learning Accounts was to come from the funding previously earmarked for 
Training and Enterprise Councils, the TECs were to retain their role as part of the institutional 
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structure of occupational training, further reinforcing voluntarism. In 1991, however, Blair had 
rejected such a scheme: “The Tories believe in a purely voluntary approach and I just can‟t see how 
such an approach is going to work”629. Reflecting this for new Labour, voluntarism was partly 
countered by the proposed new Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) which would 
simultaneously direct some of the funding at education and training to meet local employment 
needs, and thus centralise powers within the DfEE. For the first time, the funding of  the FEFC and 
the TECs would become dependent on improvements in flexibility and accountability in the 
delivery of training. 
 Despite the overall emphasis new Labour place on lifelong learning and seamless 
continuities between vocational and educational qualifications,  much of the emphasis on 
individuals in Learn as You Earn is focused on the possibility of future unemployment. We have 
already noted the implicit links between failure at Key Stage 4 and the New Deal in Aiming Higher. 
This was interpreted in Government by new Labour in the language of targeting training in 
designated Employment Zones. In these zones, conceptually similar to education action zones 
(EAZs, see Chapter Six), partnerships bidding for DfEE funding would have to provide „Learning 
for work‟, defined as training and education to improve employability, and „Business Enterprise‟ to 
help with moving Jobseekers Allowance recipients from welfare into self-employment
630
. A 
separate initiative was the expansion of the Conservative‟s Workskill Pilots which provided JSA 
recipients with funding to take up any one-year, employment related course they chose; however, 
the future employment had to meet local needs, restricting the possibilities for a broader 
employability to be gained through education
631
. 
 New Labour also introduced moves to improve the quality of training. Within a few months 
of the election, the Government established a Standards Council emphasising quality vocational 
education and training, aiming to portray Modern Apprenticeships as the equivalent of the „gold 
standard‟ A levels632 and to act as a watchdog for the activities of TECs and private training 
providers
633
. This re-emphasises the problems associated with an educational hierarchy with 
employment skills at the base, hence the suggestion in Learn as You Earn that many employees 
“lack the basic education and skills, so find it difficult to retrain and face the hazard of long-term 
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unemployment”634. This is the reality of a flexible workforce. Not only is unemployment 
henceforth treated as a „hazard‟ of the economic system, the following paragraph refers to unskilled 
employees being “vulnerable when their jobs change..” and this in turn “places a burden on the 
Exchequer”635. Thereafter the individual‟s educational failings would also be a brake on national 
prosperity. 
Here the need to stress the quality and validity of training highlighted the tensions about 
training as a human capital exercise. Many studies throughout the 1990s questioned the relationship 
between training investment and the economy. An OECD survey showed that, internationally, 
managers were far more likely than manual workers to receive workplace training, and for the 30% 
of manual workers who received it, the training was highly task-specific
636
. Other studies asserted 
that the already highly educated received most training from employers, and that the best returns 
accrue to the individual learner rather than the firm
637
.  
These all provided evidence to support the new Labour view of the importance of providing 
opportunities for individuals. However, the automatic link between the economy and education or 
training was doubted by many
638
, while flexibility was seen to exacerbate the skills shortfall 
because short-term workers receive the least workplace training
639
. From another perspective, 
Howard Glennerster cast doubts on the financial gains for poor recipients of training, because a 
sudden rise in the numbers of low skilled workers (up to NVQ Level II via the New Deal 
programme for example) would only lower the market value of these in comparison to the 
unskilled, thus driving down wages
640
. Others share the concern that improving the supply of 
skilled labour does not in itself lead to investment; lower wages are more important. Francis Green 
showed that, during a period of declining investment in Britain compared to the East Asian „Tiger‟ 
economies (1985-95), Britain actually produced a rise from 33% to 57% of the relevant age group 
entering further education and from 12% to 27% receiving higher education
641
. This exponential 
rise in education was not matched by workplace training, which was more closely correlated to the 
changing basis of demand for labour in the economy (particularly during the 1989-91 recession), 
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according the OECD analysis of the 1984-94 period
642
. Clearly, firms engage in training as and 
when it is in their perceived interests to do so and withdraw investment on the same criteria 
This debate was reflected internally by positions taken by David Miliband and Michael 
Meacher in the mini-commission meetings referred to earlier. The Miliband position accepted that 
good firms train to compete, and their success in a flexible market is evidence of the 
appropriateness of their level of training; Michael Meacher‟s alternative view was that the 
existence of training defines the good firm
643
. This is an example of internal party debates 
reflecting the parameters of the wider debate among economists and between political parties. 
Miliband‟s view added to the pressure for less state interference in training which any government 
attached to the concept of labour flexibility had to take seriously, and would certainly have 
weakened the case made by Meacher, the trade unionists and some on the employers side tried to 
make about the skills deficit. 
Some of this thinking permeated new Labour policy, to the extent that Learn as you Earn 
was seen by some as too voluntarist. There were doubts expressed about plans for ILAs and the 
University for Industry and their effectiveness as supply-side measures. Learning accounts and a 
learning bank had been initially envisaged as a funding mechanism for higher education
644
. As new 
Labour developed the idea, the emphasis changed in two ways; firstly, the plan was brought into 
the Treasury‟s remit (it was intended to be a ringfenced account for the individual) and thus subject 
to general expenditure constraints; secondly, the idea was applied to training 16 and 17 year olds in 
the workplace. As the scheme‟s originator, David Robertson, pointed out, the learning bank or 
voucher concept works best in areas where consumers are offered a wide choice of courses, as in 
the higher education system where there is a high yield to the beneficiary. However, in mass 
education or training programmes where there is often little value attached to outcomes, Robertson 
believed that it might lead to even less training than when the TECs controlled the money
645
. This 
lack of demand might be exacerbated by the requirement that employees trigger the £150 with a 
contribution of £25 themselves; and even then, £175 “buys you nothing”646. This was virtually 
admitted by the DfEE after the election, which calculated that the ILA would probably pay for two 
days tuition on Windows software
647
. Doubts about the efficacy of ILAs may have been 
demonstrated by the announcement that the introduction of pilot accounts would not begin until 
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April 1999
648
. This delay and the equally slow evolution of the University for Industry seems to 
demonstrate the problem Robertson initially identified with Treasury influence. This means that 
any assessment of the validity of these supply-side policies would not be possible until well into 
new Labour‟s second term of government.   
Policies such as those adopted by new Labour had been suggested in Labour discourse during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, but were deemed sufficient on their own to close the perceived 
skills gap with Britain‟s competitors. Individual training plans as a supplement to employer‟s 
schemes were suggested in 1988, while a 1991 document envisaged Personal Development 
Plans
649
. Individual Learning Accounts were also conceptually similar to plans outlined during the 
1990s from the CBI and even the European Commission
650
. By 1996 employer concerns were 
much higher on new Labour‟s agenda and can be seen to have been the motivating factor for policy 
change. As Blair told a business audience immediately after the launch of Learn as You Earn, 
David Blunkett and his training spokesperson Kevin Barron now believed that “a training levy ..... 
would bring costs and bureaucracy which would probably exceed any benefits”651. Crucially in 
terms of Labour‟s institutional processes, the Commission on Public Policy and British Business, 
also in 1996, dropped the levy idea which had been supported by the Commission on Social Justice 
(see Chapter Four)
652
. The internal party processes behind this policy change will be examined in 
more detail in the next section. 
 Other elements of the Learn as You Earn package were less controversial within the party, 
although they masked the clear divide between the imperatives of smaller businesses (SMEs) and 
larger employers. As with the qualification structure, it was the ambiguity among employers which 
helped define the positions in the debate. Mary Lord of the TEC National Council made calls to 
vocationalise education to the extent of obliging college and university lecturers to enter industrial 
placements because “some... have never had a proper job out in the real world”653. At the other 
extreme many either saw any state intervention as inherently bad in a market system
654
 or 
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questioned the appropriateness of training to small firms
655
. It was in recognition of these doubts 
that new Labour‟s policy has developed in such a way as to placate both large and small firms but 
fully satisfy neither. This divide is conceptually similar to the egalitarian versus meritocratic divide 
identified within the polity and the major parties, although this ambiguity partly reflects the 
differing needs of different businesses. For example, the CBI was at the forefront of efforts to 
broaden post-compulsory education and training (including reforming A levels) with the 
introduction of core skills across all syllabi, yet the Institute of Directors, representing, on the 
whole, smaller employers were against expanding the scope of NVQs in such a way
656
. The CBI 
were also among the progressive groups in favour of a more egalitarian higher education as we 
shall see in Chapter Eight.  
The obvious problem for employers of any size, however, is that at a certain level of skills 
attained, employees were likely to take those skills elsewhere, the so called „free-rider problem‟. 
An example of this emerged in a Coopers and Lybrand survey of employer attitudes to Investors in 
People in 1996. They found that while 76% of  chief executives thought training was important, 
only 27% wanted to add to the skills of their own employees if that made them vulnerable to 
poaching by competitors
657. The confused nature employer imperatives clouded new Labour‟s 
thinking, indeed its intellectual closeness to business values meant that the party came to reflect the 
ambiguity among employers. Even while party-sanctioned bodies such as the Commission on 
Public Policy and British Business could recommend statutory education and training up to the age 
of 19, and statutory day-release for employees at this age
658
, Learn as You Earn remained 
resolutely voluntarist on the issue of contributing to employee training, partly due to an awareness 
of the anti-training arguments. Employers did not, on the whole, want to pay for more training, 
rather expecting the state to take the responsibility, either through reforming compulsory education, 
or by funding serious vocational training programmes. Politically, all of this has to take place 
within a low tax environment and without harming business profitability; this, coupled with new 
Labour‟s attachment to modernisation and opportunity meant that the empowered individual would 
have to pay. 
However, new Labour policy has not only been concerned with the individual. To stimulate 
interest in training by employers within the SME sector, new Labour chose to build on the existing 
Investors in People (IiP) kitemark and lower the start-up costs which was seen as a deterrent at 
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£2,000
659
. The Learn as You Earn document also proposed to use public procurement requirements 
to spread the use of such a guarantee of good training practices. The other major idea contained in 
the document aimed particularly at stimulating SME training was the University for Industry which 
had been suggested several years earlier by Josh Hillman
660. In new Labour‟s version, the UfI 
would facilitate training and work-based learning through bringing together education providers 
and helping to distribute packages using CD-ROMs and the Internet, in the manner of the distance-
learning tradition of the Open University. Clearly, it would be a useful tool for potential ILA users. 
However, it was unclear to what extent the UfI would commission or produce material, or whether 
it would merely act as a clearing house for off-the-peg training programmes. The declared intention 
was to  
..spearhead a national drive to bring together business and industry, educational institutions, 
training providers, TECs and government departments to identify strategic priorities in the 
development of the skills of the workforce
661
.  
 
Using existing TEC and DfEE budgets, the UfI hoped to produce starter information packs and 
basic skills packs for half a million small companies who were willing to match funding.  
 The document also contained a promise to assist the further development of the NVQ 
system and expansion of the recently launched Modern Apprenticeships scheme, clearly in 
response to large employer imperatives. The main argument, however, reflected Miliband‟s 
position, that large employers who already trained their workforces to their own satisfaction were 
not to be compelled to contribute to a levy, which would fall disproportionately on such firms. The 
levy had in any case been criticised from the left because of problems of collectability, policing 
difficulties and bureaucracy
662
 as well as being politically sensitive in that it could be portrayed as a 
tax on jobs
663
. Advice to the frontbench since at least 1988 had outlined the difficulties, and during 
1990 employment spokesperson Tony Blair had been rumoured to be backing a credit based system  
suggested by the CBI
664
. Indeed, the new policy direction did move new Labour towards an 
individualised training structure, thought to be the most appropriate response to the demand for a 
flexible workforce, while it benefited from the generally favourable reaction from some egalitarians 
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about course modularisation and open or targeted access. Therefore we can see that the 
development of a consensus about the individual responsibility to train has been paralleled within 
the Labour movement, even if this was resisted by some groups. 
 
Training: the party input 
Not surprisingly, the proposed changes to training policy caused much consternation among 
Labour‟s affiliated trade unions. Changes to the party-trade union relationship have be understood 
as an evolutionary process beginning in 1983. Labour‟s quietness on training issues during the 
early 1980s was largely due to the attachment of the trade union affiliates to the corporatist model 
epitomised by the Manpower Services Commission, as we have seen in Chapter Four. As Lewis 
Minkin pointed out, workplace training caused one of the major schisms within the party during the 
1980s, and this led to front-bench actors presenting written policy to the NEC without the input of 
the unions or other party actors
665
. This helped set the precedent for developing policy into the 
1990s. Partly as a result of this, successive leaders Kinnock, Smith and Blair have progressively 
become less influenced by the unions than their predecessors, especially after the concentration on 
the presentation of policies during the Kinnock period
666
. Other factors working against the trade 
union influence were deindustrialisation, the effects of Conservative employment legislation and 
rising unemployment; in effect, the changing basis of demand for labour has weakened organised 
labour in relation to firms and the state. 
 By the time of Blair‟s leadership, with the effects of one member, one vote (OMOV) and a 
reduced reliance on block voting at Annual Conference, the hierarchy of power within the Labour 
Party had steepened so that few institutional actors could prevent the Shadow Cabinet setting both 
the broad parameters and overall direction of policy. Phil Wyatt of the GMB and a former NEC 
researcher recognised the failings of the more democratic former practices which meant that “the 
shadow cabinet were effectively lobbying the NEC to get policy changed” but regretted that 
policymaking had become far more centralised in the latter period
667
. This suggests that new 
Labour built on existing policymaking practice, which then made it far easier to retain power 
centrally.  
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Personalities were still believed to matter, however. Speaking about the changes to the 
levy/grant system, Wyatt believed that  
we would have had success with this until May 20th 1994, when John Smith died... there has 
been a noticeable change in our influence over the content of policy programmes since Tony 
Blair became leader..
668
 
 
This was reiterated by other trade union responses, creating a dual impression of personal and 
constitutional changes culminating in the election of Tony Blair as party leader. In terms of the 
party constitution, many trade union actors were concerned about the lack of credit they had 
received for the modernisation process, particularly the introduction of OMOV by John Smith in 
1993. During the difficult pre-Conference negotiations about OMOV Smith had impressed some 
trade union policy actors by his understanding of unionists‟ concerns. Jenny Pardington of the 
Transport and General Workers Union (T&G) recognised the existence of an historical 
policymaking process where it was “not liked or loved but accepted that unions would have their 
say in policymaking” operating up until Smith died669. Policymaking from the 1960s until 1994 
therefore took the form of getting union leaders to back the NEC against groups such as the 
Constituency Labour Parties; this implied a level of personal interaction and shared understanding 
of solutions within the broad Labour Movement. This was exemplified by the OMOV decision, 
when “at least two of the unions changed their vote because of the charm” exhibited by Smith in 
the crucial Conference-eve meeting
670
.  
 Despite taking part in this inherently undemocratic method of deciding which policies the 
Labour Party should support, unions were among the first to develop alternative models of decision 
making and felt deeply attached to the modernisation of Labour Party practices
671
. Pardington 
recalled that from 1979 the TGWU used collegiate policy meetings to bring together the interests of 
the unions‟ diverse industrial representation (specifically the road and rail unions), a process 
facilitated by Peter Mandelson who worked as researcher for shadow transport spokesperson Albert 
Booth
672
. This was seen by the T&G as an early example of the year-long policy discussion 
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processes of the National Policy Forum developed by General Secretary Tom Sawyer in the 
1990s
673
.  
Other union respondents also believed that the trade unions generated the modernisation 
process, but this had been „airbrushed‟ from public consciousness after 1994 as part of the 
presentational construction of „new Labour‟ as counterpoint to „Old Labour‟ and the 
Conservatives
674
. This entailed a certain amount of distance between the party and the unions, a 
situation which was broadly understood by trade unionists, at least as a short-term, pre-election 
position
675. The need to avoid „rocking the boat‟ worked to nullify alternative (ie more openly 
divisive) policymaking practices, and this is seen by some as evidence that the trade unions‟ 
acceptance of the retreat from the levy/grant system was an example of the reduction in 
institutional policymaking practices
676
. This could be manifested in several ways; in poor 
recognition for the trade unions‟ role in modernising the party; in an omission of trade union 
concerns at the expense of external advice; in changes to the policymaking structure; and through 
an understanding of the differing functions of trade unions and political parties. 
Many trade union groups within the party are concerned that they have not been credited by 
new Labour with a positive input into the modernisation project and that modernisation has reached 
the point where unnecessary changes are made to training policy for fear of upsetting employers. 
Some union representatives have noted a decline in influence over time but are more exercised by 
particular policy instances of interest to their members. For example, John Mitchell of the 
Graphical, Paper and Media Union (GPMU), while against suggested changes in employment law, 
was satisfied that the wording of new Labour‟s pre-election statements on training levies left his 
union with a get-out clause. The levy was not thought appropriate for the majority of industries by 
the party, but Mitchell would expect the paper and print industry to fall within the minority where 
such a policy was still thought appropriate
677
. More broadly the T&G was concerned about the 
emphasis on individual rights in the workplace to the exclusion of  collective rights which had 
formed the basis of their advice to the education and employment training commission. In the final 
documents, Jenny Pardington complained that: “our stuff was not in there at all”678.  
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 In terms of the advice new Labour were subject to, the attitude of many trade union 
executives was that business concerns were accorded too high a value by new Labour 
frontbenchers during the policymaking period. One former party insider, Joy Johnson, believe that 
this was exacerbated by the decline of Labour- trade union liaison meetings
679
, although this is 
countered by representatives of the unions
680
. Some saw the problem as structural, with the 
leadership becoming less dependent on trade union finance (because of Short money and Blind 
Trusts) than in previous Opposition periods, and some post-election experiences have highlighted 
the new government‟s links with big business which might support that claim681. Given this, why 
do the trade unions adhere so closely to the party? Jenny Pardington likened the party-union 
relationship to that of the football supporter and his or her team: “Labour is our team, come what 
may, they may be useless, they maybe should sack the manager, but they are still our team”. The 
ramifications of this are that, in the words of the adage: “when the leader jumps off the cliff, you 
hold out a safety net”682. For Phil Wyatt, with his experiences as a NEC researcher barred from 
speaking to shadow cabinet members, the arguments that suggest the divisiveness of  the party‟s 
policymaking structures had in the past been an electoral liability had some resonance. It was 
sensible to move away from a situation when the party leadership and the NEC “were falling into 
two armed camps”683. The GMB had developed a “consistent record ... in asking for higher levels 
of participation in the policymaking process and looking more outward than inward for ideas”, 
Wyatt believed. However, even by 1996 this had gone too far: 
Tony Blair‟s leadership has made a big difference to the way the machinery is now used [it] 
is dominated by the shadow cabinet. The new machinery was brought in to make the 
policymaking process less dominated by the NEC and other parliamentarians, it is in fact 
being dominated by a core group of the shadow cabinet
684
.  
 
Despite trade unionist‟s protestations that they were the leaders of modernisation, there have been 
limits to their understanding of what this entails, especially with regard to open markets. The 
GPMU‟s delegate at the May 1996 NPF complained about transferable vocational qualification 
units and how they denied trainees the “certainty of incentive” represented by the old 
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apprenticeship scheme
685
 (presumably a job for life in a subsidised industry). Also the GMB‟s John 
Edmonds was reported to have said that he shuddered at the language of flexibility as used by Blair 
in a speech to the TUC
686
. 
So despite the reportedly day to day contact
687
 between trade union General Secretaries and 
the Leader‟s Office in the pre-election period it seems that new Labour were open to wider 
intellectual arguments than those supplied by the trade union link. This is made easier in areas 
where there is little institutional opposition to developing policy, as in qualifications structure, and 
front bench actors were free to go outside of the party for advice. Another factor is the changing 
shape of the party hierarchy which has institutionalised a separation of functions and has reduced 
the influence trade union leaders have on actual policy debate. The problem is not so much that 
trade unions are not represented at meetings as much as they used to be or meet party front 
benchers less often, it is that policy is substantially decided in mini-commission meetings and 
personal discussions between senior leadership figures such as Blunkett and Brown, rather than at 
the official NEC Policy Commissions
688
. During the 1994-97 period with the perceived electoral 
need to minimise open debate even the Economic Policy Committee (on which trade union leaders 
sit) was regularly presented with fait accompli so far as the details of long thought out policy was 
concerned. Everything which followed, including the debates at National Policy Forum and Annual 
Conference (still the official fount of all policy
689
), was post-hoc endorsement of broadly agreed 
policy
690
. 
Given this new policymaking reality, dominated by the mini-commission of front benchers 
and their advisers, unions often felt bypassed during the construction of training policy by the 
timing of meetings. Phil Wyatt complained that the shadow cabinet member would:  
lead the commission, they decide when to meet, they decide to convene meetings when they 
have their paper ready, or when they think it is going to be ready because they are often hot 
off the photocopier at some of these meetings. Most of the papers are tabled by the shadow 
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cabinet member, and certainly all the drafts of major policy statements are from the shadow 
cabinet or a small group based around him or her
691
. 
 
Other respondents similarly claimed that meetings were timed to inconvenience General 
Secretaries, while some union leaders were slow to realise the importance of the NPF system in 
lobbying for policy change.  
Demonstrating more awareness of the process, the Manufacturing, Science & Finance Union 
(MSF) brought drafted amendments to the NPF discussion on training policy in May 1996, 
although they were issues on the margins of a generally accepted policy proposal
692
. In a discussion 
workshop Blunkett opposed an amendment to change the wording of Learn as You Earn from 
„expect and encourage‟ employers to train to creating an „obligation‟, eventually settling on the 
statement that employers „must recognise that they have responsibility‟ to train. Blunkett and 
Stephen Byers, then Training spokesperson, both used the occasion to stress the need to avoid the 
political linkage between the levy as a tax and its potential for job losses, although the provision for 
future obligation to train should be held in reserve by a Labour Secretary of State
693
.  
In terms of purely internal policymaking, the closed meetings of the training mini-
commission were concerned more with persuading the shadow Treasury team that the levy could 
be painlessly replaced than with trade union concerns. Funding for ILAs (from the budgets of the 
FEFC and the TECs) could amount to an annual spend of £460 million, which is 50% more than 
the levy would have garnered. Byers was at pains to describe the ILA plan as „cost neutral‟. The 
main theme of one meeting in March 1996, the last before the plans were put to the Economic 
Policy Commission, (which includes the major trade union affiliates) was how to present ILAs, the 
new plans for IiP and the UfI in the best financial light, and the meeting broke up with David 
Blunkett pleased that they had managed to square this particular circle by switching funding from 
the TECs and FEFC to individuals
694
. 
There are also differences in the relative roles of parties and trade unions which inevitably 
lead to clashes over policy. As direct representatives of labour, unions have their own concerns and 
are often inward looking and particularistic. They are often concerned with the details of policy, 
which can lead to conflict, rather than co-operation, with other unions, and they are, by necessity, 
resistant to change if it affects their members. As democratic bodies, they have committee systems 
of their own for policymaking which are less responsive than a media- focussed political party. 
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Some General Secretaries see Labour Party as their  political representative, not something they 
should have to lobby (although UNISON and MSF were more aware of the opportunities for 
lobbying)
695
. Several union respondents reported that meetings did not co-incide with the working 
arrangements of General Secretaries, and one respondent thought that Gordon Brown, in particular, 
used his central role on new Labour‟s electoral machine and on economic policy, and his 
workaholic reputation, to produce drafts for meetings at very short notice to his own advantage
696
. 
The impression is that some trade unions feel that the party leadership should make its 
arrangements around the needs of General Secretaries. 
The objective of a political party is different from that of a trade union. It has to be far more 
outwardly oriented, both in terms of responding to new problems in society and in meeting the 
needs of its constituency. This often implies the kind of rapid response to quickly developing 
political situations that recourse to representative committees would render impossible. It is in this 
sense that sometime leaders have to „fall off the cliff‟ and wait for the party to catch them. 
Therefore, even though some trade unions might have felt that meetings were arranged judiciously 
to exclude them (with some justification) it is in the intellectual decision to go beyond the interests 
of trade unions by the leadership, because of perceived changes to demand for labour, that the 
unionist imperative had already been rejected.  
On training issues, new Labour has had to continue to confront the internal blockage caused 
by the trade union‟s attachment to corporatism, following the early work done under the Kinnock 
leadership and by Blair himself as shadow employment spokesperson. As we have seen in Chapter 
One, both the policy review period and the new Labour period have produced a movement towards 
consensus around the Conservative‟s ground so far as individualisation of training and the 
qualifications are concerned. However, new Labour did not have to go beyond Labour‟s ideological 
tradition to enter this consensus; offering opportunities appeals to the meritocrats, while expanding 
access to those workers in the SME sector currently receiving the least training met some of the 
demands of egalitarians. New Labour‟s theme has been the removal of institutional  blockages 
through  the acceptance of open markets and flexible employment practices, and the adoption of 
supply-side socialism as an economic policy
697
. The unions generally did not welcome this, but 
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were partly assuaged by the promise of a national minimum wage and Britain‟s signature on the 
Social Charter. As Jenny Pardington recounted, “unions are the best  compromisers of the lot”698.  
 
The lifelong learning consensus: politics versus education 
Lifelong learning is different to the other aspects of VET covered in this chapter for several 
educational, political and economic reasons. Firstly, it is partially concerned with access to 
education, and educationally, lifelong learning cannot be properly realised until there is a single 
qualification and curricular framework for all post-compulsory learning and training. We have 
already seen the limits to reform in qualifications at 14-19, while Chapter Eight looks at the limits 
to reform in the university sector. As such, lifelong learning in educational terms is little more than 
an aim. Secondly, lifelong learning is used as a political football and an overarching idea by new 
Labour, and so goes beyond the concerns of further and higher education. New Labour added to the 
growing rhetorical use of the concept of lifelong learning throughout the late 1980s and into the 
1990s. The new Labour  emphasis was on the need for lifetime education as a strategy for the 
modernisation of the British economy
699
. Thirdly, the international ubiquity of lifelong learning as 
the prescribed strategy to meet globalisation and open trade in all advanced economies means there 
is nothing intrinsically „new Labour‟ about it. There has been an European Year of Lifelong 
Learning (1996), a World Conference on Lifelong Learning (1997) and in 1998 the Mumbai 
Declaration on Lifelong Learning. Fourthly, new Labour‟s use of lifelong learning, and the need for 
a flexible, retrainable workforce in order to maximise Britain‟s human capital represents continuity 
with the previous Conservative government. Although this can be portrayed as capitulation to 
employer demands, for new Labour, government has no other option in a global marketplace. Firms 
have to be free to respond to changing markets, and employees cannot expect job security if they 
are not multi-skilled and re-trainable. New Labour emphasised reform to the supply side of the 
labour market by putting the right education and training infrastructure in place. A fifth aspect of 
lifelong learning is that it represents a new consensus, not just between the major parties, but 
among most policy actors concerned with post-compulsory education and training. The importance 
of lifelong learning within the polity was evidenced by a clutch of documents from a variety of 
sources throughout the 1990s. In the absence of a fully formed lifelong learning „policy 
community‟, these reports are evidence of a  consensus position about the importance of lifelong 
learning. These include the Further Education Funding Council commissioned Kennedy Report, 
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Learning Works published in 1997 after three years of evidence gathering, and Bob Fryer‟s 
National Advisory Group for Continuing Education and Lifelong Learning established after the 
election in 1997 by David Blunkett, and in response to a suggestion from the Dearing Report into 
Higher Education (NCIHE). Following the Kennedy Report, Anna Reisenberger of the Further 
Education Development Agency (FEDA) produced Widening Participation: learning works in 
1998 in response to the FEFC‟s Widening Participation Committee and the National Institute of 
Adult Continuing Education (NIACE) produced Learning Works. On more specific issues of 
lifelong learning was the FEFC‟s Tomlinson Report of 1996 Inclusive Learning (for students with 
learning difficulties) and the  Further Education Student Support Advisory Group (with Labour 
Party local government figure Graham Lane as chair) which produced New Arrangements for 
Effective Support in Further Education. There had, of course, been a raft of documents, referred to 
elsewhere in this chapter, relating to new Labour‟s plans in opposition.  
 
Lifelong learning and new Labour in Government  
 
These papers set the context for new Labour‟s lifelong learning measures in government. But 
despite the expectations raised by the rhetoric and symbolic use of lifelong learning as modernising 
the economy, new Labour‟s response was relatively weak  The proposed White Paper eventually 
appeared as the Green Paper The Learning Age: renaissance for a new Britain in February 1998 
when it was realised that none of its recommendations (largely the long trailed ILAs and the UfI) 
actually required new legislation. Major problems have emerged with new Labour‟s vision, which 
this section will outline in turn: the financial costs of redistributing opportunity; the continuing 
emphasis on voluntarism; the continuation of the unemployment link; and the continuation of a 
stratified qualification system. Given these problems, new Labour has produced distinctly non-
radical solutions to the challenges it faced. To explain this, this section will begin with some 
contextual assessment of the British post-compulsory education situation as faced by policymakers 
in the late 1990s.  
Educational participation has risen in recent years. In line with the assumptions of this thesis, 
the main spur for participation has been governmental and individual responses to the changing 
basis in the demand for labour, and social demand for advancement. Among 16-18 year olds the 
proportion of the age group staying in education or training was 57% in 1986, rising to 75% in 
1996. The class distribution showed that 62% of unskilled and semi-skilled families were 
represented, and as many as 87% of professional and managerial families had children studying 
between 16 and 18. However, only 45% of 16 year olds attain the equivalent of NVQ level 2, while 
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30% of 19 year olds had not attained level 2 in any form of post-compulsory education or training, 
indeed at the end of 1996 437,000, or 25% of 16-18 year olds, were not in education or training
700
.  
Given the imperative of international competitiveness inherent in new Labour‟s economic 
policy, it is important to gauge the British situation in relation to other advanced economies. Britain 
has a higher level of mature students in higher education than other countries, with almost a third of 
students over the age of 21, against a European Union average of 15%. However, Britain falls 
below other countries in the number of 25-29 year olds who have A level or the equivalent NVQ 
level 3. In 1993, only 50% of 25-29s had attained A level or NVQ level 3 compared to 59% for an 
average of 11 EU states (excluding Italy)
701
. The training deficit in Britain was evidenced by the 
Labour Force Survey of 1996 which showed that only 15% of employees had any work-related 
training in the last month
702
. The World Competitiveness Report judged Britain at 40th out of 48 
countries for „motivation to retrain‟, 39th for equal opportunities regardless of background‟ and 
35th for „adequacy of the education system‟703. Clearly, Britain is producing growing numbers in 
both FE and HE, but the weak links are in adult education and workplace training. 
One of the driving forces behind the lifelong learning concept has been the desire to equalise 
the cost of post-compulsory studies. Only then would expanding access be a real possibility. An 
Association of Colleges (AoC) study in 1998 showed that the variable cost of further and higher 
education ranged from £2,780 per  FE student to £4,630 per HE student
704
, and that, despite new 
Labour rhetoric, colleges were expected to make more efficiency gains than either secondary 
schools or universities. Clearly, as we have already seen with qualification reform, there are 
important blockages to the full implications of maximising the spread of lifetime learning or even 
constant retraining given the level of financial redistribution implied. 
          This is explored more fully in Chapter Eight with reference to attempts to widen access in 
higher education. One of the main themes for participants in that sector is that HE could ill afford 
any financial redistribution which might threaten the high quality of British degrees. Of equal 
importance was the financial influence of the Treasury, thought by many to be behind the 
downgrading of the White Paper and the subsequent appearance of the Green Paper Qualifying for 
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Success in February 1998. The high water mark of new Labour‟s attachment to lifelong learning 
was probably the Fryer Report Learning for the 21st Century which appeared in November 1997
705
. 
This proposed to act as a stimulus for a cultural revolution, by launching a review into funding, 
creating incentives for lifelong learning provision in elite institutions and the extensive use of 
television as a disseminator of information
706
. Fryer believed that he was engaged in a battle for 
hearts and minds, after which success would be judged by the permeation of lifelong learning 
values: 
The core institutions have to sign up to it, to the change- that means the Prime Minister and 
the Government and the Opposition too; it means schools, churches and the legal 
profession, everybody. It means clear simple messages that become part of the sense of a 
nation.... Leadership has a role, and so does broadcasting. I‟ll believe it has occurred when 
it is in the Mirror or the Star, not the Independent or the Guardian
707
. 
 
To this end, Fryer recommended  a variety of measures which might foster this cultural revolution. 
For instance, tax breaks on educational equipment, the establishment of a learning centre in every 
community, if necessary in the local pub or council offices, or anywhere with Internet access. Use 
should also be made of existing communications structures, such as telephone help lines and a 
Lottery funded dedicated digital TV channel, all of which could link users of Individual Learning 
Accounts to the University for Industry. There were also more mundane proposals to establish 
national targets for lifetime learning, to establish parity of entitlement to grants for full and part-
time, FE and HE students. Acknowledging the human capital imperative, Fryer also wished to 
commission research into the economic value of education at all levels
708
. 
 Learning for the 21st Century appeared at a time when the White Paper had already been 
delayed several times. For some critics, the report‟s concentration on voluntarism and the concerns 
of the individual devalued talk of lifelong learning
709
. John Edmonds of the GMB union believed 
that the Fryer report had helped cause the decline of the intentions of a White Paper, with training 
falling off the agenda
710
. Still others thought that the emphasis on individuals improving 
themselves and the importance of human capital meant that changing higher education had been 
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omitted from the vision, thus scuppering any real attempts at making lifelong learning a tangible 
concept
711
.  
 The fallout from the cancellation of the White Paper was damaging for new Labour 
credibility because it left it open to attack on its strongest ground, education. Don Foster, education 
spokesperson for the Liberal Democrats, let it be known that he had received a personal assurance 
that the document would appear by mid-January 1998, but Kim Howells, Parliamentary Under-
Secretary for Lifelong Learning, denied there were any publication plans
712
. Perhaps more 
damagingly, reports abounded that suggested that Blair had a hand in the withdrawal of the 
document because there was nothing in it for the middle classes whose tuition fees would have to 
fund much of the redistribution
713
. Others reported that Blunkett had to fight a rearguard action 
against the downgrading such as ILAs and the UfI, because Blair and Chancellor Gordon Brown 
thought it contained nothing on standards and examinations
714. Conor Ryan, David Blunkett‟s 
personal adviser took the unusual step of letting his name be attached to efforts to resist No.10 and 
the Treasury, highlighting the seriousness of this for Blunkett. 
Meanwhile, evidence that the introduction of tuition fees had coincided with a fall in the 
number of mature students did not sit well with the theme of expanding lifelong learning. A Times 
Higher Education Supplement actually accused the Government of harming lifelong learning by its 
policies, which were clearly in response to lobbying by the elite universities against any 
distribution
715
. 
 Ken Spours, one of those most hopeful about the lifelong learning agenda, realised that 
Fryer‟s report had been designed to upset no-one, promising lots of cultural change but not willing 
the means to effect that change
716
. Instead, the emphasis was on persuasion and exhortation, and 
the hope that different departments would act together to achieve the common aim. The lack of any 
real sense of lifelong learning was illustrated by the distribution of responsibility for the component 
parts. For instance, the provision for training would henceforth be partly under the remit of the new 
Regional Development Agencies, and partly under the remit of TECs. While training and enterprise 
councils are the preserve of the DfEE, the RDAs come under the Department for the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions (DETR). Also involved were the Department of Trade and Industry (in 
charge of science policy, important because of the new economic responsiveness that universities 
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were supposed to demonstrate) and the Department of Social Security who have responsibility for 
the welfare-to-work aspects of post-compulsory education and training. Turf wars between the 
DfEE and DTER were said to have reduced the effectiveness of either department in raising the 
profile of training. Within education, the various state supported sectors fought over the distribution 
of funds. Above the whole government structure stood the Treasury, the meanness of which was 
thought by the editor of the THES to be turning lifelong learning from society-wide improvement 
into compulsory welfare
717
.  
Once again, the link to unemployment was present; in this case through the compulsory 
workfare scheme, the New Deal, which would damage the image of employment learning and work 
against any possibility of unifying provision. Indeed, new Labour‟s emphasis on lifelong learning 
was distinctly more employment-orientated than the Kennedy and Fryer reports, both of which 
stressed the social and personal goods which flow from adult education. It is part of the assumption 
of the policy consensus around lifelong learning that social demand should be met by increased 
provision, and the ramifications for the aspirant middle classes would be strongest; as we have 
seen, this group is already the main beneficiary from post-compulsory education, especially in adult 
education. One research project into the meaning of adult education found that the majority of 
respondents taking part in such education believed that the aim was to increased personal 
opportunity, rather than change the position of certain groups in society
718
. 
In contrast, for new Labour, the tone was set by the title of its pre-election training document, 
Learn as You Earn. Again, this reflected meritocratic tendencies at play within the party; lifelong 
learning might conceptually refer to a world in which flexible employees could dip into education 
as and when they were stimulated to, (indeed, this is part of its appeal) but in the new Labour 
version this educationalism was subordinated to the human capital assumption that demanded the 
most appropriate level of productivity from all employees.  However, there have been some 
tangible benefits accruing to post-compulsory education and training through the interventions of 
new Labour Ministers. In terms of qualifications reform, ministers began to face the inevitable 
costs of increasing the average teaching time at A levels from 18 hours per week to the European 
norm of 30, a necessity of any serious reform programme, even as this broadening had to be 
accompanied by more emphasis on standards and excellence
719
. Also, new Labour in power aimed 
to redistribute FEFC funding by targeting it at areas of low take-up, and after the disappointment at 
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the time of the Green Paper, there have been some tentative moves towards allowing part-time, 
older and further education students to borrow on the same basis as HE students, presented in the 
name of access
720
. There have also been moves to tie funding of higher education courses to the 
institutions record in attracting non-traditional HE students which have broadly favoured FE 
colleges and former polytechnics
721
. The 1999 White Paper Learning to Succeed: a new framework 
for post-16 learning attempted to end the funding imbalances between various sectors of education 
and training by centralising and unifying provision. The Further Education Funding Council and 
the 18-month-old Training Standards Council would be scrapped, with responsibility passed to a 
Learning and Skills Council (LSC) operating in fifty county-sized areas of the country
722
. Although 
this new development was intended to streamline and rationalise post-compulsory education and 
training, the new Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) and the DETR would continue to have 
an input, while the Social Exclusion Unit based in Downing Street was reportedly influential in the 
establishment of an overarching LSC
723
. Therefore centralisation of post-compulsory education 
does not imply that the Secretary of State for Education and Employment can have an overall 
control of the service, especially given that OFSTED, the school inspectorate which is answerable 
to the Crown rather than the DfEE, was given a role in the inspection of 16-19 institutions.  
Once again, standards and accountability seem to have been as important as access in 
determining new Labour government decisions, while the heralded equalisation of funding for the 
various sectors, which the White Paper was intended to address, stopped short of closing inefficient 
(disproportionately expensive and small) Sixth Form Colleges because they were seen by Downing 
Street as popular with middle class parents. Significantly, the Times Educational Supplement 
greeted this news with the front page headline „Blair intervenes to save sixth forms‟. The White 
Paper did not refer to higher education so added nothing substantial to any moves towards lifelong 
learning, and in the DfEE report Bridging the Gap, also issued in July 1999, David Blunkett 
signalled that FE institutions should concentrate on training and traditional FE courses, rather than 
higher education
724
, this only a year after the Government had told colleges that they would be 
expected to take the bulk of the extra 100,000 higher education places to be offered by 2002, at 
HNC and HND level
725
.  
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has looked at three distinct, but related subject areas. On two of the areas, lifelong 
learning and qualifications reform, new Labour have accepted that there is a need for reform but 
stopped well short of radical responses in the face of elite opposition, and this is developed further 
in the final case study chapter of the is thesis. Training policy is one area where new Labour had to 
confront an internal pressure group, the affiliated trade unions, but thanks in part to the groundwork 
already done by the party since the policy review of 1987-1989 and changes to the policymaking 
processes of the party, the new Labour leadership prevailed. In all three areas the party leadership 
portrayed changes to policy within the confines of the traditional Labour Party ideology, given that 
the changes in the nature of labour required by the economy, and the global trading environment 
Britain has to operate within, the rhetoric of modernisation was sufficient to ensure that policy 
change was relatively uncontroversial. 
 In keeping with other aspects of this thesis, the area of lifelong learning is an example of 
new Labour concentrating its political rhetoric at the natural territory of the egalitarian left, by 
couching it in the language of widening access and targeting help at those “who have traditionally 
not taken advantage of educational opportunities”726.  Educationally, this was clearly not carried 
forward in the short term although there is still scope for voluntarism and exhortation to slowly 
change the culture. For the meritocratic left, this same agenda offered opportunities for social 
advancement, and also held out the prospect of the unskilled being less reliant on welfare. For the 
former Conservative voters new Labour relied on to win in 1997, the emphasis on workplace 
training could be portrayed as punitive action against dole scroungers, as new Labour policies were 
allowed to be connected to unemployment problems. This had a detrimental effect on those who 
wished the lifelong learning agenda to challenge the assumptions of the academic-vocational divide 
and creates a huge barrier to the implementation of more radical plans. Lifelong learning is used by 
new Labour as an umbrella for the other concerns of this chapter, and many of the same themes are 
recurrent: the link between training and unemployment; the emphasis on standards which works 
against parity of esteem; voluntarism in the name of choice and opportunity; and the emphasis on 
releasing the potential of the individual. All of these areas reflect political concerns which have 
distorted the educational value of the concept of lifelong learning. By balancing the competing 
pressures and wishing to make populist connections between ideas in the polity and new Labour 
modernisation, the party raised, and then dashed expectations. 
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Chapter Eight 
 
Higher Education: actors, pressure and policy 
 
Chapter Five outlined the historical development of Labour‟s policies towards HE. It suggested that 
Labour comprised a dualism between egalitarians and meritocratic aims which it balanced in 
opposition and had to confront in Government. Labour also engaged in periods of consensus for 
example on the need for expansion. This chapter is concerned with new Labour and its relationship 
with the policy community and to trace electoral positionality in the context of  its proximity to 
office, and then goes on to demonstrate how new Labour in Government failed to transcend the 
interests of competing pressure groups in the HE sector by its efforts to stay within the confines of 
consensus, as the 1960s Labour Government had done. 
 
The policy environment 
The intention of this section is to trace the consensus which exists around a core of ideas relating to 
higher education issues, which came together or had already crystallised prior to the 1994-1997 
policymaking period. Three major categories of issues will be considered as case studies in the 
relationship between new Labour and external pressures. Firstly the chapter looks at two areas 
where little consensus was possible: the issues of quality and standards of provision; and the shape 
and structure of the higher education system. The third major issue, the funding of higher 
education, forms the main focus for the chapter because new Labour embraced a consensus 
position which could have potentially damaged its electoral appeal.  
The policy community in HE consists: the Department for Education and Employment, 10 
Downing Street, HM Treasury, and, during the period in question. Because of its proximity to 
power the new Labour front bench team of David Blunkett, Bryan Davies. Other key policy groups 
which take a permanent interest in higher education policy are: the Association of University 
Teachers (AUT), the National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education 
(NATFHE), the National Union of Students (NUS), the Committee of Vice Chancellors and 
Principals (CVCP), the Standing Conference of Principals (SCOP) the British Council, the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI), the Council for Industry in Higher Education (CIHE), the 
Committee of Scottish High Education Principals, (COSHEP), the Higher Education Funding 
Council for England (HEFCE), the Higher Education Funding Council for Wales (HEFCW) the 
Further Education Development Agency (FEDA), the Further Education, Funding Agency, 
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(FEFC), the Higher Education Quality Council (HEQC), the National Association for Adult 
Continuing Education,  (NIACE), the Scottish Higher Education Funding Council (SHEFC), the 
Society for Research into Higher Education (SRHE), the Teacher Training Agency (TTA), the 
University Association for Continuing Education (UACE), the University Council for the 
Education of Teachers (UCET), the University Council of Staff Development Association 
(UCoSDA), and the Labour Party‟s internal Socialist Education Association (SEA) and Association 
of Labour Students (ALS). In addition the Times Educational Supplement (TES) and the Times 
Higher Education Supplement (THES) are influential in expressing the diversity of opinion within 
the sector
727
.   
 In addition to these core bodies, there was a group of more ephemeral policy actors, either 
of individual or corporate construction. These are less permanent and interested in either specific 
issue areas or are concerned with the solution of temporary problems. They include: Sir Ron 
Dearing and the National Committee of Enquiry into Higher Education (NCIHE), Nicholas Barr 
and Iain Crawford, the Fryer Report team, accountants Coopers and Lybrand, Helena Kennedy‟s 
FEFC report team, the Fabian Society, Labour‟s Commission for Social Justice (CSJ) and 
Commission on Public Policy and British Business (CPPBB), David Robertson of Liverpool John 
Moores University and the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), and Josh Hillman, also of 
the IPPR.  
 
 
 
Issues, pressures and purpose 
As Chapter One demonstrated, there already existed a degree of inter-party consensus on some 
issues. This chapter aims to establish that is enough broad agreement beyond the parties to 
determine a set of consensus positions on the core issues, and it is in that sense that we can talk 
about there being an educational consensus that the Labour Party has to engage with when 
constructing policy. It is the assertion of this thesis that new Labour, when confronted with this 
consensus, chose to stay well within its confines Where there was little sense of consensus, new 
Labour avoided radical options derived from party ideology or reformers. 
 On some issues consensus was relatively easy to ascertain; as we have seen in Chapter Five, 
the development of the mid-1990s consensus position had been largely in response to the changing 
basis of demand, both for labour and for social advancement. The positions adopted by the party 
reflected the increasing emphasis on individual responsibility for continuing lifetime education and 
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an awareness of individual returns on learning. It should also be noted that many of the institutional 
actors overlap in membership and in the way they co-operate as lobbying organisations, on both 
research and campaigning issues. At the individual level, also, there are many Labour voters and 
supporters represented within these corporate organisations, some of whom were appointed to their 
posts with the advent of a Labour government in mind; in this sense there is a symbiotic 
relationship between the Party and the „educational consensus‟ which has to be taken into account 
when analysing the reasons for policy change, despite the absence of a specific higher education 
lobbying body within the Party‟s policymaking structure. The key question is the extent to which 
new Labour is affected by the competing pressures of internal and external factors. To this end the 
next section looks at the three main issues in more detail. 
 
Quality and standards 
There is comparatively little agreement on the core definitions of standards and quality or how best 
to achieve improvements because standards are evoked by defenders of the existing structure 
against potential reformers. Both new Labour and the National Commission into Higher Education 
(in the shape of the Dearing Report, 1997) failed to take on either of the extreme views and adopted 
a central position between them. In a low salience area such as this new Labour did not feel it had 
to directly take on interest groups. This section looks at the concerns of the interest groups and new 
Labour‟s reaction to the policy environment.  
Despite the lack of consensus among groups, few bodies were willing to admit that standards 
were falling in higher education
728
, although many thought that would be the outcome of a 
continued lack of funding. However, there was no evidence of consensus on the issue of quality 
assurance, where the CBI and the NUS found themselves on the same side in pressing for external 
assessment of institutions; both would share the student union‟s view that: 
It is vital for the development of higher education that a degree from University X is 
considered to be of an equal standard to that from University Y. Nothing could be more 
detrimental to the future of higher education than if the [Dearing] Committee did not robustly 
defend this view.
729
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However, the weight of the other interested actors, including the Higher Education Quality 
Council, was on the side of self-assessment through peer review
730
. HEFCE represented the view 
that standards must be expected to vary between institutions, but that “this need not matter if the 
standards aspired to and achieved are well understood”731. There were fears that the proposed new 
Quality Assurance Agency might impinge on academic autonomy, (it was akin to a national 
curriculum for some
732
) although some of those campaigning for the concept of lifelong learning, 
like Bob Fryer, see a strong, external quality assurance guarantee as a essential in an era of self-
financed students
733
. Strong quality assurance is also necessary for any credit accumulation and 
transfer scheme, and those groups opposed to either of these elements would be opposed to the 
other. They pose a clear threat to institutional autonomy; clearly self-interest determines the 
relative position of actors. While the CBI favoured external quality assurance for the value-added 
output, the NUS were motivated by ensuring equal labour market potential and equal rights as 
students for their members. 
In opposition new Labour proposed a new Higher Education Quality Agency in the Lifelong 
Learning document and in their own submission to Dearing, which called for a “proper balance 
between public accountability and institutional independence”734, with a membership drawn from 
academics, representative trade unions, student representatives and professional and employer 
bodies. One of its intentions was to give the Government advice on the development of a national 
credit framework and professional accreditation for HE teaching
735
. This seemed designed to 
straddle the divide, with some encouragement of a CAT system (after all, market choice is the 
corollary of student financed HE and demand-led expansion) yet with a quality assurance agency 
proposed which would keep most of the signals of market choice hidden within the institutions. 
The Dearing Committee‟s own findings also rejected the full market principle on quality: 
Uniformity of programmes and national curricula, one possible approach to the development 
of national standards, would deny higher education the vitality, excitement and challenge that 
comes from institutions consciously pursuing distinctive purposes, with academics having 
scope to pursue their own scholarship and enthusiasms in their teaching. The task facing 
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higher education is to reconcile that desirable diversity with achievement of reasonable 
consistency in standards of awards.
736
  
 
In this case, the position represented by the policy community groups on quality assurance seems to 
be one which acknowledged radicalism of market reformers, yet did not relish the full implications 
of such a change in educational culture. Given this situation both Dearing and new Labour  
consequently managed to steer a central course well away from the ideas they had both 
commissioned and sought out in the past
737
. In this case there was no consensus for new Labour to 
accommodate to. 
 
Shape and structure 
In discussions of the second major issue, the future shape and structure of the HE sector, 
correspondents to Dearing also failed to produce a consensus. While there was broad endorsement 
of diversification of provision and increased collaboration (AUT, NATFHE, CVCP, CIHE, 
HEFCE, NIACE, HHEW, SCOP, SHEFC, UACE, and the British Council), other groups went 
further in wishing to integrate further and higher education. This latter group, (SHEFC, FEFC, 
HEFCW, HEFCE, NATFHE and CIHE), representing employees, employers and the further 
education sector, were concerned to eradicate hierarchical forms in tertiary education (especially 
when 212,00 FE students, 5% of the total, are engaged in higher education
738
). However, 
representatives of the liberal education sector of the education market, such as the AUT, fear the 
diminution of the price and social value of HE if it is delivered in FE colleges or even the new, 
1992 universities, as the AUT submission to Dearing made clear: 
The advent of single formulae and the cultural wish of newer universities to look in almost 
all respects like older ones has created mission drift and a narrowing of perspective. We 
regret this trend....
739
 
 
The new Labour Government has concurred with this view, which coincided with the lifelong 
learning convention that sub-degree work, the area where Britain is perceived to be falling behind 
her competitors, should take place predominantly in further education colleges. Tony Blair‟s 
speech to the Labour Party Annual Conference in October 1997 promised 500,000 extra places in  
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further and higher education by 2002, and this was later clarified when ministers began to let it be 
known that FE would be the major beneficiary with 400,000 extra places
740
. Although this decision 
stored up trouble for the Government as far as funding issues were concerned
741
, it allowed them to 
take account of the divide between those actors representing liberal, meritocratic education and 
egalitarian education values. New Labour adopted a position in the absence of any consensus on 
the issue, hoping to balance the claims of the various protagonists 
 Similar cleavages occurred in the question surrounding status, with NIACE arguing against 
hierarchies, while at the other extreme the principals‟ organisation SCOP wished to relax the 
regulations on the status and titles to be used by HE institutions, whereby any institution beyond FE 
is classed as a university. SCOP‟s preference was to make it easier for intermediate groups to 
become university colleges
742
. New Labour had little to say on this issue. Overall, on the issues of 
the shape and structure of the HE sector in the future, new Labour in opposition and government 
steered a centralist course between the entrenched interests of the combatants. In the absence of 
consensus, the avoidance of open disagreement became the goal.  
  
Student finance 
The first two issues show new Labour not taking radical stances or tough decisions in areas of 
controversy, or more specifically where there was little evidence of consensus. The area of student 
finance differs in two main ways; firstly there was almost unanimity among interest groups that 
funding reform was necessary; secondly, adhering to this consensus position put new Labour in a 
position where it could have provoked electoral unpopularity. New Labour faced this dilemma in 
the pre-election period by using vague and ambiguous statements and the fact that the Dearing 
Report was not due until after the 1997 election to defer the impression that it was attacking free 
higher education. 
Not surprisingly, funding issues were of greatest concern to many of the policy actors. Two 
main concerns dominated the submissions to Dearing: the problem of  additional funding needs for 
institutions; and the problem of student support. Many, like COSHEP, believed they were 
inevitably linked and any solution should express a balanced approach between state, student and 
employers which recognised, in the words of the SCOP submission that “improvements in the level 
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of funding are unlikely to involve a greater contribution from general taxation”743. These two 
smaller principal‟s bodies allied with the CVCP in lobbying for the inclusion of tuition fees within 
the broad consensus position which accepted the principle of income contingent loans for 
maintenance
744. Other organisations used terminology like „free at the point of delivery‟ (AUT), 
„free to students before and during participation‟ (NUS745) or declared that “we do not favour a 
policy that depends solely on the students paying more”746 to express their positions. New Labour 
itself declared in the 1997 manifesto that: "The costs of student maintenance should be repaid by 
graduates on an income-related basis, from the career success to which higher education has 
contributed"
747
. 
 
In an echo of the AUT‟s position and the internal memos from John Smith‟s office (which 
suggested that new Labour could keep student maintenance loans on the basis that higher education 
would remain “free at the point of delivery”748) discussed in Chapter Five of this thesis, new 
Labour believed it could administer the loans system more efficiently and fairly. Ironically, given 
the post-election furore over free higher education, the largest element of consensus across all the 
issues so far discussed in this chapter was the belief in a degree of student-financed higher 
education. Beyond this consensus NATFHE uniquely stood on the principle of the retention of 
mandatory awards and free tuition
749, Labour‟s 1992 manifesto position.  
 The fine distinction between paying for maintenance and paying for fees was not made by 
all the submissions, especially where they were concerned with the wider institutional funding 
problems. Many such submissions saw the solution in changing the structure of learning, in line 
with the two-plus-two model favoured in the United States
750
. The NIACE submission contained a 
plan to divide HE into cycles, only the first of which would attract public finance, with the 
specialist levels left to the responsibility of the individual or sponsoring employers. The CIHE also 
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favoured such a scheme in the interest of spreading public funds more equitably
751
. Other groups 
believed that full course modularisation is the key, with public sponsorship limited to smaller units 
of learning (COSHEP), while others, such as the AUT with their endorsement of Learning Bonds 
and the Learning Bank implicitly accept the concept of part-funded education taken in units smaller 
than the traditional three-to-five year degree
752
. All these examples provide pointers to how a 
government could operate a system in which students contributed to their own education, rather 
than merely to the costs of maintenance. 
 One group which defended the principle of retaining “an element of fully funded taxpayer 
tuition” was the CBI, which believed that the necessary efficiency gains required in the sector 
would not accrue if all courses attracted a flat fee. That would best occur under conditions where 
universities have the freedom to charge differential fees reflecting market demand and by retaining 
maintenance grants only for the worst off
753
. Once again, the self-interest of policy actors is 
evident, as in this case the CBI felt they could not leave it up to the universities to make themselves 
more efficient without some market push, nor did they expect individuals to invest sufficiently to 
meet industry‟s demands. 
 Despite this caveat, it is possible to discern elements of the funding consensus. Firstly, it 
was largely agreed that free student maintenance was not compatible with the size of higher 
education sector at the present time or as envisaged in the future. Secondly, it was similarly agreed 
that students, as the major beneficiaries of higher education, should be expected to contribute 
something to the costs of their education. Thirdly, it was widely accepted that repayments (be they 
of maintenance or fees) could be made easier to bear. Fourthly, the Robbins principle that access to 
higher education should not be dependent on the ability to pay was upheld, along with its corollary 
that intake be demand led.  
How then did new Labour respond to this set of consensus positions? In fact the party‟s 
Lifelong Learning policy document of 1996 already accepted much of this agenda, which it linked 
with the need to expand: 
A broad consensus has developed in favour of seeking a contribution to the costs of higher 
education from those who benefit from it. The Committee of Vice-Chancellors and 
Principals, the National Union of Students and the Association of University Teachers have 
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all recognised that the fairest and most efficient way of increasing the number of university 
places is to share the burden of expansion between public and personal resources
754
. 
 
The document went on to note that governments around the world had faced up to the same 
pressure for expansion by “building new funding partnerships”755, citing the World Bank‟s report 
which found that all of the fifteen leading industrialised countries it surveyed operated contributory 
schemes. Particularly singled out by new Labour was the Australian Higher Education Contribution 
Scheme introduced in 1989, through which students pay for part of their own tuition
756
. However, 
the document did not make clear that the Australian example is one of student financed fees as well 
as maintenance, it was merely presented as an alternative funding regime for higher education
757
. 
The document had in effect bundled the separate issues of maintenance and tuition into „costs‟ as a 
catch-all category for the uninitiated. This was in line with the expectations of the CVCP‟s Chair 
Gareth Roberts, in December 1996, that [new Labour] “will definitely not rule out tuition fees in 
the manifesto”758. In fact, the election manifesto confined itself to maintenance and noted that 
“[t]he improvement and expansion needed cannot be funded out of general taxation”759. However, 
the seed, the recognition of the utility of the HECS and the principle of student-paid fees, had been 
planted in Lifelong Learning. 
 Therefore, new Labour‟s policymaking efforts prior to the 1997 General Election seem 
designed to obscure or fudge the tuition funding issue in the minds of the electorate, who were 
essentially told a set of truisms: that student loans were inevitable but could be administered more 
fairly; that more money would have to go into HE; that it was right and fair that the recipients of 
education should contribute to its costs; and that some countries operated schemes which allowed 
this to occur without damaging the equity of student intake (although this was a contested point).  
 The next section sets out the events surrounding new Labour‟s legislative impact and aims 
to trace the lobbying process by which the party‟s leadership was drawn into this series of policy 
positions. The background context provided by this examination of the position of policy actors is 
                                                          
754
 Labour Party (1996) Lifelong Learning, The Labour Party, London, p.21 
755
 ibid, p.21. 
756
 ibid, p.21. 
757
 In Lifelong Learning the argument is not explored. However, there is controversy about the equity 
of the HECS, in that some contest the figures of  working class and mature students deterred by 
charges, while others have noted that flat fees were best suited to non-mass systems of higher 
education, not for systems where positional good demands differentials in funding, as with the elite 
universities and the Oxbridge colleges in the United Kingdom system, see Maslen,G (1998) 
Unregulated market plan triggers union fury, THES, 16/1/98 and Barr,N (1997) Australian mantra to 
ward off (at least) some evils, THES Opinion, 3/10/97. 
758
 interview with author, Sheffield 10/12/96. 
759
 Labour Party (1997) New Labour: because Britain deserves better, The Labour Party, London, 
April 1997, p.9. 
245 
 
worth reiterating. Primarily, liberal and meritocratic education prerogatives dominated the agenda, 
as concerns about academic autonomy in terms of individual academic freedoms and the ability of 
institutions to police their own quality won out over more radical proposals to subject HE to some 
kind of open market testing. This would imply demand-led provision and is thus linked to attitudes 
towards opening access to wider groups of students, beyond the traditional age and social groups. 
No group was impolitic enough to deny the arguments for wider access or challenge the logic of 
lifelong learning, but the weight of argument, as distilled in contributions to Dearing and in new 
Labour‟s interpretation, worked against any widening agenda which threatened institutional 
autonomy on any of the key issues of funding and quality control, and by extension, on opening up 
a credit-based access scheme. Equally, no group, apart from NATFHE, stood against the idea of 
student contributions making up the shortfall created by previous expansion.  
The Dearing Report: the policymaking end-game 
The imminent arrival of the Dearing Report in July 1997 represented new Labour‟s first 
opportunity to show how it was going to tackle to problems of student finance.  By late 1996 and 
early 1997, it had become clear that Dearing‟s NCIHE would recommend some form of student-
financed tuition. The Conservative‟s Secretary of State Gillian Shephard had established the 
NCIHE precisely (and with bipartisan support) to delay a decision on the future funding of the 
sector until after the 1997 election. In the days prior to the publication of the report, Higher 
Education in the Learning Society (the Dearing Report, 23rd July 1997), it became clear that the 
retention of maintenance grants was the preferred option of the Committee, but with the 
introduction of flat-rate tuition fees paid by all
760
.  
The new Government‟s alternative solution differed from the Dearing Report‟s in that it 
wanted to abolish maintenance grants altogether, but introduce a flat-rate contribution of 25% of 
the cost of tuition (£1,000) with means-tested exemptions for students from the poorest 
backgrounds. This was seen by universities as a „fudged‟ policy, attempting to keep the NUS and 
parliamentary backbenchers onside
761
. The NUS let it be known that they had colluded with the 
Government to prevent students from the poorest homes being charged tuition fees, having 
recognised that this was Dearing‟s favoured option; Douglas Trainer, NUS President said his 
organisation was “very pleased about the decision on means testing fees but we believe the 
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principle of fees is wrong and we will campaign against this”762. New Labour MPs could expect to 
be reminded by their constituents that losing almost £2,000 in grant entitlement and gaining £1,000 
in free tuition still left poorer students £1,000 per year worse off, as well as accruing greater debts 
than other students
763
. As for families, the Government  declared that: "there will be no parental 
contribution from lower income families; and their will be no increase in parental contributions 
from middle and higher income families"
764
. 
 
As many pointed out, this was in fact disingenuous if the whole family, parents and students, were 
to be taken as the calculation unit, because the shortfall in parental input would in future be more 
than made up for by student borrowing, otherwise there would have been no extra money accruing 
to HE. That week‟s THES Editorial disapproved of the reverse-spin which accompanied the 
decision (designed as it was to show that no middle class parents would pay more), but recognised 
that  new Labour had  actually, and radically, cut back on the ultimate middle class benefit, free 
higher education
765
. Moreover, new Labour had adapted Dearing with a more equitable repayment 
system, beginning when incomes reached £10,000 rather than the report‟s recommended £5,000766. 
David Blunkett presented this in the light of party principles: 
Our preferred solution secures equity, access, quality and accountability. Our proposals 
retain the principle that repayments should be made on the basis of future income, not 
present circumstances
767
. 
 
The resulting funding arrangements would mean that students with parents earning below £35,000 
would not pay the full £1,000 (25% of tuition costs) per year, and those whose parents earned less 
than £16,000 would pay nothing at all. Parents who earned between £16,000 and £34,000 would 
pay a larger share of tuition and their offspring qualify for a smaller supplementary loan for 
maintenance the closer their income came to the upper limit
768
. However, this hybrid of the Dearing 
Report and new Labour‟s manifesto pledge on maintenance would produce less money for HE than 
the universities‟ identified funding gap between 1997 and the end of the century, only realising £1 
billion as opposed to £3 billion. With exemptions for poor students, this would reduce the extra 
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income for HE to £600 million. However, David Blunkett held out some hope for a new funding 
arrangement which would remove student borrowing from the Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement (PSBR), although that would not be possible for the following financial year
769
. The 
politics behind this decision will be discussed in due course. 
 Access was one of the biggest areas of concern. Even if mature and working class students 
continued to apply in the same numbers, the colleges and ex-polytechnics they traditionally 
attended would suffer disproportionately from the lack of incoming fees, assuming a poorer client-
base. This would negate the effects of new Labour‟s backing for more sub-degree level work in 
much of their lifelong learning rhetoric
770
.  
Therefore, for a combination of reasons, new Labour‟s funding policy caused controversy. 
There were objections from within higher education about what proportion of the tuition fees 
would actually accrue to HE because the Treasury would see loan repayments long before any 
funds trickled down to the institutions. In the post-Dearing public debate, during the Autumn-
Winter 1997-1998, there were proposals for a more rational funding system
771
, calculations were 
made which predicted that working class students would leave university with debts of £12,000 or 
more
772
, and that working class student couples could facing combined repayments of £25,000 
which could prevent them from buying a home
773
. There was also a period of confusion before the 
fears of students who had already decided to take a gap-year before advancing to university were 
assuaged, and exemptions were clarified
774
. An anomaly had also been pointed out whereby 
Scottish and European Union students could not be charged for the traditional fourth year of the 
Scottish degree programme, whilst English, Welsh and Northern Irish domiciled students would 
have to find an extra £1,000 if they chose to study north of the border
775
. Moreover, by November 
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1997, application returns to UCAS were being scrutinised by critics who pointed out evidence of a 
falling-off of mature and working class students
776
.  
The culmination of three to four years of policy development seemed to be the primacy of 
presentational and back-bench management considerations in determining policy. The Government 
had failed to build up popular support for the principled stand on means testing tuition fees, or on 
sticking to the manifesto commitment on grants
 777
. It had also become associated with the 
conservatism of the Dearing Report on course modularisation and the denial of the long-expected 
right of part-time students to apply for loans. Meanwhile, in contrast to the Government, Dearing 
himself was portrayed as the defender of student maintenance grants
778
.  
The lobbying process: new Labour and other policy actors 
Adapting to the consensus view on student self-financing obliged new Labour to take a potentially 
unpopular stance in its primary arena, that of public opinion. As we have seen, new Labour 
minimised the political effect of this decision through a degree of obscurantism about its real 
intentions during the pre-election period. In this section, the intention is to explore the actual 
lobbying relationships during the period when policy was being determined and later implemented 
in Government. The context for the interaction between actors was clearly set out by Bryan Davies, 
who was charged with developing policy on further and higher education issues as shadow 
spokesman. One key element of this context was the lack of an internal pressure group with an 
interest in HE. While the higher education policy community is open, in internal party politics there 
was no significant interests and therefore little political cost beyond the specific issue of tuition fees 
and maintenance grants. Davies believed Walworth Road was supportive of what his working 
group were doing. In reality this meant that: 
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How it would run with the NUS was probably more important than how it would run with 
Labour Youth, lets say, simply because Labour Youth would be largely on board if the NUS 
was on board... our job was to address ourselves to the national issue and secondly to the 
party...
779
 
 
As we might expect given the assumptions of Chapter Two of this thesis, Davies  chose to contrast 
this with the experiences of the party during the 1970s and up to 1983, when 
the problem for policymakers really was, what does the party want, and secondly how do 
we square that with the nation. Now it is, what is the nation willing to support, and then, 
will the party support this too....
780
 
 
Davies selected his policymaking working group
781
 from Labour-friendly academics such as 
Roderick Floud, Andrew Graham, Lesley Wagner, Cliff MacLauren, some of the Labour 
supporting Vice Chancellor‟s and “sub-groups of the interest groups with a particular Labour 
orientation”782. This group began to meet in spring 1995,  while Davies and his researcher Nick 
Pearce would relate the findings of this group into the 1996 policy statement Lifelong Learning. 
None of the institutional staff associations or quangos were invited to become members of the 
working group. However, such groups were able to gain access to new Labour‟s front-bench as and 
when necessary, partly on the basis of the salience and seriousness of various issues, and partly by 
institutional size. Tom Wilson, assistant general secretary of the AUT (the largest staff association 
within HE), believed that:  
....size does matter more to Labour, they will listen to us to the extent that they think that a) 
we have something to say, and b) if they don‟t like what we say they think we could cause 
them problems... ...so they do listen to us because they think we have interesting things to 
say, but they are not that bothered if at the end of the day they come out with something that 
we disagree with
783
. 
 
Anne Cotteril of NATFHE recognised that new Labour were not able or obliged to consult with 
every practitioner or interest groups before publishing papers, rather it was up to them to respond to 
party documents. In the pre-election period NATFHE had: "....quite friendly relations with Bryan 
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Davies.... ... there was generally no problem in setting up a meeting by issue [with the new Labour 
front bench]."
784
 
 
It is difficult to evaluate the real returns on lobbying because several groups shared the same 
concerns. Overall, however, representatives of the elite institutions such as the CVCP and the AUT 
can be seen to have had more influence on new Labour than the NUS and NATFHE. There are 
several opportunities to lobby political parties, for example, through evidence to the education 
select committee of the House of Commons, direct responses to party/departmental documents, 
submissions to the NCIHE or via media events. The difficulty is described by NATFHE‟s Ann 
Cotteril in relation to their opposition to the introduction of top-up fees,  “if we see top-up fees not 
being introduced we won‟t know if that it‟s because of our campaign”785. Actors also have a 
perhaps distorted view of the efficacy of other groups‟ ability to affect policy, particularly 
NATFHE who feared they were being out-lobbied by representatives of the elite universities: 
I think if you tried to do anything to change Oxford and Cambridge‟s funding you would 
expect a lot of lobbying. Certainly when Labour were in opposition there were people from 
the old universities going to see them..
786
 
 
This turned out to be prescient, as CVCP and representatives of the elite institutions began an 
assault on new Labour‟s plans to set uniform tuition fees during the Autumn of 1997787. The AUT 
were similarly concerned about new Labour‟s affection for lifelong learning and its potential to 
damage the interests of “HE as a distinctive activity”, concerned not with employability or 
competitiveness but with the search for “the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth”788. 
 One thing that both the major staff associations were agreed upon was new Labour‟s 
seriousness about developing realistic policy in the expectation of gaining power. Here we can see 
new Labour consciously moving from a fringe position to one at the centre of the policy 
community. For example, Tom Wilson believed that: 
Labour have become more interested in nitty-gritty policy issues... ..as the prospect of 
power has become closer. So looking back to say six or seven years ago, a lot of our 
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relationship with the Labour Party was really about campaigning issues, they weren‟t that 
interested in details of policy, it was just, well lets bash the Tories
789
. 
 
This was a view endorsed by NATFHE and Socialist Education Association representatives, and 
the sense of expectation was summed up the decision of the CVCP and other organisations to 
employ some of their representatives on the basis of their party affiliation. The developing belief 
that new Labour would win in 1997 led Gareth Roberts, Chair of the CVCP in the two years before 
July 1997,  to choose his executive specifically with a change of government in mind; he selected 
Tessa (now Baroness) Blackstone and Michael Sherwood for their Labour Party affiliation, and 
identified twenty-seven VC‟s who were party members790. The AUT also employed David 
Melhuish, a Labour Party researcher in the Lords between 1992 and 1997, after the election.  
Policy groups also share some of the same concerns  and seek to build alliances with 
Opposition parties which seem to have a chance of attaining power. Despite the different, and 
basically unchanging value systems of interest groups, most would work together on 
complementary issues, even if competition for members or interest clashes precluded lobbying 
together on all issues. NATFHE worked in conjunction with several partners on general funding 
and expansion issues, targeting their lobbying efforts 
...at a number of different bodies, not just government. We work with other organisations, for 
funding we had a major campaign last year with the AUT, CVCP plus the unions and 
employers as well, NUS, AUCL (now absorbed into AUT) and UNISON...
791
. 
 
The other major staff association, AUT, recognise the value of joint campaigns on some issues, but 
were aware that the two staff associations represented different interests and values. Tom Wilson 
believed that 
... we in the AUT are trying to prove that we are a professional association first and 
foremost.... [and] because we are a professional association it is more appropriate that we 
develop the sort of links with Parliament and influence events that way rather than by 
walking out on strike.. 
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... I think NATFHE has somewhat more informal but stronger links with the Labour Party‟s 
left-wingers, maybe because a lot of the MPs have come through that employment route, 
maybe because NATFHE has been very active in race politics..
792
  
 
On specific issues like the introduction of tuition fees, AUT, in conjunction with others, had 
campaigned for a change in attitude from the Opposition Labour Party since 1992, to the extent that 
a Labour spokesman Jeff Rooker had been sacked from his post in 1994 for considering fees out 
loud: 
...there has been so much kind of background work before that shift could take place over 
the last few years, way before Jeff Rooker even, we had been trying to play our part in 
hoping to create a climate where it was possible for that shift to take place, as the NUS has, 
but in return if you like, for us making it crystal clear what the conditions are, and what we 
say is, if Labour judge that the climate is such that you can't ever really maintain grants or 
increase taxation to a level where fees won't be necessary.... then, well these are the 
minimum criteria that we would want for any new system; that it should be progressive 
taxation not regressive, that it will actually deliver more money, that it should be stable and 
secure, that it should be paid for by those who actually benefit from the service, employers 
as well as students..
793
. 
 
At NATFHE, where the association was against the introduction of student fees and the abolition of 
grants, the institutional response to Labour‟s decision was to change tack to take account of the 
new context, for example: 
....certainly we are aware of  some opposition among MPs to the issue of  fees. As soon as 
David Blunkett announced fees, a letter was sent by our acting General Secretary to David 
Blunkett, and we particularly focused on top-up fees because although we are opposed to 
fees, we concentrated on an area where we thought we might be able to have some 
influence, we chose top-up fees because that was an area where we were aware that there is 
some lobbying in the other direction.
794
 
 
Here NATFHE reacted to the new context (where two of their former allies joined the lobby for 
top-up fees to be introduced) by reverting to their core activities in other forms of lobbying 
behaviour: 
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....and that does mean relating what we say to our general philosophical stance which is 
very much in support of access, widening participation, particularly in the direction of 
ethnic minorities and people who are less well represented, as well as what is in the interests 
of the new universities, so we are less concerned with the elite universities.
795
 
 
This illustrates the fluid nature of interest group lobbying, even while the interest groups 
themselves are relatively stable in terms of values. It is the changing political context which alters 
the actors‟ relationship with one another. While NATFHE and the NUS were happy to campaign 
alongside the AUT and CVCP on increased funding, once new Labour had decided upon student-
financed tuition, the groups reassembled on opposite sides of the top-up fees debate, with AUT 
claiming credit for having prepared the ground with Labour since around 1990, as we have seen, 
while NATFHE stood on the principles of free education because of their core position of widening 
access.  
 Similar cleavages between the organisations were recorded on issues of shape and structure,  
partly because NATFHE represent staff in both FE and HE, and even in HE they are predominantly 
represented in the new (post 1992) universities: 
....another part of our philosophical position in NATFHE is that education is a continuum, 
we don‟t see a sharp divide between FE and HE, we are very much aware that a lot of HE is 
delivered in FE, and vice-versa, so we are very much aware of the common issues.
796
 
 
This duality leads to the association having to take somewhat ambiguous stance about structural 
funding distributions, of course “we don't think HE is so well off that money should be 
redistributed to FE”797.  
The position of NATFHE shows how relatively weak the association had become in relation 
to most of the groups inside the policy community on some issues, suggesting a less sympathetic 
environment for employment-related issues of concern to a lecturer‟s trade union. In contrast, the 
AUT, which finds itself more often on the side of the main Principal‟s organisations, CVCP, could 
use the talisman of retaining quality and standards of provision as part of their argument for the 
status quo, in relation to autonomy and funding distribution. The AUT perceive the university 
system as one which has been systematically underfunded by successive governments, and link 
fears about standards and money slipping away into FE to their line on funding: 
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Part of the roots of the problem are in the success of HE, ..... and that is part of the problem 
that AUT along with CVCP have had in trying to fight against the big cuts in HE that we 
have seen over the years. They [government] have turned round and said, but you are still 
highly regarded worldwide with standards and quality, and it seems to be the case that they 
have lost out because of that
798
. 
 
The result of this is that funding across all tertiary education sectors can increasingly be portrayed 
as a zero-sum game: 
I can see this happening, because when there is a generally accepted problem as there is in 
FE, then it tends to get locked onto at the cost of other sectors, for example look at how at 
this time they are talking about raising money from HE students, without any absolute, 
explicit guarantee that it will be just for HE.
799
  
 
From this perspective, then, any changes to the shape and structure of HE and FE could have 
threatened the autonomy and funding base of the university sector. Clearly the AUT form part of a 
higher education lobby within the policy community which, is set against any diminution of 
institutional or sectoral autonomy. Therefore, a political party with an agenda towards lifelong 
learning, widening access, and which puts so much faith in the abilities of the education system to 
improve national competitiveness, would have to confront this lobby if it wanted to move policy 
beyond the status quo ante. 
 We might expect new Labour to be less responsive to elite institutions because the party 
does have an internal bias towards further and vocational education issues because of the 
employment background of its MPs, while in contrast, there is no parallel group with a sectoral 
interest in higher education within the party. Therefore an ideological approach to party 
policymaking should lead us to expect some movement towards FE concerns. However, David 
Blunkett, a Labour Secretary of State with experience of working within FE as a lecturer, did not 
see the lack of a HE lobby in the party as making any difference "because the forces of HE through 
the media and through their personal contacts are enormous and they counterweight any influence 
the party may have..."
800
. 
 
Even in the future, when receipts from the reductions in the social security budget begin to accrue 
to education, Blunkett expects further education to remain the marginalised group in relation to HE: 
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“given the clout of HE, the bulk of it will go to higher education”801. Blunkett believed that this 
was due to some of his fellow members “who are instinctively conservative about HE, they tend to 
be defensive of what is there now rather than radical about what could happen”802. 
 Evidence in support of this argument is provided by Bryan Davies
803
 who saw the party‟s 
developing views on the funding of HE thus: 
....if we are to expand the system we cannot do that from taxpayers funding HE, and the 
party is, I think, coming late to that view... ...the interesting thing about that is when we 
were developing the obvious points, we couldn‟t look at the expansion of HE on the basis of 
offering particular privileges to the 18-21 year old‟s maintenance support, now the 1992 
manifesto supported going back to 1979 levels of student maintenance. It wasn‟t 
sustainable, but in a sense there has been a realisation of change without the party fully 
understanding the arguments.
804
 
 
Clearly, the new Labour front bench was not responding to pressures from within the party, which, 
as we have seen, offers no coherent argument based on principle, except that expressed by those 
who wished to see the continuation of free tuition and maintenance. This raises two questions about 
the Labour Party‟s electoral strategy. Was the 1992 manifesto, which promised a return to 1979 
levels of student support, written with the serious expectation of attaining power?; and did the 
1994-1997 leadership react purely to the Conservative‟s expansion of places during the 1988-1992 
period? Bryan Davies believed that: 
....throughout the eighties we were always severely critical of the fairly elitist model in 
terms of access, we wanted to lever open the doors of HE.... the Tory government...under 
manpower pressure..[were influenced by two things]... you keep the unemployment figures 
down, but on the positive side there was a build up of pressure from the employment side. 
Although that was not articulated at the level of Conservative philosophy, there was a 
response to pressure that they had to succumb to quite readily, namely what the bosses were 
saying to them.
805
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Would Labour have had to react to the same pressures (the changing basis of demand for labour) if 
it had been in office during the 1980s? Certainly by 1992, the effects of the expansion were clear, 
hence the introduction of the Student Loans scheme in 1991, while representatives of the HE lobby 
were calling for a new funding regime to account for the new conditions of expansion. Only the 
authors of the Labour Party manifesto seemed unaware of the changed context. Davies clearly felt 
that any 1980s Labour governmental expansion would have been incremental, rather than unfunded 
growth. However, he neatly encapsulated Labour‟s philosophical dualism in discussing the 
possibilities of manpower planning: 
....to be fair to us on the left, there is bound to be some reservation about education purely 
as the instrument of efficiency. In a very real sense, I would sooner people have had higher 
education experience ..... even if they have to be unemployed..
806
  
 
This is an expression of the philosophical trade-off between meritocratic liberal and egalitarian 
values within the party discussed earlier. Without going beyond the boundaries of Labour 
supporters in HE, the party were able to cover all the range of opinions and positions within the 
wider policy community.  
New Labour, on approaching the prospect of government and in Government, chose to build 
on this and position itself in relation to a consensus-driven policy community, rather than to fit into 
any radical traditional position, a decision made easier by the lack of such a tradition on the left. To 
what extent did the lobbying by a section of the policy community and the presence of key party 
personnel affect policy in the run-up to the 1997 election? 
 The seriousness of new Labour‟s efforts to advance policy on student support after the 1992 
defeat was reflected in the party‟s relationships with key policy actors. Although the debates were 
confined within the Labour „movement‟ or broad church, the major motivational factor behind 
policy change was externally derived, largely consisting the lobbying of the AUT and CVCP. 
During 1994 two memoranda had been prepared for John Smith which demonstrated that Labour 
realised student contributions would have to form a plank of any serious party policy on HE 
funding
807
. This was closely related to the rationing of HE, so the solution also had ramifications 
for shape and structure issues like widening access to less represented groups. There would also be 
a knock-on effect on the issue of quality and standards, especially if money had to be drawn away 
from the spending priorities of higher education‟s elite. Against this policy background, Labour 
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would have to aggravate the electorally vital middle-income families to attain such a funding shift 
by threatening free higher education for their offspring. 
Policy change on student support after 1992 can then be seen to have developed in response 
to changes in context, as interpreted by the party. Change was not attempted before 1992 
presumably because the new context was not assumed to be permanent, and that a Labour 
Government would have gone back to 15% APR, generously funded, or key party actors could not 
be persuaded to face up to the new context. There was no reference to higher education in the 1994 
policy statement Opening Doors to a Learning Society which reflects the fact that  shadow 
spokeswoman Ann Taylor either did not want to highlight an issue which had recently cost a junior 
spokesman  his post. After the accession of Tony Blair to the leadership and the appointment of 
David Blunkett as shadow Secretary of State, new Labour found it easier to make the intellectual 
case for change. However, changing policy at the level of Conference still required some delicate 
interactions between  party affiliates and key external (but Labour-oriented) policy actors.  
Despite the lobbying of the party and the developing consensus among interest groups, the 
prospects for the adoption of  student fees did not look good on the eve of the 1995 Labour Party 
Annual Conference, when Bryan Davies said: "Some people within the party have canvassed the 
idea of repayment of fees, but I do not see any real interest in it among those with an interest in 
education."
808
. In fact, some of the groundwork had already begun at the 1995 conference of the 
NUS, when the executive floated several Labour-friendly policy options, ruling out only the status 
quo and top-up fees. Proposals for more flexible student loans with repayments based on income 
(known as a Maintenance Income Contingent Loan) were considered, within the framework of five 
principles: alleviating hardship; improving access to education; bridging inequalities between 
further and higher education; funding equitably full and part-time study; and enhancing education 
quality, all of which favoured schemes which fitted in with new Labour‟s broad philosophy809. In 
this way, new Labour were able to float, and gain acceptance for several ideas which would affect 
students more than any other group, even as Davies was officially sceptical.  
 At the 1995 Labour Party Conference the NEC were confronted with a motion which would 
have offered student support more generous than the levels envisaged in the 1992 manifesto, which 
was supported by thirty constituency groups. The NEC opposed the motion, claiming the backing 
of  Catherine Taylor, youth representative on the NEC, and eventually won the vote by a margin of 
77% to 23%
810
. This was critical for policy change in two ways. Firstly, it allowed David Blunkett 
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to criticise the costs of the motion, £10 billion, and the way that Conference pressurised leadership 
autonomy; it was “a classic resolution of impossible demands that places us rather than the Tories 
on the rack”811. Secondly, by allowing Bryan Davies to discuss how the freed-up resources would 
allow new Labour to consider plans to widen access. In a classic reshaping of the agenda, Davies 
told reporters after the vote that: 
There are still sections of the party which regard grants as part of the welfare state, and the 
argument is based on the premise that inadequate resources are the chief reason why people 
do not go into higher education. But this is not so. The real reason is that access is severely 
restricted
812
. 
 
By trading off the issues of funding and access, Davies stayed within the confines of party 
ideology, making use of the egalitarian desire for wider access and playing on working class 
disillusionment with the unfairness of the „middle-class benefit‟. Institutionally, the 1995 
Conference vote not to reject student loans for maintenance and the 1996 vote which decided not to 
reject income contingent loans were heavily reliant on the support of a few key groups, in effect 
actors in the trade-off process. Catherine Taylor noted that spending £2.5 billion on restoring 
student grants was not supported by either Labour Students (an affiliate body) or the NUS (who 
had, as we have seen, supported the leadership line in April 1996), instead “what we want is a loan 
system that works, and a higher education system that gives more people the opportunity to 
learn”813. Graham Lane of the SEA saw the 1995 vote as giving Blunkett “a green light to develop 
something about student finance”. However the political sensitivity of the issue was illustrated by 
the report that new Labour “still thought it was a vote-loser” until the NUS conference vote in April 
1996
814
. Acknowledging that the 1996 Labour Party conference would present difficulties for the 
leadership, Lane believed the fact was that: 
Labour Students at their Conference supported it [the new line], and so did the SEA at its 
Conference, so you need powerful allies to defeat those who don‟t want to go back to 
student grants, and then [the Labour Party] Conference will have made a decision, and it 
legitimises the shadow policy.
815
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Therefore, new Labour was able not only to change the nature of policy towards student support, 
but also managed to present it in the light of party democracy.  
 Even as new Labour developed policy within the essentially democratic framework of the 
party constitution, this thesis demonstrates that the actual ideas that shape policy change can come 
from external sources. The background to the introduction of changes to student finance was 
created by the Conservative‟s underfunded expansion between 1988 and 1992 (which in turn was a 
response to employment demand) and the Government‟s introduction of the Student Loans Scheme 
for maintenance in 1991. New Labour only then had to accept the inevitability of student-financed 
tuition, while offering concessions (such as Blair‟s promise to widen access and provide for some 
expansion at the 1997 Conference) which satisfied elements of party ideology. It is far from clear 
that any of the party‟s larger affiliates, such as the trade unions, would have blocked the 
introduction of student financed HE on a matter of principle, at a time when Labour were less 
overtly courting „middle-England‟. 
 Because new Labour left student finance deliberately vague in policy statements during the 
1994-97 policymaking period, progress was not as smooth as  seemed likely after the 1996 
Conference. As we have noted, new Labour was unwilling to openly admit that it would introduce 
tuition fees before the 1997 election. Sir Ron Dearing had written to all the parties during 1996 
asking them not to pre-empt his report by making any statements on HE funding. Labour in fact 
broke this rule during its 1996 Conference, by overtly ruling out top-up fees. New Labour clearly 
wanted to sound tough on top-up fees at a time when the delegates were accepting the Lifelong 
Learning document and rejecting a motion to overturn the income contingent loan element by 61 to 
39% (which effectively gave the green light for tuition fees)
816
. Indeed, the CVCP had taken new 
Labour‟s acquiescence on tuition fees as an opportunity to lobby openly for top-up fees, and the 
heightened political awareness surrounding the Conference provided the ideal opportunity for the 
leadership to be seen as tough-minded (as the difference between fees and top-up fees might not 
have been clear to many potential Labour voters). However, this was widely seen as having 
backfired, as CVCP were using the top-up fees issue as a political lever to raise more funds from 
the DfEE in the next financial year
817
. Therefore, the political expedient of wanting to sound tough 
on (top-up) fees at the time of the Conference dominated Labour strategy during the winter of 
1996/1997, perhaps to the extent of reducing total DfEE spending on higher education. 
 This was underlined closer to the appearance of the Dearing Report, when new Labour 
began to pre-emptively leak its own plans, first on selling off the student loan book (which Dearing 
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thought a poor deal
818
), and later on introducing flat-rate fees for all as well as abolishing the 
maintenance grant and introducing income contingent loans. As we have noted, this attracted much 
criticism from students, parents and Labour Party members, who had not taken much heed of the 
manifesto commitment on maintenance, but there is no doubt that new Labour‟s stance was 
ambiguous as the real position on fees had played no part in the election campaign or manifesto
819
. 
 Why then did new Labour feel the need to choose this particular option? Bryan Davies felt 
that the party had gone into the election with a clear policy on maintenance, but on fees, there were 
no clear signals emanating from the Dearing process prior to May 1st. From the point of view of 
ministers 
they decided they couldn‟t allow Dearing to come out on the issue of fees and no signal to 
come out from government. They didn‟t think Dearing had solved the problem and the 
pressures on funding for next year, they felt they had to condition the debate.... The 
executive decision was that they decided to put out their stance alongside Dearing, and I 
have to say I would have reached the same judgement if I had been part of the process.
820
 
 
David Blunkett expressed the same argument in different terms, mainly to explain why new Labour 
had come out with a response to Dearing on the same day as the report itself,  23rd July 1997, in 
the final week of the Parliamentary session: 
....if we hadn‟t taken the principle decision, every single option would have been rubbished 
over the summer and autumn. Different MPs and sections of the party would have taken up 
different stances, by the time we would have come to make a decision, we would hardly 
have had any troops on our side, so the idea of saying, this is what we intend to do, is at 
least pull the bulk of the Parliamentary party, reluctantly in some cases, behind us, rather 
than them expressing a perfectly genuine view that they were then expected to renounce 
once we had made the decision.
821
 
 
Clearly, from a party management point of view, it made sense for the leadership to control the 
timing of the report‟s emergence. Although Blunkett claimed that backbenchers and supporters had 
“missed the point that we had changed policy” at the time of Lifelong Learning, new Labour still 
had opportunities to avoid the fees debacle. One potential solution was presented by the proposed 
change to „resource accounting‟, a mechanism which allows government to take student borrowing 
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out of the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) on the reasonable assumption that the 
majority of it would be repaid. Bryan Davies highlighted the ongoing political problem this had 
raised: 
I thought that the general stance of the ONS (Office of National Statistics) and the Treasury 
on what counts as the PSBR was largely a reflection of the political will of the last 
government, and I thought, and still believe they were very value-laden and they were going 
to change under a Labour administration
822
. 
 
This was crucial as a method for immediately getting more money into further and higher 
education. Resource accounting would certainly have had some effect on the decision on tuition 
fees. However, in January 1997 the ONS pre-empted new Labour by casting doubt on the 
methodology. Davies and Blunkett‟s response was to remind the ONS that their position was a 
“Conservative stance to public expenditure and that stance will change under a Labour 
government...”. The education front-bench team expected this to be finalised after the election, 
despite the fact that they had not published anything about the plan. However, Davies avers that “in  
a very real sense before the election we set out our stall in such a away that we expected to win that 
battle”823. However, Davies failed to secure a seat in time for the 1997 election and did not become 
a minister after May 1st. Another change in personnel that Davies did not anticipate was the 
replacement of Andrew Smith from the shadow treasury team with Alistair Darling as Gordon 
Brown‟s number two in Government; in this sense, then, the deal apparently agreed between 
Davies and Smith became irrelevant, as Darling reaffirmed the ONS line after the election. Bryan 
Davies believed that the education policymaking team had come up with a solution to the short-
term funding crisis in the universities, and that this plan was brought down by the Treasury 
reasserting conservative values over new and inexperienced Ministers.  
 Davies believed that the deal was not included in documents because of the pressures of 
time. Presumably, however, had it appeared in Lifelong Learning or in the manifesto, it would have 
been sacrosanct. This was the argument used by the new Government to justify abolishing 
maintenance grants, rather that taking the Dearing Report line, which many believe would have 
been more equitable. The political problem arose because no-one had taken the opportunity after 
the doubling of the APR between 1988 and 1992 to persuade voters that such unfunded growth 
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could not go on
824
. Therefore, by taking the line of least political resistance, by hiding the issue of 
student financed tuition behind vague concepts and ill-explained international schemes such as 
HECS, and neglecting to make resource accounting part of their open funding package, new 
Labour created the problem for itself through its own financial caution. Either the ONS scheme 
would have averted the need for tuition fees, or it would have at least lessened their political 
impact. Whichever interpretation we prefer, if new Labour had campaigned honestly and openly 
about tuition fees and resource accounting, it would have made it more difficult for the Treasury to 
deny the new Government, and would have avoided the post-Dearing impression that it was not in 
control of events.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has been concerned to determine how new Labour came to make policy decisions in 
higher education. It has examined the relative impact of internal and external pressures on the 
party. Several conclusions can be drawn for the purposes of this thesis. Firstly, in higher education 
matters the leadership of the party did not set the political agenda, but reacted to the existing 
consensus among pressure groups when choosing which options to support. It follows from this 
that party institutions themselves had little impact on the agenda, although constitutionally the 
leadership relied on internal groups to produce and support Conference resolutions which the 
leadership could back..  
Secondly new Labour used symbolic rhetoric as a cover for detailed policy, so that many in 
the membership or among its potential electorate would not have realised the full implications of 
policy. This was the method employed in controversial matters (such as contributing to the costs of 
higher education) as well as in areas where new Labour were settled on positions designed to 
straddle the divide between groups. Thirdly, other political factors (external to party political 
factors), such as the parliamentary timetable and the need to present backbenchers with something 
to „fill the vacuum‟ do play a key role in policy selection.  
It is clear that the dominant concerns in HE policy are those relating to human capital and 
specifically the changing basis of demand for labour, and social demand for credentials. While this 
agenda suggested a more radical departure towards true lifelong learning, new Labour were content 
to exhort policy actors to a cultural transformation in higher education, without signalling the 
arrival of the necessary policy framework for such a transformation. In the concerns covered by 
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this chapter, new Labour showed themselves in the least radical light. The only 'brave' decision was 
to redistribute post-compulsory spending through the introduction of tuition fees and the abolition 
of grants, and as we have seen, this not only kept new Labour well within the confines of 
consensus, but in the way the policy change was announced, showed new Labour to be financially 
cautious, politically naive and reactive to events. In the absence of an internal policy lobby on 
higher education, it is more difficult to trace evidence of Michelsian capture; however, given the 
lack of interest in higher education traditionally shown by the party (as evidenced by David 
Blunkett) this is an area of policy where the leadership already had a high degree of autonomy of 
party policymaking. This made it comparatively easy for further and higher education spokesperson 
Bryan Davies to alter the focus of policy to one concerned with widening access, from one 
concerned with maintaining a middle class benefit. Once again, new Labour policy has changed 
without threatening the boundaries of party ideology, on this occasion highlighting an apparent 
shift towards egalitarian outcomes at the expense of meritocracy. At the same time, the most 
successful lobbying organisations, the CVCP and the AUT, were able to ensure that to elite 
university interests were maintained along with the overall meritocratic direction of policy. 
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Conclusion 
 
The great weakness of British Labour... is its lack of a creed. the Labour Party is hesitant in 
action because it is divided in mind. It does not achieve what it could because it does not 
know what it wants. It frets out of office and fumbles in it... If the Labour Party is to tackle 
its job with some hope of success, it must mobilise behind it a body of conviction as a 
resolute and informed as the opposition in front of it... To kick over an idol you must first 
get off your knees.     (RH Tawney
825
) 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that parts of Tawney‟s analysis are as valid today as in the 1930s. On 
education issues, Labour is divided because of the presence of two separate strands of thought 
within the broad ideology of the party: egalitarianism; and meritocracy. In this sense, the party has 
not traditionally known what it wants from the education service. The lack of a unified vision for 
education and training allowed the Labour Party leadership to exercise a degree of policymaking 
autonomy, which often produced outcomes at odds with notions of democratic socialism. By 
contrast, new Labour has a clear view of what it wants from education, and has mobilised behind 
the resolute conviction that educational structures are less important than the standard of outcomes 
the system delivers. Four conditions had combined to produces this new settlement. Firstly, the 
decline of the trade unions in the economy and within the party. Secondly, the emergence of an 
aspirational middle class cohort of parents, which corresponds with new Labour‟s target voters. 
Thirdly, the changing nature of labour skills demanded by the economy which has acted as a spur 
to educational reform, especially with regard to training and post-compulsory education. Fourthly, 
the globalisation of the economy, which has produced a consensus among policymakers that 
human capital should be maximised through lifelong retraining by the workforce.  
The tendency towards oligarchy, as Michels noted, is the technical result of proper and 
normal party behaviour. New Labour exhibits an hierarchical leadership structure which knows 
what it wants to do, and the methodology has been a synthesis of the divisions that Tawney 
highlighted. However, this thesis argues that, given Labour‟s broad ideology, Panebianco‟s 
concept of the dominant coalition is useful in describing how new Labour combined 
egalitarianism and meritocracy in policy changes without provoking serious exit.  
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In developing compulsory education policy, new Labour, in both Opposition and 
Government, has clearly been influenced by changes introduced by the Conservatives in 
government. The Labour Party clearly moved to the right, with an emphasis on individualism and 
an acceptance of the power of markets and the need for low and accountable public spending. In 
celebrating choice and diversity to suit individual requirements, new Labour entered office pledged 
to manage a system which offered a hierarchy of schools: independent fee-paying schools; 
grammar schools; City Technology Colleges; Foundation (formerly Grant Maintained) schools; 
specialist state schools (including Beacon Schools); Aided (usually church) schools; 
comprehensive schools; and secondary modern schools in areas where grammar schools persist. Of 
these eight categories, seven are state funded, while all but comprehensives and secondary moderns 
can select a proportion of their intake by ability, aptitude or religious persuasion. As well as this 
emphasis on selection by schools and choice for parents, which has created a sophisticated market 
pricing system for schools, new Labour has also introduced measures to centralise the education 
service, taking powers from both the professionals in the schools and the democratically elected 
local education authorities.  
New Labour was careful to include elements of traditional Labour Party policy on class sizes 
and on subsidies for private schools which allow them to touch traditional Labour Party bases. The 
clearest signal that new Labour proposed in compulsory education was of zero tolerance of poor 
standards, which again appealed to Labour‟s traditional working class supporters. However, 
standards were most effectively invoked rhetorically in an effort to attract middle class support to 
the „modernised comprehensive principle‟. More assiduously, the question of educational standards 
was used to override concerns about the demise of local democratic influence, professional 
autonomy, the comprehensive principle itself and the creeping privatisation of some aspects of state 
education. While there was much internal debate about these changes, particularly on selection and 
the role of the LEA, there were few internal Labour Party groups which could have prevented a 
strong new Labour leadership from introducing such changes. In compulsory education, at least, 
policy development seems to have proceeded from new intellectual and moral foundations rather 
than from the bypassing of a party caucus. The three elements of the synthesis discussed in Chapter 
Two, changes to the institutional structure, intellectual individualisation and moral 
authoritarianism, allow new Labour to take populist positions on many educational issues. In 
compulsory education new Labour can be seen to have shifted the consensus by ratcheting up the 
„standards‟ debate, and indeed in this area have fused the aspirational requirements of its new-
found supporters and satisfied the meritocratic element of party ideology by attacking the producer 
interests in ways that may even benefit some of Britain‟s most deprived communities. 
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 In post-compulsory and training issues, institutional factors were more important, especially 
with regard to training policy where the trade unions were marginalised both intellectually (the tide 
of individualistic ideas and the needs of a flexible workforce) as well as constitutionally, with trade 
union concerns listened to but rejected. These changes go back beyond the advent of new Labour in 
1994, to the Policy Review period at least. Marginalised constitutionally and in the end willing to 
exchange pre-election quietude for a minimum wage and Britain‟s signing of the Social Charter, 
the party‟s affiliated trade unions effectively reinforced Lewis Minkin‟s theory by uniting with the 
PLP leadership in the name of electoral necessity. On other issues in post-compulsory education, 
new Labour was content to join the consensus about the qualifications structure, without legislating 
to level that structure; therefore the „gold standard‟ of A levels would be retained. New Labour 
preferred to exhort long term cultural change in the name of lifelong learning, which may yet bear 
fruit as some, like Bob Fryer and Ken Spours, would hope. With less issue salience in most post-
compulsory issues, new Labour is content to use its new found policymaking autonomy to resist 
taking on the vested interests in further and higher education, therefore sacrificing egalitarianism 
for meritocracy and radicalism for caution. 
 In matters of higher education policy, the leadership of new Labour also failed to set the 
political agenda, preferring to react to the existing consensus position and declining to harm the 
elite interests of the liberal university sector. Once again, the party itself failed to develop a radical 
lobby in favour of a more egalitarian HE. The single brave decision, on tuition fees, was made 
possible by Labour‟s huge majority in a new House of Commons and the backing of virtually the 
whole policy community, but as we have seen, the implementation of the replacement of grants 
with student financed fees was politically inept. Firstly, new Labour had failed to prepare the 
ground before the election by being deliberately vague about the difference between fees and 
maintenance. Secondly, by failing to consolidate changes to the status of HE funding through 
resource accounting by including a pledge in party documents, new Labour failed to prevent the 
Treasury re-imposing conservative philosophy after the election with regard to the role of the 
Office of National Statistics. Thirdly, new Labour failed to anticipate the problems which the 
announcement caused, and despite the egalitarian slant put on the removal of the free provision of 
HE to the middle class, new Labour were too politically cautious to gain credit from its modest 
redistributive effects.  
The changes discussed in this thesis, and the synthesis which has become new Labour, have 
clearly produced a more reactive party than was possible under the dual hierarchy of the 1918 
constitution. However, given the low political salience of many of the policy issues discussed in 
this thesis, the full extent of the constitutional policymaking practices may only emerge in the 
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future. Indeed, the reactiveness of new Labour does not preclude a left-ward drift by a future, 
equally oligarchic, dominant coalition if more egalitarian policies are favoured by the electorate.  
If the consensus moves, rational parties are obliged to follow, especially if they have the 
ideological leeway of the Labour Party and the Michelsian policymaking  structure of new Labour.  
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Appendix I 
 
Inter-Party consensus tables 
 
 
Class Sizes and Teacher Supply 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1964 Labour will cut down our 
overcrowded classes in both 
primary and secondary schools: the 
aim is to reduce all classes to 30 at 
the earliest possible moment. 
The training colleges will be 
producing by 1970 three times as 
many new teachers as in 1958, and 
the larger numbers going on to higher 
education will mean more teachers 
later on. 
1966 Our first priority is to reduce the 
size of classes. We shall intensify 
our efforts to increase the 
recruitment of teachers, and 
improve their status in society 
Get more teachers especially for the 
primary schools by expanding the 
Colleges of Education, enabling part-
time teachers to qualify for pension, 
and giving more encouragement to 
married women who want to return 
to teaching. 
1970 We intend to make further progress, 
now that the supply of teachers has 
been increased, towards our aim of 
reducing to 30 the size of all classes 
in our schools 
 
1974a   
1974b    
1979 Labour will continue to give high 
priority to reducing class sizes 
further.  
 
1983 We will restore funds to local 
education authorities to reduce 
class sizes 
This country is now spending more 
per child in school than ever before, 
even after allowing for price rises. 
As a result, the average number of 
children per teacher is the lowest 
ever 
1987 We will make provision for smaller 
classes and ensure that children 
have up-to-date books, equipment 
and buildings without having to 
depend on fund-raising for those 
essentials.  
Schools will be required to enrol 
children up to the school's physical 
capacity instead of artificially 
restricting pupil numbers, as can 
happen today 
1992 Within 12 months, we will end the 
scandal of primary school classes 
of over 40 children. We will then 
establish and steadily reduce 
maximum limits on class sizes, 
until no primary school child is 
taught in a class of more than 30. 
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1997 We will reduce class sizes for five, 
six and seven year-olds to 30 or 
under, by phasing out the assisted 
places scheme, the cost of which is 
set to rise to 180 million pounds per 
year.   
 
We will.. encourage more teachers to 
enter the profession. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nursery Provision for 3 and 4 year olds and Prioritise early years 
 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1964   
1966  Give improvements to primary school 
accommodation priority over projects 
for building new comprehensive 
schools 
1970 In the next five years, we shall put 
more resources, both teachers and 
building, into the primary schools 
and expand nursery schools 
provision both in, and outside, the 
educational priority areas. 
We also recognise the need for 
expansion of nursery education. This 
is especially important in areas of 
social handicap, such as the poorer 
parts of our large cities, where it is so 
vital to give children a better start. 
1974a Expand the education service by 
the introduction of a national 
scheme of Nursery Schools, 
including day care facilities 
We shall gradually extend free 
nursery schooling throughout the 
country so that within ten years it 
should be available for all three- and 
four-year-old children whose parents 
wish them to have it. 
1974b Continue to give priority to nursery 
school and day care provision 
 
1979 Our aim is to provide nursery 
education for 90 per cent of our 4-
year-olds and half of our 3-year-
olds by the early 1980s.  
 
1983 For the under fives, our goal is to 
achieve comprehensive provision, 
with priorities for children in the 
most deprived areas. We will unify 
education and care services for the 
under-fives, both nationally and 
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locally. Our aim will be to 
introduce a statutory duty on local 
authorities to provide nursery 
education, as soon as possible, for 
all pre-school children whose 
parents wish it 
1987 We will make nursery education 
available for all three- and four-
year-olds whose parents want this 
opportunity 
Eighty per cent of all three- and four-
year-olds in this country attend 
nursery classes, reception classes or 
playgroups. Formal nursery education 
is not necessarily the most 
appropriate experience for children. 
Diversity of provision is desirable. 
LEA‟s should look to support the 
voluntary sector alongside their own 
provision 
1992 We will offer nursery education to 
three and four year olds 
We will continue to encourage the 
creation of nursery places 
1997 Nursery vouchers have been proven 
not to work. They are costly and do 
not generate more quality nursery 
places. We will use the money 
saved by scrapping nursery 
vouchers to guarantee places for 
four year-olds. We will invite 
selected local authorities to pilot 
early excellence centres combining 
education and care for the under-
fives. We will set targets for 
universal provision for three year-
olds whose parents want it. 
[O]nly we are committed to giving 
the parent of every four year old child 
a voucher so they can choose the pre-
school education they want for their 
child. 
 
 
 
 
 
Direct Grant Schools, Assisted Places Scheme, Private Schools 
 
Year Labour Conservative 
1964 Labour will set up an educational 
trust to advise on the best way of 
integrating the public schools into 
the state system of education 
 
1966 We have appointed the Public 
Schools Commission, to 
recommend the best ways of 
integrating the Public Schools into 
the State sector 
Give independent schools of high 
standing the opportunity to become 
direct grant schools, thus narrowing 
the gap between State schools and 
fee-paying schools 
1970 We have legislated to end fee 
paying in Scotland, and we intend 
We will encourage the direct grant 
schools. Many of these schools have 
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to legislate further to ensure that no 
local authority in Scotland can 
maintain an area of privilege which 
destroys the full benefits of 
comprehensive reorganisation for 
its children 
an excellent record and provide 
opportunities... regardless of their 
parent‟s income 
1974a All forms of tax-relief and 
charitable status for public schools 
will be withdrawn 
We will defend the fundamental right 
of parents to spend their money on 
their children‟s education should they 
wish to do so 
1974b Stop the present system of Direct 
Grant Schools and withdraw tax 
relief and charitable status from 
Public Schools, as a first step 
towards our long-term aim of 
phasing out fee paying in schools 
We will expect local authorities to 
make their schemes of reorganisation 
sufficiently flexible to include 
grammar and direct grants of proven 
worth. This will help meet the needs 
of bright and able children, especially 
those from disadvantaged areas. 
1979 Independent schools still represent 
a major obstacle to equality of 
opportunity. Labour's aim is to end, 
as soon as possible, fee-paying in 
such schools, while safeguarding 
schools for the 
handicapped. Labour will end as 
soon as possible the remaining 
public subsidies and public support 
to independent schools 
The Direct Grant schools, abolished 
by Labour, gave wider opportunities 
for bright children from modest 
backgrounds. The Direct Grant 
principle will therefore be restored 
with an Assisted Places Scheme. Less 
well-off parents will be able to claim 
part or all of the fees at certain 
schools from a special government 
fund 
1983 We will abolish the Assisted Places 
Scheme and local authority place 
buying;.. 
We shall also withdraw charitable 
status from private schools and all 
their other public subsidies and tax 
privileges. We will also charge 
VAT on the fees paid to such 
schools; phase out fee charging; 
and integrate private schools within 
the local authority sector where 
necessary. 
[The] Government offered Assisted 
Places to enable less well-off parents 
to send their bright children to some 
of the best independent schools. 
We shall defend Church schools and 
independent schools alike against our 
opponents' attacks. And we shall 
defend the right of parents to spend 
their own money on educating their 
children 
1987 [we shall] ... stop the diverting of 
precious resources that occurs 
through the Assisted Places Scheme 
and the public subsidies to private 
schools 
We will expand the Assisted Places 
Scheme to 35,000. This highly 
successful scheme has enabled 
25,000 talented children from less-
well-off backgrounds to gain places 
at the 230 independent schools 
currently in the scheme.  
We will continue to defend the right 
to independent education as part of a 
free society. It is under threat from all 
the other parties 
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1992 We will phase out the Assisted 
Places scheme (without affecting 
pupils currently on a place, or 
offered one from September 1992) 
and redirect the savings to meet 
wider educational needs 
We have always fought to maintain 
diversity in education, protecting the 
right of local people to preserve their 
grammar schools, and defending 
independent schools against mindless 
Labour attacks 
1997 We will reduce class sizes for five, 
six and seven year-olds to 30 or 
under, by phasing out the assisted 
places scheme, the cost of which is 
set to rise to 180 million pounds per 
year.   
We will give more talented children, 
from less well off backgrounds, the 
opportunity to go to fee-paying 
schools by extending the Assisted 
Places Scheme to cover all ages of 
compulsory education 
 
 
 
Comprehensive reorganisation, parental choice, opting out 
 
Year Labour Conservative 
1964 Labour will get rid of the 
segregation of children into 
separate schools caused by 11-plus 
Selection: secondary education will 
be reorganised on comprehensive 
lines. Within the new system, 
grammar school education will be 
extended: in future no child will he 
denied the opportunity of benefiting 
from it through arbitrary selection 
at the age of 11 
Of the many different forms of 
secondary school organisation which 
now exist, none has established itself 
as exclusively right. The Socialist 
plan to impose the comprehensive 
principle, regardless of the wishes of 
parents, teachers and authorities, is 
therefore foolishly doctrinaire. Their 
leader may protest that grammar 
schools will be abolished ' over his 
dead body", but abolition would be 
the inevitable and disastrous 
consequence of the policy to which 
they are committed 
1966 [W]e shall press ahead with our 
plans to abolish the 11-plus - that 
barrier to 
educational opportunity - and re-
organise secondary education on 
comprehensive lines. We have 
appointed the Public Schools 
Commission, to recommend the 
best ways of integrating the Public 
Schools into the State sector 
Give parents as much choice as 
possible by having diversity in the 
pattern of education. Give 
independent schools of high standing 
the opportunity to become direct 
grant schools, thus narrowing the gap 
between State schools and fee paying 
schools.  
 
1970 Comprehensive reorganisation has 
been vigorously pursued. In the 
past six years 129 of the 163 
English and Welsh local education 
authorities have agreed plans for 
reorganising their secondary 
schools. 
In secondary education, a number of 
different patterns have developed 
over the years, including many types 
of comprehensive school. We will 
maintain the existing rights of local 
education authorities to decide what 
is best for their area.  
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This progress must not be checked; 
it must go forward. We shall 
legislate to require the minority of 
Tory education authoritieswho 
have so far resisted change to 
abandon eleven plus selection. 
Many of the most imaginative new 
schemes abolishing the eleven-plus 
have been introduced by 
Conservative councils. 
We therefore believe that Labour's 
attempt to insist on compulsory 
reorganisation on rigid lines is 
contrary to local democracy and 
contrary to the best interests of the 
children.   
1974a ..finally ending the 11+... We believe it to be educationally 
unwise to impose a universal system 
of comprehensive education on the 
entire country. Local education 
authorities should allow genuine 
scope for parental choice, and we 
shall continue to use our powers to 
give as much choice as possible 
1974b As in all our plans, economic 
restraints are bound to influence 
timing. But the next Labour 
Government will:  
End the II plus and other forms of 
selection for secondary education. 
We are in no way against 
comprehensive schools: what we 
oppose is the ruthless imposition of 
these schools, regardless of local 
needs and in defiance of parents' 
wishes. Typical of this approach is 
Labour's circular, which hits the 
building programmes of local 
authorities which have not gone 
comprehensive. The next 
Conservative government will 
withdraw this 
1979 The Labour Party believes in 
equality of opportunity. Universal 
comprehensive education, which is 
central to our policy, must be 
completed in the 1980s. 
The Labour Party is still obsessed 
with the structure of the schools 
system, paying too little regard to the 
quality of education.  
Extending parents' rights and 
responsibilities, including their right 
of choice, will also help raise 
standards by giving them greater 
influence over education. Our 
Parents' Charter will place a clear 
duty on government and local 
authorities to take account of parents' 
wishes when allocating children to 
schools, with a local appeals system 
for those dissatisfied. Schools will be 
required to publish prospectuses 
giving details of their examination 
and other results. 
1983 We will: 
Repeal the Education Act 1979 and 
For a long time now, parents have 
been worried about standards and 
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prohibit all forms of academic 
selection, such as the eleven plus, 
as a condition of admission to 
secondary schools.  
 Require local education authorities 
to maintain a broad, balanced and 
comprehensive curriculum, 
providing genuinely equal 
opportunities for boys and girls, 
and for the ethnic minorities to 
meet the needs of our multi-cultural 
society.  
 
discipline in many of our schools. 
This Conservative Government has 
responded to that worry with the 
Parents' Charter and the 1980 
Education Act. For the first time:  
local authorities were obliged to take 
account of parents' choice of school 
for their children; schools were 
obliged to publish prospectuses, 
giving details of their examination 
results; parents were given the right 
to be represented on school governing 
bodies. 
1987 Labour will invest in education so 
that the abilities of all children and 
adults from all home back grounds 
and in every part of our country are 
discovered and nourished.  
At the same time as we improve the 
quality of publicly provided 
education, we shall end the 11 plus 
everywhere. 
These steps will compel schools to 
respond to the views of parents. But 
there must also be variety of 
educational provision so that parents 
can better compare one school with 
another.  
We will therefore support the co-
existence of a variety of schools – 
comprehensive, grammar, secondary 
modern, voluntary controlled and 
aided. 
If, in a particular school, parents and 
governing bodies wish to become 
independent of the LEA, they will be 
given the choice to do so. Those 
schools which opt out of LEA control 
will receive a full grant direct from 
the Department of Education and 
Science 
1992 Opted-out schools will be freed 
from central government control 
and brought together with City 
Technology Colleges into the 
mainstream of the local school 
system 
We believe all parents have the right 
to choice in education – not only 
those who can afford school fees. 
Young people differ in their interests 
and aptitudes, and we need a range of 
schools to offer them the best 
opportunities 
1997 We must modernise comprehensive 
schools. Children are not all of the 
same ability, nor do they learn at 
the same speed. That means 
'setting' children in classes to 
maximise progress, for the benefit 
of high-fliers and slower learners 
alike. The focus must be on 
levelling up, not levelling down.  
We reject the Tories' obsession 
with school structures: all parents 
Since 1979 we have created a rich 
diversity of schools, to serve the 
varied tastes of children and give 
parents choice within that diversity, 
because we believe that parents know 
what is best for their children. 
[A] grammar school in every town 
where parents want that choice. 
Schools are stronger and more 
effective where head-teachers and 
governors can shape their own 
310 
 
should be offered real choice 
through good quality schools, each 
with its own strengths and 
individual ethos. There should be 
no return to the 11-plus. 
agenda. Sometimes that means 
developing a specialism in some 
subjects. Sometimes it means 
selecting children by their aptitudes... 
special abilities should be recognised 
and encouraged. 
 
 
 
Grant Maintained and Local Management of Schools 
 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1987  Within five years governing bodies 
and head teachers of all secondary 
schools and many primary schools 
will be given control over their own 
budgets.  
They know best the needs of their 
school. With this independence they 
will manage their resources and 
decide their priorities, covering the 
cost of books, equipment, 
maintenance and staff; we will allow 
state schools to opt-out of LEA 
control 
1992 We will reform the Conservatives' 
scheme for the local management 
of schools All schools will be free 
to manage their day-to-day budgets, 
with local education authorities 
given a new strategic role 
We have further increased diversity 
by: Giving schools control over their 
own budgets and encouraging new 
types of school.  
Allowing schools to become 
independent of local councils, by 
applying for Grant-Maintained status 
if the parents involved so wish. By 
mid-1992, over 200 GM schools will 
be up and running.  
Creating a number of highly popular 
City Technology Colleges 
Existing schools which opt for GM 
status will be able to emulate City 
Technology Colleges and attract 
private technology sponsorship. 
1997 Schools that are now grant 
maintained will prosper with 
Labour's proposals, as will every 
school.  
Tory claims that Labour will close 
these schools are false. The system 
of funding will not discriminate 
unfairly either between schools or 
We will encourage more schools to 
become grant-maintained... we will 
give all grant-maintained schools 
greater freedom to expand and to 
select their pupils. 
Local authority schools are benefiting 
from our policy of local management 
of schools. 
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between pupils. LEAs will be 
represented on governing bodies, 
but will not control them. We 
support guidelines for open and fair 
admissions, along the lines of those 
introduced in 1993; but we will also 
provide a right of appeal to an 
independent panel in disputed 
cases. 
We will extend the benefits of greater 
self-governance to all LEA schools. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Raising standards, teacher quality 
 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1964   
1966 Our educational aims.. are the 
highest possible standard of 
education for all children 
Judge proposals for reorganisation on 
their educational merits. 
1970  Concern about teacher training is 
widespread. We wish the teaching 
profession to have a career structure 
which will attract recruits of high 
quality into the profession, and retain 
them.  
1974a  Because of our concern over reading 
standards we have set up an enquiry... 
to report on all aspects of the teaching 
of English. 
Higher standards of education can 
only be achieved through more and 
better trained teachers. We wish to 
move the debate away from the kind 
of school which children attend and 
concentrate on the kind of education 
they receive 
1974b  Many parents are deeply worried 
about the quality of education which 
their children receive- in particular 
about standards of learning, conduct 
and discipline. 
We must take speedy action to raise 
the standards of teaching and 
education. This will involve 
considerable strengthening of the 
system of school inspection. National 
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standards of reading, writing and 
arithmetic will be set 
1979  We shall promote higher standards of 
achievement in basic skills. In teacher 
training there must be more emphasis 
on practical skills and on maintaining 
discipline 
1983 We shall encourage a higher 
standard of achievement among all 
pupils in the variety of academic 
and other activities which are 
essential parts of fully 
comprehensive education 
Until now, HM Inspector‟s reports 
have remained secret. Now we are 
publishing them.. We are not satisfied 
with the selection or the training of 
our teachers. WE shall encourage 
schools to keep proper records of 
their pupils progress... and carry out 
externally graded tests 
1987 [W]e shall work with local 
education authorities to secure a... 
School Standards Council, and a 
new profile of achievement 
recording individual progress 
through school for all pupils. 
[M]oney alone is not enough. 
Increased resources have not 
produced uniformly higher standards. 
Parents and employers are rightly 
concerned that enough children can 
master the basic skills 
1992 By investing in better teaching, 
smaller classes and modern books 
and equipment we will raise 
education standards. To make sure 
children are reading by the age of 
seven, we will create a National 
Reading Standards programme, 
with a national Reading Recovery 
Programme to help those in 
difficulty. 
[W]ithin five years, we want four 
out of five 16 to 18 year olds to be 
able to achieve at least five GCSEs 
at grades A, B, or C, or their 
equivalent. 
Regular and straightforward tests will 
be in place for all 7,11 and 14 year 
olds by 1994. 
As the first step in the reform of 
teacher training, postgraduate 
students will spend much more time 
in the classroom, learning their skills 
under the practised eye of senior 
teachers 
1997 Standards, more than structures, are 
the key to success. Labour will 
never put dogma before children's 
education.  
Every school has the capacity to 
succeed. All Local Education 
Authorities (LEAs) must 
demonstrate that every school is 
improving. For those failing 
schools unable to improve, 
ministers will order a 'fresh start' to 
close the school and start afresh on 
the same site. 
Every school needs baseline 
Our decision to test children and 
publish the results has allowed 
standards to be measured and 
exposed. 
[W]e will require every school to 
plan how to improve its performance 
and to set targets. 
Parent power is a vital force for 
higher standards. 
Sometimes schools are failing 
because the LEA which runs them is 
failing... [these LEAs] will be 
required to set out plans to raise 
standards. 
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assessment of pupils when they 
enter the school, and a year-on-year 
target for improvement. 
Schools are critically dependent on 
the quality of all staff. The majority 
of teachers are skilful and 
dedicated, but some fall short. We 
will improve teacher training, and 
ensure that all teachers have an 
induction year when they first 
qualify, to ensure their suitability 
for teaching. 
We will establish a more rigorous and 
effective system of appraising 
teachers. 
 
 
 
National Curriculum 
 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1987 [W]e shall work with local 
education authorities to secure a 
flexible but clear core curriculum 
agreed at national level... 
[W]e will establish a National Core 
Curriculum... between the ages of 5 
to 16 to study a basic range of 
subjects- including maths, English 
and science. We will consult widely 
among those concerned in 
establishing the curriculum 
1992 Labour will modernise the national 
curriculum and apply it in all 
schools. From the age of fourteen, 
pupils will study five essential 
subjects: English, mathematics, 
science, a modern language and 
technology. 
For the first time in our history, we 
will soon have a National Curriculum 
which will require the main school 
subjects to be covered thoroughly 
1997 We must recognise the three 'r's for 
what they are the building blocks of 
all learning that must be taught 
better. 
..creating new opportunities for 
children, after the age of 14, to 
enhance their studies by acquiring 
knowledge and experience within 
industry and commerce.  
We are revising and simplifying the 
National Curriculum in primary 
schools to emphasise high standards 
in the basic skills. 
We will.. introduce a new test for 14 
year old children that covers the 
whole National Curriculum.. 
 
 
 
Post-Compulsory issues: 
A levels and Further Education provision 
 
Year Labour Conservatives 
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1964  More and more who have the ability 
to benefit will stay on to 17 and 18 
and go forward to higher education 
1966   
1970 We have never believed that 
education and educational 
opportunity should stop at the 
school leaving age; nor that further 
education should be confined to full 
time students in colleges and 
universities. 
 
1974a [A] big expansion of educational 
facilities for 16-18 year olds.. 
The expansion of further.... education 
will be less rapid than planned 
because of the reduced demand for 
places and the prevailing economic 
circumstances, but numbers will 
continue to increase 
1974b   
1979 Further education places have 
increased by 25,000 under Labour. 
 
1983 Our aim is to replace the rigid „A‟ 
level system with a broader 
programme of study... thus 
preventing over-specialisation and 
promoting flexibility and breadth in 
learning. 
 
1987 We will spread the provision of a 
comprehensive tertiary system of 
post-school education. 
There will be maintenance 
allowances for 16- to 18- year olds 
whose family circumstances would 
otherwise impeded their further 
education. 
 
1992 [W]e will establish a five-subject A 
level and bring it together with 
technical qualifications into our 
new Advanced Certificate.  
We will defend the well-respected A-
levels examination, which Labour 
would destroy. We are giving further 
education colleges and sixth form 
colleges in England and Wales 
autonomy, free from council control. 
We also value our school sixth forms 
and will ensure they retain their place 
in the new system 
1997 In schools and colleges, we support 
broader A-levels and upgraded 
vocational qualifications, 
underpinned by rigorous standards 
and key skills. 
We will continue to uphold the gold 
standards of A-levels and ensure that 
the great classics of our literature are 
studied at A-level 
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Training, provision and funding 
 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1964 Most young people, and 
particularly girls, are still denied 
either adequate training at work or 
release for further education and 
technical colleges. [We will 
implement] 
The right to first-rate industrial 
training with day and block release 
for the young worker; 
The right to retraining for adult 
workers. 
Steps will be taken to increase the 
number of industrial workers under 
18 who are released during the day to 
attend technical and other courses 
1966 Industrial Training Boards will 
increase the range of training 
opportunities for school leavers. It 
will become normal, rather than 
exceptional, for young workers to 
have part-time education up to the 
age of at least 18. 
 
1970 Over 1,400,000 people are now 
being  
Trained, including 500,000 
apprentices. 
The main responsibility lies with 
the Industrial Training Boards. The 
Central Training Council is also 
being given a more important role 
in co-ordinating industrial training 
over the whole field.[The] 
C.T.C.s have a vital role to play 
helping to meet urgent shortages of 
skilled labour and to retrain 
redundant workers for new jobs, 
particularly in the development 
areas. 
We will stimulate a massive 
retraining programme for men and 
women in industry. We will closely 
monitor the work of the Industrial 
Training Boards and the operation of 
the levy/grant system 
1974a ...redundant workers must have an 
automatic right to retraining; 
redundancy should then lead not to 
unemployment, but to retraining 
and job changing 
For the nation as a whole we have 
introduced the Training Opportunities 
Scheme... We have nearly trebled the 
numbers being trained and retrained 
under government auspices. Our 
Employment and Training Act has 
provided industry with help in 
increasing its own training, related to 
actual labour needs, through the 
newly established Manpower 
Services Commission. 
1974b Redundant workers must have a 
automatic right to retraining, with 
One possibility, which we will want 
to examine closely, is to allow 
316 
 
redundancy leading not to 
unemployment, but to retraining 
and job changing. 
children of fifteen the opportunity of 
taking up an apprenticeship or 
training as a first step towards taking 
a job 
1979 We will introduce a new statutory 
framework, linking adult training 
with initial training. This will place 
a statutory duty on employers to 
carry out training and establish 
work-place training committees. 
Adequate funds will be provided 
jointly by industry and government 
We are aware of the special problems 
associated with the need to increase 
the number of high-quality entrants to 
the engineering professions. We shall 
review the relationship between 
school, further education and training 
to see how better use can be made of 
existing resources 
1983 We will give to young employees 
who are at work the right to be 
released to college or school, on 
full pay. Employers will be given a 
statutory duty to provide 
opportunities for their young 
employees to receive systematic 
education and training 
This year, some 1,100,000 people are 
being training or helped by the most 
comprehensive programme of its kind 
in Europe. Training for work must 
start with better, more relevant 
education at school. [Our aim is] 
reform of the industrial training and 
apprenticeship system. 
1987 British industry now carries out less 
than half the training of our 
competitors. Labour will therefore 
establish a national training 
programme to bring about a major 
advance in the spread and standard 
of skills. 
 
1992 Learning must become a lifetime 
opportunity, with new chances to 
update skills at work. Sixteen year 
olds not in full time education will 
be entitled to a new traineeship 
lasting for up to two years, with an 
option of another two years. Every 
young person in employment will 
be guaranteed the right to Learn 
While You Earn 
We will... continue to develop new 
high-quality National Vocational 
Qualifications, and introduce a new 
post-16 diploma which recognises 
achievement in both vocational and 
academic courses. 
Now we are offering young people 
aged 16 and 17 vouchers they can use 
to buy approved courses of education 
or training, and which will put the 
power of choice in their hands 
1997 Employers have the primary 
responsibility for training their 
workforces in job-related skills. But 
individuals should be given the 
power to invest in training. We will 
invest public money for training in 
Individual Learning Accounts 
which individuals... can then use to 
gain the skills they want. 
We will give 250,000 under-25s 
opportunities for work, education 
and training. Four options will be 
We will give students between 14 and 
21 a learning credit which will enable 
them to choose suitable education or 
training leading to recognised 
qualifications up to A-levels or their 
equivalents. 
We will also introduce National 
Traineeships and encourage 
employers to offer more Modern 
Apprenticeships.. 
We will continue to support the 
network of Training and Enterprise 
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on offer, each involving day-release 
education or training leading to a 
qualification:  
private-sector job:  
employers will be offered a 60 
pound-a-week rebate for six months 
work with a non-profit voluntary 
sector employer, paying a weekly 
wage, equivalent to benefit plus a 
fixed sum for six months full-time 
study for young people without 
qualifications on an approved 
course: 
a job with the environment 
taskforce, linked to Labour's 
citizens' service programme. 
Rights and responsibilities must go 
hand in hand, without a fifth option 
of life on full benefit. 
Councils. 
 
 
 
Human capital, value-for-money 
 
Year Labour Conservatives 
1964 Labour believes the national plan 
will require a faster rate of change 
in industry. To meet the human 
needs that will arise it is essential to 
combine with our education 
reforms a revolution in training 
Education is the most rapidly 
developing feature of our social 
outlay. This reflects our view of 
education as at once a right of the 
child, a need of society, and a 
condition of economic efficiency. 
1966 The universities are being assisted 
to make a growing contribution in 
science, technology and social 
studies 
 
1970 This increased [educational] 
expenditure reflects our belief.. that 
it will make a contribution the 
welfare, quality and happiness of 
our society. 
We are in transition to a new era 
where higher education could 
become available to  wider section 
of the community. This expansion 
will require very careful planning. 
Modern industry imposes new and 
heavy burdens on all levels of 
management. Good management is 
essential not only for efficiency and 
the proper use of capital resources, 
but also for the creation of good 
industrial relations 
1974a   
1974b   
1979   
1983 Give the Manpower Services If we are to make the most of the 
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Commission the authority and 
resources it needs to do the job.. 
develop regional and local 
structures, advise companies on 
their plans for manpower.. 
employment opportunities that 
present themselves in an age of rapid 
change and more varied patterns of 
work and occupation, up-to-date 
training is essential 
1987 For modern, wealth-creating 
industry we need a well trained 
workforce.  
Education for life through a well 
funded adult education service will 
help to provide the means by which 
rapid economic and social change 
can be embraced 
[W]e must meet the nation‟s demand 
for highly qualified manpower to 
compete in international markets 
1992 Good education is the best 
investment in Britain‟s future. We 
want every child to get 
qualifications that count 
Last year we launched the new 
Employment Action programme, 
which will help more than 61,000 
people in a full year 
1997 Education... is not just good for the 
individual. It is an economic 
necessity for the nation. We will 
compete successfully on the basis 
of quality or not at all. And quality 
comes from developing the 
potential of all our people. It is the 
people who are our greatest natural 
asset. We will ensure they can fulfil 
their potential. 
Britain‟s prosperity depends on the 
quality of [children‟s] education. 
Competitive markets demand high 
skills. If Britain is to win, we need to 
encourage learning and give people 
the opportunity to go where their 
interests and inquiring minds take 
them. 
 
 
Further and Higher Education expansion 
 
Year Labour Conservative 
1964 Labour will carry out a programme 
of massive expansion in higher, 
further and university education. 
More and more who have the ability 
to benefit will stay on to 17 and 18 
and go forward to higher education. 
This will be made possible by our 
plans for the universities, colleges of 
advanced technology, higher 
technical institutions and teacher 
training colleges 
1966 We shall expand higher education 
provision in the universities, the 
colleges of education, and the 
leading technology colleges. 
We shall establish the University of 
the Air... this open University will 
enormously extend the best 
teaching facilities and give 
everyone the opportunity to study 
Restore the university and further 
education buildings programme cut 
by the Labour Government  
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for a full degree 
1970 We shall still further expand higher 
education. We are in a transition to 
a new era where higher education, 
traditionally the preserve of a small 
educational elite, could become 
available to a wider section of the 
community. 
The demand for higher and further 
education in universities, 
polytechnics and other colleges will 
increase in the 1970s. We will expend 
the number of places available. 
1974a  The expansion of further and higher 
education will be less rapid than 
planned because of the reduced 
demand for places and the prevailing 
economic circumstances. 
1974b We will support the further 
development of the Open 
University. 
 
1979 Further education places have 
increased by 25,000 under Labour. 
Labour will substantially increase 
the opportunities for people from 
working-class backgrounds.. to 
enter higher education. 
We are aware of the special problems 
associated with the need to increase 
the number of high-quality entrants to 
the engineering professions. 
1983 Our policy for education after 18 is 
expansion with change. We will 
reverse the Tory cuts and restore 
the right of all qualified young 
people seeking higher education to 
secure places. We will also 
substantially expand opportunities 
for adults in both further and higher 
education. 
More of our young people are now 
entering full-time degree courses than 
under the last Labour government . 
1987 We will ensure that our universities 
and polytechnics get the resources 
they need to restore and expand the 
opportunity for all qualified young 
people seeking higher education to 
secure places. We will ensure that 
more adults have access to higher 
education. 
[W]e want to expand higher 
education opportunities still further. 
1992 [W]ithin four years we will double 
the number of students in higher 
education, with at least one in three 
young adults participating by 2000. 
By the year 2000, one in three young 
people will follow full-time higher 
education courses. Meanwhile, the 
number of mature entrants to higher 
education has risen by 65 per cent 
since 1979. 
1997 The improvement and expansion 
needed cannot be funded out of 
general taxation. 
We have world class research in 
British universities which we will 
continue to support. 
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Higher Education funding, student loans 
 
Year Labour Conservative 
1964 To stop the „brain drain‟ Labour 
will grant to the universities and 
colleges of technology the funds 
necessary. 
 
1966   
1970   
1974a  The review of student‟s grants is 
proceeding and we shall continue to 
improve the parental income scale so 
that parents on a given income will 
pay less toward the grant 
1974b  We.. want to ease the financial 
problems faced by our universities 
and see that teachers in polytechnics, 
with the same qualifications as those 
at the universities, receive the same 
salaries. In addition our aim will be to 
finance the polytechnics and colleges 
of education in a similar way to the 
universities. 
1979  Much of our higher education in 
Britain has a world-wide reputation 
for its quality. We shall seek to 
ensure that this excellence is 
maintained. 
1983  The very large sums of public money 
now going to higher education must 
be spent in the most effective way. 
1987 We will also invest in research in 
higher education, in order to 
provide the facilities and 
opportunities necessary to sustain 
standards of excellence. 
As part of aim to widen access to 
higher education we have begun a 
review of student support... 
No final conclusions have been 
reached, but we believe that top-up 
loans to supplement grants are one 
way, among others, of bringing in 
new finance to help students and 
relieve pressure on their parents. 
1992 The student loan scheme deters 
many bright youngsters from poor 
families. We will replace it with a 
fairer system of student grants and 
targeted help for housing and 
vacation hardship. 
We will continue to provide generous 
support for students and to expand 
our student loans commitment. The 
new system will steadily reduce the 
proportion of student‟s living costs 
that their parents are expected to 
meet. 
1997 The costs of student maintenance  
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should be repaid by graduates on an 
income-related basis, from the 
career success to which higher 
education has contributed. The 
current system is badly 
administered and payback periods 
are too short. We will provide 
efficient administration, with 
fairness ensured by longer payback 
periods where required. 
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Appendix II 
 
 
Persons interviewed for this thesis: 
 
a) Representatives of teacher unions 
 
Richard Margrave, Association of Teachers and Lecturers, (ATL), Northumberland 
Road, London 25/9/96 
 
Eamon O‟Kane, Deputy General Secretary, National Association of Schoolmasters/Union of 
Women Teachers, (NASUWT), Covent Garden, London 24/9/96. 
 
Neil Robinson, National Union of Teachers, (NUT), Bloomsbury, London 20/8/96. 
 
Rowie Shaw, National Association of Head Teachers, (NAHT), Westminster, London 
21/8/96. 
 
John Sutton, General Secretary, Secondary Heads Association, (SHA), Leicester, 23/9/96. 
 
David Melhuish and Tom Wilson, Association of University Teachers (AUT), Notting Hill 
Gate, London, 3/9/97. 
 
Ann Cotterrell, National Association of Teachers and Lecturers in Further and Higher 
Education, (NATFHE), Leeds, 10/9/97. 
 
Representatives of Labour Party affiliated trade unions 
Phil Wyatt, General, Municipal and Boilermakers, (GMB), Wimbledon, 29/10/96. 
 
John Mitchell, Graphical, Paper and Media Union, (GPMU), Bedford, 14/8/96. 
 
Jenny Pardington, Political Officer, Transport and General Workers Union, (TGWU), 
Victoria, London, 25/9/96. 
 
Charlotte Atkins, UNISON, Woolwich 24/9/96. 
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Representatives of pressure groups and statutory bodies 
 
Margaret Tulloch, Executive Secretary, & Melian Mansfield, NEC Member, Campaign for 
the Advancement of State Education, (CASE), Bloomsbury, London, 30/10/96. 
 
Professor Gareth Roberts, Committe of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, (CVCP) University 
of Sheffield, 11/9/96 and 10/12/96.  
 
Geoff Hall, Further Education Funding Council, (FEFC) 10/9/96, Leeds. 
 
Professor James Tooley, Institute of Economic Affairs, (IEA), Hayfield, Derbyshire, 7/3/97. 
 
John Hillier, National Council for Vocational Qualifications, (NCVQ), Euston Road, London, 
15th August 1996. 
 
Stephen Pollard, Social Market Foundation, (SMF), Queen Ann‟s Gate, London, 3/3/97. 
 
Ian Kane, University Council of Teacher Training, (UCETT), Manchester Metropolitan 
University, 17/3/97. 
 
 
Representatives of the Labour Party  
 
Liz Allen, Education Policy Officer, Millbank Tower, London, 29/10/96. 
 
David Blunkett, MP, Sheffield, 22/8/96, Leeds, 13/9/97. 
 
Bryan Davies (Lord Davies of Oldham), Westminster, London, 3/9/97. 
 
Margaret Hodge, MP, interviewed by questionnaire, November 1996. 
 
Graham Lane, Socialist Education Association, (SEA), Sheffield, 11/9/96. 
 
 
Individuals 
 
Professor Robin Alexander, University of Warwick, 4/3/97. 
 
Professor Maurice Kogan, Islington, London, 29/10/96. 
 
Professor Lewis Minkin, Leeds, 1/8/96. 
 
Nick Pearce, interviewed by telephone, 8/10/97. 
 
Professor David Reynolds, University of Newcastle, 17/3/98. 
 
Professor David Robertson, Liverpool John Moore‟s University, 14/4/97. 
 
Professor Peter Scott, University of Leeds, 22/4/97 
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Ken Spours, Institute of Education Post-16 Centre, University of London, 20/5/97. 
 
Sally Tomlinson, Goldsmiths College, London,18/3/97. 
 
Peter Wilby, New Statesman offices, Victoria, 19/3/97. 
 
Professor Alison Wolf, Institute of Education, University of London, 10/3/97. 
 
 
